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Executive Summary
Aims of the Study
This report has been prepared on behalf of the National Economic and Social
Council (NESC) of Ireland. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) was
invited by NESC to examine the social and economic effects of recent immigration
to Ireland and to suggest ways in which Ireland could manage migration more
effectively to enhance the benefits of migration while minimizing its costs.
The bulk of the study was undertaken between 1 January and 30 June 2005. In
preparing this study, IOM assembled a team of international experts and
organized two policy workshops in Dublin in April 2005 to discuss the economic
and social implications of migration to Ireland. The Irish government is in the
process of elaborating a more comprehensive and managed approach to migra-
tion. This report is intended as a contribution to the current policy debate.
Policy Context
The recent substantial increase in migration to Ireland poses a number of
opportunities and challenges for the Irish economy and society. In less than a
decade, Ireland has changed from being principally a country of emigration to a
country of immigration. The growth in immigration to Ireland was very much
influenced by Ireland’s economic boom and subsequent policy responses that
facilitated immigration and the return of Irish nationals living abroad. In the year
up to April 2005, over 70,000 people moved to Ireland, resulting in net immigra-
tion of just over 53,000, nearly double the net level of 2000.
A distinctive feature of immigration to Ireland in recent years is the growing
proportion of non-nationals. Already by 2000, the share of non-nationals in inward
migration increased from about half in 2000 to nearly three-quarters in 2004. In
addition, there has been an increase in the number of non-national migrants
coming from outside the European Union and the English-speaking world.
However, as a result of EU enlargement and the increase in migration from the
new accession states, the majority of immigrants arriving in Ireland today are EU
nationals. Recent research indicates that between April 2004 and April 2005, 70
per cent of non-Irish immigrants arriving in Ireland were from other EU countries.
The bulk of migrants arriving in Ireland during the 1990s were skilled workers.
More recently, there has been an influx of migrants into less-skilled occupations.
The non-Irish migrant workforce is still predominantly made up of young people
without dependants, but the experience of other countries suggests that this
pattern may change as more migrants choose to settle in Ireland and are joined by
their family members.
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Immigration is projected to continue at current levels of about 30,000 a year for
the next five to ten years and then to decline, with migrants contributing 40 to 50
per cent of expected labour force growth in the decade to 2016.
Until April 2003, Ireland’s labour migration policies were almost entirely
“employer-led”. Few restrictions were imposed on employers’ recruitment of non-
European Economic Area (EEA) foreign workers apart from a “labour market test”,
aimed at encouraging employers to make efforts to fill existing vacancies with EEA
workers before looking to employ non-EEA workers. This policy changed in April
2003 when the Employment Permits Act made it easier for nationals of the EU-10
accession countries to work in Ireland. After 1 May 2004, EU-10 nationals could
travel to Ireland and work without having to rely on Irish employers to obtain work
permits for them.
Separate administrative measures introduced in 2003-2004 made it more difficult
for Irish employers to obtain work permits for unskilled non-EEA workers, and
declared jobs in some sectors off-limits to non-EEA workers. The government
expects that in the future, unskilled job vacancies can be filled by EEA nationals
and that future non-EEA migrants will be highly skilled.
In 2005, there was evidence of a shift in policy thinking in favour of a more
managed approach to migration. These changes included the creation of the Irish
Naturalisation and Immigration Service (INIS), a new “one-stop shop” for applica-
tions for entry to the country, the publication in April 2005 by the Department of
Justice, Equality and Law Reform (DJELR) of a discussion paper which outlines policy
proposals on a comprehensive Immigration and Residence Bill, and the announce-
ment by the government on 29 June 2005 that it would introduce a new Employ-
ment Permits Bill offering migrant workers greater protection in the workplace.
Ireland’s migration policies were designed during a period when the economy was
growing rapidly and demand for migrant labour was high. During this period of
rapid immigration, there was relatively little discussion of distributional issues
relating to the impact of migration. More recently, although there has been a
growing acceptance of the need for a more managed approach, there has been
relatively little explicit recognition in policy documents that migration can bring
both costs and benefits. There has been little discussion about the likely short-
term and long-term social and economic effects of different migration policy
measures on different groups in Ireland and beyond.
Impact of Recent Immigration
Migration can have a complex set of economic, social, political and cultural
consequences for the receiving country, for migrant workers and their countries of
origin. The impact of migration will also be determined by the profile of those who
migrate, their skills, age and language abilities.
The actual impact of immigration is much disputed and there are many fears
about its potential negative effects.These include concerns that migrants take jobs
away from local workers, depress wages and become a burden on the welfare
system. However, researchers generally agree that negative effects are minimal
and that migration often brings many gains. For example, a number of studies
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have found that on average migrants tend to pay more in taxes than they receive
in benefits over their lifetime. Generally speaking countries with high levels of
immigration in Europe and North America (e.g., Germany, Switzerland and the
United States) have been very successful economically. The most important
economic impact of immigration is generally distributional. Those who may lose
economically by the entry of international migrants are the workers with whom
the new migrants compete for employment. Much of the effect depends on the
extent to which immigrants are complements or substitutes for local workers. In a
growing economy with low unemployment, there may be few negative effects
because a rising economy may be strong enough to raise all incomes.
Most of the international research on the effects of migration has focused on the
economic impact of migration, while the social and cultural benefits of migration
tend to be overlooked. Migration can have a profound effect on a host society and
can alter a country’s sense of identity. Migrants undoubtedly make significant
positive contributions to social and cultural life in the arts, literature, sports and
science, but these benefits are more difficult to quantify. Migrants are also
becoming an increasingly important source of labour for the social and healthcare
sectors in many countries. At the same time, failure to integrate migrants into
society and allow them access to public services can lead to their being socially and
economically excluded.
Benefits of Migration
Given the recent rapid growth in immigration to Ireland, especially non-Irish
immigration, there are fewer studies than in some other countries regarding the
economic and social effects of migration. Nonetheless current research and data
sources in Ireland suggest a number of effects which are broadly summarized below.
As the bulk of immigration to Ireland over the 1990s involved skilled labour, with
more than half being returning Irish emigrants, migration played a key role in
expanding the productive economy, allowing rapid growth and helping to reduce
long-term unemployment. These immigrants contributed to the easing of
significant skills shortages. Research by the Economic and Social Research Institute
(ESRI) demonstrates that Ireland has benefited from the fact that the labour market
profile of immigrants has shown them to be a young and highly educated group.
Ireland’s booming economy also attracted many former emigrants to return home,
bringing back with them the experiences, skills and knowledge accumulated while
overseas. Many found themselves earning wages on return that were higher than
similarly educated natives who had not migrated. In addition, this return flow of
migrants had a number of positive effects on the economy. For instance, some
research shows that as migrants (including returnees) were relatively more skilled
than the native population, this inflow (because of its skilled nature) actually
contributed to a reduction in earnings inequality.
Overall, it is generally agreed that immigration to Ireland in recent years has
increased economic growth, eased labour market shortages, improved output and
reduced earnings inequalities. While economic studies show that immigration
tends to contribute positively to Irish gross national product (GNP), these analyses
are less definitive on its impact on GNP per capita, which is broadly used as a
executive summary xiii
measure of the standard of living. For this reason, the key effect is distributional
since the major impetus to economic growth from adding migrant workers to the
labour force derives from lower wages or at least a slower rate of increase in
wages. Immigrants may also have other positive or negative economic and non-
economic effects that are real but not easy to measure, from increasing
productivity growth by filling skills gaps to reducing productivity growth by
preserving inefficient industries that would otherwise shrink or be replaced by
imports. The skills composition of the migrant population is also an important
determinant of the economic impact of immigration on national income; the more
highly skilled the migrants, the greater the likely positive impact on GNP.
Immigration has also brought other benefits to Ireland as it has fuelled population
growth, increased the size of the domestic market and resulted in increased
demand for a variety of goods and services. It is also reasonable to generalize that,
in the majority of cases, employment in Ireland leads to a financial gain for the
individual migrant that may not have materialized had that worker stayed home.
Even when employment in Ireland is at or near the minimum wage, the wages
earned by migrants are still likely to be significantly higher than the wages they
would be earning in their countries of origin, regardless of their skill level.
It is possible that Ireland’s openness to admitting migrant workers for employ-
ment, including for low-skilled jobs, has helped to avoid the large-scale irregular
immigration and/or irregular working of migrants as seen in, for example, the
United States. While there may be significant illegal employment of foreigners in
Ireland, there has been little systematic research to confirm this.
Another distinctive feature of the rapid growth in immigration has been the large
increase in the number of foreign students studying and living in Ireland. A total of
18,608 international students were pursuing higher education in Ireland in 2004,
of which 15,000 were from non-EU countries. It has been estimated that
international students generated revenue of EUR 275 million during the year
2003/2004.
In addition to the benefits to receiving countries, migration also results in benefits
for the migrant’s country of origin, which is especially important for the economies
of developing countries. Migrants living in Ireland regularly send money back
home. This study conservatively estimates, for the first time, the value of
remittances sent from Ireland and suggests that, during the last two years,
migrants sent home more than EUR 100 million through formal channels (see
Chapter 10). The real level of remittances is likely to be much higher as this figure
excludes the sums sent by migrants to European countries and North America.
However, the cost of transferring money from Ireland is high and the development
impact of these transfers in countries of origin could be enhanced if transaction
costs were lower.
Migrants in Ireland come from more than 100 different countries. The resulting
greater cultural diversity could boost Ireland’s trade with other countries.
Migrants’ language skills and their knowledge of business practices in Ireland and
their own countries may stimulate the development of new trading relations.
Immigration and increasing diversity are likely to spur investment into Ireland,
particularly in Dublin, where the majority of migrants are living and working.
xiv
To date, most migrants have been young and single and in the case of accession
state nationals and some categories of work permit holders their access to welfare
entitlements were restricted until changes were announced in early 2006.
Generally speaking, it is likely therefore that migrants have contributed more in
taxes and social insurance contributions than they have received in welfare
payments in recent years. Unlike other countries in Europe few immigrants in
Ireland are unemployed or claim social assistance benefits. Migrants have also
helped to reduce skill and labour shortages in the health and social care sectors of
employment. And Ireland’s health sector has even actively sought to recruit health
workers from countries like the Philippines, India and China, in recent years to
meet shortages in skilled labour.
The Costs of Migration
Overall, there is little evidence that the sharp increase in migration to Ireland has
resulted in extensive negative economic or social effects, but there are some
negative aspects. As in many other countries, most of the concern about the labour
market status of immigrants in Ireland concerns those in low-paid and unskilled
jobs. Irish employers argue that migrants are filling jobs shunned by local workers,
sustaining local industries and earning far more than they could at home. However,
unions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) stress that some migrants are
subject to low wages, poor treatment and inadequate housing, and there are
sufficient allegations of such treatment to feed a steady diet of news stories.
Although, there is little research to suggest that migration is systematically
lowering wages or raising unemployment among local workers, there have been
some recent high-profile cases where native workers’ wages and employment
opportunities may have been negatively affected. Unrestricted international
migration means that employers may choose among a larger number of
prospective employees and offer lower wages than they might offer to attract
workers in a tighter labour market. The result can be lower wages, longer working
hours and fewer benefits. The actual effects of international migration will vary
depending on broader economic trends in the country and policies chosen by the
government to facilitate or restrict the hiring of non-EEA nationals. When an
economy is growing, the capacity to absorb and benefit from new workers can be
considerable.
Recent Irish research conducted after the bulk of this report was written suggests
that there is little solid evidence to assess the extent to which displacement of
Irish workers may be happening1. A study of non-nationals in the labour market
based on an analysis of the third quarter 2005 Quarterly National Household
Survey (QNHS) concluded that “the case regarding displacement remains
unproven”. The authors went on to comment:
“By the very nature of the intensity of international competition, it is very likely
that some non-national workers have displaced Irish workers as companies seek
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1. AIB Global Treasury Economic Research, Non-National Workers in the Irish Economy, February 2006.
to remain competitive. However, actual statistics on this issue are not available
so it is difficult to ascertain the scale on which this may be happening”
(AIB, 2006, 1).
There is some research using economic models which suggests that low skilled
immigration might create negative effects in the future, if economic conditions
change in Ireland. Theoretical simulations conducted by ESRI, suggest that a
substantial influx of less-skilled migrants into Ireland, while relieving unskilled
wage pressures, if continued indefinitely could push unskilled wage rates down
further and lead to an increase in unemployment among the unskilled. Although
an immigrant inflow that is largely unskilled would still increase GNP, the impact
on unskilled labour could be very negative. Low-skilled wages were estimated to
fall by 3.7 per cent and low-skilled unemployment to rise by 4.1 percentage points.
As GNP per head would fall, this suggests a possible decline in living standards.
However, to date there is little evidence to suggest that the recent sharp rise in
immigration to Ireland has increased unemployment among Irish workers. A recent
study concludes: “despite the increase in non-national employment in Ireland,
employment among indigenous Irish workers has continued to grow and the
unemployment rate for this group has remained close to full employment”. In
addition,“the scale of non-national employment, at about 160,000 or eight per cent
of total employment is not particularly large by international standards.” (AIB, 2006)
There are some indications that Ireland is not making the best use of migrants’
skills and that this is resulting in “brain waste”. One study by ESRI estimates that if
immigrants were in jobs that fully utilized their educational abilities, immigration
would have increased Irish GNP by 3.3 per cent in the five years to 2003, rather than
the actual 2.6 per cent.
Not all migrants find economic success and migrant workers may sometimes
become victims of discrimination and/or exploitation, including trafficking. The
currently available information is too limited to draw conclusions about the extent
to which the extensive rights and protections offered to migrant workers under
Ireland’s equality legislation are implemented and enforced in practice. In the
absence of systematic evidence, the suggestion that the exploitation of migrant
workers may be fairly widespread remains an open question. What can be said,
based on the anecdotal evidence, is that at least some migrant workers employed
in Ireland do experience limitations of their rights that exceed those provided for
by Ireland’s labour immigration policies. There is also some evidence that the hours
worked by migrants in some sectors (e.g., health and social care, hotels and restau-
rants) are much longer than the average.
The exploitation of migrant workers has not been fully documented because of the
lack of inspections of workplaces. There were only 21 inspectors to monitor
compliance with labour and immigration laws, and there were 300 cases of
possible employer violations pending in March 2005. Since the introduction of
employer sanctions, only three employers have been convicted of hiring unautho-
rized foreign workers.
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Managing the Costs and Benefits of Migration in Ireland:
Some Key Issues for Policy Makers
Immigration is often characterized as “good” or “bad”. Such an approach is often
misleading because immigration, like many other public policy choices, is more often
a contest between competing goods. Immigration has benefits and costs, and thus
the proper approach is to analyse and debate these benefits and costs and then
discuss which benefit gets higher priority and what steps can be taken to minimize
costs. As Ireland continues to be a net immigration country, discussions about the
competing goods involved in migration are likely to become more common.
Some of the key questions and issues that we believe policy makers will have to
address in the future are outlined below. These questions and recommendations
are drawn from our discussions with stakeholders in Ireland, including four days of
intensive debate during two workshops held in Dublin in 2005, and our analysis of
the evidence relating to the likely short-term and longer-term effects of migration
in Ireland as presented in this report.
1. A statement of strategic goals?
Similar to many other countries, the question facing Ireland is no longer whether
to accept migration, but rather how to manage migration more effectively to
enhance the positive while minimizing the negative. Left on its own, migration is
unlikely to produce equitable benefits for all.
Immigration has consequences and those consequences can be shaped by policy
interventions and by actions, purposive or otherwise, of stakeholders. It is this
possibility of shaping the consequences of migration that makes it so important to
adopt a strategic approach. Until recently, Ireland’s immigration strategies were
quite rudimentary, although this is beginning to change. During the course of our
discussions with government officials and other stakeholders in Ireland, the IOM
team posed the question – what are Ireland’s main goals in regards to migration
policy? Many different objectives were mentioned, but there was no clear answer
or common consensus.
Given that immigration is likely to remain a structural feature of a growing Irish
economy, the Irish government should, therefore, develop an explicit policy
statement that provides guidance for employers, unions and civil society regarding
Ireland’s overall approach to immigration. The government should lead a balanced
and informed public debate about the reasons for migration, and explain how it
will manage the costs and benefits of migration.
As discussed in Chapter 7 of this report, any policy recommendation on labour
immigration has to be preceded by separate discussions about the impact of
migration and the objectives of labour immigration policy. There has been little
discussion about which of the multifaceted and inter-related impacts of migration
should be assigned most importance in the design of Ireland’s labour immigration
policies, and why. As a result, a number of important questions about the overall
objectives of Ireland’s labour immigration policies remain unanswered. For example:
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s To what extent, if at all, should Ireland’s labour immigration policies prioritize
the interests of Irish citizens over those of migrants and their countries of
origin?
s To what extent, if at all, should concerns over the potentially adverse effects of
immigration on local workers limit the level of labour immigration demanded
by individual employers?
s What role should non-economic considerations, such as potential impacts of
migration on national identity and social cohesion, play in shaping Ireland’s
labour immigration policy?
Migration brings both benefits and costs and these effects are often interrelated
and potentially conflicting. Explicit discussion of these types of effects needs to be
central to thinking about future directions for migration policy. If Ireland is to
manage the costs and benefits of migration successfully, the government will need
to ensure that policies are developed in the interests of both the host society and
migrants, and in cooperation with countries of origin.
2. Who will manage migration?
Ireland today has large numbers of EEA nationals who have the freedom to live and
work in Ireland, and the Irish government will have declining influence over their
movements as barriers to travel and work fall in the European Union. This suggests
that there will need to be an increased emphasis on the effective management of
migration within Ireland, as policy makers may have less influence over the scale and
composition of migratory flows in the future given the high level of immigration
from other EU countries.
Ireland’s overall policy framework for regulating immigration since the late 1990s has
given employers relatively easy access to a large pool of non-Irish workers of all skill
levels. However, if Ireland decides to become an immigration country, it may not want
to have employers alone making decisions about who should immigrate to Ireland. If
migration is to be managed successfully, strategies will have to be developed to
manage the costs and benefits of migration in the interests of a broad range of
interest groups.
Informal discussions with stakeholders during the course of this study suggest that
there is currently no clearly defined lead agency to develop migration policy and
coordinate efforts to manage migration within government. It was also suggested to
us that given the recent fall in the number of asylum seekers, the government has an
opportunity to shift resources to the migration sector, without necessarily increasing
government expenditures.
Given that migration is an issue which cuts across many policy domains, even if a lead
agency is identified in government, there will be a need to work closely with other
agencies within and outside government to develop policy coherence.
In order to promote greater policy coherence, it is likely that mechanisms should be
established to promote greater inter-departmental coordination. Consideration
should be given to the establishment of an inter-departmental committee within the
government.A mechanism aimed at fostering policy dialogue on migration between the
government and other stakeholders,such as NGOs,employers and unions,is also needed.
xviii
In order to inform these policy discussions and contribute to evidence-based policy
making, the government, in consultation with key stakeholders, should consider
sponsoring a programme of policy-oriented research and analysis to promote a
better understanding of the effects of migration and the likely impacts of different
policy measures.
3. Temporary or permanent migration?
Unlike European countries which declared their preference for guest workers
during the economic boom of the 1960s, and traditional immigration countries
which have a long-standing preference for settler immigrants, Ireland is still
considering to what extent today’s migrants are to be considered as temporary
workers or immigrants who are expected to settle. Does Ireland want to become a
“country of immigrants” with permanent residence status, a country of “guest
workers” with temporary work and residence permits, or a mixture of both? 
To date, migration has been viewed as a temporary phenomenon and not part of a
long-term strategy to promote economic and social goals. It would be useful and
desirable to develop an explicit policy statement to guide employers, unions and
civil society on whether migrants are expected to return to their countries of origin
or expected to remain and become integrated in Irish society.
The shape of Ireland’s future integration strategy is contingent on whether Ireland
embraces permanent or temporary migration, and in particular how it wishes to
treat migrants arriving from non-EEA countries. If the former, a more compre-
hensive approach to integration will be needed.
If Ireland wishes to attract more migrants, particularly skilled migrants, to settle in
Ireland, it may have to consider creating a permanent immigration channel. At
present, Ireland does not have a permanent immigration programme providing
permanent residence and employment rights to migrants immediately upon their
arrival. Ireland could develop an immigrant status that entitles selected migrants
to long-term working and residence rights in Ireland. Such a measure could help
Ireland to become a more attractive destination for highly skilled workers. There is
evidence to suggest that Ireland will benefit the most economically from policies
which encourage inflows of highly skilled workers.
4. How to foster integration?
The current economic climate offers Ireland an excellent opportunity to reform its
immigration programmes and to implement a robust integration strategy. As a
result of Ireland’s experience with emigration and its strong sense of community,
there already exists a latent capacity to mobilize support for integration in the
country. This capacity will need to be nurtured as the capacity of the NGO sector to
provide services is still relatively weak. If Ireland’s integration programmes are
expanded, they should include all categories of immigrants. For integration to succeed,
governments, union, employers, and NGOs will need to work together to develop
an effective partnership. The capacity of local government agencies, unions and
NGOs to plan, organize and deliver integration services will need to be enlarged.
Some migrants have restricted access to social welfare benefits due to their
temporary status. It is likely that a growing number of migrants may choose to
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reside in Ireland for a long period of time and they and their children may settle
in the country. This is to some extent to be expected as a result of EU enlarge-
ment. Migrants arriving from the accession countries no longer need to apply for
a temporary work permit and can now more easily settle in Ireland if they wish.
Long-term migrants will need to be given wider access to social services and
government departments dealing with social policy will need to be increasingly
sensitive to the requirements of this group and the growing diversity of Irish society.
For integration to occur, support will need to be built on a widely shared vision of
how integration might contribute to a dynamic, secure and socially cohesive Irish
future. The creation of such a vision would provide a basis for stakeholder alliances
and would permit the development of coherent plans. Ultimately for integration to
succeed, migrants will have to be seen as potential assets and not as charitable
works or temporary aids to facilitate labour adjustment. Integration of migrants
into the host society is likely to be a key determinant of whether migration will be
a success or failure in Ireland in the future. An active integration policy is a key
requirement of a successful migration management strategy.
5. How to manage the benefits of migration for all?
Although there is little evidence that immigration is significantly lowering wages
or raising unemployment for local workers, the potential for immigration to
generate adverse labour market impacts is likely to increase significantly during an
economic downturn. Although currently no such economic downturn is expected
in Ireland, rapid economic growth may not continue indefinitely. There are several
different ways in which Ireland’s labour immigration system could implement
measures to ensure that migrants are recruited in sectors which have genuine
labour shortages – for example by developing better assessments of which sectors
are likely to suffer from labour shortages and more effective enforcement of
labour market tests. Better enforcement of employment laws for all workers is
likely to ensure that migrants do not undercut natives by accepting lower wages
and worse working conditions. Such measures will benefit both migrants and 
local workers. Sanctions must be enforced more effectively against employers
who illegally employ migrant workers or exploit workers with work permits or
students in employment, to protect all migrant workers and prevent the growth
of irregular migration.
To minimize conflicts and promote cooperation with non-EEA countries of origin,
Ireland may wish to explore bilateral agreements that set out arrangements for
the recruitment and employment of migrants. Closer cooperation with sending
countries could also help to reduce the potential costs of migration to these
countries.
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Concluding Remarks
Ireland has largely benefited from immigration in recent years. The extent to which
Ireland will continue to benefit from immigration will depend on a broad range of
factors, including economic conditions and the socio-economic profile of migrants.
Much will also depend on policy and how migration is managed.
Immigration did not create the Irish economic miracle, but, properly managed,
migration can sustain Ireland’s economic growth and generate many other benefits.
Immigration coupled with successful integration strategies is likely to make Irish
society more tolerant and, ultimately, more resilient and adaptive.
As Ireland grapples with these issues, it should be remembered that it is good to
have the “problem” of managing immigration, since immigration reflects the fact
that foreigners want to come and work, or settle in a country.
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Introduction1
In less than a decade, Ireland has been transformed from a country of emigration
to a country of immigration. Unprecedented economic growth during the 1990s
resulted in a significant increase in employment and the emergence of widespread
labour and skill shortages. The government responded to the request from
employers for additional workers by making it relatively easy to recruit and employ
workers from outside the country. The economic boom also encouraged large
numbers of Irish emigrants to return home.
From the mid-1990s, Ireland has experienced net inward migration. This is due
both to emigration falling and immigration rising; by 2001, some 20,000 people
were leaving the country each year but more than twice that number were
arriving. There was substantial net inward migration during the 1970s also, with an
average inflow of just over 14,000 during the years 1972 to 1979, but the scale of
recent net inflows has been larger (see Chapter 2).
The composition of migration in recent years also differs from the 1970s. Most of
the 1970s migration consisted of returning Irish nationals. While inflows of Irish
people continue to be significant, a distinctive feature of migration in recent
years is the growing proportion of non-nationals. In addition, there has been a
substantial increase in the number of non-national migrants coming from
outside the European Union and the English-speaking world. EU enlargement in
May 2004 changed the status of many migrants from EU accession countries.
The substantial increase in net inward migration since the mid-1990s generates a
number of opportunities and challenges for the Irish economy and society.
Migration can alleviate various labour shortages in the private and public sectors.
Some migration can play a particular role in facilitating the growth of key
knowledge-based industries. It may be a significant source of entrepreneurship,
and the diverse population created by migration can also enrich a country’s social
and cultural life. However, migration also poses a number of challenges. The inflow
of migrants can increase the pressure on services and infrastructure, and raise
issues in relation to social integration and the society’s acceptance of cultural
diversity. Migrants with few or no skills may be particularly vulnerable to becoming
unemployed and dependent on welfare benefits during an economic downturn. To
this must be added the fear that migrants may undercut wages and take jobs away
from the local workforce, and that their concentration in particular areas will
undermine neighbourhood ties and change local culture. Irregular migrants can be
exploited by unscrupulous employers, landlords and recruitment agents. New
challenges arise in relation to disease surveillance. There are also fears that anti-
social elements may take advantage of migrant communities in Ireland, such as
traffickers of human beings, and other organized criminal activities.
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1.1  Managing the Costs and Benefits of Recent Immigration
The aim of this report is to identify and develop an understanding of the factors
that have driven the recent sharp increase in immigration to Ireland and which
may sustain it in the future. The report also aims to assess the social and economic
impact of the recent marked change in the scale and composition of immigration
flows, and discusses the policy challenges posed by this new trend, based on the
evidence available in Ireland and the experience of other countries.
Similar to many other countries, the question facing Ireland is no longer whether
to accept migration, but rather how to manage migration effectively to enhance
the positive while minimizing its negative effects. To that end, policy makers need
to identify the essential components of a viable migration policy that are con-
sistent with national objectives and other elements of public policy, and to balance
these elements against each other and integrate them into a cohesive strategy.
Indeed, no simple task.
A better understanding of the relative costs and benefits of recent immigration for
the Irish economy and society can be a valuable element in the development of a
viable migration management strategy.2 Yet, no straightforward methodology for
quantifying the effects of migration is available to assist in this task. It is clear that
migration cannot be evaluated in economic terms only, but that the linkages to
such complex issues as international security, human rights, public health and
national identity have to be taken into account and a multifaceted and balanced
approach, sensitive to the human, economic, social and cultural aspects of
migration, adopted.
A number of barriers exist even for the potentially calculable effects, such as the
impact of migration on wages, unemployment, tax revenues and welfare
payments3. First and foremost is the lack of accurate and comparable data. Though
countries with a long tradition of immigration have developed data collection
mechanisms, the majority of European countries have little appropriate
information to enable them to fully assess the impacts of migration. Even where
data are available, variations in the underlying models and methodologies mean
that the same dataset can produce contradictory results, depending on the
approach adopted. The complex patterns of cause and effect associated with
migration can make it difficult to distinguish and isolate particular outcomes that
are related solely to migration. Just as a strong economic environment draws
migrants to a particular destination, those migrants then contribute to the
continuation of economic growth. Though migrants are often studied as an
external factor in the national labour market for the purpose of data analysis, they
can be as equally affected by fluctuations in wages and unemployment as native
workers. Other effects, such as those on culture and society, are almost impossible
to calculate in any scientific manner. How is one to measure the social capital of a
community, or put a value on cultural diversity? Given that the rapid growth in non-
Irish immigration to Ireland has occurred since the mid-1990s, data needed to fully
evaluate its impact on various sectors of economic and social life are limited. This
report, therefore, draws also on relevant research findings from other countries.
2
2. For a comprehensive discussion of the costs and benefits of migration, see IOM’s World Migration Report 2005.
3. For an excellent recent discussion of the challenges involved in measuring such effects, see World Bank (2005).
Demanding though the development of policies capable of accounting for all of
these impacts may be, the costs of not managing migration can be much higher.
High profile cases concerning the abuse of the migration system can be extremely
damaging to its integrity and undermine public support for migration. A
comprehensive approach of planned and direct policy interventions can ensure
that the benefits of migration outweigh the costs for individual migrants, the
country of origin and the host society.
1.2  Current Policy
Despite the large annual inflows of migrants to Ireland, necessary legislation and
policy concerning immigration have been constructed in a piecemeal fashion only.
The government itself has acknowledged that,“in recent years, Ireland has had the
most open economic migration system in Europe” (DJELR, 2005: 60). Much of the
focus during the 1990s was on how to respond to the increasing number of asylum
seekers arriving in Ireland, and immigration policy was left relatively under-
developed. Over the past decade, a series of statutes4 have been passed in response
to the rapid changes in immigration flows and emerging problems.
Access to the labour market was principally controlled through the work permit
system, regulated by the Employment Permits Act 2003. Initially devised in the
expectation of a small inflow of temporary workers, this system is now dealing
with thousands of applications each month: in 2004, a total of 34,067 permits
were issued. A significant proportion of these are in fact renewals, leading to a
situation of de facto, though not de jure, permanence in Ireland for many work
permit holders.
It is becoming clear that, as labour migrants have flowed into Ireland, new policy
challenges have occurred outside of the work permit system. The number of
foreign students in Ireland has doubled since 2002, though, until recently, there
was little regulation of educational institutions, or of the student population,
despite evidence that students are working in the informal labour market. Finally,
the enlargement of the European Union has brought with it new sources of
migrant labour, necessitating a number of changes in Irish policy.
As regards organization, various administrative functions are dispersed
throughout the government apparatus.The DJELR retains general responsibility for
immigration policy and regulates admission and residence in Ireland, while the
Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment (DETE) is responsible for
economic migration policy, processes all applications for work permits and
assesses future foreign labour needs. However, there are many other government
departments and agencies involved in the immigration system, such as the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), which processes entry visas, the Garda
National Immigration Bureau (GNIB), which controls Ireland’s borders, and the
Department of Social and Family Affairs (DSFA), responsible for social assistance for
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4. Immigration Acts 1999, 2003 and 2004, the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000, and the Irish Citizenship and 
Nationality Act 2000 and 2004.
migrants. Migration also affects other policy areas, such as health, education and
housing. The administration of a system involving so many policy actors is a
complex process and requires a great deal of coordination, consultation and
sharing of information.
1.3  Policy Reform
The government has accepted that the “pragmatic approach” to immigration
currently adopted in Ireland needs to give way to more comprehensive, trans-
parent and managed courses of action,5 and is taking appropriate steps in that
direction. A number of policy consultations have been undertaken with a view to
reforming the immigration system in Ireland. During the first phase, in 2001-2002,
the DJELR conducted a public consultation, inviting stakeholders’ views and recom-
mendations for reform. As part of this, IOM was commissioned to produce an
overview and analysis of international experience in the field of immigration
legislation and practice, which was published in 2002 (IOM, 2002). This study set
out the various policy models in use around the world, and offered an assessment
of the respective advantages and disadvantages of the instruments employed in
migration management.
In 2005, the process of policy reform gained new momentum. The DJELR intended
to draft a new Immigration and Residence Bill by the end of 2005 to “review,
amend, consolidate and enhance the current body of legislation” (DJELR, 2005). To
assist in the preparation of this legislation, the department issued a discussion
document outlining possible future policy approaches, and inviting public input.
Meanwhile, the DETE is drafting a new bill to formalize the current work permit
system. These legislative changes are accompanied by an administrative reorgani-
zation, with a new “one-stop shop” (INIS), integrating the immigration services
previously dispersed across various government departments to offer migrants a
single access point for services.
The current report seeks to contribute to the renewed policy debate about the
future of immigration to Ireland. It reviews the evidence regarding the social and
economic implications of recent immigration to Ireland, and suggests a number of
policy implications arising from this analysis. The bulk of this study was conducted
during a period of six months (1 January to 30 June 2005). IOM was invited by the
NESC to consider several questions relating to recent immigration to Ireland
including:
s What are the factors driving migration to Ireland?
s What is the likely future demand for migration? 
s How are non-nationals performing in the labour market?
s How are migrant workers being treated in the workplace?
s What are the effects of migration on the economy, wages, unemployment and
public finances? 
4
5. See the introduction to the DJELR’s discussion document Immigration and Residence in Ireland: Outline Policy Proposals for an
Immigration and Residence Bill, published in April 2005.
s What are the implications of non-labour migration (e.g. students, dependants,
refugees, etc.)?
s What are the strengths and weaknesses of the current arrangements for
regulating labour market migration in Ireland?
s How does migration impact on social services, public health, educational
provision, housing, poverty and social exclusion?
s What role do factors such as language, education, migrant networks etc.,
play in the successful social integration of migrants in Ireland?
s What is the role of stakeholders in securing integration?
s What are the contributions made by migrants to the development in their
home countries?
In order to offer the broadest range of expertise, IOM appointed four experts in the
fields of migration, social and economic policy to provide their analysis of the
impact of migration in Ireland, and to suggest possible policy responses:
s Professor Philip L. Martin – Professor of Agricultural and Resource Economics,
University of California-Davis and Chair of the University of California’s
Comparative Immigration and Integration Programme;
s Dr. Martin Ruhs – Senior Labour Market Economist, Centre on Migration,
Policy and Society (COMPAS), University of Oxford;
s Mr. Meyer Burstein – Co-founder of Metropolis and former Director-General 
in the Canadian Department of Citizenship and Immigration, responsible for
strategic planning, research and intelligence; and
s Dr. Pauline Conroy – independent researcher on social policy in Ireland for
Ralaheen Ltd., conducted previous research for the Irish government, the
European Union and several international organizations.
Migration management requires the investment of human as well as financial
resources in the development of effective policy frameworks, and the recognition
that policy formulation is an ongoing process. With this in mind, IOM brought
together relevant stakeholders in Ireland – government officials, employers, trade
unions, migrant associations, public and private non-governmental organizations
– to discuss the costs and benefits of migration to Ireland, and explore potential
policies for managing the process. Two workshops, the first on economic
implications, and the second on social effects, were facilitated by the expert
consultants to benefit from the insights of those most profoundly interested in,
and affected by, immigration.6 Summaries of these discussions can be found in the
annex to this report. The consultants have drawn on this dialogue, individual
meetings with a wide range of relevant actors, and their own extensive expertise
to provide a comprehensive assessment of policy needs and priorities in Ireland, as
detailed in this report.
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1.4  Structure of the Report
Immigration has been an important element in the economic and social
development of Ireland. Some impacts are easily identified. That migrant labour
helped fuel and support the Celtic Tiger is indisputable. Other consequences, such
as the impact of migration on the labour market, public services, health, housing,
poverty and individual communities, are harder to determine.
Though it is clear that these effects overlap, for the sake of clarity this report has
separated the various impacts into thematic areas. In Chapter 2, migration to
Ireland is put in context. This is done in three ways. First, the actual facts and
figures of migration to Ireland are set out and the availability of data is discussed.
Second, the role of migration in Ireland’s social and economic development is
discussed. Third, Ireland’s immigration experience is placed within the
international context. Chapter 3 sets out the policy framework for immigration
into Ireland, and Chapter 4 examines the factors driving modern migration, and
the expected future need for migrants in Ireland.
The latter sections of the report focus on the economic and social impact of
migration to Ireland. First, non-nationals in the labour force are profiled and their
performance in the labour market, as well as their experiences in the workplace,
assessed. Chapter 6 reviews the international evidence regarding the economic
effects of migration, including wages, income, public finances and services,
housing and spatial implications. Though the focus is on the formal labour market,
irregular migration is also discussed, as is the increase in the foreign student
population and their linkages to the labour market. Finally, this section of the
report turns to labour-market policy. How sustainable or desirable is the current
system, and what scope is there for reform? This chapter discusses possible policy
approaches in the light of recent flows to Ireland, and suggests new approaches
regarding the formulation and implementation of a policy capable of meeting
Ireland’s future needs.
Chapter 8 assesses the implications for health and social welfare for both migrants
and the host society. What are the likely effects of migration on public health,
health services, social security, housing, educational provision, poverty and social
exclusion? Chapter 9 examines the international arguments and evidence of
beneficial or harmful social and cultural effects of migration on the host society,
and looks at the development of migrants and their families over time relative to
the native population. This includes a discussion of the role public policies can play in
fostering integration and in identifying some of the factors involved in securing that
integration, such as language competency, welfare support, and migrant networks.
Chapter 10 puts Ireland once again within the international context, this time
concerning sending countries, especially developing countries. To what extent are
migrants and migrant networks contributing to the development of their home
countries? Can migration policy play a role in this development through
cooperation with sending countries?
The report concludes with a number of policy recommendations based on the
findings of the study. Chapter 11 recommends and discusses Ireland’s overall
approach to migration and how the country could best reap the benefits of
migration in the future.
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Recent Trends in 
Immigration to Ireland
2
9This chapter aims to provide an overview of recent trends in immigration to
Ireland, and a brief assessment of the availability and quality of migration data in
the country. In order to be able to assess the economic and social impact of these
migration trends, an accurate picture of the changing nature of migration to
Ireland, the stocks and flows of foreign nationals and the characteristics (age,
gender, nationality) of those entering the country is needed.
For most of the past two centuries, Ireland was an island of emigration. But, within
the past decade it has become a country of net immigration. Immigration is at an
all-time high and emigration at an all-time low. Total immigration in the year to
April 2005 is estimated at 70,000 according to the Central Statistical Office.
Between April 2004 and April 2005, Ireland recorded its highest level of
immigration – 70,000 persons and lowest level of emigration, 16,600 since current
records began. This gives a net migration rate of over 50,000 persons. Between
April 2003 and April 2004, over 50,000 people moved to Ireland from over 100
countries, resulting in net immigration of just over 30,000, a 55 per cent increase
over the past five years (CSO, 2004).7 
7. Emigrant flows dropped by 59 per cent over the same period.
Figure 2.1 Immigration and Emigration Trends 1994–2004
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Net
0
Out In
-10
2003 2004
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80‘000
Source CSO
2.1  Data Sources
A number of current and potential data sources relevant to migration can be
identified:
2.1.1  Central Statistics Office (CSO) 
The CSO collects information from a number of different agencies and acts as the
central depository for data in Ireland. The main method for migration data
collection used by the CSO is the Quarterly National Household Survey, (QNHS),
which provides the basis for the classification of annual migration flows by sex,
age group, origin/destination and nationality. Population and migration estimates
are published each year in April, using the results of the QNHS and other migration
indicators, such as the continuous country of residence inquiry conducted at ports
of entry, the register of electors, the child benefit scheme, grants of visas, work
permits, and asylum applications.
The CSO is also responsible for the national census, the most recent having been
conducted in 2002 (and published in 2003). This offers a far more accurate picture
of the stocks of foreign nationals by age, gender and nationality. However, it does
not include data on labour force participation by nationality, or qualitative
information on the socio-economic status of migrants.
2.1.2  Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment (DETE)
A major source of data on economic migration of non-EEA nationals is the work
permits database compiled by DETE, which contains figures on temporary work
permits issuance and renewals by nationality, employment sector and the location
in Ireland of employer’s business. As the majority of labour migration is facilitated
through the issuance of one-year permits, such data can be used to examine the
evolution of labour migration of non-EEA workers to the country. However, there is
potential for much more analysis. Applications for work permits contain informa-
tion on age, gender, qualifications, experience, wages and method of recruitment,
yet this information is not accessible. Ruhs has noted that much of the data have
not been aggregated in any usable and comparative form (Ruhs, 2003).
2.1.3  Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform (DJELR)
With lead responsibility for immigration and asylum policy, the DJELR receives and
collects data from a variety of agencies.
GNIB is where all non-EEA nationals are required to register within three months
of their arrival. Since September 2001, the GNIB has kept accurate numbers of
those who have come to Ireland to live and work, or who have been granted
refugee status. Though asylum seekers with temporary residence permits do not
have to register, the system regularly includes information from other government
departments on work permits, visas and asylum seekers (CSO, 2003). The database
contains information on sex, date of birth, marital status, country of birth and
country of nationality, and thus is relevant for the accurate compilation of stock
and flow figures for the migrant population it covers. However, currently this
information is not publicly available.
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In addition, GNIB is responsible for border control. However, data on border
apprehensions have not been made available either publicly or to the closed
exchange of information system that occurs within the EU Centre for Information,
Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration (CIREFI). It
is unclear whether this is due to security concerns, or the lack of a systematic
collection system for such data. The most recent cross-border organized crime
assessment released by the GNIB contained no figures for apprehended facilitated
entry (smuggling).
DJELR does not collect the information required to produce data on annual visa
issuance (data generated originally by the DFA), which would allow them to
capture entries for work, study and family reunification (dependants). Other data
are unavailable due to problems with the computer processing systems operated
by the department (Ruhs, 2003).
Finally, the department gathers data on asylum flows, applications and outcomes
from the Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner, the Refugee Appeals
Tribunal and the Reception and Integration Agency. However, the CSO Steering
Group on Social and Equality Statistics has noted problems with data retrieval
(CSO, 2003). These figures are also available from the statistical arm of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
2.1.4  Department of Social and Family Affairs (DSFA)
DSFA is responsible for policy and administration related to social welfare benefits.
In order to access social welfare services, as well as a wide range of other
government services, migrants must register for a Personal Public Service Number
(PPS number) to identify them. The widest selection of socio-economic data is
collected here through four main systems through which the various data flow
back and forth, and the DSFA believes it has almost full coverage of persons
normally resident in the country. Clearly, the statistical potential for this with
respect to the socio-economic characteristics of the non-national population, their
social welfare needs and their use of government services is enormous. In addition,
the PPS number offers a second source of employment data that can be compared
with the work permit data and CSO data, and the social contributions made by
each migrant.
The recent assessment by the CSO noted that data transfer from paper to
computer was often incomplete, and the information flow between data systems
unsatisfactory. However, a number of reforms are being introduced, not least the
development of a database containing key data from the PPS number, and
allowing other agencies to cross-reference their own data with the central PPS key.
In terms of migration data analysis, this could be a vital source for the future,
though a number of privacy laws prevent the dissemination of much of the PPS
information.
2.1.5  Foras Áiseanna Saothair (FÁS)
The national training and employment authority, FÁS, holds detailed data on the
labour market, including vacancies notified for overseas recruitment, and it
publishes regular updates in the form of the Quarterly Labour Market
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Commentary and an annual Labour Market Review. Most importantly, the FÁS
reviews data on applications for PPS numbers from new EU citizens, which is
invaluable for assessing new flows from central and eastern Europe following the
recent EU enlargement.
2.1.6  IOM Dublin 
The IOM office in Dublin implements a number of voluntary assisted return and
reintegration programmes. Statistical information, which aims to demonstrate key
trends in those applying for and availing themselves of the services, can be made
available on request.
2.2  National and International Comparability
One of the main conclusions of the CSO assessment of the statistical potential of
administrative data is, that despite the wealth of information being collected, it is
often not comparable even inside departments, as most data are stored in stand-
alone information systems designed for administrative purposes rather than to
serve policy-making needs. Efforts to improve comparability have been
recommended, including the use of standard classifications and coding systems,
and coordination with the CSO itself.
The government is taking steps to improve data collection in Ireland. In its Strategy
for 2003-2008, the National Statistics Board (NSB) recommended that a networked
approach be taken across government departments and agencies to ensure a fully
integrated system of official statistics, with the CSO taking the lead (NSB, 2003a).
As a result, a scoping study on Irish social and equality statistics (NSB, 2003b) and
an assessment of the statistical potential of administrative data being collected in
six governmental departments (CSO, 2003) were undertaken. The latter assess-
ment concluded that, while there was a vast amount of information being collected,
“in most cases, they are contained in stand-alone information systems primarily
designed to meet administrative requirements rather than the needs of policy
makers”. It recommended that greater efforts be made to integrate data systems
and standardize terminology.
2.3  Facts and Figures
The population in the Republic of Ireland is at its highest level since 1871, standing
at 4.04 million. The population growth over the past few years owes as much to
migration as to natural increase (births minus deaths). Annual inflows of migrants
have more than tripled in less than two decades from 17,200 in 1987 to 66,000 in
2002. The most recent estimates of the total stock of foreign-born in Ireland put
the number at around 400,000, or 10.4 per cent of the total population (OECD,
2005). However, in terms of nationality, the number of non-citizens in Ireland is
much lower, around 225,000, or 5.9 per cent of the total population.
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The increase in immigration has been accompanied by a steady fall in emigration;
while in 1989 as many as 70,000 left Ireland, fewer than 19,000 did so in 2004.
Though initially many entrants were in fact returning Irish nationals (56% of the
total in 1994), their numbers have gradually declined. Irish nationals accounted
for only a quarter of those entering Ireland in 2004, (see section below on return
migrants).
Though migration has been driven by the economy (see later in this chapter and
report), the inflow of migrant workers has been supplemented by the dependants
of migrant workers. In addition, the numbers of students coming to Ireland has
increased significantly. Work permit issuance is on a temporary basis (permits are
for one year, renewable; see Chapter 3 for a more detailed description of the labour
migration system). However, the actual scale of return migration of foreign nationals
is unknown. It can be assumed that a significant proportion of foreign nationals
return home after the expiry of their work permits, but no data are available on the
length of stay of permit holders.
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Figure 2.2 Population Change in Ireland 1996–2004
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2.4 Inflows by Country of Origin
The trends in the flows of non-Irish nationals can be broken down by region
(Figure 2.3).
European Union – As might be expected given the free movement within the
region, EU citizens have made up between one-quarter and one-third of the
annual inflow of immigrants over the past 15 years. Their share of the inflow has
increased gradually. This is likely to change in the future as a result of the accession
in May 2004 of ten new states, which has already triggered a sharp increase; over
85,000 nationals from the EU accession countries were issued with PPS numbers
between May 2004 and April 2005. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, UK nationals
accounted for approximately three-quarters of the EU inflow. However, since then,
other EU entrants have reduced the UK proportion of total entrants to about 50 per
cent. In 2004, that proportion fell further with the new EU accessions.
United States – Outside of the European Union, the United States had been the
largest contributor to migrant inflows, accounting for between one-third and one-
half of the non-EU total. However, this proportion has declined over the past
decade, not only owing to fewer Americans coming to Ireland, but also because of
the increasing arrivals of other non-EEA nationals.
Rest of the World – This has been the most dynamic increase of recent years.
Between 1999 and 2002, the inflows increased nearly fivefold, from 4,500 in 1999
to 21,700 in 2002. A great deal of this inflow came from Central and Eastern Europe,
and several of the new EU member states, in particular Poland, Latvia and
Lithuania. The year 2004 saw a drop in entrants from outside the European Union,
Figure 2.3 Inflows by Region 1987–2004
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largely attributable to the incorporation of much of central Europe into the EU
totals. As to asylum, Africa, the Balkans and Eastern Europe are the main source
areas of refugees and asylum seekers. Regarding asylum applications in 2004, by
far the largest number came from one country, Nigeria, while applicants from
Romania, Somalia, China and Sudan made up a significant proportion of the rest.
From the available data it is impossible to accurately assess how many migrants
come from developing countries; however, some breakdown can be made. Using
the World Bank’s income country classification, it can be concluded that 13.7 per
cent of the total number of work permits (new and renewed) in 2004 went to
nationals of low-income countries (defined as those with < US$ 765 annual per
capita gross national income (GNI)), while the majority of permits (54.3 per cent)
were given to nationals of lower middle-income countries (US$ 766-3,035). In
addition, four of the top five sending countries of asylum seekers (as above) are in
the low-income bracket, while Romania is rated a lower middle-income country.
Finally, nationals from India and Pakistan (low-income countries) made up 5.9 per
cent of the 2003-2004 international student population, while nationals of China
and Iran (lower middle-income countries) form 15.7 per cent of the student body
(Education Ireland, 2004). Clearly, developing countries are significant sources of
non-EEA migrants to Ireland, though their numbers may decline following EU
enlargement.
2.5  Stocks by Nationality
As the changes in flows suggest, the stock of foreign-born in Ireland has changed
considerably over the past decade. Figure 2.4 shows that overall, the foreign
population in Ireland has become more diverse and a greater proportion originated
from outside the EU-15 and the Americas in 2002. In particular, the stocks of
migrants from Asia, Africa and Central and Eastern Europe have increased
substantially.
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Figure 2.4 Stock of Foreign-Born by Region of Origin
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European Union – UK nationals remain the largest foreign population in Ireland
(Figure 2.5), although their proportion declined from three-quarters to less than a
half of the total in 2002. Other EU countries with large populations in Ireland
include France, Germany and Spain. It is worth noting at this point that, although
their relative size has declined, the actual number of EU nationals living in Ireland
has increased by about 65,000.
United States – The same is true of US nationals whose numbers rose from 15,619
to 20,977 over the six-year period, though it remained stable as a percentage of the
total foreign-born population.
Rest of the World – The 1996 census does not give a breakdown of birthplace
outside of the EU and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) countries, making it difficult to directly compare the 2002 population
statistics, which do report these details, with the 1996 data. Significant numbers of
migrants from developing countries, including China, Nigeria, Romania and the
Philippines, would seem to have arrived, but their respective numbers in 1996 are
not known. What can be said is that the number of immigrants from developing
countries has changed dramatically, with the stock of Asian nationals increasing
threefold (from 8,150 to 27,500), the stock of African nationals fivefold (from 4,867
to 25,743) and the stock of non-EU European nationals rising by seven (from 3,605
to 25,799). In 2003, the top five nationalities among the refugee population were
from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nigeria, Congo Democratic Republic, Republic of
Serbia, and Zimbabwe.
These changes are increasingly reflected in commentary on the Irish economy.
They do imply significant qualification to some long-standing perspectives.
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Figure 2.5 Top Ten Countries of Origin of Migrants in Ireland
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2.6  Characteristics of the Immigrant Population
The size and composition of the foreign population was most comprehensively
assessed during the 2002 census. Over 220,000 people of foreign nationality were
resident in the country, and information was collected on their location, age,
gender, nationality and county of residence.8 In addition, data collected from work
permit applications, including additional data analysed by Martin Ruhs in 2003,
provide a more detailed picture of the non-EEA workforce in Ireland (Ruhs, 2003).
2.6.1 Age
According to the 2002 census, nearly three-quarters of foreign nationals are of
working age (aged between 15 and 64), and nearly half are between 20 and 40
years old (Figure 2.6). In addition, the average age of first-time work permit holders
is 30 years (Ruhs, 2003).
2.6.2 Gender
In 2002, the gender split among foreign nationals in Ireland was roughly equal,
with women only slightly outnumbered by men. However, more men than women
hold work permits: between 1999 and 2002 nearly two-thirds of work permits
holders were male. But, during that same period, the workforce became
increasingly feminized and the share of women among new work permit holders
increased from 28.4 per cent in 1999 to 34.3 per cent in 2003.
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Figure 2.6 Total Non-Irish Population by Age Group, 2002
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2.6.3  Geographical Distribution
As might be expected, roughly one-third of the foreign-born population lives in
Dublin, with the cities of Cork and Galway also hosting large numbers. In terms of
the working population, 45.6 per cent of work permits issued in 2004 were for the
Dublin area, with a further 6.5 per cent each going to Cork City and County Kildare.
2.6.4  Educational Level
As is noted later in Chapter 3, a great deal of work permits are granted for semi-
skilled or unskilled work predominantly in agriculture and the services sector.
Indeed, about 75 per cent of work permit holders in 2003 were in unskilled jobs.
However, this does not necessarily mean that migrants filling those jobs have a
low educational background, as other issues such as language and available
opportunities may be instrumental in preventing those with appropriate
qualifications from taking up skilled employment. In fact, research based on the
2002 census determined that the immigrant workforce was highly qualified, with
over half (54.2%) holding third-level qualifications, and 30.8 per cent having
completed upper secondary education (Barrett et al., 2005: 6). This compares with
27.3 per cent of the native-born population with a third-level qualification. In a
recent report entitled the “Skills Needs in the Irish Economy: the Role of Migration”,
prepared by the Expert Group on Future Skills Needs and Forfás to the Minister for
Enterprise, Trade and Employment, it is also suggested that “Ireland generally
attracts highly skilled immigrants relative to the foreign-born residents of other
European countries”. But the pattern of immigration has changed in recent years.
FitzGerald (2004) notes that although the bulk of immigration into Ireland, over
the 1990s was skilled labour, since 2000 there has been a substantial influx of
migrants with work permits for low skilled jobs. This change is important to bear
in mind because according to economics literature and as discussed in Chapter 6,
skilled migration has quite different effects on the economy and labour market
compared with unskilled migration.
2.7  Categories of Migrants
As noted above, the 2002 census showed a stock of over 220,000 foreign-born who
were usually resident in Ireland. However, lack of detail makes it impossible to
break these figures down further (see Chapter 3 for a detailed overview of the
channels of regular immigration into Ireland). There are alternate sources for the
number of work permits or work visas/authorizations, asylum seekers, refugees
and students.
The largest known migrant populations are those entering Ireland for work, either
under the freedom of movement enjoyed by EU nationals, or the work permit
scheme. In 2004, over 34,000 work permits were issued by DETE to non-EEA
nationals. As these permits are issued for one year at a time, over two-thirds of
these permits were actually renewals for migrants already employed in Ireland.
This is in contrast to the year 2000, when new permits accounted for close to 90
per cent of all permits issued. In addition, unlike labour migration to other EU
countries, the majority of recent migrant workers to Ireland are entering sectors
that are relatively unskilled. Over 42 per cent of work permits were issued for work
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in the service industry, and a further 24 per cent for employment in catering,
followed by agriculture and fisheries (11 per cent). A total of 1,317 work visas/author-
izations were issued in 2004.
UNHCR estimated that over 7,200 refugees were living in Ireland in 2004, and
nearly 3,700 asylum seekers were awaiting determination of their status (UNHCR,
2005). As noted above, the number of people arriving to claim asylum in Ireland
increased substantially over the past decade, peaked in 2002 and has fallen since
to 4,766 in 2004. Yet more than half fail to attend their first interview with the
Refugee Applications Commissioner (DJELR, 2003). It is thought that many go on,
or back, to the United Kingdom.
Education Ireland has estimated that there are at least 18,608 international
students currently registered at recognized higher education institutions, the vast
majority from non-EU countries (Education Ireland, 2004). The European Union
accounts for 33 per cent of international students, and the United States for 16 per
cent. Other significant sending countries are China (15%) and Malaysia (7%). How-
ever, these figures are not thought to be exhaustive, as the government agency
relies upon survey responses for institutions, and has noted that foundation
colleges, colleges offering awards from other jurisdictions, colleges offering 
e-learning programmes and colleges offering awards that were neither recognized
in Ireland nor internationally, were not included in the estimate. The number 
of persons arriving in Ireland to study has increased dramatically over the past
few years, increasing by 19 per cent between 2003 and 2004 alone (Education
Ireland, 2004).
2.8  Return Migrants
A considerable proportion of migrants in Ireland are in fact returning Irish
nationals. Between 1994 and 1997, there was a net inflow of 16,400 into Ireland,
made up of returning migrants and non-Irish immigrants in roughly equal
proportions (Barrett, 2002). The figure for returning Irish migrants peaked in 1999
and has been falling in recent years, (OECD, 2004). In addition, some of those
migrants classified as foreign-born are the children of returning Irish migrants,
(CSO population and migration estimates). It is likely that the proportion of return-
ing Irish migrants will continue to fall as the available “pool” of returning Irish
migrants is shrinking (since emigration has fallen), although the size of the Irish
diaspora remains large. During the 1980s, highly educated people were more likely
to emigrate and therefore it is not surprising that returnees have significantly
higher levels of educational attainment and tend to be aged 25-44 rather than 15-25
(Barrett, 2002). Irish research suggests that returning migrants even had higher
levels of education on average than the emigrants of the 1980s as a whole (ibid).
Return migration had a number of positive effects on the Irish economy in the
1990s. First, the inflow led to an increased level of GNP, and second, it reduced the
wages of skilled workers relative to what they would have been in the absence of
immigration. This is due to the fact that many returnees were skilled workers
(Barrett, 2002). Third, the earnings of returnees exceeded those of comparable
non-migrants, at least for men, suggesting increased human capital and a positive
contribution to the Irish economy (Barrett et al., 2002).
2.9  Irregular Migration
From the perspective of destination countries, irregular migration is illegal entry,
stay or work in a country, meaning that the migrant does not have the necessary
authorization or documents required under immigration regulations to enter,
reside or work in a given country (IOM, 2004).9 Official estimates of the number of
irregular migrants in Ireland are lacking, and there is little data on which to base
estimates of those irregularly working and residing in Ireland. The Immigrant
Council of Ireland has suggested that there are around 15,000 irregular migrants,
while an official in DETE suggested that up to 50,000 migrants could be working
irregularly in Ireland (NCCRI, 2004). Thus, there is a wide margin of error.
Data on border apprehensions are not publicly available in Ireland, though
information is being collected by the GNIB on its border activities. It is difficult,
therefore, to estimate the number of migrants entering the country irregularly,
and whether they arrive independently or through smugglers and traffickers.
Police activities have focused on the known sections of the clandestine population,
i.e. whose asylum applications have been rejected, as they are registered with
several government agencies and are thus more easily tracked.
As regards human trafficking, in its most recent assessment of organized crime,
GNIB referred to the absence of any known trafficking activity in Ireland. Yet, it is
believed that Ireland is both a transit and destination country for trafficking,
though no research or statistics to support this are available. A 2003 study into the
trafficking of unaccompanied minors estimated that approximately 10 per cent of
minors coming into Ireland have been the subject of criminal investigation in
relation to trafficking or smuggling by adults (Conroy, 2003).
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Figure 2.7 Percentage of Foreign-born in Selected OECD Countries
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9. It should be noted that there is no clear or universally accepted definition of irregular migration.
2.10  Migration to Ireland in an International Context
In terms of absolute numbers, the Republic of Ireland is host to just a small fraction
of the estimated 191 million international migrants in the world today (UN, 2006).
However, as a proportion the ratio of foreign-born to the local population in Ireland
is high compared with other industrialized countries, especially considering that
immigration to Ireland began only recently. Though, as noted above, many of these
are descendants of earlier emigrants and hold Irish citizenship, Ireland’s proportion
of 10.4 per cent of foreign-born exceeds that of its neighbour, the United Kingdom
(8.3%) and is similar to countries with a longer history of immigration (OECD,
2005). Indeed, the percentage of foreign-born residents in the United States stands
at 12.3 per cent, while in Germany it has reached 12.5 per cent.
2.10.1  Europe
Europe as a whole, including the European part of the former USSR, is host to over
56 million international migrants, of whom at least 33 million reside in the pre-
enlargement EU-15 countries (IOM, 2005). Ireland was the last member of the EU-
15 to become a country of net immigration. Despite this, the country has caught up
quickly and now has one of the highest immigration rates in the European Union:
in 2003, the increase stood at 7.1 migrants per 1,000 of the population, against an
EU-15 average of 4.1 (IOM, 2005).
Europe as a whole is facing a demographic challenge characterized by declining
fertility rates and a rapidly ageing population, and though migration is not a
generally accepted means to offset this trend, it does have implications for the
labour force and welfare state in Europe. With the highest fertility rate in the EU-
25,10 Ireland’s demographic projections are positive compared with the rest of the
region, and the country has less need of migration as a means of replacing the
dwindling working-age population. However, as the European Union moves towards
agreement on common minimum standards in immigration and asylum, and more
EU citizens take advantage of the freedom of movement, the demographic changes
across Europe are of increasing relevance to Ireland.
2.11  Sharp Increase in Immigration Since EU Enlargement
The number of persons arriving in Ireland following EU enlargement on 1 May
2004 has increased substantially. After 1 May 2004, EU-10 nationals no longer
needed a work permit to work in Ireland. While it is not possible to discern exactly
how many of these workers were already in Ireland before this date, it is known
that 85,114 workers from the new EU-10 were issued with PPS numbers between 1
May 2004 and 30 April 2005. About half of these workers are Polish, 21 per cent are
Lithuanian and 11 per cent are Latvian. Most are young – 60 per cent between 18
and 30 – and many are employed in construction, and farming or farm-related
industries such as meat processing. This trend is discussed in more detail in the
first section of Chapter 3.
recent trends in 
immigration to ireland 21
10. Ireland has 1.98 children per woman, against a European Union average of 1.48 (Eurostat, 2004). Ireland’s fertility rate has dropped
from 3.25 in 1980.
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2.12  Concluding Remarks
Ireland has been a net immigration country since the mid-1990s. A distinctive
feature of recent flows has been the rapid growth in the immigration of non-Irish
nationals. Immigration also seems to have become more diversified, with migrants
originating from a wider range of countries of origin. Nonetheless most of the
migrants who have arrived in Ireland during the past decade have come from
EU/EEA countries.
Another important trend is that while the bulk of immigration into Ireland over
the 1990s was skilled labour, since 2000 there has been a substantial influx in the
number of migrants working in less skilled jobs.These trends are important to bear
in mind in our later discussion as the social and economic impact of migration is
likely to vary according to the scale and composition of the migrant population.
From a policy perspective it is important to bear in mind that there are at least
three different categories of migrants, and the policy instruments available to
influence these different flows vary. First, there are return migrants who have Irish
citizenship and although their arrival has had an important impact on the Irish
economy, they are unlikely to have the same needs as non-Irish immigrants, in
regards to integration etc. Second, there is a significant number of persons from
Central and Eastern Europe, who following EU enlargement, have similar rights to
Irish citizens. Since the enlargement of the European Union in 2004, citizens from
25 member states and from the three EEA countries currently have the right to live
and work in Ireland. Third, there is a substantial number of non-EU migrants,
including migrants from both developed and developing countries. These different
groups of immigrants have different socio-economic profiles and work in different
sectors of the Irish economy. It is important to bear in mind these differences when
discussing the policy implications of recent immigration to Ireland.

Current Policy Framework3
This chapter outlines Ireland’s current policies for regulating the immigration and
employment of non-Irish nationals, with a focus on workers from outside the
recently enlarged European Economic Area (EEA11). This includes discussions of
Ireland’s policies toward EEA nationals, including workers from the new EU
member countries; the current channels of immigration and access to the Irish
labour market for non-EEA nationals; migrants’ rights and possibilities for securing
permanent residence, and current policy developments.
3.1  EEA Nationals 
As a member of the European Union, Ireland’s labour immigration policies operate
an important distinction between persons from within and outside the EEA. EEA
nationals enjoy the unrestricted right to migrate and take up employment in
Ireland. This means that their numbers, selection – by skill level and nationality, for
example – and sector of employment in Ireland cannot be directly influenced by
Ireland’s immigration policies. During 2000-2004, EEA nationals constituted almost
half of all non-Irish inflows (CSO, Population and Migration Estimates) and almost
two-thirds of all non-nationals living in Ireland (CSO, 2002). As a result of EU
enlargement and the subsequent sharp increase in migrants arriving in Ireland
from the EU-10 accession countries, the bulk of immigrants in Ireland today origi-
nate from the European Union.
On 1 May 2004, ten new countries acceded to the European Union.12 Long before
accession day, the EU-15 and the ten accession countries agreed on a “transitional
system” allowing previous member states to maintain restrictions on the employ-
ment of accession state workers for a maximum of seven years.
The Irish government made one of its most significant labour immigration policy
decisions in the context of this EU enlargement in April 2003. Together with the
United Kingdom and Sweden, Ireland granted accession state nationals unrestricted
access to its labour market immediately upon EU enlargement. This change in legal
status and access to the labour market applied to both newcomers (i.e. arrivals
after 1 May 2004), and to accession state nationals who had already been
resident/working in Ireland before this EU enlargement, either regularly or
irregularly. For the latter, 1 May 2004 was, effectively, an amnesty.
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11. The EEA comprises the EU-25 member states plus Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein.
12. The ten accession countries are Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Malta, Slovenia and Cyprus.
Data provided by the DSFA indicate that 85,114 nationals from accession countries
were issued with PPS numbers between May 2004 and April 2005. This is more
than ten times the number of new work permits issued to accession state
nationals during the period May 2003 – April 2004. As previously mentioned, about
half of the PPS numbers issued to accession state nationals since May 2004 were
issued to Polish nationals (48%), followed by Lithuanians (21%)), Latvians (11%) and
Slovaks (8%).
The available PPS data do not distinguish between newcomers and those
accession state nationals who had already been working irregularly in Ireland
before 1 May (those working legally simply kept their PPS numbers and are not
included in the new figures released by DSFA). However, one may reasonably
speculate that a significant number of accession state nationals acquiring PPS
numbers since 1 May would have already been irregularly employed in Ireland
before that date and used the EU enlargement to regularize their status. This
happened in the United Kingdom, where 175,410 accession state nationals
registered for work during May 2004 – March 2005, up to one-third of whom may
have already been there before 1 May 2004.13
The more than 85,000 workers from the new EU member countries who took up
legal employment in Ireland during May 2004 – April 2005, either as newcomers or
by regularizing their status, constitute over four per cent of Ireland’s labour force.
This is a significant share, both in absolute terms and relative to the United
Kingdom, where the 175,000 workers registering for work between May and
December 2004 made up about 0.5 per cent of the labour force.
Based on the evidence available at this point, it could be argued that the number
of workers from the new EU member states migrating to take up employment in
Ireland and the United Kingdom has been larger than expected.14 At the same time,
however, the widespread fears about the potential abuse by accession state
nationals of the Irish and UK social welfare systems have not materialized.
It is difficult to predict the duration of the inflow of accession state nationals into
Ireland. So far, there is no indication of a decline in the number of PPS numbers
issued to accession state nationals. In April 2005, 9,802 PPS numbers were issued
to accession state nationals, the highest monthly number since May 2004. One
may, however, speculate with a reasonable degree of confidence, that most of
those receiving PPS numbers since January 2005 are newcomers rather than
workers who had already been working in Ireland irregularly before 1 May 2004
and who used EU enlargement to regularize their status. In the United Kingdom,
the share of workers from the new EU member countries declaring when they
register with the Home Office that they had already been in the United Kingdom
before 1 May 2004 declined from 46 per cent in May-June 2004 to five per cent in
January-March 2005.15
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13. In the United Kingdom, a registration scheme for accession state nationals was introduced to monitor inflows. The UK Home Office
issues quarterly reports on registration statistics (Accession Monitoring Reports), available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/. The
May 2005 report suggests that of the 175,410 applicants during April 2004 – March 2005, 19 per cent reported that they had entered
the United Kingdom before 1 May 2004, 66 per cent reported that they had entered on or after 1 May, and 15 per cent did not state
their arrival date.
14. A study commissioned by the UK Home Office predicted that EU enlargement would lead to an average annual net migration
(inflows minus outflows) of 5,000-13,000 accession state nationals for the period up to 2010 (Dustmann et al., 2003). Unlike the
British government, the Irish government had not commissioned any studies predicting the likely number of migrants from the new
EU member states taking up legal employment in Ireland following EU enlargement.
15. Home Office (May 2005).
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Though the development of a common EU
immigration policy has been discussed for
decades, it was only in 1999 that concrete
measures were taken. Article 63(3) of the
Treaty of Amsterdam directed the Council
to adopt measures on immigration policy
within five years, in the following areas:
“Conditions of entry and residence,
standards on procedures for the issue by
member states of long-term visas and
residence permits, including those for
family reunification.” In October 1999, The
European Council at Tampere set out an
ambitious programme of action based on
this legal mandate, within the aegis of the
Directorate General of Justice and Home
Affairs. The majority of measures agreed
since have been minimalist in nature,
providing minimum standards for
immigration policy, such as the right to
family reunification and the status of long-
term residents. Little progress has been
made towards obligating states to
harmonize their migration policies.
This notwithstanding, in November 2004
the European Council published a new five-
year work programme (2005-2010;
European Council, 2004). Described as a
“wish list” rather than a detailed policy
agenda (van Selm, 2005), this new
timetable focuses on the regulation of
migration flows and the control of external
EU borders, accepting that “international
migration will continue”. The main areas
related to migration are regular migration
and the fight against irregular
employment, integration of third-country
nationals (see Chapter 9 for more on EU
integration policies), the external
dimension of asylum and migration policy
(i.e. partnerships with third countries, and
countries of origin and transit), and the
management of migration flows (i.e.
border control and visa policy).
With respect to regular economic
migration, the Council underscored that
the determination of the numbers of
admissions was a matter for the member
states themselves. Legislation at EU level
will focus instead on harmonizing common
rules and criteria for admission. To this
end, the European Commission has been
invited to present a policy plan on regular
economic migration, with particular
emphasis on “admission procedures
capable of responding promptly to
fluctuating demands for migrant labour”
(European Council, 2004), and the
Commission published a green paper
intended to launch a public discussion on
the subject of managing economic
migration. The results of this policy debate
are to be made public by the end of 2006.
Ireland, along with the United Kingdom,
has an “opt-out” agreement regarding all
immigration and asylum laws agreed at
the EU level.16 However, the policy direction
set out by the European Commission will
still have indirect implications for Irish
policy regardless of whether they
participate in an EU-wide strategy. Many of
the questions being considered by the
European Commission in its green paper
are similar to those faced by the Irish
government, such as whether admissions
systems should be based on sector
shortages or a more flexible green card
scheme; how far EU workers should have
preference over third-country nationals,
and whether migrant mobility should be
limited to particular employers or sectors.
A Common EU Immigration Policy
16. Ireland can choose to “opt-in” to discussions of tabled proposals, as well as adopt legislation at a later date. In practice, Ireland has
opted into most proposals concerning asylum and illegal migration, and opted out of proposals concerning visas, borders and legal
migration (Statewatch, 2004).
3.2  Channels of Immigration and Access to the Labour
Market for Non-EEA Nationals
The regular channels of immigration and employment for non-EEA nationals,
which Ireland can and does regulate, may be classified into employment-based
and non-employment based channels (see Figure 3.1). The term “employment-
based” means that the migrant’s primary reason for coming to Ireland is to work.
Of course, it is important to add that some of the other, non-employment based
channels of immigration may also, either immediately or after some time, facilitate
some degree of regular access to the Irish labour market (e.g. some students and
all working holiday-makers may work part-time; dependants may be given
permission to work, and some asylum seekers may eventually be recognized as
refugees and thus be allowed to work). The point is, that in those cases, employ-
ment is not meant to be, though in practice it sometimes may well be, the primary
reason for migration.
The Employment Permits Act 2003 regulates employment-based immigration.
There are four major types of employment permits: work permits, work visas and
work authorizations, permits for intra-company transfers, and permits for trainees.
In addition, there are separate “business permits” for non-EEA nationals who wish
to come to Ireland to set up a business. The major regular channels for non-
employment based immigration include students, working holiday-makers,
asylum seekers and dependants.
The institutional framework for administering the various modes of entry for non-
EEA nationals may involve a number of government departments. Regardless of
their channel of immigration into Ireland, all non-EEA nationals must obtain
“permission to remain” (residence permit) in Ireland. This is always issued by DJELR.
Nevertheless, it is important to realize that other government departments are
often actively involved in, and often take the primary responsibility for,
determining how many, and for what reasons, non-EEA nationals should be
admitted to Ireland. For example, with the exception of working visas/authori-
zations, which are issued by the DFA, all employment permits are issued and
administered by DETE. In these cases of economic migration, the role of DJELR may
be described as that of a “gatekeeper” rather than that of the primary government
department deciding on the admission of non-EEA workers to Ireland.
The remainder of this section reviews each of the various modes of entry and stay
in Ireland, outlined in Figure 3.1, and identifies the associated conditions, if any, that
regulate the access by migrant to the Irish labour market.
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3.2.1  Work Permits 
The great majority of non-EEA nationals who have regularly taken up full-time
employment in Ireland since the late 1990s were admitted under the work permit
system, administered by DETE.
Work permits are valid for a maximum of one year, renewable on an annual basis.
They are issued to employers rather than migrant workers, subject to an
administrative fee, payable by the employer, of up to EUR 500 per work permit, and
are not transferable. A migrant worker employed on a work permit is not allowed
to work for any employer other than the one specified on the permit.17
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17. DETE’s Work Permits Information Leaflet explicitly states: “All employees are advised that a work permit will entitle them to work
for the specific employer named, and no other, for the duration of the permit. When the permit has expired the employee’s
permission to work in Ireland has expired”. DETE has, nevertheless, taken a flexible approach in processing applications for new
work permits that involve a change of employers by a migrant worker who is already employed on a work permit in Ireland.
According to DETE, an annual average of about 2,000-3,000 such “transfers” were approved in recent years.
Figure 3.1 Major Channels of Legal Immigration into Ireland for Non-EEA Nationals*
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?
Source DETE, DJELR
Notes *Short-term mobility for tourist purposes is excluded.
? Indicates that data are currently not available.
1 Preliminary data for January-November 2004.
2 Issued on a concessionary basis.
A core element of the work permit system is the “labour market test”. Before
applying for a work permit, a local employer needs to first demonstrate that “every
effort has been made” to recruit an EEA national. Since January 2002, employers
have been required to advertise a job vacancy with FÁS prior to applying for a new
work permit for a non-EU national.18 The vacancy must be registered with FÁS for
four weeks and will be broadcast to all major employment databases within the
EEA, including EURES, the EU’s “job mobility portal”.19 If, after four weeks, no suit-
able EEA worker has been found, FÁS will issue a letter certifying the unavailability
of local workers, thus enabling the employer to proceed with an application for a
work permit at the DETE.
With regard to regulating the number and selection of migrant workers to be
admitted, Ireland’s work permit policies evolved during the course of two distinct
policy regimes.20 Until April 2003, Ireland's work permit policies were almost
entirely “employer-led”. As long as they were prepared to go through the work
permit system's administrative procedure, which included the mandatory labour
market test referred to above, local employers were essentially in a position to
legally recruit as many non-EEA workers as they wished, from whatever countries
they wanted, and to employ them in any job, regardless of the skill level required.
As a result, the number of work permits issued to non-EEA nationals rose
dramatically from 5,750 in 1999 to 47,707 in 2003. Furthermore, it is known that
approximately three out of every four permits issued in 2002 were for relatively
low-skilled and/or low-wage occupations, especially in the service sector.21 There
was also great diversity in the composition of the migrant workforce employed on
work permits at that time; in 2000-2003, work permits were issued to nationals
from more than 150 countries, with workers from the ten new EU member states
accounting for about one-third of all permits issued during that period.
The publication of the Employment Permits Act in April 2003, which facilitated the
access for workers from the ten EU accession countries to the Irish labour markets
immediately upon EU enlargement, marked the beginning of a more inter-
ventionist work permit system in Ireland. The government felt that its liberal policy
toward workers from the EU accession countries required a more managed
approach to regulate the number and selection of migrant workers to Ireland from
outside the enlarged European Union. This was primarily based on the expectation
that local employers would be able to fill most of their vacancies after 1 May 2004,
from within the enlarged European Union.
First, in April 2003, the DETE and FÁS published a list of occupational categories
that became ineligible for work permit purposes.22 FÁS had identified a sufficient
supply of local workers for those occupations, most of which involve low-skilled work.
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18. Importantly, this requirement does not apply to applications for renewals of existing permits.
19. See http://europa.eu.int/eures/ 
20. For a discussion of the evolution of Ireland’s labour immigration policies since the late 1990s, see Ruhs 2005a.
21. See Ruhs 2003a.
22. For a current list of ineligible sectors, see http://www.fas.ie/services_to_businesses/wp_eligible.htm
Second, in late 2003, the government began encouraging employers to give
preference to workers from the EU accession countries. In November 2003, the
DETE started to return applications for new work permits for workers from outside
the enlarged European Union whenever workers from the EU accession countries
were available to fill the vacancy.
Third, in August 2004, the DETE announced that it would no longer consider
applications for new work permits for the employment of non-EEA nationals in
low-skilled and/or low-wage occupations. Table 3.1 shows the consequent change
in the distribution of job categories for which work permits were issued. From
September 2004 to April 2005, 31 per cent of work permits were issued for non-
EEA nationals in professional occupations, associate professional and technical
occupations, or as managers and administrators. In 2003, the corresponding
share was 12 per cent.
Together with EU enlargement, this shift towards a more restrictive and skills-
based permit system contributed to a drop in the number of work permits issued
from 47,707 in 2003 to 34,067 in 2004. Regarding new permits, at 606, the average
monthly number of work permits issued from May 2004 to April 2005 was the
lowest since 1999. It is interesting to note, however, that this figure is approxi-
mately the same as the average monthly number of new permits issued to workers
from outside the enlarged European Union from November 2003 to April 2004.
This suggests that the opening of the labour market to accession state nationals
on 1 May 2004 may have reduced, though it certainly did not eliminate, employer
demand for new work permits for workers from outside the European Union.
3.2.2  Work Visas and Work Authorizations
The work visas and work authorizations scheme is intended to be Ireland’s “skilled
and highly skilled migrant worker programme”. It was introduced in 2000 and
covers selected jobs in information and computer technologies, construction
professionals, and a broad range of medical, health and social care professions,
such as including medical practitioners, nurses, speech and language therapists,
occupational therapists, radiographers, physiotherapists, social workers and
psychologists.23
Like work permits, work visas/authorizations are only issued after the worker has
secured a job in Ireland. However, they differ from work permits in two important
ways. First, work visas/authorizations are valid for two years and may be renewed
for another two years. Second, they are issued directly to workers rather than to
their employers in Ireland. Holders of work visas/authorizations may freely change
employers within the same skills category after arrival in Ireland, as long as they
continue to have permission to work and reside in the country. Compared to work
permits, the number of work visas and authorizations issued has been quite small:
10,300 during 2000–2004.24 Of the 1,158 work visas and authorizations issued in
2003, the majority (798) were taken up by registered nurses and other medical staff.
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23. For a full list of occupations covered under the working visa and working authorization scheme, see
http://www.entemp.ie/publications/labour/2004/workauthorisation.doc.
24. 1,317 work visas/authorizations were issued between January and November 2004.
The relatively low number of working visas/authorizations issued may partly be
due to insufficient awareness among employers of the programme. In a recent
survey of about 1,000 employers in Ireland, only 11 per cent reported having any
particular knowledge of the working visa/authorization scheme (Chambers of
Commerce of Ireland, 2004).
3.2.3  Intra-company Transfers and Trainees
The remaining two employment permit programmes, the programme for trainees
and the intra-company transfer scheme, have been indefinitely suspended since
late 2002. The suspension was triggered by the DETE’s concern over their potential
abuse by both companies and workers, in particular, that Irish companies were
abusing these schemes to bypass the work permit system and the domestic labour
market.
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Table 3.1 New Work Permits Issued to Non-EEA Nationals
by Job Category, January 2003–April 2005
2003 Jan–Aug 2004 Sept 2004–
April 2005
Managers & Administrators 2% 2% -4%
Professional Occupations 6% 11% 17%
Associate Professional 
and Technical Occupations 4% 6% 10%
Clerical and Secretarial Occupations 1% 1% 1%
Craft and Related Occupations 16% 15% 15%
Personal and Protective 
Service Occupations 22% 18% 23%
Sales Occupations 2% 1% 1%
Plant and Machine Operatives 5% 3% 2%
Other Occupations 41% 44% 27%
Total (%) 100% 100% 100%
Total number 21.965 7,438 4,944
Source Based on work permits data provided by the DETE.
Prior to its suspension, the trainee programme was intended to enable persons
coming to Ireland from an overseas company to engage in paid or unpaid training
at an Irish-based company. The employment permit for trainees was valid for three
years. The intra-company transfer scheme was intended to facilitate the temporary
transfer of senior management and key personnel within international companies
with offices in Ireland. Persons posted on this scheme were given an employment
permit for a maximum period of four years. Their employment was restricted to
the company who transferred/seconded the workers to its Ireland office.
Despite the official suspension of the intra-company transfer scheme, the DETE
has, on a concessionary basis, issued 752 permits for intra-company transfers during
2003-2004.
3.2.4  Business Permits
Non-EEA nationals who wish to come to Ireland for the sole purpose of setting up
a business require a business permit, which is issued by the DJELR. Business
permits are valid for one year, and may be renewed for another year. After two
years, longer-term permits may be granted. To qualify for a business permit, a
number of conditions need to be met, including a minimum capital transfer to
Ireland of EUR 300,000 and the creation of at least two new jobs for EEA nationals.25
In 2004, 97 persons were granted business permits, down from 134 in 2003.
3.2.5  Students
In 2004, there were 21,270 registered non-EEA students in Ireland (about half from
China, with most attending English language schools in Ireland).26 This is a con-
siderable increase over the 11,000 non-EEA nationals studying in Ireland in 2002.27
Until recently, all non-EEA nationals who came to Ireland for the purpose of
studying, including those who came for short-term English language classes, were
entitled to take up casual employment (20 hours part-time work per week, or full-
time during vacation periods). Under revised arrangements in force since April
2005, access to casual employment is restricted to students attending a full-time
course of at least one year’s duration, leading to a qualification recognized by the
Minister for Education and Science.
This new measure was introduced in response to increasing anecdotal evidence
that some English “language schools” effectively operate as a front to sell visas to
non-EEA nationals wishing to migrate and work in Ireland without going through
the work permit system. The government intends that the new measures, which
bar non-EEA nationals on short-term language courses from working in Ireland,
will help to reduce the abuse of the student visas system. It is expected that this
will also help and support Ireland’s current efforts to further develop its inter-
national education market.28
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25. For a full list of criteria, and a more detailed description of the business permit system, see
www.justice.ie/80256E01003A21A5/vWeb/flJUSQ5YUK2K-en/$File/Business+Permission.pdf.
26. Data provided by DJELR.
27. This is based on data taken for the Census 2002.
28. In November 2004, an Interdepartmental Working Group made a number of recommendations on, among other things, how to
increase the number of non-national students coming to Ireland for study; and how to raise and safeguard the quality of the
education services provided to non-national students (Department of Education and Science, 2004).
After completing their studies in Ireland, non-EEA students may apply for a work
visa/authorization, but only if their intended employment in Ireland falls within
the designated occupations eligible under this scheme. There is no corresponding
mechanism for students to acquire a work permit after completion of their studies.
3.2.6  Working Holiday-makers
Persons aged 18 to 30 from Australia, Canada, New Zealand and, since January
2005, Hong Kong (SAR), can apply for working holiday visas, enabling them to work
casually and to spend an extended holiday in Ireland. A working holiday visa is
valid for one year, but bars the holder from working for any one employer for a
total of more than three months.29 Working holiday-makers may, however, apply
for a work permit to extend their stay, provided that their employer wishes to
retain them. Employers applying for new work permits for working holiday-makers
are not subject to the requirement to first check for available EEA nationals.
Approximately 3,000 working holiday-maker visas were issued in 2003.30
3.2.7  Asylum Seekers
The number of persons seeking asylum in Ireland increased dramatically from only
362 in 1994 to 11,634 in 2002, before falling again to 4,766 in 2004. Many attribute
the recent decline in asylum applications to two relatively recent policy develop-
ments. First, in January 2003 the Supreme Court ruled that non-national parents of
children born in Ireland no longer had an automatic right to residence. Second,
following a referendum on the issue in early 2004, the government recently
removed the constitutional guarantee of citizenship for children born to non-
national parents in Ireland (The Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 2004).
Asylum seekers do not have the right to take up employment in Ireland. If,
however, their applications are successful and they are officially recognized as
refugees, they acquire full employment and social rights. Between 1995 and 2004,
the country officially recognized 6,794 refugees.
3.2.8  Dependants
In respect of refugees, for the purpose of family reunion family members are
defined to include: the resident’s spouse; children aged under 21 and children over
21, if they are dependent on the resident; the spouses of any children of the
resident and his/her spouse; dependent parents and grandparents of the resident
and his/her spouse, and other dependent relatives in the ascending line of the
resident and the spouse. Family members are not defined in Irish immigration law.
Somewhat different rules apply to family members of Irish and other EEA nationals
on the one hand, and to family members of non-EEA nationals living in Ireland, on
the other. The former are allowed to join their family member in Ireland as long as
the person in Ireland is able to support the immigrating family member without
recourse to public funds. Non-EEA nationals migrating to Ireland for the purpose of
family reunification with an Irish or other EEA national enjoy the unrestricted right
to take up employment in Ireland.
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29. See http://193.178.1.205/services/visa/documents/WorkingHolidayApplication.pdf.
30. The figure for 2004 is not yet available.
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Non-EEA nationals may also join a non-EEA family member in Ireland if they can be
supported without recourse to public funds. In contrast to EEA nationals, however,
non-EEA nationals who have joined a non-EEA family member in Ireland under the
family unification scheme, may only take up employment in Ireland after their
prospective employers have secured a work permit for them. A recently introduced
special regulation/exception relates to the spouses of selected skilled migrants.
Since February 2004, the spouses of researchers, academics and medical
professionals employed on work visas/authorizations, or work permits, haven been
allowed greater ease of access to employment in Ireland by: (i) not requiring their
employers to advertise the Job with FÁS prior to filing a work permit application;
(ii) accepting applications for jobs in categories that would otherwise be ineligible
for work permits, and (iii) exempting the application from the work permit fee. The
objective of this policy is to make the employment of non-EEA workers in occupa-
tions that suffer from significant labour shortages, especially nurses, more attractive.
3.2.9  Irregular Immigration and Irregular Work 
Given the geography of Ireland, irregular work by non-EEA nationals, which may
follow regular or irregular immigration, is likely to be more pervasive than irregular
immigration. For example, some migrant workers may not leave Ireland after their
employment permits expire. Similarly, some non-EEA students may choose to work
more than the legally allowed 20 hours per week. As already referred to, there is
anecdotal evidence that some so-called English “language schools” effectively sell
visas to non-EEA nationals without providing any significant education services.
In recent years, Ireland has passed a number of laws aimed at combating irregular
immigration. Together, these laws provide a legal basis for the deportation of non-
nationals in violation of Ireland’s immigration laws (The Immigration Act 1999);
ban the smuggling and trafficking of irregular immigrants (The Illegal Immigrants
(Trafficking) Act 2000) and the carrying of a passenger who does not have proper
immigration documents (The Immigration Act 2003), and financially penalize or
imprison employers and workers who do not comply with the Employment
Permits Act 2003. In addition, some state benefits have been restricted to irregular
residents (e.g., the payment of rent assistance was restricted in 2003).
Another measure to curb irregular immigration and irregular working has been an
increase in the number of deportations, up from 188 in 2000 to 663 in 2004.31 To
facilitate repatriation, Ireland has entered into return agreements with Poland,
Nigeria, Romania and Bulgaria, and has also approached IOM to operate voluntary
return programmes on its behalf.
The increased level of legislation and deportations suggests that the government
is expanding its efforts to combat irregular immigration; however, the lack of
reliable data or systematic evidence hamper any assessment of the extent to
which Ireland’s current immigration and employment laws are in fact enforced.
31. Data provided by DJLR.
At the same time, there is no evidence of a serious crackdown on irregular working.
As of February 2005, only three employers had been convicted for violating the
Employment Permits Act 2003.32 However, the current low number of convictions
does not necessarily imply low compliance with the Employment Permits Act
2003, though it does clearly reduce the incentive of employers to comply.
3.3  Migrants’ Rights and Possibilities for Securing
Permanent Residence 
Non-EEA employees are officially entitled to the same full range of statutory
employment rights and protections as Irish and other EEA workers. These rights
and protections include, among others, the right to minimum wages (cf. the
National Minimum Wage Act, 2000) or to the (potentially higher) minimum pay
rates specified in the Employment Regulation Orders established by the Joint
Labour Committees in selected sectors, and general protection from discrimination
based on age, gender, marital status, family status, race, religion, sexual
orientation, disability or membership of the travelling community (cf. the Employ-
ment Equality Act, 1998).33 Non-EEA migrant workers are entitled to most of the
social rights enjoyed by Irish citizens, including the benefits of Ireland’s extensive
equality legislation.
One important exception relates to access to social welfare benefits. The Social
Welfare (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill 2004 introduced a “habitual residence” test
as a precondition for any person claiming a social assistance payment, including
unemployment assistance,34 and child benefits. The new residence test requires a
claimant for social assistance to be “habitually resident” in Ireland or the rest of
the Common Travel Area (United Kingdom, Channel Island and the Isle of Man) for
a continuous period of at least two years. In addition to duration and continuity of
residence, whether or not a person is habitually resident is decided according to
employment prospects, reasons for coming to Ireland, future intentions and centre
of interest (e.g., family, home connection).35 (See Chapter 8 for more details of these
provisions.)
With regard to permanent residence, the first point to note is that Ireland does not
have a permanent immigration programme that grants migrant workers the right
to permanent residence immediately upon admission to Ireland. There are, how-
ever, two possibilities for non-EEA nationals who are already lawfully employed in
Ireland to get permission to stay and work permanently: naturalization (after five
years), and application for “permission to remain without condition as to time”
(after eight years).
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32. Data provided by the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform in March 2005.
33. There is one important exception. Section 37(5) of the Employment Equality Act 1998 exempts employment in private households,
e.g. domestic child minders and carers. Note that some of those jobs are excluded from the work permit system since April 2003
(when the list of ineligible occupational categories was introduced).
34. The full list of social assistance payments to which the new residence test applies includes: unemployment assistance, non-
contributory old age and blind pension, non-contributory widow(er)’s and orphan’s pensions, one parent family payments, carer’s
allowance, disability allowance and supplementary welfare allowance (other than once-off exceptional and urgent needs payments).
Importantly, the residence condition does not apply to social insurance payments such as disability benefit, retirement pensions, and
where entitlement is gained by the payment of social insurance contributions.
35. The introduction of the habitual residence tests was thought necessary to secure and protect the social welfare system in light of
the anticipated inflow of workers from the accession countries.
3.3.1  Naturalization
After five years of legal residence in Ireland (over a period of nine years), migrant
workers may apply for Irish citizenship.36 So far, the number of naturalizations has
been quite small. Between 2001 and 2004, a total of 5,387 foreigners acquired Irish
citizenship, with the highest number being Pakistani (653), Bosnian (578), Indian
(299), Somali (257), Iraqi (229) and Sudanese (200).37 A breakdown by previous
residence/employment status in Ireland is not available, but the above list
suggests that the majority of naturalized persons during 2001-2004 would have
been recognized refugees. Given that the number of work permits started to increase
dramatically in 1999, an imminent significant rise in the number of applications for
Irish citizenship from persons who have been employed on employment permits in
Ireland for five years or longer may be expected.
It is interesting to note in this context that, according to the DJELR, there is
currently a backlog of approximately 9,000 naturalization applications. Extra
resources have been deployed to tackle the 24-month processing time.
Immigration officials believe that the 184 per cent increase in applications
between 2001 and 2004 is likely to further accelerate in the coming years.38
3.3.2 Permission to Remain without Condition as to Time 
Non-nationals who have been legally resident in Ireland for over eight years39 but
have not, for whatever reason, applied for naturalization, may apply for long-term
residence in Ireland without condition as to time. Persons granted this permanent
residence permission are also exempted from employment permit requirements.
It is important to emphasize that, apart from the unlimited right to reside and the
right to work without need of an employment permit, leave to remain without
condition as to time does not grant migrants any rights beyond those of non-EEA
nationals employed on temporary employment permits. For example, migrants
from a country subject to the visa requirement with leave to remain without
condition as to time, will still need a visa each time they re-enter Ireland. They can
also be refused permission to enter on all the normal grounds (such as insufficient
funds). Furthermore, unless migrants can support their families, family reunifica-
tion will not be allowed.
It may therefore be concluded that the rights and security associated with
permission to remain in Ireland without condition as to time, fall well short of the
rights enjoyed by Irish citizens, other EEA nationals in Ireland and, more generally,
by “immigrants” with permanent residence status in some other immigration
countries.40 This may be presumed to be a major consideration in a migrant’s decisions
on the best way of acquiring secure and permanent residence status in Ireland.
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36. As an important exception, legal residence as a student or asylum seeker does not count toward this minimum period of five years.
37. Data provided by the DJELR.
38. Personal communication with official at the DJELR in April 2005.
39. Again, periods of residence in the State for the purpose of study or for the examination of an asylum claim do 
not count for this purpose.
40. See, for example, the rights associated with permanent immigrant status in Canada (see
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/newcomer/guide/section-09.html).
3.4  Current Policy Proposals and Developments
Ireland’s transformation into a country of immigration has been both recent and
extremely rapid. In response to the new phenomenon of significant immigration
and employment of non-Irish nationals, immigration policies had to evolve very
rapidly. As a result, it is widely agreed that most of Ireland’s current policy frame-
work for immigration may be seen as rather piecemeal.
The Irish government is in the process of formulating a more comprehensive 
and managed approach. This is borne out by five current policy proposals/
developments: (i) the recently announced creation of the INIS; (ii) the recent
publication by the DJELR of a discussion paper which outlines policy proposals on
a comprehensive Immigration and Residence Bill, expected to be introduced later
this year (2005); (iii) current work by the DETE on a new Employment Permits Bill,
which is also expected before the end of 2005; (iv) current work on reviewing the
Employment Agencies Act 1971, and (v) efforts to strengthen the work of the
Labour Inspectorate.
3.4.1  Creation of the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service (INIS)
In March 2005, the Irish government announced the establishment of INIS, a new
executive office within DJELR. According to the DJELR, INIS will provide “a single
contact point or “one-stop shop” for applications for entry to the State, combining
the current work permit and visa application processes”.41 It is proposed that INIS
will achieve this through, among other things, a virtual link between the work
permit system at DETE. If this can indeed be implemented, INIS may be expected
to be instrumental in streamlining and coordinating current systems for obtaining
work permits (issued by DETE) and visas (issued by DJELR). However, it is important
to emphasize that, as currently proposed, the creation of INIS will not
automatically lead to any substantive policy changes on economic immigration,
which remains in the domain of DETE.
3.4.2  Preparation of a new Immigration and Residence Bill
In April 2005, DJELR published a discussion paper outlining a number of policy
proposals for a comprehensive new Immigration and Residence Bill. The purpose of
the discussion paper is to present an assessment of the requirement of the
proposed Immigration and Residence Bill without, however, setting out in detail
the legislative provisions proposed.
The key policy proposals outlined in DJELR’s discussion paper are summarized
below.42
s A new legislative basis for the visa system, improvements in customer service,
and a review of the need for re-entry visas by those with a valid Irish
residence permit.
s A review of existing border control legislative provisions to ensure their
effectiveness, the use of biometric data in border controls and the provision of
improved facilities for immigration control in airports and ports.
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41. See Press release by DJELR, 1 March 2005.
42. The bullet points are taken directly from the DJELR press release of 12 April 2005.
s Clearer admission procedures of migrants for a variety of purposes, including
employment and self-employment, studies, family reunification and other
purposes.
s The use of residence permits to establish entitlements to public services and
the introduction of a new long-term resident status for those already legally
resident for more than five years in the country.
s Cooperation and coordination across the public service to combat irregular
immigration and people trafficking and smuggling.
s A single procedure for the consideration of asylum and other protection
claims, and an accelerated procedure for the removal of those irregularly
present in the country.
s Improved customer service and new administrative arrangements in INIS.
With regard to regulating economic immigration, the discussion paper suggests
that legislation should “provide powers for the Minister (or the Minister of
Enterprise, Trade and Employment, as appropriate) to set out in secondary
legislation schemes for economic migration” (DJELR, 2005: 15).43 It does, however,
make a number of proposals on economic immigration, including: the creation of
a permanent migration system, with a primary focus on attracting skilled people
to Ireland; a fast-track scheme of temporary skilled migration based on sponsor-
ship by the employers, and the strengthening of employer sanctions.
With regard to creating permanent immigration channels, the discussion paper
also proposes that the Minister (of DJELR) should have the power to regulate entry
through a variety of measures, including, for example, quotas and a points system.
3.4.3  Preparation of a new Employment Permits Bill
DETE is currently preparing a new Employment Permits Bill. Its primary purpose is
to codify and create a statutory basis for the current administrative practices of
regulating labour immigration through the employment permits system. The bill
is also expected to include enabling powers for the Minister (of DETE) to
implement a range of policies necessary to regulate labour immigration to Ireland.
This includes the introduction of “a ‘green-card’ type system for highly skilled
migrant workers”.44
In a related development, following the recommendation for a skills-based
immigration policy made in the Enterprise Action Plan published in March 2005,
Forfás and the Expert Group for Future Skills Needs are currently engaged in
research on labour shortages and the types of skills for which employment permits
should be issued in the future. This report, expected in mid-2005, will form the
basis of a separate policy paper to be published subsequently by DETE.45
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43. The discussion paper also explicitly states that that “economic migration policy is a matter for the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and
Employment”, and the Immigration and Residence Legislation should be fully consistent with the Employment Permit Legislation”
(DJELR, 2005: 15).
44. Statement by Minister Micheál Martin to Seanad Eireann on 14 March 2005.
45. Ibid. `
3.4.4  Review of the Employment Agency Act 1971 
In May 2004, DETE published a discussion paper reviewing Ireland’s Employment
Agency Act 1971.46 The review was motivated by the fact that the Employment
Agency Act 1971 was enacted mainly to protect Irish emigrants going to the United
Kingdom from potential abuses by employment agencies. Ireland’s transformation
into a country of net immigration obviously raised new issues that need to be
considered in the regulation of employment agencies.47
DETE is currently preparing a policy paper dealing with employment agencies.48
This paper will launch a second round of public consultations. According to DETE, a
new bill dealing with employment agencies is expected to be published by the end
of 2005. DETE considers that in the future:49
s Employment agencies will be required to register with DETE, rather than
being licensed as at present. Overseas agencies supplying workers to work in
Ireland will also be required to register with DETE.
s Employment agencies will be required to adhere to the terms of a Statutory
Code of Practice which will set out in detail the practices and standards to be
followed by agencies.
A Statutory Monitoring and Advisory Committee will be established, representing
the various interests in the sector. This committee will oversee the code and make
recommendations to the Minister for Labour Affairs in relation to revoking or
suspending registration and/or the prosecution of agencies in breach of the code.
s Any employer who recruits a worker from an unregistered agency, either from
Ireland or overseas, will be committing an offence and be liable to prosecution.
3.4.5  Efforts to Strengthen the Work of the Labour Inspectorate
The Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment recently increased the number
of labour inspectors from 17 to 31, mainly in response to recent allegations of abuse
of migrant workers employed by the Turkish construction company Gama.
According to DETE, the additional inspectors will “concentrate their efforts on
issues of concern to migrant workers”.50
The increase in labour inspectors also follows an internal report produced by the
Labour Inspectorate, which was leaked and reported in the Irish Times, on the
measures necessary to make the Labour Inspectorate operate more effectively. As
reported in the Irish Times, the Labour Inspectorate suggested, among other things,
to raise the number of labour inspectors to between 38 and 51.51
40
46. See Review of the Employment Agency Act 1971, Discussion Paper by the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, May
2004 (downloadable at www.entemp.ie ).
47. In this context, consideration of the draft EU Directive on temporary agency workers was also agreed to be important.
48. Speech by Mr Sean Power T.D, Minister of State at the Department of Health and Children, to the National Recruitment Federation’s
Annual Conference, 7 April 2004 (downloadable at www.entemp.ie ).
49. The bullet points are taken directly form Sean Power’s speech to the National Recruitment Federation’s Annual Conference, 7 April
2004.
50. DETE press release, 12 April 2005.
51. “Labour inspectorate condemns lack of resources”, Irish Times, 8 April 2005.
3.5  Evaluation of the Regulatory Framework
This section discusses some of the major strengths and weaknesses of Ireland’s
policies and regulations for managing labour immigration from outside the EEA.
The regulatory framework is assessed with a view to the potential interests of both
Ireland and migrants.
3.5.1  The Interests of Ireland 
The impacts of immigration on the host country are multifaceted and interrelated.
This means that the identification of the “immigration needs” of the Irish economy
and society could be based on a range of economic considerations, such at the role
of immigration in sustaining economic growth, as well as non-economic factors,
such as the impact of immigration on social cohesion and national identity. In the
end, the definition of Ireland’s interests with regard to labour immigration must
derive from a discussion among the Irish public and policy makers about the
desirable objectives of Ireland’s labour immigration policies.52 Therefore, rather
than attempting an overall and definitive evaluation, the discussion below
identifies some of the major strengths and weaknesses that could potentially
affect Ireland’s interests with regard to the immigration and employment of non-
EEA nationals.
3.5.2  Providing Employers with Flexible Access to Migrant Workers
Ireland’s overall policy framework for regulating labour immigration since the late
1990s may be described as a flexible system that has given employers relatively
easy access to a large pool of non-Irish workers of all skill levels. As discussed in
Chapter 3, up to 2003, this access was facilitated through an employer-led work
permit system that was very liberal with regard to regulating the admission and
selection of non-EEA workers. Since the recent EU enlargement, local employers
have enjoyed unrestricted access to workers from the new EU member states, who
can now be employed without work permits. Employers in Ireland can also continue
to use the work permit system and the work visa/authorization programme,
neither of which is subject to quotas, to employ non-EEA workers for skilled and
highly skilled jobs. To what extent the recent exclusion of low-skilled jobs from the
work permit system affects employers’ access to workers willing to do accept such
jobs is an important question that will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.
The current immigration system’s flexibility and responsiveness to employer
demand for migrant labour has undoubtedly generated benefits for individual
employers and the Irish economy overall. For instance, it is widely agreed that with
the domestic labour pool drying up, immigration has played a critical role in
meeting significant labour shortages at both the high and low-skill labour market
segments. This has clearly helped maintain Ireland’s rapid economic growth since
the mid-1990s.53 Immigration is also considered a key requirement to maintaining
high levels of economic growth in the future.54
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52. The key issues to be considered in the choice of policy objectives are discussed in Chapter 7.
53. See, for example, Bergin and Kearney (2004).
54. See, for example, FitzGerald (2004).
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It is also possible, although perhaps less clear, that Ireland’s openness to admitting
migrant workers for employment in a variety of jobs, including low-skill labour, has
helped avoid the large-scale irregular immigration and/or irregular working of
migrants experienced in, for example, the United States and, to some extent, also
in the United Kingdom. It is clear that in the United Kingdom the absence of
significant labour immigration programmes allowing the employment of
migrants in low-skilled occupations has been a significant factor leading to
irregular immigration and irregular working of migrants, especially in low-skilled
jobs.55 At the same time, it should be acknowledged that the causal linkages
between opportunities for regular immigration, irregular immigration and irregular
working remain contested. For example, the Bracero Programme, the guest worker
programme implemented by the US government during 1942-1964 to recruit
Mexican farm labour, is widely considered to have been one of the primary factors
in the emergence of a large pool of irregular migrant workers in the United States.56
3.5.3  Few Safeguards for the Employment Prospects of Local Workers
Ireland’s policies to manage labour migration were designed in the context of a
rapidly growing economy and a significant demand for migrant labour. As a result,
there was little concern about distributional issues, such as the potentially adverse
impact of immigration on the employment prospects of local (i.e., Irish and other
EEA) workers. This is partly reflected, for example, in the continuing toleration of
the failure of the labour market test, i.e. the mandatory requirement for local
employers to search for local workers before making a work permit application for
a non-EEA national.
In late 2002, FÁS carried out an internal comparative analysis of the available data
on the potential labour supply (including the number of people on the Live
Register and others registered with FÁS for the purpose of finding employment),
vacancies notified with FÁS, and work permits issued across the various
occupations. The striking finding of this analysis was that, in late 2002, the
majority of work permits had been issued for work in unskilled occupations for
which there appeared to be a sizeable supply of local labour.57
Although there is no evidence at present that immigration is lowering wages or
raising unemployment for local workers during the current economic boom, the
potential for immigration to generate adverse labour market impacts is likely to
increase significantly during an economic downturn. Although currently no such
economic downturn is expected in Ireland, the rapid economic growth that Ireland
has experienced over the past few years cannot be presumed to continue indefinitely.
The lack of effective policies and thinking to protect the employment prospects of
local workers in a less favourable economic environment is, therefore, a serious
weakness in Ireland’s current labour immigration system.
55. In 2003, the United Kingdom issued about 130,000 work permits for skilled and highly skilled workers but only about 40,000 work
permits for employment in selected low-skill occupations and sectors.
56. See the discussion in Martin and Teitelbaum (2001).
57. Information based on personal communication with official at FÁS in 2004.
3.5.4  Lack of a Permanent Immigration Programme 
The lack of a permanent immigration programme that could be used for “direct
entry” of newcomers, and to acquire secure “permanent immigrant” status for
migrant workers already employed in Ireland on temporary work permits, is
problematic for a number of reasons.
First, the offer of a temporary employment permit with no opportunity to gain
secure permanent residence status other than through naturalization may be a
serious obstacle to attracting skilled and highly skilled workers to Ireland. In
today’s globalized labour markets for highly skilled workers, the conditions offered
are known to be an important factor in a migrant’s choice of destination. This has
recently been illustrated by the failure of Germany’s “green card” programme,
which offered a strictly limited five-year work permit to attract significant
numbers of highly skilled migrants. It is likely that the effective recruitment of
foreign talent requires the offer of secure permanent residence immediately, or at
least very soon, after arrival.
Second, the lack of possibilities for migrants already in the country to acquire
secure permanent immigrant status other than through citizenship puts pressure
on the naturalization system. As discussed in section two, there is currently a
backlog of 9,000 applications for citizenship, many from migrant workers already
employed in Ireland on temporary work permits for more than five years. The lack of
a permanent residence programme might also be seen as debasing the meaning of
naturalization, as some migrant workers may simply resort to it as a means of
gaining permanent residence in Ireland, rather than as the significant process of
identifying with a new country that it is intended to be.
Third, a permanent immigration programme is needed to ensure that Ireland’s
work permit policies avoid the policy mistakes made by past guest worker
programmes, particularly the presumption that migrant workers are essentially
available on tap, i.e., that their numbers could be increased or decreased as a
simple function of the economic needs of the receiving country. It needs to be
recognized that some migrant workers entering Ireland under the temporary work
permit system may seek permission to remain in Ireland on a permanent basis.
This demonstrates the need for transparent mechanisms and rules for a regulated
and conditional (i.e. non-automatic) transfer into other and upgraded programmes
granting permanent residence status to some foreign workers under certain
conditions.
3.5.5  Enforcement Challenges 
As of February 2005, only three employers had been convicted for violating the
Employment Permits Act 2003. The failure to effectively prosecute employers who
illegally employ migrant workers is widely agreed to be one of the most important
factors leading to irregular immigration and irregular work and, as a potential
consequence, to the failure of labour immigration policies. This is because, in
contrast to all other immigration control policies, employer sanctions serve the
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important purpose of addressing the demand for irregular migrant workers. In the
absence of appropriate policies to minimize demand, the policies aimed at
minimizing supply (border control, deportations) are likely to be much less
effective than they could be.58
There is also anecdotal evidence supporting the view that Ireland’s extensive
equality and employment legislation does not always translate into the effective
protection of and respect for migrants’ employment conditions in practice. Apart
from the obvious adverse consequences for migrants, low levels of enforcement of
employment laws and regulations could also harm Irish interests. For instance, it
could put local workers at a disadvantage by undercutting local wages and employ-
ment conditions unacceptable to local workers. Whatever the economic circum-
stances, the violation of minimum employment conditions increases the risk that
the employment of migrant workers will adversely impact the employment
prospects of local workers.
3.5.6  Lack of Overall Policy Coordination and Consistency
Given the recent and rapid increase in the number of non-Irish workers arriving in
Ireland, labour immigration policies had to be developed in a very short period of
time. As a result, the overall policy framework for managing labour immigration
has been designed in a piecemeal rather than in a coordinated and consistent
manner. For example, although a number of different departments are involved in
regulating the admission and employment of migrant labour, there is currently no
permanent interdepartmental committee or working group on migration. Besides,
despite its declared objective to facilitate the temporary immigration and employ-
ment of non-EEA nationals, the current work permit system includes no policies to
encourage migrants to return once their temporary work permits have expired.
Instead, migrants employed on temporary work permits for over five years are
eligible to apply for citizenship without having to fulfil any economic criteria.
Ireland’s current temporary work permit policies are thus effectively a first step
toward permanent residence status through naturalization. While this is not
necessarily undesirable, it does beg the question whether the objective of the work
permit system is to facilitate temporary or permanent immigration, or a mixture
of both.
3.5.7  The Interests of Migrants
Migration can affect migrants in many ways. Just as in relation to the national
interests of home or host countries, a migrant’s interests are likely to include a
range of economic and other considerations. At the risk of oversimplification, it is
useful to make a broad distinction between the impacts of Ireland’s current labour
immigration policies on migrants’ economic welfare, i.e., their income and
employment prospects, and migrants’ rights.
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58. For a discussion of this argument for the case of the United States of America, see Cornelius (2004).
3.5.8  Financial Gains from Good Access to the Irish Labour Market
Until recently, Ireland’s labour immigration policies made it relatively easy for non-
EEA nationals to access the Irish labour market. Until 2003, the work permit system
was effectively open to non-EEA nationals of all skill levels, to be employed in
almost any job in Ireland. Since then, the labour market access of workers from
outside the enlarged European Union (especially those seeking employment in
low-skilled jobs in Ireland) has been more restricted. At the same time, the access
for workers from the new EU member countries has been further liberalized by
removing all restrictions on their immigration and employment in Ireland.
To be sure, not all migration stories are economic success stories and migrant
workers may sometimes become victims of discrimination and/or exploitation in
the workplace. Recent research has also shown that the educational attainment
and skills of migrant workers are often significantly above those required by the
work they are doing in Ireland.59 Nevertheless, it is reasonable to generalize that, in
the majority of cases, employment in Ireland leads to a financial gain for migrants,
which may otherwise have not materialized if the worker had remained at home.
Even when employment in Ireland is at or near the minimum wage, and in jobs
that do not reflect the migrant’s educational attainment and skills, the wages
earned by migrant workers are still likely to be significantly higher than, and in
some cases multiples of, the wages they would earn in their countries of origin.
Unfortunately, there is currently no systematic evidence regarding the incomes of
migrants in Ireland. The only available study on this subject is based on
information provided by employers in the work permit application form.60 This
form requires employers to specify the gross weekly pay offered to migrant
workers. There is, of course, no guarantee that migrant workers actually receive
those wages in practice.
The study found that, in 2002, the average gross weekly pay offered to migrant
workers employed on work permits was EUR 423.61. However, there were
significant variations across occupations and economic sectors. Data on weekly
pay by occupation suggest that the highest paid work permit holders are active in
associate professional and technical occupations (EUR 1,033 per week in 2002),
followed by professional occupations (EUR 933) and managers and administrators
(EUR 556). The lowest pay for work permit holders were found in sales occupations
(EUR 304 per week), other (unskilled) occupations (EUR 336) and personal and
protective service occupations (EUR 383).
It may be concluded that Ireland’s labour immigration policies since the late 1990s
have by and large benefited migrants by providing them relatively good access to
the Irish labour market, which, in turn, has enabled migrants to financially better
themselves and their families. However, the recent exclusion of low-skilled jobs
from the work permit system means that the financial benefits from employment
in Ireland are now available only to those non-EEA nationals with the qualifi-
cations to take up skilled and highly skilled employment.
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59. See Minns (2005) and Barrett, Bergin and Duffy (2005).
60. See Ruhs (2003a). This study contains a detailed descriptive analysis of work permit data for 1999 to March 2003.
3.5.9  Potential Personal Costs from Violations of Migrants’ Rights 
Based on their change of location and legal status (from citizens in their countries
of origin to third-country migrants in the host country), migrant workers
necessarily experience a change in the range and scope of their legal rights and
obligations. One of the most frequently discussed restrictions is that a migrant
worker employed on a temporary work permit in Ireland is only allowed to work for
the employer specified on the permit, thus restricting the migrant’s right to
freedom of movement in the labour market.
In addition to the official restrictions of migrants’ rights imposed by the current
regulatory framework for managing labour immigration, there may be other
irregular restrictions of migrants’ rights and employment conditions. Although
there is no systematic evidence, NGOs, trade unions and some elements of the
public media have persistently reported on alleged violations of migrant workers’
rights, especially concerning minimum wages and employment conditions of
migrant workers employed under the work permit system.61 A number of high
profile cases have been made public recently, including those of Gama, a Turkish
construction company accused of paying its Turkish migrant workers less than Irish
workers, and Irish Ferries, accused of paying a Filipina worker EUR 1 per hour.62
Such unlawful restrictions and violations of migrant workers’ rights may have a
number of causes. For instance, the requirement that migrants work for the
employer specified on the work permit only, the current work permit system may
make it difficult for some migrants to escape unsatisfactory working conditions.
The problem may be exacerbated by some employers’ illegal practices of retaining
migrant workers’ passports and by the provision of “tied accommodation”, i.e.,
accommodation provided by the employer to their migrant workers on the
condition that, and as long as, the migrant continues to work for that particular
employer. This may lead to employers gaining excessive control over migrant
workers, which they would not be able to exercise over local workers, and thus
potentially lead to exploitation.
It is important to emphasize that the information currently available is insufficient
to draw from conclusions on the extent to which the extensive rights and
protections offered to migrant workers under Ireland’s equality legislation are in
fact implemented and enforced in practice. In the absence of systematic evidence,
the suggestion of fairly widespread exploitation of migrant workers can be neither
confirmed nor refuted. What can be said, based on the anecdotal evidence, is that
at least some migrant workers employed in Ireland do experience restrictions of
their rights that go beyond those officially imposed by Ireland’s labour
immigration policies.
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61. See, for example, ICI (2004 and 2003), MRCI (2004), Grabowska (2003) and Conroy and Brennan (2003).
62. These cases attracted extensive media coverage in early 2005. See also the DETE press release  “Statement by Minister Micheál
Martin to Seanad Éireann in Relation to Rights of Migrant Workers”, 12 April 2005.
3.6  Concluding Remarks
The discussion above suggests that Ireland’s labour immigration policies may have
presented some migrant workers in Ireland with a trade-off in outcomes: on the
one hand, migrants have reaped financial gains resulting from their access to the
Irish labour market, while, on the other, employment in Ireland also meant official
restrictions of some of their rights and, in some cases, the disregard of their
employment conditions. The extent to which the restriction of their rights and the
violations of their employment conditions entail personal costs for migrants will
vary between different migrants (and their employers). The trade-off between
migrants’ rights and financial gains from employment in Ireland is a potential one;
whether and to what extent it occurs in practice is an important question for
empirical research.
It is also important to recognize that migrant workers with few or no other
opportunities to economically better themselves and their families are likely to
accept at least some restrictions of their rights in return for improved access to the
labour market in Ireland or any other high-income country. In fact, given the wide
income inequalities between developed and developing countries, migrant
workers may sometimes be willing to trade economic gains for restrictions of
personal rights and freedoms to a degree that would normally be considered
unacceptable in most liberal democracies. Two extreme examples concern migrant
workers from developing countries who choose to migrate temporarily to the oil-
rich Persian Gulf states and Singapore despite the grave restrictions of many of
their labour and other rights while employed there.
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Migration Determinants 
and Projecting Need
4
This section deals with projections of demand for and supply of labour in Ireland
in the medium term, focusing on factors motivating migration in general and to
Ireland in particular. We discuss the demand for labour as well as the capacity to
expand the Irish labour force in terms of numbers, skills, and hours worked to fill
Irish jobs.
4.1  Overview
Historically, Ireland has been a classic country of emigration. The 1841 census
recorded 6.5 million residents in the counties that today constitute Ireland.
Emigration helped to reduce the number to 5.1 million in 1851, 4.4 million in 1861,
3.2 million in 1901, and a low of 2.8 million in 1961. In 2004, the Irish population was
four million, with an estimated three million Irish citizens abroad, most in the
United Kingdom and the United States; this diaspora included 1.2 million persons
born in Ireland. Ireland’s migration turning point, after which inflows (including
returning Irish citizens) exceeded outflows occurred in 1996.63
Between 1991 and 2004, the Irish labour force increased by an average 43,500 a
year, rising from 1.35 million to 1.95 million. This growth included an average 16,700
net migrants, two-thirds of whom were in the labour force. Migrants (including
returned Irish) contributed 26 per cent to labour force growth over the past
decade, which was also marked by rising female labour force participation and
falling unemployment (CSO, 2004: 29, 31).
In 2004, there were almost 1.9 million employed workers and 87,000 unemployed,
for an unemployment rate of 4.4 per cent (Table 4.1). Employment is projected to
rise by 45,000 in 2005 and by 22,000 in 2006, with the unemployment rate stable.
This additional employment is projected to be concentrated in two sectors:
construction, adding 11,000 jobs in 2005, and services, adding 33,000.
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63. FitzGerald (2004, 11) emphasizes that, although “emigration may still be part of the experience of up to a third of each generation,”
contemporary Irish emigrants are seen as “homing pigeons” likely to return, with their experience abroad increasing their incomes in
Ireland over what they would have been if they had not gone abroad.
The Irish population is projected to be 4.2 million in 2006. In making projections of
the Irish population and labour force after 2006, the CSO developed two
assumptions about immigration, both of which anticipate declines from the
current 30,000 net migrants a year64 (Table 4.2). In both cases, the Irish population
grows, from 4.2 million in 2005 to 4.8 million in 2016 and 5.7 million in 2036 under
M1, and from 4.2 million to 4.6 million and to 5.1 million under M2, using the
middle F2 fertility assumption of 1.85 babies per woman under both scenarios
(CSO, 2004: 32).
Under the higher M1 migration assumption, the 15-64 age group would rise from
2.6 million in 2001 to 3.2 million in 2016; under M2, it would rise to 3 million. Under
the higher M1 assumption, the Irish labour force is projected to increase by 38,000
a year, versus 29,000 a year under the lower M2 assumption. This means that,
under both migration assumptions, labour force growth will slow because much of
the 1991-2004 labour force growth was due to Irish women raising their labour
force participation rates, a one-time event. The difference between the higher M1
and the lower M2 migration assumptions results in a difference of 100,000 in the
size of the labour force in 2016.
Ireland’s labour force could be larger or smaller than the CSO assumes because
government policies can affect the size of the labour force directly and indirectly.
Most governments encourage citizens to work and to ensure that sufficient decent
jobs are available to them, and supply can influence demand if government
undertakes projects that create jobs to ensure that otherwise unemployed
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64. M1 assumes 30,000 immigrants a year between 2006 and 2016, then 20,000 a year to 2025, and 15,000 a year after 2026. M2 drops
from 30,000 to 20,000 immigrants per year in 2006, to 10,000 in 2011, and to 5,000 after 2016.
Table 4.1 Ireland: Employment and Unemployment
by Sector 2004–2006
Annual averages 2004 2005* 2006 2004 Distribution
Agriculture 117 115 113 6%
Construction 214 225 225 11%
Industry 301 305 305 16%
Services 1,232 1,265 1,289 66%
Total 1,865 -1,910 1,932 100%
Unemployed 87 85 88
Labour Force 1,952 1,995 2,020
Unemplyment Rate % 4.4 4.3 4.4
Source  FÁS Labour Market Quarterly Report 2005 www.fas.ie/information_and_publications/publications/index.html  
*Data for 2005 and 2006 are projecte.
workers have jobs. The demand for labour is derived from the demand for output,
and the government can influence the demand for output by e.g., running deficits
to finance projects that create jobs or running surpluses to remove buying power
from the economy. Ireland has ceded control of monetary policy to the European
Central Bank, otherwise, it could adjust devalue its currency to bolster exports and
job creation or vice versa.
If we begin with the supply of labour, the number of workers seeking jobs reflects
government policy decisions. For example, if Ireland continues to permit EU-10
nationals to enter and work, the Irish labour force could grow faster than assumed
by the CSO, and faster still if non-EU foreigners are granted work permits.65 Policies
such as those on (minimum) wages, unemployment benefits, and education 
and pensions also affect the size and growth of the labour force, so that the
potential sources of labour listed below are subject to at least some degree of
government control:
s Irish residents who are unemployed or not in the labour force;
s Irish citizens outside Ireland who could return and work;
s EU-15 nationals who may want to move to Ireland;
s EU-10 nationals who may want to move to Ireland, but whose employment
can be restricted until 2011; and
s Non-EEA nationals inside or outside of Ireland.
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65. Most non-EEA migrant workers arrive with renewable one-year work permits issued by DETE to the migrant’s Irish employer after a
test of the Irish labour market to ensure that the migrants are needed. The number of new work permits issued rose from about
4,600 in 1999 to a peak 30,000 in 2001, and then fell to 10,900 in 2004 when EU-10 nationals were no longer required to have work
permits. An additional 1,158 work authorizations were issued in 2003, primarily to nurses who are given two-year authorizations to
work for any e.g., hospital employer. The Employment Permits Act of 2003 as well as separate administrative decisions made it
harder to get work permits for unskilled EEA workers.
DETE suspended the trainee programme at the end of 2002, which allowed foreigners to engage in paid or unpaid training at an
Irish firm for up to three years, as well as the intra-company transfer scheme, which allowed transfers to Irish offices of the same
firm for up to four years, for fear that recruitment agencies were abusing these programs (Ruhs, 2005: 12. There were some
exceptions made to the intra-company transfer stop). Non-EEA nationals who invest at least EUR 300,000 and create at least two
new jobs in Ireland for EEA nationals can receive renewable one-year permits that can eventually be converted to permanent
residence permits
Table 4.2 Irish Labour Force, 1991–2016
Ave Annual Ave Annual Ave Annual Migration
Net Migration Migrant Labour Force Labour Force Increase Share
1991–2004 16,700 11,139 43,500 26%
2004–2016 Projections
No Migration 0 16,900 0%
M1 High 30,000 20,010 37,800 53%
M2 Low 17,500 11,673 29,200 40%
Assumes that 2/3 of migrants join the labour force.
Source CSO, 2004, 31
The demand for labour is derived from the demand for output, which reflects
conditions in Ireland and abroad. Forecasts for industrial countries usually begin
with predictions of economic and productivity growth to project aggregate
employment as well as employment by industry and occupation. The ESRI Medium
Term Review 2003-10, for example, forecast that employment would rise from
about 1.8 million in 2005 to 2 million in 2010, that the unemployment rate would
fall slightly, and that net migration would be about 20,000 a year.66
These projections underestimated employment in 2005 (1.9 million), overestimated
unemployment, and underestimated net migration. The Enterprise Strategy Group
(2004) issued a report projecting more migrants. It examined the evolution of the
labour supply between 1993 and 2003 and concluded that, if Irish economic growth
continued at current rates, some 420,000 new workers would be employed by
2010 (DJELR, 2005: 61).
Developing such a model was beyond the scope of this project, but an Expert
Group examining the role of migration in addressing skill needs in the Irish
economy reviewed the forecasting models for both skill and labour shortages
(2005). The Expert Group distinguished skill shortages from labour shortages,
emphasizing that time is required for a worker to acquire skills, and identified skill
shortages in nine areas, from construction and finance to healthcare and catering
in Ireland (chefs received the most work permits in the first half of 2005). Labour
shortages (not enough workers at prevailing wages and conditions) were
identified in generally unskilled jobs in agriculture and food processing as well as
in services such as security guards and waiters. The Expert Group examined the
availability of potential migrants from other EEA countries, who already have
freedom of movement rights to seek jobs in Ireland, and concluded that “continued
non-EEA immigration will be needed…over the next number of years” to meet Irish
labour needs.
Irish workers are likely to be even more skilled in the future. Ireland has raised
educational achievement remarkably, and now has a higher percentage of 25-34
year olds who have completed upper secondary or high school than the EU or
OECD averages. This is a remarkable accomplishment in light of the fact that 20
years ago Ireland was well below average in educational attainment, as shown in
Table 4.3 that only 37 per cent of those 55 to 64 completed upper secondary
education (high school).
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66. All of the employment growth was projected to be in services. Employment in agriculture and industry was projected to decrease.
Completion of tertiary education (college and university) is also rising, and
significantly exceeds the OECD average among 25–34 year olds, at 37 per cent for
Ireland and 28 per cent for all OECD countries (OECD, 2004b: 11).67 Ireland also has
a much higher percentage of 20-29 year old graduates in mathematics, science and
technology than the EU average, suggesting significant progress in reaching the
country’s goal of transforming itself from a technology-importing, low-cost
economy to an innovation-based, technology-generating society.
The major Irish migration management challenges are likely to involve workers in
jobs that do not require high levels of schooling. In some cases, these workers may
have a secondary or university education, but be working in unskilled jobs in
Ireland because of the wage difference between Ireland and their countries of
origin. If they settle, they are likely to quickly learn English, and should enjoy upward
mobility in Ireland. Also of concern are foreign workers with little education arriving
to fill jobs that do not require much education; FitzGerald (2004, 12) suggests that
admitting unskilled migrants is likely to “push unskilled wage rates down and raise
the rate of unemployment.”
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67. In 1995/96, tuition fees for undergraduates were eliminated in Ireland; expenditure per student averaged US$ 10,000 in 2001. Ireland
has 20 major publicly funded higher education institutions, seven universities and 13 institutes of technology.
Table 4.3 Per Cent of Adults with an Upper Secondary 
(High School) Education, 2002
25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 25–64
Ireland 77 65 51 37 60
France 79 68 60 48 65
Germany 85 86 84 77 83
Sweden 91 87 79 67 82
Switzerland 88 85 80 75 82
United Kingdom 70 65 62 56 64
United States 87 88 89 84 87
OECD Average 75 69 61 50 65
EU Average 75 68 60 49 64
Source OECD, 2004b, 10
4.2  Why Labour Migration?
Economically motivated migration is generally explained by demand-pull factors
in the destination area, supply-push factors in the origin area, and network factors
that link them. There are three clear lessons of experience:
s If demand-pull and supply-push factors exist, approved or unapproved
recruitment can set labour migration in motion. If the reasons for migration
persist, the people and information networks that evolve can help migration
to snowball or increase over time;
s If supply-push factors weaken because of e.g. wage and job growth in migrant
areas of origin, emigration can slow even if demand-pull and network factors
abroad persist, as in the Korean, Irish, Italian, and Spanish cases, where
emigration slowed with economic growth; and
s If demand-pull factors abroad persist, migrants are likely to continue to arrive
although their origins and networks may change, as in the case of Germany’s
shift from Turkish to Polish construction workers.
Public policy can influence the nature and interaction of demand-pull, supply-push
and network factors. Demand-pull factors are most amenable to management by
governments at the beginning of labour flows, explaining the aphorism that the
easiest way for a government to start a labour migration flow from a particular
area is to encourage, allow or tolerate the recruitment of migrants there. Over
time, government policy may lose its effectiveness as migrant supply creates its
own demand in destination areas in ways that make government efforts to reduce
migrant inflows difficult. For example, middle-class households who once did their
own house work can hire gardeners and domestic helpers, creating more jobs and
new industries, while migrant networks in construction, agriculture, and some
manufacturing and services can “take over” recruitment and training mechanisms.
If employers adapt to the language and nature of the migrant work force, they may
no longer seek local workers to fill vacant jobs.
Governmental efforts to “re-nationalize” what have become migrant work forces
are generally unsuccessful. In France in the early 1980s and in the oil-exporting
Gulf countries today, government policies aimed at training natives and
subsidizing their wages to “better compete with” migrants have generally failed
because many employers preferred the migrants to whom they had become
accustomed.68 Successful “re-nationalization” strategies generally involve (subsidized)
mechanization or technological changes that restructure work, as in agriculture, or
provide sharply higher wages, as with home healthcare workers hired in the
United States by the elderly with support of tax monies.69 Freer trade can also
affect the demand for migrants, as cheaper imports eventually shrink or eliminate
certain industries and their demand for migrants.
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68. For example, in 2004 Saudi Interior Minister Prince Naif said that Saudi Arabia's goal was to "fill all jobs with Saudis." Government
agencies and private firms have been ordered to employ Saudis and improve the competencies of their new Saudi employees by
providing them with the necessary training, as well as "reasonable salaries." He said, "God willing, a time will come when there will
be no competition for Saudis [in the labour market]. Competition will only be between the Saudi graduates themselves, and the
most qualified and capable will get the job." Saudi Arabia has 4.6 million foreign workers; they are 70 percent of Saudi Arabia's
workers.”
69. In California, in-home care was upgraded when a public agency was created in each county to be a co-employer with the elderly
person, and unions negotiated agreements with these county agencies that were binding on the elderly receiving in-home care
services. Wages were raised above the minimum, health benefits were added, and the work was shifted, at considerable cost to
taxpayers, from irregular to regular.
In some cases, the demand-pull for migrants can be reduced with stepped-up
enforcement of labour, immigration, and tax laws, especially when the demand for
migrants exists or expands because of violations of such laws. However, it has been
difficult for governments in most countries to sustain the level of enforcement
needed to transform “migrant jobs” into jobs acceptable to local workers solely
with enforcement. With employers and migrants wanting to prolong their
relationship, there must be ample and sustained enforcement to prevent what the
public often sees as an economic asset or at worst a “victimless crime.”
4.3  Managing Labour Migration
Governments generally react to the immigration that accompanies economic and
job growth. When a government wants to assess how to proceed after a decade of
immigration, it is very hard to find general guideposts to re-assert “control” over
labour migration.
In the Irish case, projections of future labour demand and supply will be very
different if the base is the past decade of rapid growth or a longer period in which
growth was slower. Furthermore, labour market projections in other countries
have often been wrong, as demonstrated by examples of governments subsidizing
teaching, nursing or engineering education to meet a projected shortage, and then
having graduates enter the labour market just as unemployment surges.
There is one universal strategy for dealing with labour demand that exceeds
supply – raising (minimum) wages, which has the effect of reducing labour
demand and increasing local supply.70 However, most labour shortages are sector
specific, so that raising minimum wages across the board may be inflationary. In
addition, a general strategy of raising the minimum wage could eliminate jobs for
migrants as well as non-migrants. This opens the possibility for sector-specific
solutions to more jobs than workers in particular industries, and the focus on
specific sectors can highlight links that justify importing workers.
Sector-specific strategies to manage migration in ways that complement
government strategies are available. For example, mechanisms could be developed
to allow government, employers and workers organizations in migrant-dependent
sectors such as construction, catering, or agriculture to agree on policies to deal
with current and projected labour surpluses and shortages. If a trade or policy
change is expected to reduce the demand for farm or textile workers, many of
whom are migrants, a medium-term strategy may be to import foreign workers
while retraining local workers for other jobs, knowing that eventually the industry
is likely to shrink with trade liberalization. One way to generate funds for such
sector-specific plans is to charge employers a monthly levy, as some Asian
countries do, but use the funds collected to implement the strategies developed by
the tri-partite sector groups, which they do not do. Alternatively, the payroll taxes
paid by employers and migrants could be isolated and used to fund sector-specific
transformation plans. These taxes need to be paid to equalize the cost of hiring
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70. Protecting migrants so that they have safe working conditions and entitlements can also reduce the demand for migrants if a
significant share is employed in violation of labour standards laws.
migrants and local workers and thus protect local workers, but in many cases
migrants are not eligible for the benefits supported by their tax payments, such as
for unemployment benefits.
On the other hand, if labour market projections expect demand to continue to
exceed supply, as for healthcare workers, the response might be subsidies for
training local healthcare workers while allowing the recruitment of foreigners,
with a policy decision required on whether the migrant nurses and other
healthcare professionals should be guest workers expected to return, immigrants
expected to settle, or probationary immigrants who can settle if they meet certain
criteria. Sector-specific discussions are most likely to identify efforts to subsidize or
coordinate labour-saving changes (such as those that reduce demand) or training
strategies (that increase supply by encouraging greater labour force participation),
more hours of work, and/or migrants.
In general, governments opting for immigration to deal with current and projected
labour shortages must decide whether the foreign workers should be admitted
temporarily or permanently, and how the basis for admission should be linked to
current job vacancies. Policies that look closely at current vacancies are considered
demand-based, in the sense that employer demand leads to the admission of
foreign workers, while policies that look closely at individual characteristics are
considered supply-based, in the sense that the foreigner’s individual characteris-
tics determine whether a visa is issued. The two approaches can also be combined,
as for example in the US H-1B programme that allows employers to request only
college educated foreigners to fill vacant jobs, or the Canadian point system that
awards up to ten of the (currently) 67 points needed to be eligible for a skilled
worker immigrant visa to foreigners with permanent job offers in Canada.71
The US government takes primarily a demand approach to current job vacancies,
allowing employers to decide who is best qualified to fill a particular job, and
admitting migrants if employers select them for periods ranging from a few
months to several years to indefinitely. The immigration front door has four major
streams: family unification, employment (to fill vacant jobs), refugees and
diversity. About one-seventh of US immigrants (up to 140,000 individuals a year
including family members)72 are admitted because they have extraordinary ability
(using an assessment without points) or because US employers sponsored them
for immigrant visas (Table 4.4).
If Ireland were to follow a demand approach to selecting economic immigrants,
there are two lessons from the US experience that warrant attention. First, three-
fourths of the employment-related immigrant visas involve “pre-admission”
labour market tests or certification, which means that a US employer must prove
to the satisfaction of the US Department of Labor that US workers are not
available to fill the job for which the employer is seeking an immigrant.
Governments can and the US government does impose certain minimum criteria
that the foreigners selected by employers for particular types of immigrant visas
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71. Currently, applicants for skilled worker immigrant visas must achieve at least 67 of 100 points, with up to 25 points awarded for
education, 24 for language skills, 21 for work experience, and ten each for age, a Canadian job offer, and “adaptability” to Canada
(www.cic.gc.ca/english/skilled/qual-5.html).
72. Only “principals” must satisfy the labour market test; their family members are admitted without any tests. An average 55,000
“principals” a year got employment-related immigrant visas after being screened or sponsored in recent years.
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must satisfy73, such as having a college or advanced degree. However, in the course
of reviewing the job and the foreigner’s credentials, there are often disputes,
suggesting that the global talent these immigrant programmes aim to attract can
be in the eye of the beholder. In order to evaluate whether employers have made a
good faith effort to recruit local workers, the Irish government would have to
establish a system to determine prevailing wages by industry, occupation, and area
and consider employer appeals of negative decisions.74
Second, the United States has relatively few admissions of “global talent.” The
regulations permit foreigners with “extraordinary ability” to enter as immigrants
without a labour market test, but this so-called first preference immigrant
category admits an average 2,200 foreigners a year, well under one per cent of the
annual immigration flow.75 As we move down the table, the requirements for an
immigrant visa are reduced and the numbers increase, so there are an average a
2,400 outstanding professors a year given immigrant visas and 6,700 executives
and managers. If the US share of global migrant talent is about the same as its
share of anticipated regular immigration, about half, it appears that the pool of
highly talented people eager to migrate is not large.
73. The 1965 Immigration Act allows foreigners to be admitted to fill vacant US jobs if (1) there are not sufficient workers who are able,
willing, qualified and available at the time of application for a visa and admission to the United States and at the place where the
alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled labour, and (2) the employment of such alien will not adversely affect the wages and
working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.
74. The United States has a Board of Alien Labour Certification Appeals (http://www.oalj.dol.gov/libina.htm).
75. Second- and third-preference immigrants, professionals with advanced degrees and other professionals and unskilled workers, must
undergo labour certification. (http://atlas.doleta.gov/foreign/perm.asp), meaning that their U.S. employers must prove to the
satisfaction of the US Department of Labor that no US workers are available to fill the job
Table 4.4 Per Cent of Adults with an Upper Secondary 
(High School) Education, 2002
1998 2000 2002 Average
Principals getting visas 33,771 50,135 79,802 54,569 Per Dist
1st Preference 8,709 11,452 13,807 11,323 100%
Aliens with 
extraordinary ability 1,691 2,002 2,881 2,191 21%
Outstanding 
professors/researchers 1,835 2,667 2,737 2,413 4%
Multinational
executives/managers 5,183 6,783 8,189 6,718 4%
2nd preference professionals
with advanced degrees 6,933 9,815 21,334 12,694 12%
3rd preference 15,143 24,373 41,238 26,918 23%
Skilled workers 8,515 13,651 17,788 13,318 49%
Source US CIS, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 
http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/yearbook/index.htm
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand are examples of governments that take a
supply approach to selecting immigrants, meaning that foreigners wishing to
immigrate are assessed on the basis of personal traits such as age, years of
education, language ability etc., and those achieving enough points are allowed to
immigrate. Point systems are considered supply-side approaches to selecting
immigrants because they identify personal characteristics that are likely to assure
economic success in the destination country, and admit only those who score
sufficient points. The result is sometimes disappointment, as foreigners with
credentials find that local employers do not value them or local professional
associations refuse to issue required licenses, which can lead to “brain waste.”
For example, even though 45 per cent of adult immigrants arriving in Canada in
2000 had university degrees, many worked in jobs that did not require degrees.
University-educated immigrant men 25 to 54 who arrived in Canada between 1990
and 1999 earned an average CAN 41,700 in 2000, while comparable Canadian-born
men earned an average CAN 66,500. This brain waste is estimated to cost the
Canadian economy CAN two billion a year (Reitz, 2005) and has prompted the
government to launch programmes to speed up recognition of immigrants’
credentials. For example, the International Pharmacy Graduate Program offers
gap-filling courses to those trained outside North America so that they can more
quickly get licenses to work in Canada.76
4.4  Concluding Remarks
Demand approaches to selecting immigrants should be associated with minimal
unemployment, since migrants are being selected to fill vacant jobs, but they allow
employers rather than government to determine exactly who enters. Supply
approaches reserve more selection authority for the government, but run the risk
of having migrants be unemployed or underemployed after arrival. Some
governments combine demand and supply approaches to selecting immigrants, as
when they require foreigners to satisfy certain criteria to be eligible for immigrant
visas (the United States requires some economic immigrants to have at least B.A.
degrees) or award additional points to foreigners with job offers (Canada offers up
to ten of the 67 points needed for an immigrant visa to those with a Canadian job
offer www.cic.gc.ca/english/skilled/index.html). If Ireland were to develop an
immigrant selection system, it might want to include both demand- and supply-side
elements in its selection system, which appears to be the trend in most countries.
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76. There are 13 jurisdictions, 15 regulated professions and more than 400 regulatory bodies in Canada, and the government in April
2005 announced grants to professional organisations so that they can more quickly determine if foreign-trained doctors, nurses,
engineers, and other professionals qualify for licenses to work in Canada.
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Migrant Characteristics,
Performance, and Experiences
5
This chapter deals with the characteristics, performance and experiences of the
nearly 160,000 non-Irish nationals in the labour force in Ireland in 2005 (FÁS, 2005:
16). The focus is on where migrants work, the composition of their earnings 
and employment patterns, as well as their integration into Irish labour markets and
society.
Section 5.2 suggests that the widely cited problem of ‘implementation’ may consist
of four distinct problems and illustrates this with the experiences of those involved
in policy and partnership. Section 5.3 identifies the national and international
context in which the issue of public policy and delivery should now be considered.
Section 5.4 outlines some key analytical insights on policy making, distinguishing
between negotiated agreements and hierarchical direction. It shows the key role of
authoritative government in ensuring that negotiated agreements achieve genuine
problem solving and, consequently, serve the public good. Finally, in Section 5.5, the
Council identifies some of the challenges that now need to be discussed and
addressed by government and the social partners if Irish public policy is to imple-
ment the demanding strategies identified in Chapter 3.
5.1  Overview
As described in detail in Chapter 2, most of the migrants arriving in Ireland in the
past decade are returning Irish and EU or EEA nationals. According to the 2002
census, there were about 88,000 non-Irish EU-15 nationals and another 58,000
non-EU-15 nationals in the Irish work force of 1.8 million, so that about nine per
cent of the foreigners assigned to occupations in the 2002 census were non-Irish
(Table 5.1). The five occupations often mentioned in connection with migrants 
(i.e., farming, construction, manufacturing, professionals and services) included
about half of the total Irish labour force and about 60 per cent of the total non-
Irish labour force.
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As noted in Chapter 3, the EU-15 nationals do not need work permits to work in
Ireland, but EU-10 nationals did until May 2004. In 2003, the leading countries of
origin of work permit holders in Ireland were Poland and Lithuania, about 10 per cent
each, followed by the Philippines and Latvia, about eight per cent each. One-third of
the work permits in 2003 were issued to EU-10 nationals.
Table 5.2 shows that the number of permit renewals climbed steadily after 2000,
reflecting employers’ apparent satisfaction with the performance of permit
holders. Some of the foreigners whose work permits have been renewed several
times are approaching the five years of legal residence in Ireland required for
naturalization.
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Table 5.1 Irish Labour Force by Occupation, 2002 Census
Farming Manufacturing Construction Professionals Services Subtotal Total
Irish 92,528 208,285 127,563 261,998 150,375 52% 1,614,629
Non-Irish EU 1,444 8,746 5,858 18,008 19,231 61% 88,069
Non-Irish non-EU 1,652 6,612 2,356 12,403 10,439 58% 57,563
Total* 96,279 225,020 136,698 293,794 170,578 52% 1,779,786
*Includes persons who do not state nationality etc.
Percentage Shares
Irish 96% 93% 93% 89% 88% 91%
Non-Irish EU 1% 4% 4% 6% 11% 5%
Non-Irish non-EU 2% 3% 2% 4% 6% 3%
Source Ruhs, 2005, Table A8, p102 from Census 2002
Most of the non-EU-15 nationals were admitted on the basis of work permits
granted to employers after those employers sought and failed to find local
workers.77 In 2002, about 74 per cent of the work-permit migrants were employed
in low-skilled jobs such as catering (14% of total permit issued) and agriculture
(13%) (Ruhs, 2005: 37). Many immigrants are highly skilled, but the work permits
database includes information on earnings but not education or work experience.
According to a study cited by Ruhs, (2005: 37), the single most important match-
maker between migrants and employers are private recruitment agents, whose
number rose from 329 in 1998 to 541 in 2003, when they recruited one-third of non-
national workers.78
5.2  Labour Market Status
The CSO has been collecting benchmark employment and unemployment data in
Ireland since September 1997 as part of its QNHS, and currently interviews 39,000
households each quarter (www.cso.ie/qnhs/what_is_qhns.htm). The survey reports
information on nationality, whether the respondent was born in Ireland and, if not,
provides 16 options for place of birth, from Northern Ireland and Britain to India
and Pakistan. Questions 31-33 ask whether the respondent has always been born in
Ireland and, if not, when the respondent began to reside in Ireland.
The data on place of birth, nationality and time in Ireland are not reported, and are
thought to be too scanty for analysis, which limits the usefulness of the QNHS for
examining the labour market status of persons not born in Ireland and non-
nationals. However, Barrett, Bergin, and Duffy (2005) were able to use a special
tabulation of QNHS data to find that “immigrants in Ireland are highly educated
relative to the native population but their occupational distribution does not fully
reflect their educational attainment,” suggesting “brain waste”. Using QNHS data
migrant characteristics,
performance and experiences 63
77. FÁS supervises the employer’s test of the local labour market by requiring that job vacancies be listed for at least four weeks. Work
permit applications that include details about the job are sent to the Work Permits Unit of the DETE with a EUR 500 fee for a six to
12-month permit, and permits are issued within four to eight weeks. Workers abroad use the DETE work permit to obtain entry visas,
and migrants after arrival receive residence stamps in their passports that correspond to the duration of their work permits.
78. Recruitment agencies are regulated by the Employment Agencies Act of 1971, and require recruiters to have licenses. Inspections find
few violations.
Table 5.2 Work Permits, New and Renewals, 1999–2004
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Total Issued 5,750 17,833 36,576 40,504 47,707 34,067
New 4,598 15,735 29,951 23,859 22,512 10,885
Renewals 1,652 2,271 6,485 16,602 25,039 23,346
Renewal share 29% 13% 18% 41% 52% 69%
Source Ruhs, DJLER, 2005, 61
for the second quarter of 2003,79 Barrett et al. defined immigrants as non-Irish
nationals, persons not born in Ireland, and those living in Ireland less than ten
years, and compared them with other persons in the QNHS, finding 72,000 natives
and 3,600 immigrants.
The immigrants were younger than the natives, with 82 per cent between 20 and
44 (versus 44% of natives), and more likely to be in the labour force, 63 per cent of
immigrants and 58 per cent of natives were employed or looking for work (Barrett
et al., 2005: 2-3). About 40 per cent of the immigrants had a third-level degree or
more, versus 17 per cent of natives, but their occupational distribution was not very
different from natives, which may reflect a lack of English even among highly
educated immigrants (2005: 8).
Immigrant men in the QNHS had a higher labour force participation rate (72%)
than Irish men (69%), and so did immigrant women (54 versus 48%). Unemploy-
ment rates for immigrants were only slightly higher than for Irish workers, and a
significantly higher percentage of immigrant women had full-time employment in
Ireland, 40 versus 31 per cent. A much larger share of immigrant men and women
had a third-level university degree, 39 to 15 per cent among men, and 41 to 19 per
cent among women.
The occupation distribution of natives and immigrants is compared in Table 5.4.
The native-immigrant ratio compares the shares of Irish and immigrant workers in
selected sectors and shows, for example, a much higher percentage of Irish than
immigrant workers employed in agriculture, and a much higher percentage of
immigrants employed in hotels and restaurants. The shares of immigrants in
health and manufacturing are also higher than the shares of Irish in these sectors.
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79. The Quarterly National Household Survey surveys 3,000 households each week, so a quarterly sample has data on 39,000 households.
Table 5.3 Native and Immigrant Worker Characteristics,
Second Quarter 2003, QNHS
Characteristic (% of total) Irish men Immigrant men Irish women Immigrant women
FT Employed 61 61 31 40
Unemployed 5 7 4 6
LFPR 69 72 48 54
3rd level degree 15 39 19 41
Source: Ruhs, 2005, Table A8, p102 from Census 2002
Barrett et al. (2005, 11) report that 40 per cent of Irish workers, and 14 per cent of
immigrants, are union members. Unions often assert that migrants can be
exploited by unscrupulous employers, and that some are. For example, Turkish
construction workers posted to Ireland by Gama protested underpayment of
wages in April-May 200580 and many key informants repeated the story of
recruiters who placed a Filipino beautician on an Irish Ferries boats for very low
wages.81
Almost two-thirds of the non-Irish workers in the 2002 census were from EU-15
countries and thus guaranteed freedom of movement, including having the right
to appeal to EU institutions if they were denied opportunities in Ireland. The third
who were not from EU-15 countries included 20 per cent who were professionals
from the United States, Philippines, Australia and Africa, with many employed in
financial services or nursing.
Most of the concern about labour market status is with work permit holders who
have lower-wage jobs. Irish employers emphasize that non-EEA migrants are filling
jobs shunned by local workers, thereby sustaining local industries and earning far
more than they could at home. However, unions and NGOs stress that some
migrants receive low wages, poor treatment, and have poor housing, and there are
enough allegations of such treatment to feed a steady diet of news stories.
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80. Turkish-owned Gama Construction was accused in March 2005 of underpaying its Turkish workers posted to Ireland. Gama, which
employed up to 800 migrants in Ireland on several public works projects, allegedly paid its Irish workers EUR 13 an hour, but paid
Turkish migrants only a small local stipend and deposited the rest of their wages to accounts with Finansbank in the Netherlands.
Some Turkish workers said they were unaware of the Dutch accounts, suggesting that they thought their entire pay was the
stipend, which was well under the Irish minimum wage.
81. According to the Sunday Independent (3 April 2005), a Manila recruiter, CF Sharp, recruited the woman, whose contract called for EUR
354 a month for an 84-hour work week, with 80 per cent of the wages deposited to an account in the Philippines. Irish Ferries
eventually paid the beautician EUR 25,000, representing twice the minimum wage for six months work at the minimum wage, since
she joined the Siptu union, which has a week-on-week-off schedule for workers on ships.
Table 5.4 Share of Natives and Immigrants by Sector,
Second Quarter 2003 QNHS
Sector Irish Immigrants Immigrant/
Native Ratio
Agriculture 7 2.3 0.3
Manufacturing 15.8 17.7 1.1
Construction 11 7.1 0.6
Retail 14.3 9.6 0.7
Hotels/Rests 5.7 18.2 3.2
Health 9.1 13 1.4
Source Barrett et al., 2005
There have been 21 inspectors to monitor compliance with labour and immigration
laws, and there were 300 cases of possible employer violations pending in March
2005. However, since employer sanctions were introduced, there have reportedly
been only three employers convicted of hiring unauthorized foreign workers, one
reason cited by unions complaining of a growing “culture of lawbreaking” among
certain employers.
There were 5,000 inspections of employers in 2004, and 14 employers were prose-
cuted for violations, but publicity surrounding the Gama case82 led the government
to add 11 labour inspectors who would focus on enforcing laws protecting migrant
workers in Spring 2005. However, discussions with labour inspectors suggested
that the fact that there are few of them, that they are based in Dublin and Cork,
and that longer term investigations can be interrupted by “urgent cases” meant
that it was hard to develop and implement a medium–term enforcement strategy
that might, for example, concentrate on a particular sector such as construction as
German labour inspectors have done.83
Some key informants suggested that there are likely to be more complaints of
labour market abuses because Eastern Europeans no longer need work permits,
and are more likely to complain of abuses because they will no longer be forced to
leave Ireland if they lose their jobs. On the other hand, other key informants noted
that non-EEA migrants may be even less likely to complain because employers can
tell them that, if they are fired, they must leave Ireland, and that there are plenty
of Poles and East Europeans to replace them.
Many of the migrant abuse complaints are aimed at recruitment agencies. Under
the Employment Agencies Act of 1971, recruitment agencies must obtain licenses,84
and neither employers nor recruitment agents are allowed to charge workers for
jobs or work permits, and both the employer and migrant must sign the work
permit application (Ruhs, 2005: 18). Agencies must renew their licenses each year
at a cost of EUR 500, and face fines of EUR 2,000 for violations. The number of
licensed recruitment agencies in Ireland rose from 329 in 1998 to a peak 778 in 2001
before falling to 541 in 2003.
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82. The Gama case prompted, inter alia, the Chambers of Commerce of Ireland in May 2005 to call for tougher sanctions on employers
who abuse migrants. Irish Independent, 21 May 2005.
83. The Irish Times on 8 April 2005 reported that a DETE report prepared by the inspectors complained that inspectors did not have to
know labour law before being appointed, so that a great deal of training is required to have consistent application of the law,
especially in light of the high turnover among inspectors and the 12 to 18 months of experience needed to be effective. In some
cases, employers allegedly find it cheaper to run the risk of detection and fines rather than obey the law.
84. Employment agency must obtain licenses from the DETE by submitting “two independent references vouching for the good
character of the applicant and by means of a report from the Gardai that there is nothing in their records that would render the
applicant unsuitable to hold an employment agency license” (www.entemp.ie/employment/rights/agencies.htm).
There are relatively few complaints about recruitment agencies, and inspections of
87 agencies between 2001 and 2003 found most to be in compliance with the 1971
Act. When there were violations, agencies were given the opportunity to correct
problems, so that only one agency was recommended for prosecution in 2001
(DETE, 2004: 7).
The Employment Agencies Act (EEA) of 1971 was not enacted to regulate agencies
bringing migrants into Ireland. Instead, its original purpose was to regulate the
activities of agencies that were recruiting young Irish workers for overseas jobs,
primarily in the United Kingdom (DETE, 2004), and included special regulations for
recruiting Irish workers under the age of 18. The DETE review of the EAA noted that
public employment services were no longer actively engaged in job matching and
that self-service (direct employer-worker contacts) and employment agencies were
filling the void.
The EEA requires agencies to have physical premises in Ireland and there have been
allegations that some agencies have their major office elsewhere and only a token
presence in Ireland. In such cases, only the agency in Ireland is regulated under the
EEA, which means that there could be supplemental contracts signed overseas for
which the Irish authorities have no jurisdiction. Ireland is considering revising the
1971 EEA.
Under Irish law, the person responsible for paying wages is considered the
employer of a worker, but there can still be ambiguity as to who is the employer in
particular cases. Thus, there is discussion of clarifying the rights of “agency
workers”, requiring directors of agencies to pass tests and requiring agencies to
post bonds with DETE to cover any unpaid wages due workers. Discussions with
key informants suggested that most of the “good agencies” would welcome
stricter regulation of the industry.
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Table 5.5 Licensed Recruitment Agencies, 1998–2003
Agencies
1998 329
1999 447
2000 396
2001 778
2002 597
2003 541
Source DETE, 2004, 7
5.3  Asylum and Refugees
There is virtually no data on the labour market status of the 6,794 foreigners who
were officially recognized as refugees between 1995 and 2004. A study from the
Economic and Social Research Institute concluded that, “If immigrants worked in
occupations which utilized their educational abilities fully, immigration would
have increased GNP by 3.3 per cent in the five years to 2003, rather than the actual
contribution of 2.6 per cent.”85 However, this study did not distinguish refugees
from other foreigners.
The number of asylum seekers peaked in 2002 at 11,634 and fell to 4,766 in 2004
(Ruhs, 2005: 19). Irregular migrants could enter without inspection from the United
Kingdom, but most are persons who entered Ireland legally and then overstayed
their visas or permits or violated their terms. For example, foreign students could
become irregular by working more than 20 hours a week while studying, and
tourists could violate the terms of their entry by working. The Employment Permits
Bill of 2003 includes penalties for employers and irregular workers, but there
appear to have been few fines for violations.
5.4  Agriculture Case Study
Ireland has about 144,000 mostly small farms with older-than-average operators;
farms averaged 29 hectares and almost half of operators were over age 55 in the
most recent census. During the 1990s, there was a decline in the number of those
involved in farming, as the number of farm operators, spouses, family workers, and
regular non-family workers on Irish farms fell.The sharpest decline was for spouses
of farm operators, many of whom found non-farm jobs.
Farming is an industry that is transitioning to fewer and larger production units, as
the land of several retiring operators is often taken over by the relatively fewer and
better educated younger farmers entering the industry. In most industrial countries,
the fewer and larger farmers who remain do most of the farming operations with
family labour, but depend increasingly on foreign migrants if they produce labour-
intensive commodities. Some small farms have been able to maintain money-
losing traditional operations by agri-tourism, either attracting consumers to
purchase farm-based cheese, fruits and vegetables, and wine, or developing farm
stay or bed and breakfast operations. If these are successful, they too may result in
the hiring of migrant workers.
Irish farm sales have been stable at just under EUR five billion a year, and about 75
per cent of farm sales are from livestock, milk and other animal products. The Irish
Farmers Association’s Horticulture Committee says that the industry has farm gate
revenues of EUR 390 million a year, including EUR 130 million from mushrooms,86
EUR 100 million from potatoes, and EUR 160 million from fruit, vegetable, flowers
and other specialty crops. Within the labour-intensive horticulture sector, farms
are also getting fewer and larger, increasing their reliance on migrant workers.
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85. Quoted in John McManus, “ESRI sees 6 per cent growth but warns on living standards,” Irish Times, 23 March 2005, p. 1.
86. In a press release, the Irish Mushroom Growers’ Association on 28 May 2004 noted that the number of mushroom growers fell from
560 to 240 between 1996 and 2004, and that the Irish industry was unable to compete “with the more efficient Dutch and the
lower cost Polish industries.”
http://212.17.35.157/ifa/Press/DisplayFullArticle.asp?ID=463
The industry sees no alternative to continued reliance on migrants. The chairman
of the Horticulture Committee in a 31 January 2003 press release warned that “the
horticulture industry is now firmly dependent on non-EEA workers”. John Coleman
continued, “While unemployment is increasing in this country, it would take an
economic collapse before horticultural producers would have any hope of sourcing
Irish and EEA labour. The fact is that Irish and EEA workers no longer consider
working in horticulture an attractive option because of the nature of the work.”
http://212.17.35.157/ifa/Press/DisplayFullArticle.asp?ID=130
Coleman was protesting the plan to place new restrictions on non-EEA workers
that eventually was approved in the Employment Permits Act of 2003. He argued
that migrants were hired because there were no Irish workers available, not
because they are cheaper: “Foreign workers in horticulture have the same wage
demands and entitlements as everyone else and there is also the added cost for
the employer as Work Permits and Permit Renewals are quite expensive. Producers
already have to prove to FÁS that there is no Irish and EEA labour available before
applying for a Work Permit and the result is always the same i.e. there are no Irish
and EEA willing to work in the industry. The Government must be practical on this
issue and realize the serious consequences of any move to limit the availability of
Work Permits.” http://212.17.35.157/ifa/Press/DisplayFullArticle.asp?ID=130
There are few studies of migrant workers employed in Irish agriculture. During the
Anti-Racist Workplace week 1-7 November 2004, the Horticulture Committee
reported on the case of a mushroom grower who entered into a partnership with
three Latvian migrants so that they apparently received part of the proceeds from
the sale of mushrooms rather than a wage, resulting in a win-win situation. A
landscape contractor reported that his Bulgarian and Ukrainian employees had
learned English and integrated into the local community, especially in sports
(Leddy, 2004).
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Table 5.6 Irish Agricultural Sales, 1999–2003 (Euro Millions)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Livestock 2,089 2,173 2,178 2,020 2,070
Cattle 1,336 1,366 1,246 1,258 1,168
Milk 1,408 1,446 1,564 1,568 1,415
Crops 1,050 1,060 1,097 1,168 1,108
Crops % 23% 22% 22% 24% 23%
Total 4,578 4,719 4,876 4,852 4,731
Source Economic Intelligence Unit, Ireland Profile, 2004, p 45
A study of 200 dairy farmers who were younger than average and had an average
of 56 cows each found that 80 per cent hired non-family workers, with many
obtaining short-term or seasonal dairy workers through Farm Relief Services and
using contractors to perform operations such as cutting silage (Ruane and Phelan,
2001). Half of the respondents reported problems finding farm labour, but only a
few sought workers from outside the area. Young farmers reported making
changes to their operations to save on labour because of the difficulty finding
workers.
5.5  Experiences
Most migrant workers in Ireland appear to have good experiences, but there are
complaints of discrimination against non-national workers. Minister Micheál
Martin on 12 April 2005 asserted that “people who come to Ireland seeking
employment are welcome and that it is a shared expectation on the part of
Ireland, its people and the new arrivals that the experience will be beneficial to all”.
(www.entemp.ie/press/2005/20050413.htm) Martin went on to decry “instances
where the expectations of people coming to work in Ireland are not met for any of
a variety of reasons”.
The government directly fosters equality and campaigns against racism, and
provides financial support to employers and unions as well as NGOs to foster
acceptance and integration in the ever more diverse work force. There is an annual
Anti-Racist Workplace week, begun in 1999 and supported by a number of
government agencies and employer and union organizations. Its campaign in
November 2004 was “Together Ireland is Working. Don't Let Racism Obstruct Us”.
The Equality Authority, an independent body set up under the Employment
Equality Act 1998, reported that it receives a significant number of complaints
from migrants about dismissal, equal pay and working conditions because of their
race. In one 2004 case cited by the Equality Authority, a Labour Court ruled that a
non-national could not be fired from her job at a hostel for refugees and asylum
seekers in Dublin for taking three bananas. The court, in ordering compensation of
EUR 15,000, said that “employers have a positive duty to ensure that all workers
fully understand what is alleged against them, the gravity of the alleged
misconduct and their right to mount a full defence including the right to
representation. Special measures may be necessary in the case of non-national
workers to ensure that this obligation is fulfilled and that the accused worker fully
appreciated the gravity of the situation and is given appropriate facilities and
guidance in making a defence” (quoted at http://193.178.1.9/index.asp?locID
=209&docID=222).
In addition, employers, chambers of commerce, unions, churches and NGOs provide
information, education and advice to migrants via websites, brochures, and
forums. Studies of migrants commissioned by these support groups find that
migrants have problems but that local residents accept and think highly of them.
For example, a report on migrants in Westmeath concluded: “the goodwill toward
migrant workers…is a positive which should be mobilized to address the serious
problems with invisibility, isolation, and lack of awareness of rights that
characterize the migrant worker population” (www.athlonechamber.ie/home/
Migrant%2520Worker.pdf&e=9707).
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Another report, Voices of Immigrants, The Challenges of Inclusion, includes reports
of the experiences of 22 immigrants and their families in Ireland (www.immigrant
council.ie/voices.htm). The Migrants Rights Centre has issued a report on migrants
employed in private homes (www.mrci.ie, and the National Consultative
Committee on Racism and Interculturalism (NCCRI) plays a key role educating
against racism (www.nccri.ie).
There is no anti-migrant political party in Ireland, and there appear to be few talk-
show hosts or organizations devoted to anti-migrant issues. Nonetheless, many
key informants acknowledged that there are worries about migrants among
workers and the general public, with native workers fearing they may be hurt by
the presence of migrants if there is an economic downturn and the public fearing
that the presence of migrants may be associated with more crime, crowding, and
other factors that lower the quality of life.
5.6  Concluding Remarks
While most of the migrants arriving in Ireland in the past decade were returning
Irish and EU or EEA nationals, it is clear that the profile of the typical migrant
worker in Ireland is changing. As EU-15 migrants live and work freely in Ireland, and
since EU-10 nationals no longer required work permits after 1 May 2004, it is no
surprise that EU-25 nationals represented 58 per cent of immigrants in the year
ending April 2005 (FÁS, 2005: 5) Recent data show that overall, employment and
the labour force have been booming in Ireland spurred not only by increased
participation rates of both native and non-native workers, but also my net inflows
of migrants. Work permit renewals have accounted for an increasing percentage of
total permits issued, apparently indicating employer satisfaction with migrant
employees in the Irish labour force. Research has also shown that migrants have
contributed positively to economic growth in Ireland, and have alleviated both
skills and labour shortages. Despite this, Ireland is increasingly faced with public
fears that should the economy slow, native workers could be negatively effected
due the increasing presence of non-nationals among them, particularly for the
least skilled occupations.
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Economic Effects of Migration6
This section reviews international evidence on the economic effects of migration,
including irregular migration, and deals with questions such as the effect
of immigration on wages, income and its distribution, public services and finance,
and housing. It also deals with student migration and the spatial implications 
of migration.
6.1  Overview
As interest in the effects of immigration has grown, so has a sizeable collection of
research accumulated over the past few decades in an effort to measure more
precisely the costs and benefits of migration to national economies. Data have
become more broadly available allowing researchers to begin to separate out the
characteristics of migrants (e.g., age, education, experience, etc.) and to estimate
the various impacts different types of immigrants have on outcomes.
A good portion of this literature has been undertaken by American researchers and
has focused only on the US economy, which has a rich and lengthy history as a net
immigration country. The major conclusion from this varied work is that immigra-
tion expands the size of the economy as measured by GNP, but has little or no
impact on average living standards as measured by GNP per capita.87 For this
reason, the most important economic impacts of immigration in the United States
have been found to be distributional, since the major impetus to economic growth
from adding migrant workers to the labour force derives from lower wages or at
least a slower rate of increase in wages. Immigrants may also have other positive
or negative economic and non-economic effects that are real but not easy to
measure, from increasing productivity growth by filling skills gaps and by bringing
together diverse teams that increase the rate of innovation to reducing
productivity growth by preserving inefficient industries that would otherwise
shrink or be replaced by imports (for example, labour-intensive farm commodities).
There is a large literature on these potential ancillary effects of immigration, but
little consensus on which effects dominate.
Zimmerman observes that there has been a substantial lack of empirical research
on the impact of migration on European economies (2005: 2). Recent literature on
the economic effects of immigration has focussed on labour market issues
particularly the consequences on wage and employment levels, both for nationals
and non-nationals, and the potential for reducing skills shortages in the receiving
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87. This is possible as the increase in the population limits the per capita measure of increases in GNP).
country. Drawing conclusions over time has been further challenged by recent
expansion of the European Union, which facilitates expanded inter-EEA flows of
both skilled and unskilled work. Following a review of existing studies, Zimmerman
states “[s]urprisingly, we reach the valid conclusion that immigration is largely
beneficial for the receiving countries” (2005: 3).88
In Ireland, economic research into the effects of immigration89 on the general
economy and the labour market in particular is a relatively new undertaking. This
is true as Ireland’s history as a net immigration country is quite recent, and relevant
data on which to base rigorous analysis limited. Nevertheless, a growing body of
research is becoming available and the general conclusions from these studies is
that Ireland derived net positive economic effects,90 particularly beginning in the
mid-1990s when the annual number of migrants coming to the country (both
returning Irish nationals and others) has consistently exceeded the number
leaving. As the average skill and education levels of the entering group have been
shown to exceed that of the local labour force,91 this has benefited the economy,
improved the labour pool and reduced earnings inequalities. The higher skills set
derives from both well-trained and educated non-Irish immigrants as well as
returning Irish who improved their knowledge base and earning potential while
overseas, benefiting not only themselves and their families, but also the country as
a whole on their return. In other words, the research suggests there have been
significant returns to human capital92 that accrued in the Irish economy and that
are directly attributable to immigration, particularly since the mid-1990s.
6.2  The Irish Immigration Experience
A simplified 50-year historic perspective of Ireland’s migration experience is
characterized by relatively steady but small natural increases in its total
population (i.e., births versus deaths) coupled with significant net annual
emigration (in response to a continued lagging home economy and discouraging
employment prospects) that together resulted in significant net population
declines. This pattern continued until the 1960s and 1970s, when government
policies concerning trade liberalization and foreign direct investment began to
improve the poor domestic economic situation and hence, eventually reversed the
net loss from migration as fewer people left and more arrived.While weak economic
performance returned in the 1980s as did net outflows of migrants, this trend was
reversed in the mid- to late-1990s. At that point, unprecedented economic growth
attracted a growing number of migrants to the country, many of whom were
returning Irish nationals. This economic growth continued to the end of the decade
and was responsible for significant jobs creation and continued net immigration
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88. Most research addressing the general effects of immigration on native workers has shown any effects to be quantifiably small. For
such a discussion, see Dustman et al. (2005), Friedberg and Hunt (1995) and Longhi et al. (2004).
89. As would be expected with Ireland’s long history as a net emigration country, there exists more research into the question of the
costs and benefits of the outflow of Irish not only on domestic economic performance, the labour force and unemployment, but
also on the emigrants themselves. For a discussion of this body of work, see Barrett (2005).
90. As Hughes and Quinn (2004) point out, research to date on the impact of immigration on Ireland’s civil society has been limited to
the community and voluntary sectors and analysis of immigrant social networks and not all of the results are positive.
91. This work is first credited to Barrett and Trace (1998) who analysed the inflow in the mid-1990s and found the arrivals to be more
highly skilled and educated than the average resident. In addition, they noted that the non-Irish subset of immigrants were even
more highly qualified than the returning Irish.
92. Human capital is defined as “the ability, skills, knowledge and qualities embodied in people that are accumulated through
schooling, training and experience” (Bergin and Kearney, 2004: 4).
throughout the period. Since the turn of the decade, real growth in output and
employment has continued, but at slower rates. Nevertheless, significant net immi-
gration to Ireland, which reached an all-time high in 2002, continues to be seen.
In addition to these observations about net migration in Ireland, of interest is the
composition of the arriving migrants. In 1991, just over two-thirds of immigrants
were returning Irish who had spent time living and working abroad. Over the
decade, this percentage slowly declined to about half and by 2004, had dropped to
25 per cent of total immigrants (Hughes and Quinn, 2004: 9).93 At the same time,
the labour force in Ireland expanded rapidly from about 1.4 million in 1994 to just
over 2 million in 2005. This increase was possible in the earlier period as additional
labour demand was met by Irish nationals who had previously been unemployed
or outside of the labour force. But by 2004, as unemployment has reached new
lows, a greater portion of the increased labour demand has been met by migration.
(FÁS, 2005: 15).
6.3  Macro and Distributional Effects
While immigration adds “mouths to feed and hands to work”, the consensus
among most economists is that migrants who move voluntarily from lower to
higher-wage areas are the major beneficiaries of migration. Receiving or
destination countries also benefit from immigration as it expands employment,
primarily by lowering (the growth in) wages and creating additional income that
accrues to (mostly native) owners of capital.
The generally-accepted model for estimating the macro-economic impacts of
immigrants94 emphasizes that the net economic benefits for natives depend on
the share of gross national product (GDP) accruing to labour, the per cent of the
labour force that is foreign born, and the decline in wages due to immigration. As
shown in Figure 6.1, before the arrival of migrant workers, employment for native
workers would have been at level L0 and wages would have been at W0, (point E).
Total national income is the area AE L00, the wages paid to workers plus the
triangle above the wage line, which is the share of national income going to
owners of capital and land. With the arrival of immigrants, the supply curve shifts
to the right (SLw/imm) wages fall to W0 and employment increases to L0 (point F).
The movement from E to F creates rectangles C and D and the net gain triangle B.
Rectangle C represents the reduced wages paid to workers in the local market.
These reduced wages do not disappear but are transferred to the owners of capital
and land in the form of higher profits and rents. Because of immigration, the
economy expands by rectangle D and triangle B, with migrant workers getting
most of the benefits of this expansion in the form of their wages (D).95 Grant and
Sweetman concluded that “new immigrants produce more output, but they also
reap the benefits of that production such that there are generally few net
spillovers to the general population”. (Grant and Sweetman, 2004: 19).
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93. Recent data on the nationality of immigrants published by FÁS (2005: 16) show that EU-10 nationals represented nearly 38 per cent
of the total inflow in 2005, the first year for which this breakdown is available.
94. See Smith and Edmonston (1997) for a full discussion of the estimated effects on the US economy.
95. The increase in national income due to immigration–triangle B–will be larger if (1) there are more migrant workers and/or (2) if the
wage lowering effect of migrant workers is larger.
This model for estimating the economic effects of immigration is based on several
assumptions, such as that all labour is homogeneous (immigrants and natives
have identical skills and are easy substitutes) and there is a fixed capital stock
(immigrants do not bring capital and there is no investment due to immigration).
It also assumes constant returns to scale, which means that doubling all inputs
doubles output. If there are different types of labour, the gain to natives is greater
the more different the residents are from the immigrants, as when skilled immi-
grant workers complement or raise the wages of unskilled workers. If there are
positive externalities, such as when immigrants are entrepreneurial, the economic
gains due to immigration are larger. If there are negative externalities, as when
immigration is associated with crime or crowding in schools, the gains are smaller.
George Borjas, one of the most esteemed researchers on the economic effects of
immigration, refined his calculations over a period of two decades. In 1994, he
offered a “back of the envelope” calculation that the economic benefits to the
United States from immigration were relatively small, between US$ 7 billion and
US$ 25 billion (Borjas, 1994). His review of previous research on the subject later
concluded that there was little evidence of any strong or adverse effect on the
wages or employment levels of native workers (Borjas, 1996). In 1997, Borjas et al.
suggested that any observed earnings inequality in the United States were
attributable to the immigration of unskilled workers and found that this had a
negative effect predominantly on the economic status of the least skilled US
workers (high school dropouts and those in the bottom 20% of the wage
distribution) but did not significantly effect the wage differential between high-
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Figure 6.1 The Net Economic Effects of Migration: Static Case
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and low-skilled wages (Borjas, 1997: 3, 67). The model is static in the sense that it
does not allow for the immigrants to spend their earnings and create jobs that
raise the demand for labour and thus push wages back up to previous levels (or
even higher). The alternative dynamic model in Figure 6.2 shows immigration
shifting supply to the right, increasing employment but at lower wages along the
D0 curve.
Furthermore, if the presence of immigrants leads to an increased demand for
housing and consumer goods, and perhaps increased investment in anticipation of
more workers and residents, demand can shift outward, putting upward pressure
on wages. As a result, wages can return to their original pre-immigration level,
although the economy is now larger with more employment. DeVoretz (2004: 11-13)
compared static and dynamic models in North America, and concluded that the
wage-lowering effect of immigration seems to be more pronounced in the United
States than in Canada. However, even in Canada, where the presence of immi-
grants pushed out demand and restored wages to hypothetical no-immigration
levels, there was considerable churning as the presence of immigrants increased
the rate at which Canadians changed jobs.
This theoretical dynamic analysis would lead to the conclusion that immigration
carries small positive benefits for receiving countries, with the major beneficiaries
being migrants whose incomes rise and the owners of capital in the receiving
country. Therefore, the most important impact of migration in receiving countries
according to the model is distributional, as residents who compete with migrants
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Figure 6.2 The Net Economic Effects of Migration: Dynamic Case
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could be faced with reduced wages or higher unemployment and residents with
capital or complementary skills gain from the presence of migrants. The consensus
among economists is that immigration is one of several factors that has the
potential to increase inequality in industrial countries, but a less important factor
in changing the wage distribution than changes in technology, trade patterns and
tax policies. Dustmann et al. (2003) concluded for the United Kingdom that “if
there is an impact of immigration on unemployment, then it is statistically poorly
determined and probably small in size”. While acknowledging that data are scanty,
Dustmann et al. found that “higher immigration [to the United Kingdom] seems to
be associated with higher wage growth in the currently resident population”
(2003: 4).
Some studies draw distinctions between the economic impact of skilled and
unskilled migrants which can lead to differing conclusions from the above. Skilled
migrants (for example, those with post-secondary levels of education) are believed
to contribute more to overall economic growth than less-skilled workers. Indeed, in
the case of Israel,Weiss (2000) concluded that the arrival of highly skilled migrants
did not reduce wages or the employment of local workers because the immigration
wave was accompanied by more capital investment, which maintained the capital-
labour ratio.
A study by Barrett et al. (2002) illustrates this point for the Irish economy. The
authors found that although earnings inequality increased between 1987 and
1994, with the increased inflow of highly skilled labour between 1994 and 1997 this
outcome was reversed. Using a modelling approach put forth by Borjas et al. (1997),
they estimated that during the period immigration decreased skilled wage rates by
4.5 percentage points and resulted in a short-term increase in GNP of 1.5 percentage
points.96 This meant that the rate of unemployment would fall, by approximately
0.7 percentage points, and as skilled and unskilled labour are assumed to be
complements, most of this decline would effect the unskilled in the labour force
(Barrett et al., 2002: 675).
The analysis of workers migrating to higher wage areas and raising total income
and employment in the destination area can be extended globally. If there were no
barriers to international migration, and workers moved from lower to higher wage
countries, Hamilton and Whalley (1984) estimate that global GDP could more than
double. The authors grouped 179 countries into seven world regions, assumed that
the world’s labour supply was fully employed producing a single output, estimated
differences in the marginal productivity of labour across seven multi-country
regions, and assumed these differences were due to migration restrictions. Thus, if
workers moved from lower to higher productivity (wage) areas, economic output
would rise, and the authors asked what would happen to world output if enough
workers migrated to equalize productivity and wages across the seven world
regions but there was no migration of capital. Hamilton and Whalley’s model is a
theoretical exercise based on certain assumptions, but the apparent potential of
migration to greatly increase world output is one reason why trade specialists
sometimes note that the gains from freer migration are far larger than the gains
from freer trade.
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96. The longer-term impact on GNP would be “even higher due to the slow adjustment of productive capacity to changing economic
circumstances” (Barrett et al., 2002: 675).
What are the real economic impacts of immigration on Ireland? Ireland experi-
enced an economic boom in the 1990s, and immigration allowed that boom to
continue; the alternative could have been some “choking off” effects on growth if
there were sharp upward wage adjustments in skill- and labour-short sectors. The
immigration to Ireland occurred against a backdrop of rising education levels,
rising employment and labour force participation, and rising wages, so that the
counterfactual of how much faster these indicators would have risen did not
attract a great deal of attention. While unemployment among Irish youths has
risen somewhat since 2001 to 7.9 per cent in 2005 (with higher peaks during the
summer months), Ireland’s youth unemployment rate is still the second lowest in
in the EU-25. Overall, total unemployment has fallen significantly during the last
decade from 12.3 per cent in 1995 to 4.2 per cent in 2005 and is now the lowest rate
in the EU-25 (FÁS, 2005: 18) 
Between 1972 and 2002, the share of Irish workers with only a primary school
education fell from about 50 per cent to five per cent, while the share with a third-
level education rose from five per cent to 35 per cent. Bergin and Kearney (2004)
estimated that, if Ireland had not made this investment in human capital that
reduced the number and share of workers with little education, its GNP in 2002
would have been 20 per cent lower, primarily because there would have been less
foreign and local investment that created more and better jobs. Using a simulation
model, they concluded that adding 10,000 highly skilled immigrants to the Irish
labour force reduced the wages of highly skilled workers by about 1 per cent and
raised employment for less-skilled workers in Ireland, confirming the results of
Barrett et al. (2002). There was also a consequent increase in output and
productivity. However, adding 10,000 low skilled immigrants decreased the wage
rate for unskilled wage earners by less than 1 per cent but had a net negative effect
on GNP and the level of employment. This result tends to confirm the results seen
by Borjas (2003) for the effect on wages and income inequality of low-skilled
migration into the United States (Bergin and Kearney, 2004: 18-19).
One reason for the finding that highly skilled immigrants mostly affect highly
skilled Irish workers arises from certain assumptions made in the models. The
highly skilled are defined as those with a secondary school certificate. Barrett et al.
(2005: 14) concluded that there is “essentially zero elasticity of substitution between
high-skilled and low-skilled labour,” and that high-skilled labour was readily
available to Ireland via immigration (high-skilled was defined as those with at
least a higher secondary qualification). Under this definition, two-thirds of the Irish
workers but 85 per cent of the non-Irish immigrants who arrived between 1993 and
2003 were “highly skilled”. The Barrett et al. simulation found that increasing the
supply of highly skilled workers via immigration reduces the wages of highly
skilled workers in the long-term by about 6 per cent, increasing Ireland’s
competitiveness, employment and GNP between 3.5 and 3.7 per cent, with the GNP
per head increasing by 1.1 per cent.97
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97. In their model, the authors then reversed the observed skills mix of the actual migrant population, i.e., assuming that low-skilled
migrants accounted for 85 per cent of the total. In doing so, GNP still increases though by a smaller amount, low skilled wages fall
by a greater amount, this increases earnings inequality and results in an actual reduction in GNP per capita (Barrett et al., 2005: 16).
6.4  Micro and Labour Market Effects
The majority of research into labour market effects has focused on the impact on
national wages and unemployment rates. Some studies have attempted to
ascertain whether particular labour market segments were more adversely
affected by an influx of foreign labour. Theoretically, as the models above suggest,
local wages should fall, at least in the short term. Though it is logical that an
injection of labour could displace local workers, much of the actual effect depends
on whether new workers are substitutes for native workers (i.e. similar skills,
education and experience) or are complementary to the skills and assets of the
native workforce. In theory, nationals risked being displaced only when cheaper
labour could replace them effectively in the economy.
The aggregate labour markets pictured in Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show the supply of
labour shifting (initially) to the right or downward along a fixed demand curve,
which could result in lower wages or increased unemployment for native workers.
Much research attention has focused on migration in industrial countries, but it
has proven to be very difficult to measure significant decreases in real wages or
increases in unemployment due to the presence of migrants alone. As stated
before, evidence of any impact on wages has in general been modest, though
largely negative. Competition between unskilled workers and immigrants, at least
in the United States, also tended to be greater according to Altonji and Card (1991).
Methods to calculate the effects have varied widely, with some authors taking a
regional labour market approach (comparing regions with different numbers of
immigrants) and others adopting methods focusing on employment sectors and
worker characteristics.
More recent research has questioned the effectiveness of a regional approach,
which generally does not show a significant impact on wages or employment. A
study assessing wage effects in the United States according to workers’
educational attainment and experience found that between 1980 and 2000,
immigration increased the labour supply of working men by 11 per cent, and
reduced the wage of the average native worker by 3.2 per cent (Borjas, 2003).
However, this impact differed more dramatically according to education: wages fell
by 8.9 per cent for high school dropouts, 4.9 per cent for college graduates, and just
2.6 per cent for high school graduates. The study therefore concluded overall that
immigration had an adverse effect on competing natives.
Several studies have used particular events to isolate labour market effects, such as
the Mariel boatlift on the Miami, USA, employment scene (Card, 1990). Despite
increasing the labour market by seven per cent, the research found no discernible
impact on wages and local employment. An assessment of the impact of 900,000
repatriates from Algeria entering the French labour market showed a similar lack
of effect: a maximum increase in unemployment of 0.3 per cent combined with a
maximum decrease in wages of 1.3 per cent (Hunt, 1992). The difficulty in calcula-
ting these effects, even when focusing on discrete occurrences, was highlighted
through research on Portuguese retornados from Angola and Mozambique; the
researchers felt that indications from data were swamped by adverse external
conditions prevailing at the time (Carrington and de Lima, 1996).
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There have been several comparative studies involving analysis of European
countries. Both Gang and Rivera-Batiz, and Bauer and Zimmerman supported
findings in the United States of small negative impacts. For example, the effect of
Asian immigration to the United Kingdom was a 0.08 per cent reduction in
average wages (Gang and Rivera-Batiz, 1994). However, both sets of research noted
that data sets in Europe are not considered satisfactory enough to draw
conclusions with any certainty. In addition, research suggested that the labour
market structure itself can be a factor in the potential impacts of immigrants. A
study looking at the effects on the employment rate of native workers across
Europe found that adverse impacts tended to be greater in the presence of labour
market rigidities (Angrist and Kugler, 2001). In such instances, their findings also
showed considerable adverse effect on local employment. On average, the intro-
duction of 100 immigrants into the labour market resulted in an estimated job
losses for 83 local workers.
A number of recent studies may have more specific significance for the Irish
situation. Spain has only recently become a country of immigration, following
economic development and growth during the 1980s and 1990s. In 2002, research
was undertaken to estimate the effects of immigration to Spain on employment,
in the light of rapidly increasing numbers of foreign workers. Following Borjas’
approach in identifying skill characteristics of migrants, the study found only
minor negative impacts on the employment rate of native workers. Given the large
numbers of irregular immigrants in Spain, the report concluded that an amnesty
for an estimated 500,000 irregular immigrants was unlikely to have a large effect
on the employment rate (less than one percentage point). However, the authors
noted that the recent nature of immigration to Spain made long-term projections
premature (Carrasco, Jimeno and Ortega, 2005).
The UK Home Office has also begun to assess the effects of immigration on the
labour market. The study commissioned in 2002 found no significant effects, except
for small evidence of a negative effect on employment rates (Dustmann et al.,
2003). The report accepted that the data sources used had serious weaknesses,
though available data (Labour Force Survey, New Earnings Survey and Population
Census) suggested that higher immigration is associated with higher wage growth.
Other European countries, such as Germany, have completed more data analysis
(De New and Zimmerman (1994), Pischke and Velling(1997)), though the size and
nature of immigration to Germany limit a comparative use for Ireland in much the
same way as US research is only of limited usefulness for Europe. Regardless, all
evidence points to a small impact only.
A common economic technique for estimating migrant worker impacts on local
workers is to compare the wages and unemployment rates of workers thought to
compete with migrants in cities with more and fewer migrants. In the 1980s, to the
surprise of economists, comparisons between high and low immigrant US cities
found few of the expected wage-depressing or unemployment-increasing effects
of immigrants, prompting economist George Borjas (1990: 81) to assert that
“modern econometrics cannot detect a single shred of evidence that immigrants
have a sizeable adverse impact on the earnings and employment opportunities of
natives in the United States.”
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As more data became available, researchers studying internal migration patterns
found that US workers most likely to compete with immigrants were moving away
from “high-migrant cities,” presumably to avoid competing with them in the
labour market, or not moving to migrant gateways. The effects of immigration on
wages and unemployment in “high-migrant cities” were thus spread throughout
the entire labour market, which made them hard to measure in any particular city.
Later analyses showed that this was the case in Miami (Angrist and Krueger, 1999),
leading to a new conclusion—migrant wage and (un)employment impacts can be
diffused quickly throughout a national economy if workers are mobile and wages
are flexible.
Case studies and city comparisons tend to examine migrant labour market
impacts at a point in time, but the most important impact of migrants may
happen over time. As in Figure 6.2, if labour demand increases as a result of
immigration, the demand for labour curve can shift outward, so that wages do not
fall despite an increase in the labour supply. Such a result is most likely to occur if
migrants have high earnings and spend most of their earnings in the country to
which they move.
Econometric studies in the 1990s also began to acknowledge that the effects of
immigration on local labour markets may be hard to measure if the native workers
thought to be negatively affected by migrants do not compete with them for jobs.
A study by Smith and Edmonston (1997) concerning labour market effects in the
United States found that immigration had little negative effect on job oppor-
tunities for most citizens, though certain workers, such as those unskilled domestic
workers having to compete with immigrant workers, may have been affected by
lower wages and higher unemployment.
So-called economic mobility studies in the classical countries of immigration
generally find that immigrants begin their Australian, Canadian, or American
journeys earning less than comparable natives. Immigrant-native earnings
differences narrow over time, as the migrants acquire local language and labour
market skills, so that within one to two decades immigrants often earn as much or
more than similar native workers, similar in age and years of schooling. In one
pioneering study, economist Barry Chiswick (1978) found that immigrant men
arriving in the United States in the 1960s initially earned 10 per cent less than
similarly educated US-born men. However, within an average 13 years, college-
educated foreign-born men earned as much as US-born college educated men, and
went on to earn 6 per cent more than comparable natives after 23 years, an
earnings catch-up and cross-over effect that was attributed to the extra drive and
ambition that prompted particular individuals to migrate.
Subsequent studies showed that this catch-up and cross-over income scenario
applied to peculiar circumstances. The United States and Canada relaxed restric-
tions on Asian immigration in the late 1960s to favour the entry of highly skilled
professionals, who were able to fairly quickly raise their earnings as they gained
labour market experience. As the proportion of less-well educated Asians and Latin
Americans rose, so did the gap between native and immigrant earnings. For
example, in 1970 the average immigrant earned 1 per cent more than the average
US-born worker, but in subsequent decades average immigrant earnings slipped
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behind those of natives. Prospects for closing the earnings gap in classical immi-
gration countries began to fade as educational levels of natives rose more rapidly
than the years of schooling of arriving immigrants (Reitz, 2005).
In contrast, Barrett and O’Connell (2001) compared the wages of returned native
(Irish) migrants with the wages of those who had remained at home. Their analysis
evaluated the theory that accumulated knowledge and experience earned while
living and working overseas result in a net benefit to the individual in his/her
home country following return. With Ireland’s significant history as a net
emigration country, and as Irish were a large part of the returning group in the
1990s, such flows could have important economic implications. This evaluation is
key to the notion discussed by Co, Gang and Yun (2000) that overseas employment
can be an important part of the human capital accumulation process. Barrett and
O’Connell expand on this, however, saying not all migrants go abroad for purely
“investment” purposes, but also for adventure or other non-labour reasons. Their
results showed that a wage premium is observed only for men98 and this premium
was higher for those who left with the intention of working or gaining other skills.
In fact, returning Irish men who reported they left for work reasons enjoyed a 15 per
cent higher wage on their return than men who remained at home. Those whose
migration took them overseas for non-work intentions, gained 10 per cent on non-
emigrants, still a significant advantage.
On the heels of the study discussed previously by Bergin and Kearney (2004),
Barrett et al. (2005) have furthered the debate on the effects of immigration on the
Irish labour market by analysing in greater detail the occupations of non-Irish
immigrants.99 They show that at least for the ten-year period to 2003, most highly
skilled non-Irish immigrants arrived and took employment in occupations that did
not fully reflect their education levels. They may do so for a variety of reasons (e.g.,
their educational qualifications are not fully recognized, they wish to get a
foothold and experience in an otherwise competitive market before trading up
etc.) but the result is that a skills comparison alone may not accurately reflect such
immigrants’ true effect on the labour market, in fact it may overstate it. As such,
adjusting for this occupational gap, their estimates result in a smaller impact on
GNP since wages fall by less and the impact on Irish competitiveness is smaller.
Nonetheless, the overall impact of immigration on Ireland remains positive.
6.5  Public Finance
Migrants pay taxes directly in the form of social security and other taxes deducted
from their pay as well as indirectly in value-added taxes on their purchases and
property taxes included in rents. Migrants also consume government-funded
services directly and indirectly, as when they or their children receive services. The
public finance “balance” for both natives and migrants depends primarily on the
immigrants’ age and income distribution, and secondarily on eligibility for and
take-up rates of government services.
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98. Women were found not to make higher wages on return than their non-immigrating sisters, regardless of their initial motivation
for leaving Ireland. While not fully explored, Barrett and O’Connell believe this to be indicative of women’s moves being influenced
by the labour market considerations of their partners.
99. Recall that the work of Barrett and Trace (1998) found that for the mid-1990s, this group tended to be more highly skilled when
compared to their Irish returning counterparts and the resident population.
Most public finance systems re-distribute resources from working-age persons to
the young and old. Since migrant workers tend to be in earning and tax-paying
rather than service-receiving ages, they tend to be net payers of taxes rather than
net recipients of public benefits. However, migrants with lower than average
incomes tend to pay lower than average taxes and may also be eligible for more
government-funded services, especially if their families are with them. For this
reason, some countries choose to make guest workers and newly arrived
immigrants ineligible for many government-funded services for at least five years,
the usual minimum period of legal residence required to naturalize.
There are generally two ways to assess the fiscal contribution of immigrants. First,
there is the snapshot approach, looking at taxes paid, minus benefits received from
the state in a particular year (or set of years) by immigrants as a group. For
immigration to industrial countries, the OECD concluded in 1997 that these
“provide no definitive answer as to whether immigrants are a net burden on the
social transfer system or a net cost.” (OECD SOPEMI, 1996). Second, there is the
more sophisticated generational accounting approach to calculate the net
contribution of the immigrant throughout the entire lifecycle, and finding the net
present value based on likely future government income and expenditure. This
approach takes far greater account of the age of the immigrant on entry to the
host country, which is thought to be an important determinant of the overall
contribution made to public finances, along with education and labour force
participation. Residents in a country are expected to be net contributors to
government revenues during their working lives. Theoretically, the costs of
childhood and retirement should by then be offset by tax contributions made
during that period. Given that most immigrants arrive early in working life, it is
expected that, overall, they will contribute more than they receive.100
One general conclusion of accounting studies is that migrant workers tend to pay
wage-linked taxes that flow to the central government. In federal systems such as
the United States, this means that the federal government tends to profit from
immigration because it is the entity that collects most earnings-linked taxes, while
state and local governments that pay for most education, healthcare, and other
services from property and sales taxes often find that migrants do not “pay their
way”, meaning that their state and local tax payments do not cover the cost of the
local services they receive.
The remedy for such unequal payments and services is some kind of federal-state
revenue. This has been resisted in the United States under the theory that
immigration is a net economic benefit, but is common practice in Canada.101 In the
United States, limited federal revenue sharing programmes aimed at partially
reimbursing state and local governments for the cost of incarcerating foreign
criminals and providing emergency healthcare to irregular migrants tend to
highlight only negative aspects of immigration.
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100. For example, in 1996, California households headed by natives were estimated to pay US$ 1,178 additional each year in state and
local taxes to cover the education, healthcare, and other state and local services used by immigrants that their state and local taxes
did not cover (Smith and Edmonston, 1997).
101. In Canada, immigrants pay fees that cover the cost of language training and counselling services: CAN 500 for each adult plus a
CAN 975 landing fee but are generally eligible for social welfare services upon arrival. Ontario, which receives 57 per cent of Canada's
immigrants, gets CAN 800 per immigrant, while Quebec gets CAN 3,800.
The three key parameters in the accounting studies are the characteristics of the
immigrants, their age at arrival and subsequent earnings,102 and the nature of the
tax and transfer system (i.e., how much does it redistribute from rich to poor). The
most widely cited study of the present value of an immigrant made assumptions
that increase the economic value of future immigrants in the United States (Smith
and Edmonston, 1997). This study concluded that the present value of the average
immigrant in 1996 was US$ 80,000. This estimate has two components: the
present value of the average immigrant was (–US$ 3,000), but assuming that 80
per cent of the children of the immigrants who arrived with less than 12 years of
schooling would achieve at least a high school education, and 95 per cent of their
children and grandchildren would be high school graduates, the net benefits of the
children of each immigrant are US$ 83,000.103
The net US$ 80,000 present value of an immigrant takes into account the taxes
paid and benefits received by immigrants as well as their children and grand-
children.104 However, most economists quickly moved from the overall estimate to
subgroups, focusing on immigrants who arrived with a college education, a high
school or secondary school education, and less than high school. The results
suggested that the economic benefits of immigration could be increased by
favouring well educated newcomers, since adult immigrants arriving with more
than a high school education had a present value of US$ 198,000, while those
arriving with less than a high school education imposed a net fiscal cost of US$
13,000 over their lifetimes.
As with labour market costs and benefits, most research has focused on the
limited, though largely beneficial impact immigration has had. For example, a
study conducted in 2000 determined that the fiscal consequences of altering the
level of immigration in the United States would be quite small, and should thus
not be a consideration for public policy (Lee and Miller, 2000). The study did note,
however, that a policy of admitting only highly educated immigrants of young
working age could be highly beneficial in fiscal terms, consistent with the findings
of the National Research Council (detailed above, Smith and Edmonston, 1997).
Storesletten (2000) asks whether selective immigration policies alone can balance
the budget. His conclusion is that the current immigrant mix in the United States
cannot, but that an annual inflow of 1.6 million immigrants, highly skilled and
aged between 40 and 44 (excluding dependants), would. However, he concedes
that the practicalities of implementing such an immigration policy make it largely
unrealistic.
However, public policy itself may have an impact upon the overall benefits offered
by immigration. Auerbach and Oreopoulis (2000), using a generational approach,
compared the fiscal burden on present and future generations in the United States
with present levels of immigration, against a scenario where all immigration is
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102. There are predictable parts of life for consuming government services and paying taxes. For example, children consume educational
services, pay taxes as adults during their working lives, and consume health and pension services after they retire. If immigrant
fiscal impacts are measured at a point in time, fiscal impacts will depend on their age structure, earnings, and their eligibility for
and use of public services.
103. It should be emphasized that researchers made many assumptions about future developments to calculate the present value of an
average immigrant. For example, they assumed that the ratio of government debt to GDP would be stabilized in an arbitrary future
year (2016) using tax increases and benefit reductions, which increases the benefits of immigrants because they would pay more
taxes and receive fewer tax-supported benefits.
104. The US$ 80,000 net gain reflected US$ 105,000 for the federal government and a net cost of US$ 25,000 to state and local
governments.
halted. The researchers found that, while the fiscal burden was alleviated for both
present and future generations by the presence of immigration, the size of this
gain depended on government policies of “fiscal responsibility”. However, the gain
is small relative to the overall imbalance within the United States, and immigra-
tion should not be viewed as a potential solution to the US fiscal problem.
Other more recent research has taken the reverse approach (Anderson, 2005).
Rather than calculating the balance of payments for the immigrant, research
conducted by the National Foundation for American Policy focused on the
government revenues that would be lost if there were zero future immigration,
and the resulting tax increases for US residents necessary to retain the current
fiscal balance. This approach leads the researchers to claim that the net benefit of
immigrants coming into the United States will be US$ 407 billion over the next 50
years, the amount by which social security taxes would have to increase.
The UK Home Office has commissioned a number of studies into the effects of
immigration, beginning with the conceptual study “Migration: an Economic and
Social Analysis”, outlining possible effects (Glover et al., 2001). Much of the
research available in the United Kingdom has focused on the “snapshot” approach,
examining the net government surplus or deficit in a particular year. The downside
of this method is that the changing fiscal impact of a migrant over the lifetime is
not captured, though the contributions of different immigrant groups (by age,
earnings capacity, education, etc.) can be isolated. The first such analysis was
commissioned by the UK Home Office using available data for the year 1999/2000.
The study estimated that migrants contributed GBP 31.2 billion in taxes while
consuming GBP 28.8 billion in benefits and state services (Gott and Johnston,
2002), resulting in a net fiscal benefit to the United Kingdom of approximately
GBP 2.5 billion for that year. In addition, migrants who were highly qualified and
fluent in the language performed better economically. However, it must be noted
that the year chosen was one of net government surplus, so both immigrants and
nationals were net contributors to public coffers.
Addressing some of the criticisms of the Gott and Johnston study, a second
analysis applied the same methodology over a five year period, 1999-2004
(Sriskandarajah, Cooley and Reed, 2005). This found that the contribution of
immigrants to public finances in the United Kingdom is both positive and growing.
By 2003-2004, immigrants accounted for 10 per cent of government tax receipts
and only 9.1 per cent of government spending, while total revenue increased from
GBP 33.8 billion in 1999-2000 to GBP 41.2 billion in 2003-2004.
In The Netherlands, the Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis undertook a compre-
hensive study on the effects of migration on the Dutch economy (Roodenburg et
al., 2003). The study concluded that GDP would increase (though accruing largely
to immigrants), residents with skills comparable to those of immigrants would lose
out, immigration would not be a major contribution to public finances, and the
burden placed by an immigrant on the state depended very much on the migrant's
age when entering the country and labour market performance. The Dutch
research bears out much of the international experience.
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Recent research in Spain has used generational accounting to calculate the net
present value of immigrants in the country (Collado and Iturbe-Ormaexte, 2004).
Using three scenarios (no immigration; 60,000 individuals per year, and 200,000
individuals per year) the researchers estimated the impact of immigration on the
welfare state. Their main finding was that increasing the inflow of immigrants
would substantially lower the fiscal burden on future natives, a conclusion that
differs somewhat in magnitude from the US experience. The study suggests that
the higher educational level of immigrants in Spain, and the fact that Spain’s
native population is ageing at a faster rate than that of the United States, may
account for this difference.
Along with age and skills, labour force participation plays a role in determining the
fiscal benefit and burden of immigrants. Research in Sweden, where both public
expenditures and taxes are high, found that the net present value for young, working
age immigrants can be as large as US$ 23,500 (Storesletten, 2003). However, the
average new immigrant represents a loss of US$ 20,500. Age and employment rates
are the main factors in determining whether immigrants “break even”.
6.6  Housing and Spatial Issues 
Other immigrant impacts may be more important to local residents, but are much
harder to assess. For example, migrants need housing, and they may fill housing
vacated by move-up-and-out locals or compete with natives who are moving to
the areas with migrants and seeking housing. In either case, homeowners,
landlords, and builders benefit from the presence of immigrants, but natives may
not be “negatively affected” by higher rents if they are seeking housing that is
“different” from that sought by migrants. Similarly, migrant children can fill
schools that are otherwise under-occupied, so that the marginal cost of educating
them is less than that of natives because fixed costs are spread over more pupils.
Alternatively, the presence of migrant children can require new schools or services,
increasing the marginal cost of schooling because new facilities must be built or
additional staff hired or (re-)trained.
Similar rising or falling marginal cost reasoning applies to hospitals, transportation,
and similar infrastructure used by both natives and migrants. If there is over
capacity, the marginal cost of serving migrants is low, and the arrival of migrants
can lower average costs for natives and migrants combined. If there is under capacity,
the marginal costs of migrants can be high as new facilities are constructed, and
the arrival of migrants can raise average costs for natives and migrants combined.
Migrants are attracted to opportunity, which often means to fast-growing cities. In
the case of Ireland, almost half of GDP is generated in the Dublin and the
surrounding counties of Meath, Kildare, and Wicklow, which has a majority of the
non-Irish migrants and thus concentrates migration’s benefits and costs. In the
Greater Dublin Area, which has about 40 per cent of the residents of Ireland,
congestion suggests that marginal costs of additional people can be greater than
average costs, as infrastructure is already taxed.
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Ireland has a National Spatial Strategy (www.irishspatialstrategy.ie) that aims to
narrow economic differences between the Greater Dublin Area and the rest of the
country by supporting regional gateways105 that specialize in particular sectors,
such as pharma and chemicals in the Cork City area, IT in the mid-west, food in the
northeast, and medical devices in the Midlands. However, it will take time for the
dispersion of economic activity to move beyond Dublin–about three-fourths of
internationally traded services are in the Greater Dublin Area.
6.7  Foreign Students 
The student door is often the easiest entry door for foreigners seeking to live and
work in another country, and those who graduate are increasingly allowed to settle
if they find local employers to hire them. International student mobility to and
within OECD countries has doubled over the past 20 years, a growth due in part to
the Asian economic miracle that raised the demand for an English-language
higher education and the emergence of more public and private educational insti-
tutions seeking tuition revenues.106
A related but hard-to-measure factor increasing student mobility are government
policies allowing foreign students to work while they study and graduates to stay
if they find local employers to hire them. There is speculation but little reliable data
that middle-class Asian families in particular are paying for English-language
instruction and schooling abroad as a way to eventually obtain the right to
immigrate. The OECD (2004a: 138), finding that 88 per cent of the Chinese
recipients of PhDs from US universities were working in the United States in 1995,
as were 80 per cent of the Indian PhDs, concluded that “much of the cross-border
demand for American…education is migration-related.” The OECD noted that
instead of passing on lifetime savings to their children, many families are “more
interested in using these savings to invest in their children's education. This is a
distinctive Chinese feature.” (OECD, China in the World Economy: The Domestic
Policy Challenges, 2002: 789-790).
There were 1.5 million foreign students in OECD countries in 2001, including
840,000 in the 22 European OECD countries, 520,000 in the three North American
OECD countries and 190,000 in the Asia-Pacific OECD countries (OECDa, 2004:
194–95).107 Ireland had 9,300 overseas third-level students in 2001/02, including
5,500 fee-paying students from outside the EU-15. They accounted for about 7 per
cent of the 133,000 third-level students.108 In the United Kingdom, by contrast,
foreigners were about 11 per cent of higher education students.109 The OECD, in a
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105. Ireland’s five regional gateway cities are Dublin, Cork, Limerick, Galway and Waterford.
106. Ireland is included with Australia, the United Kingdom and United States as countries in which (non-EEA) foreign students pay
higher tuition than local students (OECD, 2004a: 10).
107. The OECD (2004a, 7) noted that institutions and governments in host nations have encouraged the arrival of foreign students for
four major reasons: to promote mutual understanding by having students participate in exchange programmes that involve study
in another country; to augment the local human capital stock quickly in countries of origin by sending students abroad; to generate
revenues for educational institutions in host countries by exporting educational services and to attract skilled migrants for
employment in the host economy after graduation.
108. According to the Interdepartmental Working Group, fees from third-level students were EUR 68 million in 2001-02, and their total
economic impact as EUR 140 million (Department of Education and Science, 2004: 5).
109. There were about 857,000 foreign students in European universities in 2001, including over 90 per cent in the ten countries that each
had more than 15,000 foreign students each. A total of 75 per cent were in the Big 3 countries—the United Kingdom, Germany, and
France. However, the highest share of foreign students was in Switzerland, where 17 per cent of the students were foreigners.
review of Irish higher education, recommended that Irish universities “should
market themselves more energetically internationally with a view to doubling the
international student population in five years”. (OECD, 2004b: 56).
Students moving over borders are similar to workers moving over borders in
several important respects. First, most countries participate in international
education as both senders and receivers of students—as with labour migration,
only a few of the poorest countries primarily send students abroad. Second, just as
labour markets vary in the wages, benefits, and the career opportunities they offer
to local and migrant workers, so do higher education systems vary in their
structure, governance, and goals, with the sharpest distinction between “free”
systems geared to providing basic and applied knowledge in much of continental
Europe versus private and for-profit US institutions that often recruit fee-paying
foreign students for specialized courses closely linked to the US labour market.
Third, as with labour migration, there are strong network effects, with experience
and anchor students providing information that encourages and enables more
students to follow.
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Table 6.1 Foreign Students in Selected European Countries, 2001
For Students Total Studets Share
Austria 31,682 264,017 12%
Belgium 38,150 359,906 11%
France 147,402 2,019,205 7%
Germany 199,132 2,074,292 10%
Italy 29,228 1,826,750 2%
Netherlands 16,589 502,697 3%
Spain 39,944 1,815,636 2%
Sweden 26,304 360,329 7%
Switzerland 27,765 163,324 17%
United Kingdom 225,722 2,070,844 11%
Big 3 572,256
Top 10 781,918
Total Europe 856,733
Source OECD, 2004a, Table 3.2
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Table 6.2 OECD: Growth in Foreign Students,
1980–2001 (1990=100)
1980 1990 2001
Spain 107 100 389
Finland 38 100 389
Australia 30 100 382
New Zealand 76 100 343
Hungary 83 100 340
Portugal 35 100 296
United Kingdom 70 100 282
Ireland 87 100 250
Sweden 98 100 247
Turkey 87 100 217
Netherlands 47 100 187
Denmark 45 100 186
Germany 58 100 186
Korea 45 100 172
Austria 64 100 172
Czech Republic 76 100 161
Poland 68 100 156
OECD 71 100 156
Japan 15 100 141
Belgium 47 100 139
Italy 135 100 134
Norway 16 100 128
Switzerland 65 100 123
USA 77 100 117
Canada 81 100 116
France 79 100 105
Source OECD, 2004a, Figure 5.2
Ireland hosted about twice as many foreign students as it sent abroad, according
to ERASMUS data, giving it the same 2:1 ratio of students-in to students-out as the
United Kingdom (OECD, 2004a: 77). The growth in foreign students in Ireland is
well above the average for OECD countries, although slower than in some English-
speaking countries that have institutions and government policies to more
aggressively recruit foreign students, such as Australia, New Zealand, and the
United Kingdom.
Students go abroad for many reasons, including a lack of sufficient places in
appropriate institutions or courses of study in their countries of origin, in search of
a foreign experience, and as a means to migrate for employment. In the past, most
“non-immigrant” European countries insisted that foreign students return to their
countries of origin upon graduation, while immigration countries such as
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States generally allowed foreign
graduates who found jobs with local employers to remain temporarily or perma-
nently. Recently, many European countries have changed their policies, and most
now allow foreign student graduates to remain and work at least temporarily.
Meanwhile, traditional immigration countries have made it even easier for foreign
students to stay after graduation if they find jobs.
An Interdepartmental Working Group in November 2004 recommended that
Ireland promote itself as a centre for excellent English-language education, and
that an “Education Ireland Quality Mark” be awarded to institutions that offer
quality education to foreign students (Department of Education and Science,
2004). The group further recommended that the visa-issuing process be stream-
lined for foreigners arriving to study at Quality Mark institutions, and that student
visas be refused to foreigners intending to study at non-Quality Mark institutions.
Like most other OECD countries, Ireland allows full-time foreign students to work
up to 20 hours a week while studying and full-time during school holidays. The
students do not need to obtain work permits, and the employers for whom they
work do not have to first search for comparable EEA workers. There were widely
reported abuses of foreign student work rules, with a few English-language
schools appearing to be little more than recruitment agencies that advertised the
ability to work in Ireland as a reason to pay tuition to attend their English-
language school.110 In other cases, foreign students arrived but did not attend
classes, or remained in Ireland after graduation to work without authorization, and
the institutions they attended did not report this information to authorities.
Finally, some foreign students stayed in Ireland by repeatedly re-enrolling in short-
term courses of less than 12 weeks.
Ireland has an important English as a Foreign Language Sector that attracted
200,000 visitors in 2003, generating EUR 300 million for the Irish economy,
according to the Interdepartmental Working Group (Department of Education and
Science, 2004: 5) that made recommendations to continue to welcome foreign
students and prevent abuse. Beginning in April 2005, only foreign students
pursuing a degree or certificate recognized by the Minister for Education and
Science and enrolled in a course of at least a year’s duration can work while
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110. Reportedly, about 95 per cent of the 20,000 registered Chinese students in Ireland in spring 2005 were in English-language schools.
studying. Foreign students accepted at universities but first taking preparatory
courses such as English are now barred from working until they enrol in the
university, and those enrolled in short-term courses can stay in Ireland a maximum
18 months.
Closely related to foreign student workers is the working holidaymaker
programme, which permits non-EEA nationals aged 18 to 30 from Australia,
Canada, New Zealand and Hong Kong (SAR) to stay in Ireland one year and work up
to three months for any Irish employer. Some 3,000 working holiday-maker visas
were issued in 2003, and Irish employers may request one-year work permits for
those working holiday-makers they wish to employ for a longer period.
6.8  Migration Trade Offs 
Immigration is often characterized as “good” or “bad.” Such an approach is often
misleading because immigration, like many other public policy choices, is more
often a contest between competing goods. Immigration has benefits and costs,
and thus the proper approach is to enumerate, analyse and debate these benefits
and costs, then determine which benefits get higher priority while at the same
time minimizing costs. Most industrial countries have accepted the need to debate
priorities between competing goods, such as whether low inflation or low
unemployment deserves higher priority, or whether freer trade or protecting
workers should be favoured.
The use of migrants in agriculture provides an example. Consumers want to pay
low prices for food, but most also want seasonal farm workers, like other workers,
to have decent wages and working conditions. The trade off is thus between low
food prices and the competing good of better wages and conditions for farm
workers. For example, what would happen if the influx of migrant workers were
slowed, farm wages rose, and the increase in farm labour costs were passed
through to consumers? Experience in the United States shows that for a typical
household, a 40 per cent increase in farm labour costs translates into a two to
three per cent increase in retail prices.111 At the same time, farm wage increases
may lead to farm productivity improvements, so that consumer prices may
decrease rather than increase. There is no easy answer to whether the savings on
fresh produce due to the presence of migrants is worthwhile. The migrants are
better off in high-wage labour markets, earning five to ten times more than they
would at home. Landowners are also better off, since lower farm worker wages
tend to be capitalized into higher land prices. Consumers of these commodities
pay less for fresh produce. The critical question is whether these benefits are more
valuable than having farm work performed and rewarded like other work.
There is no easy way to balance the tradeoffs between the competing goods in the
inflation-employment or the trade-jobs equation, but policy making can be
improved with more accurate information on what level of unemployment triggers
higher inflation, or how many jobs are lost as a result of freer trade (or freer
migration). As Ireland continues as an immigration country, debates about the
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111. For a full discussion, see Martin (1993).
competing goods involved in immigration are likely to become more common.
Further research, data collection and analysis can improve policy making by
highlighting the trade offs that are often asserted but rarely documented.
6.9  Concluding Remarks
Ireland changed in the past decade from a net emigration to a significant net
immigration country. A history of emigration has made the Irish people and
government sensitive to the discrimination often encountered by newcomers, so
migrants are arriving in a country with a strong commitment to social justice.
Unions, NGOs, and the media have played prominent roles in highlighting abuses
of migrants in Ireland, and the government has responded with more protections
for migrants and the means to remedy abuses that have been detected.
The government has also made several significant changes in policy, and is poised
to make more. Most of these changes relate to unskilled migrants. The
Employment Permits Act of 2003 and separate administrative measures made it
easier for nationals of the EU-10 accession countries to work in Ireland, and
assumed that workers from EU-10 countries in Eastern Europe or other new
accession countries could fill any future unskilled job vacancies. Asylum has
become a less contentious issue since Ireland ended automatic birthright
citizenship in 2004 and the number of asylum applicants fell in Ireland and other
industrial countries.
With Irish growth rates and employment projected in the near future to follow the
impressive trend set during the last decade, migration will certainly remain a key
feature allowing the labour market to react to changes in demand and further
boosting Irish competitiveness. As such, Irish unemployment is expected to remain
low, especially when compared to other EU countries. This will be a significant
advantage to Ireland in the expanded European Union.
Ireland is grappling with whether to become a longer-term immigration or guest
worker country. As in other countries that previously had few migrants, foreign
workers began to arrive when the economy boomed and increased labour force
participation and reduced joblessness still left unfilled jobs. Migrants were
available to fill those jobs and the government allowed their entry in ever larger
numbers. Since May 2004, there are large numbers of EEA nationals who have the
freedom to live and work in Ireland as well and the Irish government will have
declining influence over their movements as barriers to travel and work continue
to fall in an enlarging EEA. Within Ireland, some non-EEA migrants will soon reach
the five years of legal residence needed to naturalize, which could make the guest
worker option and its implicit suggestion of rotation difficult to enforce. However,
if Ireland decides to continue as an immigration country, it may not want
employers that offer unskilled jobs to make the decisions about who should
immigrate to Ireland.
Immigration brings changes and raises fundamental questions in a society, forcing
residents to ask:Who are we? What kind of a society have we built, and whom shall
we welcome to it? What should we do to encourage the integration of newcomers?
How should we deal with those that arrive irregularly? As immigration is likely to
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remain a structural feature of a growing Irish economy, the government will also
need to determine and enforce the rules as to how many, from where, and in what
status newcomers should arrive, as well as how to foster and promote the
integration of migrants and their children into the Irish economy and society. There
are no easy answers to these questions, but Ireland should address its inquiry in a
systematic and balanced manner, based on the best estimates of the significant
economic impact all migrants (newcomers and returning Irish nationals, skilled
and unskilled) can have on the economy and the country’s social identity. The latter
is of particular importance as Ireland takes up its place in a newly expanded and
increasingly competitive European Union.
Immigration was not the source of the Irish economic miracle, but it can help to
sustain the Celtic Tiger’s economic growth. As Ireland grapples with the “problem”
of managing migration on its journey to an uncertain destination, it is important
to remember that immigration reflects Irish prosperity. Despite the problems
associated with managing immigration and integration, there are likely few Irish
who would want to go back to the “old days” in which emigration rather than
immigration was the dominant theme.
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Labour Market
Policy Considerations
7
This chapter suggests a number of considerations that could inform the govern-
ment’s planned comprehensive overhaul of Ireland’s labour immigration policies. It
does so by discussing (i) the fundamental questions concerning the design of labour
immigration policy; (ii) the basic policies needed to manage employers’ demand for
migrant labour, and (iii) the major policy tools for managing labour immigration,
including temporary and permanent migration programmes, and policies to
regulate the access to the labour market by dependants and students. The discus-
sion draws on international policy experiences and lays down some policy options
for Ireland.
7.1  Fundamental Questions in the Design of Labour
Immigration Policy
It is useful to distinguish between three fundamental questions that require separate
discussions in the debate and design of a country’s labour immigration policy:
1. What are the consequences of international labour migration? 
2. What should be the objectives of labour immigration policies? 
3. What are the policies best suited to achieve these objectives? 
The ordering of the questions makes the obvious but important point that any
policy recommendation on labour immigration has to be preceded by separate
discussions about the impacts of migration and the objectives of labour immigra-
tion policy. Given Ireland’s relatively short history of employing significant numbers
of non-Irish migrant workers, both discussions, about impacts and objectives,
remain seriously underdeveloped at this point in time.
Although a literature on the economic effects of immigration in Ireland is
beginning to emerge,112 there are still fewer economic impact studies whose depth
and scope of analysis would be comparable to the studies carried out for some
other countries. As a result, there is currently relatively little systematic evidence
on the effects of recent immigration on Ireland’s economic growth, labour market,
public services and the fiscal balance more generally.
Similarly, it is clear that the rapid increase in immigration over the past few years
is transforming Ireland from what used to be a very homogeneous into an
ethnically more diverse and multicultural society. It is less clear, however, how
these trends impact on Irish identity, i.e. on how Ireland’s residents see themselves,
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and whether these impacts are perceived as positive or negative. Discussions
concerning changing identities because of immigration have just recently begun
to emerge.
Besides this lack of evidence concerning the diverse impacts of migration, there
has been little discussion about which of the multifaceted and inter-related
impacts of migration should be assigned most importance in the design of
Ireland’s labour immigration policies, and why. As a result, a number of important
questions on the overall objectives of Ireland’s labour immigration policies remain
unanswered. For example:
s To what extent, if at all, should Ireland’s labour immigration policies prioritize
the interests of Irish citizens over those of migrants and their countries of
origin?
s To what extent, if at all, should concerns over the potentially adverse effects
of immigration on local workers limit the level of labour immigration
demanded by individual employers?
s What role should non-economic considerations, such as potential impacts of
migration on national identity and social cohesion, play in shaping Ireland’s
labour immigration policy? 
s Does Ireland want to become a country of “immigrants” with permanent
residence status, a country of “guest workers” with temporary work and
residence permits, or a mixture of both? 
s How do Ireland’s labour immigration policies fit in with the objectives of
Ireland’s long-term economic and social policies?  
The lack of discussion of these and other relevant questions about the objectives of
Ireland’s labour immigration policies makes it difficult, if not impossible, to formulate
a comprehensive, consistent and coordinated approach to managing labour
immigration in a manner that benefits Ireland in the long term. Ireland needs a
public immigration debate that is explicit about the overall policy objectives. Of
course, such a “normative” debate must involve discussions about fundamental
values and ethics, not just about facts and impacts of migration alone.113
7.2  The Need to Manage the Demand for Migrant Labour
Like in most other high-income countries, there is widespread agreement in
Ireland that the economy needs migrant labour to fill vacancies in both the high-
and low-skill labour market segments. Therefore, the primary question is no
longer whether there is a need or, as economists prefer to call it, demand for
migrant labour, but rather how important this demand is, and what policies are
needed to meet it.
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To answer the first question, it is necessary to recognize that, regardless of the
economic conditions and the number of vacancies advertised in the economy,
there is always a need for host countries to manage the demand for migrant
labour. This is because the level of labour immigration in the interest of
individual employers is unlikely to always coincide with the best interest of the
overall economy. More specifically, whatever the details of policy design, at least
three policies are needed to keep the level of immigration aligned with the
overall interests of the host economy:
s The protection of the labour rights of all migrant workers.
s The protection of the right of EEA nationals to preferential access to the Irish 
labour market.
s To encourage employers to consider alternatives to employing migrant
workers to meet perceived labour shortages.
7.2.1   Protecting the Labour Rights of Migrant Workers 
The demand by individual employers for labour critically depends on the cost at
which workers can be employed. Importantly, the cost of employing migrant
workers is not only determined by employers’ wage costs, but also by the
employment conditions at which migrant labour is available. If, for example,
employers are in a position to lower costs by offering wages and employment
conditions below minimum standards, employers’ demand for migrants is likely to
be higher than if employment laws were enforced. There is thus a need to ensure
that the demand for migrant workers identified by employers is in fact a demand
for workers who can be, and end up being, employed in compliance with Ireland’s
existing employment and immigration laws.
In the Irish context, more effective protection of migrants’ employment conditions
will require at least two policies. First, the Labour Inspectorate has to be empow-
ered to play a stronger and more effective role to help enforce employment laws
and regulations. In addition to increasing the numbers and powers of inspectors, it
will be critical to begin to collect, analyse and publish systematic evidence on some
of the relevant details of the cases investigated by the Labour Inspectorate,
including especially those pertaining to migrant workers. At a minimum, this will
require information about the nationalities of workers whose cases are under
investigation by the Labour Inspectorate.
A second policy necessary to protect the employment rights of migrants more
effectively and thereby help to manage employers’ demand for migrant labour, is
the enforcement of employer sanctions. Unscrupulous employers who feel that
the illegal employment of migrants has a good chance of going unpunished may
have little incentive to make use of the existing legal channels to recruit migrant
workers. Similarly, employers who employ migrants illegally may also have little
incentive to comply with employment laws and regulations.
7.2.2   Protecting the Right of EEA Nationals to Preferential Access 
to the Irish Labour Market
It is generally accepted, and EU law requires, that Irish citizens and all other EEA
nationals enjoy a preferential right of access to Ireland’s domestic labour market as
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opposed to non-EEA workers. This implies that any demand for non-EEA workers
must be a residual demand, that is, the demand for labour after employers have
made all reasonable efforts to recruit workers from within the EEA. Any
assessment of the demand for non-EEA workers must thus take account of the
local or EEA-wide supply of labour and, to the extent possible, ascertain that no
EEA workers are available to fill the vacancies advertised by local employers. The
measures necessary to achieve this in practice depend on the manner in which
labour immigration is regulated.
Under a temporary labour migration programme, where a work permit cannot be
granted unless the migrant has secured a job in Ireland, employers are usually
required to demonstrate that no EEA workers are available to fill their vacancies
(“labour market test”). Although the experiences of Ireland and other more long-
standing countries of immigration have shown that effective labour market tests
are difficult to implement in practice, there are a number of mechanisms that
could make Ireland’s current policies more effective. These policies will be
discussed in section 4.3.
Under a permanent immigration programme, a work permit/visa could be granted
to a migrant without having a job offer in Ireland. This means that the protection
of EEA nationals’ right to preferential access to the Irish labour market requires the
government to effectively assess (i) the current (and future) skills needs of the Irish
economy, and (ii) to what extent this need can be met from within the EEA. The
conclusion of this analysis will then have to determine the minimum skills
requirements for migrants to be admitted under the permanent immigration
programme.114
7.2.3  Encouraging Employers to Consider all Potential Responses 
to Labour Shortages 
A third important reason for the need to manage the demand for migrant labour
is that the employment of migrant workers is often only one of a number of
possibilities for employers to respond to perceived labour shortages. The whole set
of potential responses includes: (i) increasing the capital or technology-intensity of
the production process (e.g. mechanization); (ii) relocating to countries with lower
labour costs (“offshoring”); (iii) increasing working hours of already employed
workers, or trying to recruit inactive or unemployed local workers; (iv) switching
output to less labour-intensive commodities or services, and/or (v) recruiting
migrant workers. Although not all of these options are available to all employers at
all times (e.g., it is clearly not possible to offshore the work of waiters in hotels and
restaurants), it is likely that many employers have at least some alternatives to the
employment of migrant labour.
An employer’s response to a perceived labour shortage will depend on the relative
cost of each of the available options. If the costs of employing migrant workers are
very low, employers will not consider other alternatives. It could be argued, for
example, that the ready supply of cheap labour may discourage some employers
from modernizing production processes and result in a situation where inefficient
companies and industries continue to operate because they are in effect being
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the difficulties with manpower planning and forecasting of labour shortages, see, for example, Doudeijns and Dumont (2000);
Richards and Amjad (1994).
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subsidized by a readily available and cheap immigrant workforce.115 This may be in
the short-term interest of individual employers, but maybe not in the long-term
interest of the host country’s economy overall.
There is thus a clear need for the government to introduce the right incentives for
employers to recruit migrant workers only after considering the potential
alternatives, including mechanization and/or switching to less labour-intensive
production processes (or services).116 To achieve this, it will be necessary to monitor
and, whenever necessary and possible, regulate the relative cost at which migrant
workers are available to local employers. This will be easier to achieve in relation to
the employment of non-EEA nationals who require employment permits (that can
be made available to employers at a cost) rather than EEA nationals who may
migrate and work in Ireland without any restrictions. Nevertheless, there are
policies such as the enforcement of employment laws and the regulation of
private recruitment agencies that could help keep employers’ recruitment costs
sufficiently high so that alternative responses to perceived labour shortages are
not immediately disregarded.
The regulation of the private migrant worker recruitment industry may be an
important policy tool that could affect employers’ costs at which both EEA and
non-EEA workers are recruited. The experience of other immigration countries has
shown that under employer-led immigration policies, such as Ireland’s before April
2003, private recruitment/employment agencies can become a powerful and often
driving force in determining the size and composition of labour immigration. This
sometimes happens because of the illegal recruitment practices of unscrupulous
recruiters, for instance, charging migrants to be recruited, which lower the cost at
which migrants are made available to employers. In other cases, an unregulated
private recruitment industry can generate a dependence on particular employment
channels for migrant workers, i.e., the ready supply of cheap workers provided by
recruitment agencies creates a demand for such workers by employers whose
business practices gradually become dependent on migrant workers that are
available at very short notice.
7.3  Policy Tools to Manage Labour Immigration 
The lack of clear policy objectives makes it difficult to work out clear-cut and
detailed recommendations for the reforming of Ireland’s current labour immigra-
tion policies. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify three broad labour manage-
ment policy tools which the government should consider in its planned overhaul
of Ireland’s labour immigration policies:
s Temporary labour immigration programmes;
s Permanent labour immigration programmes,
s Regulating the labour market access of dependants and students.
The discussion below suggests potential policy options for the use of each of these
policy tools in the Irish context. It is important to bear in mind that these policies
are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, it is very likely that Ireland’s future labour
115. See, for example, Martin and Olmstead’s (1985) discussion of the mechanisation controversy in US agriculture.
116. Viewed from this perspective, immigration can and needs to be considered as a tool of both labour market policy and industrial policy.
immigration policies will have to include a mix of all three policies. However, the
weight given to each of them in managing labour immigration is an important
question that can only be answered after the objectives of labour immigration
policy have been clarified. In particular, to what extent does Ireland want to be a
country of “temporary guest workers” or “permanent immigrants”? 
7.3.1  Temporary Labour Migration Programmes (TLMPs)
This section first briefly outlines the rationale and international policy lessons of
TLMPs and then proposes a number of considerations necessary in the reform of
Ireland’s current temporary employment permit policies.
7.3.2  Rationale and International Policy Lessons
From an economic standpoint, the theoretical rationale of a TLMP is primarily
based on the potential economic benefits for all parties involved: receiving
countries may benefit from efficiency gains from an increased supply of labour and
human capital; sending countries may benefit from remittances and the return of
their workers; and employment abroad offers migrant workers the opportunity to
increase their productivity and wages.
In addition, TLMPs could enable host countries to minimize the potentially adverse
impacts of the employment of migrant workers on the wages and employment
opportunities of local workers. This could be done, for example, by restricting the
employment of foreign workers to sectors which suffer from labour shortages (a
restriction impossible to impose on foreign workers with permanent residence
status). More generally, because of the requirement to secure a job before
migrating to the host country on a temporary work permit, a TLMP is able to keep
admissions in line with the (managed) economic demand for migrant labour.
The international experiences with TLMPs suggest that their theoretical benefits
outlined above tend to be difficult to achieve in practice. Critics of TLMPs argue
that such programmes are simply unfeasible in a liberal democracy. This argument
is based on the fact that many of the past and existing TLMPs – most notably the
Bracero programme in the USA (1942-64) and the Gastarbeiter programme in
Germany (1955-73) – failed to meet their stated policy objectives and instead
generated a number of adverse, possibly unintended, consequences.117 The three
most important adverse impacts included:
s the exploitation of migrant workers in both recruitment and employment;
s the emergence of labour market distortions, and the growth of a structural
dependence by certain industries on continued employment of migrant
workers;
s the non-return and eventual settlement of many guest workers.118 
Proponents of new TLMPs argue that innovative policy designs could help to avoid
past policy mistakes and generate significant benefits for all sides involved,
including migrant workers and their countries of origin.119
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118. The slogan “there is nothing more permanent than a temporary foreign workers” has been a popular summary statement of the
perceived failure of past guest worker programmes.
119. For a discussion of the need and policies for new and improved TLMPs see, for example, Schiff (2004) and Martin (2003).
7.3.3  Considerations in the Reform of Ireland’s Temporary Employment
Permit Policies
It is useful to focus the discussion concerning the reform of Ireland’s temporary
employment permit policies on three key issues: (i) managing admissions;
(ii) facilitating the portability of employment permits, and (iii) managing the
departure of migrants whose temporary employment permits have expired and
who failed to acquire permanent residence.
s Managing admissions 
The first key question is whether low-skill jobs should be permanently excluded
from Ireland’s temporary employment permit policies. This will depend on
whether, as the government expects, workers from EU accession states will fill all
existing vacancies at the low-skill labour market segment. On the one hand, the
relatively large number of workers from the new EU member countries who have
taken up legal employment in Ireland suggests that this new labour supply should
be able to meet the demand for workers in low-skilled jobs in Ireland.
On the other hand, it is questionable whether accession state nationals, who now
enjoy complete free choice of employment in Ireland, will take up jobs in sectors
with low wages and difficult working conditions, such as in agriculture and in the
domestic help sector. Analysis of work permit data for 2002120 revealed that
“personal and protective services in the domestic service sector” and “other (low-
skill) occupations in agriculture” were the two job categories with the lowest
weekly pay offered to work permit holders (EUR 253 and EUR 286 per week,
respectively).121 Systematic data and research is urgently needed to assess the
measures taken by employers in these sectors to recruit workers from inside the
enlarged European Union, and their success in doing so.122
It is also interesting to note in this context that, in 2002, workers from outside the
enlarged European Union accounted for three-quarters of all work permits issued
for employment in the domestic service, and the medical and nursing sectors.
Workers from the Philippines accounted for respectively 58 per cent and 32 per cent
of work permits issued for these sectors, which involve a significant number of
low-skilled jobs. Again, research is needed to assess the demand for non-EEA
workers following EU enlargement, and the extent to which accession state
nationals are taking up employment in these sectors.
A second issue to consider in the reform of Ireland’s current policies is how to
regulate the admission of migrants for employment in occupations that remain
eligible under the work permit system.123 As a first step, there is a clear need to
improve the current mechanisms for checking and verifying the unavailability of
local workers before permission is given to proceed with a work permit application.
Following EU enlargement, the labour market test administered by FÁS concerns a
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121. This is based on information provided by employers on the work permit application form.
122. Anecdotal evidence from the horticultural sector suggests that workers from the new EU member countries are filling many
vacancies. At the same time, there is also some indication that workers from the new EU member countries may be reluctant to
take up certain jobs in specific sub-sectors such as jobs in the nursing stock industry. Unattractive working hours are thought to be
the primary deterrent for accession state nationals to do these jobs.
123. Assessing the demand for migrants to perform domestic services in private household is particularly problematic. This is because
migrants employed as domestic workers frequently carry out a wide range of duties including caring for children and the elderly as
well as performing basic household chores such as cleaning. Arguably, the existence of some of these jobs is sometimes more of a
reflection of the household members’ preferred lifestyle – i.e., a preference to have the house cleaned by somebody else – rather
than a reflection of genuine “need”.
much larger pool of potential EEA workers, including all workers from the accession
states. Given the history of failure, this expanded labour market test cannot be
expected to be any more successful than that implemented before 1st May.
In order to improve the process of trying to match local vacancies with local
workers, employers who express a need for non-EEA workers might be required to
offer wages and working conditions that are equal to or higher than the average
(rather than minimum) wages and working conditions prevailing in that job
category. This could help to attract local workers into jobs which would not be
considered acceptable or desirable employment options if advertised at the
minimum wage. It could also protect the wages and employment conditions of
competing local workers (including all EEA nationals) already employed in similar
occupations.
An improved labour market test could also be part of a two-tier system: the
requirement to actively search for local workers could be waived in sectors or
occupations which are verifiably known to suffer from shortages of local workers;
the remaining sectors/occupations would still be subject to a labour market test
which could then be more focused and therefore potentially more effective.
If accession state nationals were able to fill all labour shortages at the low-skill
labour market segment, an effective labour market test would suffice as a means of
regulating the admission of non-EEA nationals for employment in the remaining
sectors. If, however, it is found that local employers cannot fill all their vacancies
with workers from the new EU member states, and/or if the implementation of an
effective labour market test remains elusive, Ireland may need to consider
“economically oriented” (rather than just “administrative”) work permit fees as the
most efficient way to regulate admissions.
Singapore is currently among the few countries using economically oriented work
permit fees to manage the admission of migrant workers. Singapore’s “foreign
worker levies” are payable by the employer for each foreign worker they employ.The
levies are flexible (i.e. regularly revised) and specific to the sector of employment
and the skill level of the migrant worker.124
To effectively keep labour immigration aligned with the (managed) demand for
labour, work permit fees would need to be set at a level high enough to provide local
employers with sufficient incentives to: (a) search for local workers who can be
employed without paying the fee (this would effectively help to protect local
workers’ right to preferential access to the labour market) and, (b) consider
alternative measures, such as mechanization or off-shoring before considering the
recruitment of migrant workers. The level of fees necessary to achieve this is likely
to be significantly above the EUR 500 currently charged by the DETE for a six to 12
months work permit.
There are two main challenges to using work permit fees as an effective tool for
regulating the admission of temporary migrant workers. First, there is the risk that
some employers will illegally deduct work permit fees from migrant workers’
wages. In that case, the fees will fail to achieve their intended objectives and simply
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serve to reduce the wages of migrant workers. To prevent this, work permit fees
need to be effectively enforced with credible and significant penalties for
employers found to pass the fees on to their workers. This would require a signifi-
cant investment in enforcement, which the government may or may not be willing
to make. Second, the setting of work permit fees requires a sound understanding
of the current demand for migrant labour in different industries. This requires the
continuing analysis and monitoring of labour market trends.
Quotas may be an alternative to economically oriented work permit fees. A major
advantage of setting quotas is political: by capping the number of migrant workers
admitted each year, the government is perceived as being in “control of labour
immigration”. Furthermore, the process of setting quotas may, in principle, involve
consultations with a wide range of stakeholders (e.g. the social partners in the Irish
case), which may help to give the process the characteristics of a relatively
transparent and democratic tool of public policy making.
In practice, however, quotas are a highly problematic and frequently inefficient
means of regulating inflows. In particular, they have frequently proven to be too
rigid a tool to be able to respond efficiently to the changing needs of the domestic
labour market. The changing of quotas may also potentially involve difficult
political discussions that might be avoided more easily under a system where the
admission of migrants is regulated by economically oriented work permit fees.
s Rights after admission: the portability of temporary work permits
In addition to the enforcement of immigration and employment laws, the effective
protection of migrants’ rights requires at least some portability of temporary work
permits, enabling migrants to change employers whenever necessary. This applies
to all occupations, but especially to migrants working, and also often living, in
private households. It is important to recognize that immediate, complete and
unlimited portability across all occupations and sectors of the host country’s
labour market would undermine the alignment of the size and composition of
economic immigration with the demand for migrant labour. In addition, it may
also result in a substantially reduced propensity on the part of local employers to
recruit migrant workers. This is mainly because employers may be reluctant to
recruit migrant workers who are free to leave them again before at least part of
the employer’s recruitment costs have been recovered.
A more realistic and desirable policy objective would be to facilitate the portability
of temporary work permits inside a defined job category and after a certain period
of time. The determination of the duration after which permits become portable
must be based on a realistic assessment of the time needed for employers to
recover at least part of their original migrant worker recruitment costs. It is likely
that this period will not exceed one year. It should be noted in this context that it
may not be desirable to guarantee employers that they will recover their entire
migrant worker recruitment costs, since to do so could significantly reduce the risk
for employers in relation to hiring migrant workers relative to that of recruiting
local workers (who may leave the employer at any time, i.e. also before the
employers’ investment in the workers have been recovered). This could, in turn,
encourage employers to recruit migrant workers rather than local workers.
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Besides making work permits portable inside certain occupations/sectors and
after a certain period of time, other important policies would have to include
making it a criminal offence for employers to retain their workers’ passports, and
the need to inform migrant workers of affordable housing, where available, other
than that offered by the employer.
s Managing the return of migrants whose temporary employment permits
have expired and who have failed to acquire permanent residence
It should be recognized that some migrant workers entering Ireland on temporary
employment permits may wish to apply to remain in Ireland permanently. This
calls for transparent mechanisms and rules for a regulated and conditional (i.e.
non-automatic) transfer into different and “better” programmes that grant some
foreign workers permanent residence status. However, it should be re-emphasized,
that the rationale of a temporary labour migration programme is that, rather than
a right that migrants can acquire by virtue of their residence and employment on
temporary work permits alone, the decision to grant permanent residence to
migrants on temporary permits must remain at the discretion of the host country.
How this can be achieved in practice is discussed later in this chapter.
While providing channels for the conditional “upgrading” to permanent residence
status, policies that maintain the general expectation of temporariness of
migrants’ stay under a temporary labour migration programme are also called for.
First, measures must be available to prevent foreign workers from overstaying a
temporary work permit, for instance, because initial savings targets were not
realized during the validity of the work permit. This calls for the strict enforcement
against employers and recruiters who engage in the illegal practice of contract
substitution125 and provide foreign workers with misleading information about
employment conditions and living costs in the receiving country.
A related second policy is to issue temporary work permits to allow migrant
workers, especially in occupations with low wages, to generate the net financial
gains that make migration financially worthwhile for them. In the context of
migration to Ireland, it must be recognized that, following EU enlargement, the
average travel and recruitment costs for migrant workers employed under Ireland’s
work permit system are likely to be substantially higher than before EU
enlargement (when accession state nationals accounted for a third of all migrant
workers employed on work permits in Ireland). This makes it increasingly unlikely
that migrant workers, especially those employed in occupations with low wages,
will be able to generate the net financial gains necessary to make migration
financially worthwhile, by taking up employment in Ireland for one year only. There
is a case for increasing the duration of new work permits and/or renewals to, for
example, 2+2 years, or 1+2 years. This would be a relatively straightforward modi-
fication of current policies that can be introduced without changing/affecting any
other aspects of the current work permit system.
Third, migrant workers with a valid work permit need to be given the right and
opportunity to travel freely, or at the least without excessive restrictions, between
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conditions etc. (ILO 1999).
the home and host country. This will help migrants to maintain links with their
home country, which, in turn, raises the probability of their eventual return home.
Fourth, financial return incentives could include the transfer of migrant workers’
social security payments to their home country. Another policy option is the
creation of special savings accounts offering migrant workers the opportunity to
save part of their wages at special high interest rates on condition that such
savings will only be released to migrant workers upon their return to their home
countries. Such financial return incentives have been tried before with mixed
success. The most infamous example is the Mexican Bracero programme that
required a portion of migrants’ earnings to be deducted for retirement in Mexico.
The policy ultimately failed as migrants never received the money and their claims
for deferred wages have been under investigation for decades.
A fifth policy option is to require employers to establish a financial security bond
for each migrant worker they employ, that bond to be confiscated if the worker
does not leave the country after the expiration of the work permit. This system is
currently being pursued in Singapore, where employers of non-Malaysian workers
need to deposit security bonds of US$ 5,000 per worker employed. This measure
can be effective only if it can be ascertained that a migrant has in fact left the
country. It also raises a number of civil liberty concerns, based on which security
bonds have often been opposed in liberal democracies.
Finally, clear and effective procedures that penalize employers who employ
migrant workers without valid work permits, and to remove migrant workers who
overstay their temporary work visas are necessary. Regarding the latter, efforts will
have to be made to obtain the cooperation and assistance of sending countries. For
instance, sending countries could adopt measures to regulate their migrant
worker recruitment industries and to assist with the return of migrant workers
who have been apprehended and deported by the authorities of the migrant
receiving country.
7.3.4  The Potential Role of Bilateral Recruitment Agreements and 
Seasonal Worker Programmes 
Bilateral recruitment agreements are labour mobility agreements concluded
between two countries. They enable host countries to limit the admission of
migrant workers from particular countries only. There are currently over 176 such
agreements in force in OECD countries.
Bilateral recruitment agreements can have a number of advantages over unilateral
admission policies. For example, bilateral agreements have frequently been
concluded in exchange for readmission agreements for irregular migrants. They
may also allow the signatories to share the burden of monitoring and admini-
stration between migrant receiving and sending countries. A recent OECD report
argues that “ensuring adequate travelling, living and working conditions, or
creating a system to avoid the double payment of social security taxes, can create
incentives for potential employers to participate in the agreement” (OECD, 2004, 16).
A basic policy question in regard to bilateral recruitment agreements concerns the
countries with which to conclude such agreements. Regarding Ireland, the
labour market policy 
considerations 107
question might well be as to whether any future bilateral recruitment agreements
should be concluded in respect of workers from Romania and Bulgaria, two
candidate countries for EU accession. Naturally, a principal consideration has to be
whether the skills of workers from those countries are those required to fill the
vacancies in Ireland. Another consideration concerns the potential regular and
irregular labour supply that bilateral recruitment agreement with EU applicant
countries could generate. On the one hand, it could be argued that, because the
programme would eventually become redundant as candidate countries join the
European Union, the conclusion of bilateral agreement at this stage would help to
build the networks necessary to facilitate the future unrestricted migration and
employment of workers from EU applicant countries. On the other hand, it could
also be argued that the creation of such networks may trigger irregular
immigration and the overstaying of work permits in anticipation of legalization in
the next round of EU enlargement.
Seasonal worker programmes have become one of the most common types of
bilateral recruitment agreements. They are currently used in both traditional
immigration countries, such as the United States of America and Canada, and in
European countries such as Switzerland, France and the United Kingdom.126 They
are most commonly, but not exclusively, used to hire migrants for seasonal jobs in
agriculture. While facing many of the same challenges as other temporary
migration programmes, some seasonal programmes appear to be quite successful
in ensuring that migrants’ stays are in fact temporary, a key objective of any
temporary migration programme. This has been achieved by limiting eligibility to
workers who are married with families in their home countries (as under Canada’s
Agricultural Seasonal Worker Programme) or by requiring seasonal workers to be
full-time students in their home countries (as required under the Seasonal
Agricultural Worker Scheme in the United Kingdom).
A common characteristic of seasonal worker programmes is that seasonal workers
tend to circulate between the receiving and their home countries over a prolonged
period of time. For example, the majority of migrants currently employed under
the Canadian Agricultural Seasonal Worker Programme have joined the
programme repeatedly over many years. Repeat migration is possible as long as
the Canadian employer issues a favourable letter of evaluation at the end of each
season, a requirement which has sometimes led to employers exercising excessive
control over workers who wish to return to Canada the following year.
Ireland has operated a small-scale Seasonal Horticultural Workers Scheme since
2002.127 It is restricted to horticultural students in eastern and central European
countries. Out of about 250 students to be admitted in 2005, some 150 will be from
the new EU member states, and around 100 from the Ukraine. The horticultural
industry has made special arrangements with the DETE to facilitate the issuing of
work permits for non-EEA students wishing to participate in the scheme. The need
for non-EEA workers arises primarily because certain seasonal work begins in
March, whereas most students from the new EU member countries only become
available as from May/June.
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http://www.bordbia.ie/industry/sector_profiles/agri-food/index.html
The scheme relies heavily on contacts with horticultural colleges in the students’
home countries, and the colleges' involvement in selecting and facilitating the
placement of their students in Ireland. Besides helping to meet the labour needs
of Irish employers, the scheme is intended to provide students with the
opportunity to gain practical experience, improve their English and familiarize
themselves with a new culture.
Employers wishing to participate in the scheme must satisfy three conditions: (i)
the payment of at least the minimum wage; (ii) accommodation must be provided,
either on the premises or in the vicinity of the workplace, and (iii) students must
be offered employment for at least three and up to a maximum of six months.
The degree of compliance with the return requirements of the Seasonal
Horticultural Workers Scheme by non-EEA nationals is found to be reasonably
high. Whenever students remain in Ireland beyond the expiration of their initial
placements and their work permits, the students’ colleges are informed
accordingly.
7.3.5  Permanent Labour Migration Programmes
A permanent labour migration programme is designed to admit migrant workers
on a permanent basis. Many of the traditional immigration countries, such as
Canada and Australia, have used permanent immigration programmes to attract
skilled workers as permanent immigrants with a view to their eventual
naturalization. Therefore, permanent immigration programmes are usually
accompanied by measures to facilitate the successful long-term integration of
migrants into the host country’s economy and society.
The most common policy tool in regard to permanent immigration programmes is
a “points system” which evaluates applications for permanent residence according
to a broad range of factors, including migrants’ individual characteristics as well as
the labour market needs of the host economy. The best known and most well-
established points systems are operated by Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
More recently, the United Kingdom has also begun to apply a points system to
regulate the admission of highly skilled workers (Highly Skilled Migrant
Programme).128
For example, to qualify for the acquisition of permanent residence under Canada’s
points system, applicants must: (i) meet certain minimum work experience
requirements, (ii) prove that they have the funds required for settlement, and (iii)
score a sufficient number of points in regard to six selection factors to achieve the
“pass mark”. The six selection factors include education, language skills,
experience, age, arranged employment in Canada, and “adaptability” (including
previous work experience and/or study in Canada). These factors have been
selected to maximize the probability that the admitted migrant workers will
successfully integrate into Canadian society and the economy.
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128. Although this programme initially offers temporary employment and residence permits, it provides for indefinite leave to remain
after four years, without the additional requirement of sponsorship by a UK employer.
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Table 7.1 compares the points systems as practised in Canada, Australia and the
United Kingdom. Strictly speaking, they are not readily comparable, as Australia
operates more than one points system, and under the UK system, temporary
employment and residence permits are initially issued. Nevertheless, it is still
useful to demonstrate the diverse forms of various points systems in operation.
Depending on which selection factors are given priority, it is possible to imagine a
range of diverse points systems: at one extreme, supply-based systems select
migrants based on their individual characteristics; at the other, demand-based
systems select migrants based on labour market needs in the host country. All
three systems in Table 7.1 fall between these two extremes. However, the UK
system is clearly more demand-based than either the Canadian or Australian
system. Under the latter two, domestic labour market needs only account for 10 to
11 per cent of the overall points awarded.
A points system is generally thought to have a number of advantages over other
policies that grant permanent residence on a case-by-case basis.129 First, a points
system is often viewed as a transparent means of regulating labour immigration.
Most point tests are available online, enabling applicants to evaluate themselves
based on a clear and known set of criteria. Second, a points system may be
attractive to the host population as it is clear and transparent regarding the
control of labour immigration.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, a points system is a relatively flexible tool for
regulating admissions. The selection criteria, and/or the scoring system, may be
modified through administrative measures. This enables relatively fast responses
to changes in local labour market conditions or other considerations deemed
important in the design of labour immigration policy.
At the same time, points systems should not be viewed as a simple and
straightforward “best practice” for managing permanent labour immigration. The
design and effective implementation of a points system poses a number of
challenges, including decisions regarding the optimal scoring method to be used
to evaluate migrants’ skills, educational qualifications and language abilities.
Given that the host country’s labour market needs are only one of many possible
selection criteria, there is also a risk that points systems that are too supply-based
become disconnected from the host country’s labour market needs. For example,
Canada is currently thinking about measures to address the severe under-
utilization of immigrants’ skills in the Canadian labour market. A recent study
found that foreign-educated immigrants in Canada earned US$ 2.4 billion less
than native-born Canadians with comparable formal skills, simply because they
worked in occupations below their skills levels (Reitz, 2005).
As discussed in section 2, Ireland needs a permanent immigration programme that
could be used for both “direct entry” by newcomers, and regulating the acquisition
of secure permanent residence status for migrants already employed in Ireland on
temporary work permits. To that end, Ireland could institute a points system. The
Canadian experience suggests that, in order to align immigration with the
economic demand for labour, demand considerations, such as the requirement to
be able to fill certain occupations where there is a labour shortage, or to have a job
offer in Ireland, must play a significant role.
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129. See the discussion in Papademetriou and O’Neill (2004).
It is worth to re-emphasize that a points system is designed to regulate the
admission of migrants for long-term employment and residence only. Given the
importance assigned to individual characteristics rather than to an offer of
employment as the only factor determining eligibility (as is the case under most
temporary labour immigration programmes), a points system is inherently unsuit-
able to regulate the selection and admission of migrant workers on a strictly
temporary basis. Consequently, a points system is meant to complement rather
than replace temporary employment permit programmes.
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Figure 7.1 Permanent and Long-Term Immigration Flows into
Selected OECD Countries by Main Categories, 2001
(Percentage Composition)
Australia
Switzerland
United Kingdom
Portugal
Canada
Norway
Denmark
France
United States
Sweden
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Workers Family Reunification Refugees
Note Countries are ranked by decreasing order of the percentage of workers in total inflows. Categories give the legal reason for entering
the country. A worker who has benefitted from the family reunification procedure is regrouped into this latter category even if he has a
job in the host country while entering. Family members who join a refugee are counted among other refugees.
1. For Australia, Canada, the United States, Norway and Sweden, data concern acceptances for settlement. For Denmark, France, Portugal and
Switzerland, entries correspond to residence permits usually delivered for a period longer than one year. For the United Kingdom, data are
based on entry control at ports of certain categories of migrants (excluding EEA citizens). For Australia, “worker” includes accompanying
dependents who are included in the category “family reunification” for all other countries.
2. Data refer to fiscal year (July 2000 to June 2001). Category “workers” includes accompanying dependents. Excluding citizens from New
Zealand who do not need a visa to enter the country.
3. Passengers, excluding EEA citizens, admitted to the United Kingdom. Data only include certain categories of migrants: work permit holders,
spouses and refugees.
4. Category “workers” includes specialists and other permits that constitute grounds for permanent residence in Norway. Non-renewable
permits are not included.
5. Entries of EU family members are estimated. Excluding visitors. Among those who benefitted from the regularisation programme, only
those who received a permit under the family reunification procedure are counted. The “family” category also includes spouses of French
citizens and scientists; parents of French children; and those with family relationships, who received the new permit “vie privee et familiale”.
6. Data refer to fiscal year (October 2000 to September 2001). Excluding Immigrants who obtained a permanent residence permit following
the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA).
7. Excludinig Nordic and EEA citizens.
Sources National Stastical Offices.
Source OECD 2005, 33.
7.3.6  Regulating Labour Market Access of Dependants and Students 
The comprehensive management of the immigration and employment of migrant
workers must take account of the various non-employment immigration channels
that migrants may use to access the host country’s labour market. In the Irish
context, the most important of these channels involves students – over 20,000
student visas were issued in 2004, double the number of new work permits – and
dependents whose precise numbers are not known officially. Figure 7.1 shows that,
in many countries, the share of dependants in long-term immigration flows far
exceeds that of workers. The most extreme example is Sweden, where dependants
and refugees account for almost all long-term immigration flows. In Ireland also,
dependants may be expected to rapidly evolve into a significant immigration
category. Data and research into the numbers, labour market participation and
employment of dependants are urgently needed.
The recent increase in the number of non-EEA nationals registered as students in
Ireland suggests that this channel of immigration may provide a significant
number of workers – working legally or illegally – for the Irish labour market. In
many other high-income countries, such as the United Kingdom, students are a
critical source of labour in certain industries, including especially the hospitality
sector.130 A similar development may already be underway in Ireland. There is
clearly a need for more information and data about the contribution made by
students to employment in Ireland and for this to be taken account of in
determining the number of admissions under the labour immigration channels.
There is also scope to ease current regulations that make it difficult for students to
acquire temporary employment permits after they have completed their studies in
Ireland. Under the current system, students may acquire work visas/authorizations
(in the sectors open to this scheme) in Ireland, but not work permits (unless they
first leave the country). This can cause difficulties for students wishing to remain
and work temporarily in Ireland immediately after completion of their studies. It is
also likely to create unnecessary costs for employers who wish to recruit non-
national students immediately after graduation in Ireland.
To remove these inefficiencies, the work permit system could consider applications
for new work permits for resident non-EEA nationals who have just completed
their studies in Ireland. To prevent abuse, such a policy would need to be limited to
students who have completed relatively long-term studies in Ireland (viz. degree
courses). To implement such a policy, non-EEA graduates could be included in a
“second stage” of the temporary work permit system’s labour market test (i.e.
search for EEA nationals in the first instance, and non-EEA nationals who have just
completed long-term studies in Ireland in the second instance).
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130. In the United Kingdom, the number of non-EEA nationals admitted as students in 2003 (319,000) was more than double the
number admitted as workers.
7.4  Concluding Remarks
This chapter has discussed three broad labour migration policy tools which the
government could consider in the future; temporary labour migration pro-
grammes, permanent migration programmes, and measures to regulate the access
of dependants and students. However, the lack of discussion about the objectives
of Ireland’s labour immigration policies makes it difficult, to formulate a compre-
hensive, consistent and coordinated long-term approach to managing labour
immigration. A number of questions about the overall objectives of Ireland’s
migration policies remain unanswered because there has been little discussion
about which of the many impacts of migration should be assigned most impor-
tance in the design of Ireland’s labour migration policies.
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Implications for Social Policy:
Health, Social Welfare and Migration
8
8.1  Introduction
Social policy has implications for the development and implementation of
effective and sustainable integration measures. These can and should focus on
social inequality and poverty, minimum labour standards, including minimum
wages, housing, healthcare and social services, as well as language training and
education. The rapid rise in migration to Ireland has profound implications for Irish
social policy considerations and the provision of a range of services, including
healthcare, social services, income maintenance, housing and education. Concerns
have been raised that migrants would add pressure on welfare services and create
new demands on housing, health and education (NESC, 2003: 103-4) and that
the low-skilled migrants of today could face social exclusion and become the
welfare dependants of tomorrow in the event of a down turn in the economy
(NESC, 2005: 33).
In sectors such as health and education, whilst the arrival of a new group of young
taxpayers can ease financial pressures on the social security system. Ireland’s
continued economic growth has meant that migrant workers have been easily
absorbed into the labour market without impacting on the low rate of
unemployment (4%). Since these effects have not yet been studied in any great
detail in Ireland and since many social impacts will not be felt for some years to
come, the discussion of the implications of migration for social policy in Ireland in
this chapter can only be tentative and explorative in nature.
Some immigrants arrive with financial capital, some arrive with extensive social
capital in the form of professional qualifications and experience, multilingual
competences, survival strategies, networks and entrepreneurship. Other highly
qualified professionals or university graduates have arrived in Ireland with consid-
erable social assets for which there is no commensurate outlet. Their potential
positive economic and social impact on Irish society remains unrealized and is a
social loss. Other migrants arrive without assets (incomplete education, little
English, no savings) and some arrive in debt (to recruitment agents, loans to pay
airfares and obligation to refund parental/family loans or savings). In addition to
the diversity of social and human capital migrants might introduce into their host
society, their position will be affected by such characteristics as age, nationality,
gender and ethnic origin, among others. Thus, migration itself may be said to be a
microcosm composed of diverse and changing spheres and varied impacts.
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Many of the new migrants to Ireland are more vulnerable in the labour market and
the housing market than are established Irish residents. In particular, immigrants
with an undocumented or indeterminate status, together with other groups such
as women and young people, are particularly vulnerable to poverty, poor housing
conditions and exclusion from society. In these areas social policy can play a critical
role in integrating and including people in society, thereby enhancing social
cohesion and the accommodation of diversity to the benefit of everyone. Specific
examples of what works includes making language classes available for all
immigrants free of charge, ensuring that health and education services are
provided in culturally appropriate ways that reflect the diversity of the population,
cultural awareness and equality training for front line service providers in social
welfare and health services, and specific measures for immigrant women.
So far, it has not been general practice in Irish social policy to factor migration into
social policy planning, social protection or social reporting. The types of
measurable impacts require differentiation. Concerning short-term studies of
migration impacts, when migrants are predominantly clustered in the recently
arrived or economically active age groups, the “outcome” benefits of migration will
tend to be economically positive in terms of taxation, social protection contribu-
tions and the dynamism of the working-age labour force. Guest worker migration
regimes shorten the duration of stay and reduce the likelihood of migrants
claiming compensation or insurance benefits.
Concerning migration impacts over time, as migrant communities include a wider
spread of age groups, the more positive economic effects may fade somewhat as
migrants begin to consume the same services – health, education and welfare - as
the rest of the local population. Policies can also influence the use of public
services. For example, where family reunification is restricted, as has been the case in
Ireland, migrants will not have claimed child benefits, used paediatric care or sought
medical treatment, pensions and social housing in retirement. This may imply that
the current migrant population in Ireland is under-consuming social benefits.
8.2  Social Policy Context
Specific social policy issues that address migrants’ rights and entitlements can be
located within several policy contexts, including those found in equality policies,
anti-poverty policy and specific provisions in the National Action Plan Against
Racism 2005-2008. In addition, the discussion paper on immigration and residence
in Ireland, published in 2005 by the DJELR, highlights the need for a better
integration of public policy relating to immigration, including the impact on
services such as education, health and housing. Social policy considerations
affecting migrants exist in a variety of policy documents that address social
exclusion and poverty, most notably the National Anti-Poverty Strategy and the
National Action Plan for Social Inclusion (NAPS Inclusion).
8.2.1  Equality Context
Underpinning much of the recent development of Irish social policy has been the
progression of a multi-ground approach to equality covering both employment
equality and equality in the provision of services. The Equal Status Acts 2000 and
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2004, place responsibilities on providers of goods and services, including those in
the public sector to promote equality, prohibit certain kinds of discrimination
across nine grounds, prohibit sexual and other types of harassment, prohibit
victimization, provide reasonable accommodation of people with disabilities and
allow for a broad range of positive action measures. The Acts play an important
role in improving access to health, care, welfare, education, employment, housing
and other services. Equality in the provision and receiving of services means that
services are provided on the basis that no one group, culture, value system or
practice is dominant or considered the norm. In this respect services that are
provided in ways that are responsive to and understanding of the diversity of the
community to whom and with whom services are provided, have implications for
the delivery of services, the awareness and understanding of migrants economic,
social and cultural backgrounds (Pillinger, 2005).
8.2.2  National Action Plan Against Racism, 2005-2008
The National Action Plan Against Racism (NPAR) is a broad ranging approach
containing some specific strategic social policy developments. However, there is no
statutory basis nor a specific budget allocated for the implementation of the
actions contained in the plan. It identifies a framework for the development of “a
more inclusive, intercultural society in Ireland…based on policies that promote
interaction, equality of opportunity, understanding and respect” (2005a, 27). The
intercultural framework includes a range of social policy measures that focus on
the integration of migrants within equality policy, anti-poverty policy and public
service modernization. The five underpinning objectives have particularly
important implications for social policy developments:
s Protection: effective protection and redress against racism;
s Inclusion: economic inclusion and equality of opportunity;
s Provision: accommodating diversity in service provision;
s Recognition: recognition and awareness of diversity;
s Participation: full participation in Irish society.
The methods to be used to achieve the aims of the framework are as follows:
s Mainstreaming an intercultural approach into policy-making processes and
into all relevant policy areas, with reference to Ireland’s commitments to
equality and human rights;
s Targeting of specific strategies to overcome the inequalities experienced by
specific groups informed by an evidence-based approach to policy making;
s Benchmarking progress through targets and timescales and the development
of statistical strategies to provide the necessary data to measure such progress;
s Engagement of key stakeholders and drivers to support the implementation
of the plan includes policy makers, specialized and expert bodies, the social
partners and local communities, including groups representing cultural and
ethnic minorities.
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This framework is important to engaging policy makers and other stakeholders,
and raising awareness of social and economic issues facing migrants in Ireland.
Specific social policy initiatives that are signalled for development through the
plan cover the planning of services and mainstream and targeted policy initiatives
in the areas of education, health, social services and childcare and accommodation.
In the area of policy development there are specific mechanisms to integrate the
needs of migrants into macro economic and social policy planning, although
concerning migrant workers this is to be “consistent with the requirements of
policy on immigration, employment and equality”. Overall the plan calls for the
reasonable accommodation of diversity and positive action in the design and
implementation of policies, programmes and organizational practices.
8.2.3  Social Inclusion Initiatives
Social inclusion initiatives have been introduced as a response to the potential for
the marginalization, isolation and exclusion of migrants. These measures have not
only been important to promote inclusion and integration, but they have been a
crucial element of a broad approach to preventing racism.
A range of social inclusion initiatives have been introduced in Ireland in the last
decade, which emerged from a concern about persistent poverty in Ireland and
also from the greater attention given to combating social inclusion in Europe, most
notably through the NAPS Inclusion. The plan provides a focus for social inclusion
activities and a national coordination framework is provided through the Cabinet
Committee on Social Inclusion. Ireland’s strong focus on partnership working has
also provided a focus for targeting resources into marginalized communities, and
through these into designated projects for asylum seekers and other minority
ethnic groups, through the Local Development Social Inclusion Programme made
up of 38 partnerships, 33 community groups and four employment pacts.
Other social inclusion measures have been introduced through the City and
Council Development Board’s ten-year plans for economic, social and cultural
development. The plans were equality proofed during their development and they
contain specific references to the principles of equality and social inclusion and to
the integration of policy and service delivery for migrants and other minority
ethnic groups.
8.2.4  EU and International Policy Context
There is also a European (European Union and Council of Europe) and international
policy (United Nations and International Labour Organization (ILO)) context that is
driving social policy developments in this area of migration. For example, basic
social standards have been established in the International Convention on the
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.
Under Article 28 migrant workers and members of their families shall enjoy the
same treatment granted to nationals; Article 28 of the Convention includes the
right to all migrant workers to receive any medical care that is urgently required;
and Article 30 provides for the basic right of access to education based on the
principle of equality of treatment with nationals.
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The ILO (2004) has also developed a non-binding multilateral framework for a
rights-based approach to labour migration which takes account of labour market
needs, with guidelines and principles for policies based on best practices and
international standards. The NCCRI (2004) have argued that even if these
conventions are not ratified and implemented they should still underpin minimum
standards in Irish policy.
There is also an emerging EU social policy framework addressing migrants that will
impact on Irish social policy. This is underpinned by the Lisbon guidelines, and
mapped out in the Charter on Fundamental Rights, a recent (2006) Green Paper on
managed economic migration which is likely to address some core social policy
issues, and a Commission Communication for A Common Agenda for Integration
Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union
(2005). Other specific provisions are found in the Directive on family reunifi-
cation,131 social inclusion and equality policy initiatives.
The European Commission recommends that in implementing the Council Directive
2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification (OJ L 251,
3.10.03) that access to the labour market should not be restricted. Other recom-
mendations concern the need to address the different situations and conditions
faced by immigrant women and men in the integration process, give special
attention to the double discrimination faced by immigrant women in the labour
market, and ensure that Community funding is used to integrate a gender perspec-
tive into immigration and integration policies (European Commission, 2005).
8.3  Social Policy Provisions, Rights and Entitlements 
for Different Groups of Migrants
8.3.1  The Social Impacts of Migration
Measuring the social impacts of migration on the public welfare system will depend
on the entitlement and access of migrant communities to such services as health-
care, education, income support and housing. An attempt has been made to
categorize these entitlements in Table 8.1. The categories exclude involuntary
migration (trafficking, displacement, asylum seekers, and programme refugees).
The different legal status held by different groups of migrants influences social
rights and entitlements and access to social, health, employment and other
services for non-Irish nationals. Here we differentiate between migrant workers
(work authorization/ working visa holders, work permit holders, citizens from the
new member states, and working students) and refugees and asylum seekers.
8.3.2  Migrant Workers
The QNHS for the last quarter of 2005 suggests that there were an estimated 253,500
foreign nationals aged 15 years and over living in the State, of whom just over 171,000
were in employment. The fastest growing group of new migrant workers are
nationals of the new EU member states, whose numbers increased from under
30,000 in the last quarter of 2004 to over 65,000 in the last quarter of 2005.
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There are differences in status between migrant workers holding work permits and
those holding work authorization visas/ working visas regarding family reunifica-
tion and legal status. Limited attention has been given to issues concerning access
to health, childcare, training and employment services, and other services support-
ing migrant workers integration into Irish society. These groups of migrants that
are working can in time build up rights to social insurance related benefits through
pay-related social insurance (PRSI), while access to GP, hospital and other health
services is subject to nominal charges. There is also access to first and second 
level education for children of migrant workers. The Habitual Residency Condition
(HRC) discussed below restricts access to certain social welfare benefits. Similarly,
the limited duration of employment contracts makes long term planning for
housing difficult.
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Table 8.1 Classes of Migrants Residing in Ireland
Estimated Entitlement to Public Social Cenefits and Services in 2005
Class of Migrants Right of Access to Services
Migrants within the 
Common Travel Area of Ireland 
and the United Kingdom 
(non-treaty arrangement)
EU-15 nationals plus 
EEA and Swiss nationals 
prior/post May 1, 2004
European nationals from 
10 accession countries,
May 1, 2004
Non-EU national
Refugee status and humanitarian 
leave to remain
Regularized leave to remain – 
EU parents of Irish-born children 
in 2005
Source prepared by P. Conroy, Ralaheen, 2005
Right of access to employment and services equal to Irish
nationals, confirmed in part by the Good Friday Agreement.
Equal treatment in relation to employment and related
insurance rights, access to education, housing and health
services. Portability of many social protection entitlements
for workers and their families.
Employment insurance-based rights to income support, but
not discretionary welfare provisions. Unclear entitlements in
relation to other social, welfare, labour market or housing
services, where the Habitual Residency Test is applicable.
Limited rights of access to welfare services. Generally not
entitled to public housing/rent allowances, but exceptions
exist. Entitled to 1st and 2nd levels of education at present,
not to 3rd level, unless able to pay “overseas” fees.
Differences with other residents regarding right of access
to social benefits, where the latter rely on length of
residence, duration of social contributions, or length of time
on Live Register.
Unclear status in relation to service entitlement when
changing status from asylum seeker to regularized resident
with leave to remain.
8.3.3  Work Authorization Visa and Working Visa Holders
Greater employment security, possibilities to stay and the right to family
reunification were introduced through the working visa and work authorization
scheme (2000) to enable prospective employees with job offers from employers in
Ireland to obtain immigration and employment clearance in advance from Irish
embassies and consulates. Visas are held by the worker for two years. Sectors
covered include information technology, professionals in construction, and regis-
tered nurses. Similarly, the Work Permits Bill (2005) seeks to extend entitlements
to highly skilled workers including settlement and family reunification.
8.3.4  Work Permit Holders
In contrast work permits are held by employers for one year. Work permits are
normally issued to lower skilled occupations in the horticultural, construction,
social care and service sectors of the economy. There are no rights to family reuni-
fication or for spouses to work. As with work authorization / working visa holders,
in most cases work permit holders are ineligible for medical cards and have to pay
nominal charges for healthcare in the same way that Irish citizens do.
8.3.5  Migrant Workers from the New EU Member States
The government anticipates that there will be a sharp reduction in the number of
work permits issued, as the numbers of workers from the new member states
increases. Between May 2004 and June 2005 104,706 PPS numbers were issued to
migrant workers from the new EU-10 member states. The impact of the HRC and
planned changes to this policy is discussed below.
8.3.6  Working Students 
Since 18 April 2005 new students granted permission to remain in the State will
not be permitted access to employment unless they are attending a full-time
course of at least one-year’s duration and leading to a recognized qualification.
Students are entitled to work up to 20 hours per week part-time and full-time
during vacation times. Students carrying out preparation courses leading to a full-
time course will not be permitted to work until they commence the full-time course.
8.3.7  Refugees and Asylum Seekers
Under the 1951 Geneva Convention, Ireland accepts an agreed number of
programme refugees as part of its international obligations to protect people
fleeing persecution, as well as more recently by responding to asylum seekers
seeking to be recognized as refugees. In terms of social policies asylum seekers
receive more limited entitlements to social supports and are unable to work,
although refugee status brings with it similar rights to those held by Irish citizens,
and refugees have the right to apply for citizenship. Government policy has been
drawn up in the document Integration: A Two Way Process (DJELR, 1999). Support
for asylum seekers is covered under a policy of Dispersal and Direct Provision.
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Specific social policy issues concern the right to work, education and training, and
supports for women asylum seekers with children. In particular, the Irish policy of
dispersal, often locating people in rural areas and small towns, has raised a number
of social policy challenges, concerning access to social networks, healthcare,
language classes and interpretation services, childcare and other supports. In the
areas of healthcare, for example, planning for additional resources such as GP
services has not always taken place through a planned and adequately resourced
approach and in some cases refugees have been left without access to GP and
other healthcare supports.
In terms of accommodation and social support an Asylum Seekers Unit provides a
community welfare service to non-Irish nationals and specific clinics with a
dedicated service for refugees and asylum seekers have been established by the
service. The Reception and Integration Agency operates seventy accommodation
centres across the country for asylum seekers who are provided with full board and
accommodation and pocket money whilst waiting for a decision on their status
(this is discussed further below). Asylum seekers have a range of entitlements,
including schooling for children between the ages of six and 16 years, English
language and literacy supports provided within an adult education context and
measures to include asylum seekers in local community and cultural activities.
Additional social supports were recommended under the NPAR and service
providers in the health and education sectors have instigated additional services
and supports for asylum seekers and their children in response.
Restrictions on citizenship and residency have also been put in place. The provision
that allowed citizenship to be granted to Irish born children ended with the
citizenship referendum in 2003. A similar provision allowing parents to have access
to residency by virtue of an Irish born child was also ended following a decision of
the Supreme Court. These provisions impact on both parents and children regard-
ing access to social policy rights associated with residency and citizenship.
8.3.8  Gender and Migration
Gender is a particularly important issue since it shapes channels of entry and
access to services and benefits, work, asylum and family reunification. The HRC
discussed below leaves many women in marginal and excluded situations; this is
particularly the case for women who have childcare responsibilities and women
who experience domestic violence and who are unable to claim services and
benefits for themselves and their children. Female dependent spouses and women
working in some sectors are particularly socially isolated and lack access to
information in their local communities. Social isolation is enhanced because many
women migrant workers do not have family networks to help them with childcare
and other support.
8.3.9  Family Reunification
The law does not provide a right to family reunification, although those migrants
granted long term residency or permission without condition as to time are
permitted to have their family members live with them in Ireland. However, the
decision to grant family reunification is given at the discretion of the Minister of
Justice and applications have to prove sufficient resources to support family
members, since in many cases they will not be granted the right to work in Ireland.
124
Family reunification is dependent on the immigration category under which the
primary working migrant enters the jurisdiction. Family reunification is a critical
issue for many migrants. As the National Women’s Council of Ireland has stated
(2005) “Family reunification is of immense importance to many migrants and in
particular to migrant women who have been forced to leave their children and
families behind when they emigrate to Ireland. This puts huge strains particularly
on mothers of young children as well as on the children themselves.”There are also
gendered assumptions underlying family reunification policies, which may be
embedded in assumptions of women’s dependence in the family. A change in
policy was necessitated by a potential drop in overseas nurse recruitment and
other areas of skilled employment, attributed to a lack of rights to family
reunification, as exists in other countries. Granting a spouse the right to work and
to family reunification, under the work authorization and working visa schemes,
has helped to maintain overseas nursing staffing levels in particular.
The continued requirement that spouses of work permit holders be disallowed
from working has reinforced dependence of women on their husbands/partners,
including a loss of financial independence for women. This creates an environment
that can lead to abuse, domestic violence and an absence of personal autonomy.
This situation creates dependence and inequality with particularly important
implications for support systems for women who experience domestic violence,
pregnancy or social isolation. In particular, a number of organizations have called
for greater legal protection for women who experience domestic violence to be
given independent legal status and the right to remain in Ireland, as exists
currently in the United Kingdom. Without this women are tied into dependency on
their spouses, legally, financially and in accessing services.
8.4  Amending the Habitual Residency Condition and Access 
to Social Welfare Benefits
With the enlargement of the European Union on 1 May 2004, Ireland, along with
the United Kingdom, provided general access to the labour market for workers of
the new EU-10 member states, but put in place a number of restrictions regarding
access to welfare benefits and other forms of social assistance. Following the
imposition of restrictions to welfare benefits introduced in the United Kingdom,
Ireland put in place the HRC132 which restricted access to welfare benefits for all EU
and EEA citizens. At the time the government was concerned that the system could
be open to abuse and “welfare tourism”. The HRC applied principally to Unemploy-
ment Assistance, Old Age (Non-Contributory) and Blind Pension, Widower’s and
Orphan’s Allowance, Supplementary Welfare Allowance and Child Benefit. In order
to satisfy the HRC an applicant for social welfare has to demonstrate that they
have lived in the State habitually for two years or more, and that there is an
intention to live in Ireland in the long term.
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Applying for social welfare requires an applicant to go through the HRC “test”,
eligibility for which is made by one of seven HRC Deciding Officers based in the
Department of Social and Family Affairs. One of the difficulties is that the increase
in cases for adjudication has resulted in delays in making decisions. In contrast
Supplementary Welfare Allowances can be claimed by people in emergency
situations who have little or no means and the benefit can be provided for
immediately by a Community Welfare Officer. The discretionary powers vested in
Community Welfare Officers means that in some cases exceptional and urgent
needs payments are granted on an ad-hoc basis. Exceptional needs payments can
also now be issued to someone who has failed the HRC.
Although social welfare systems are the responsibility of EU member states, the
European Commission contested the application of the HRC in 2005, based on
Article 7(1) of EEC Regulation 1612/68 concerning freedom of movement of labour
and the requirement of equal treatment for EU nationals concerning conditions of
employment and work, and in the case of Article 7(2) equal treatment in respect of
social and tax advantages. Of relevance to the Irish case, is that the European Court
of Justice133 has stated that the United Kingdom’s habitual residency provisions
should not restrict access to the UK’s job seekers allowance. Similarly, in Ireland
under the equal treatment principle EU/EEA workers should be equally entitled to
Supplementary Welfare Allowance on the basis that this provides for a minimum
subsistence benefit. In addition, the European Commission has stated that child
benefit and one parent family benefit also apply, thereby rendering the HRC
redundant in these areas, although not in the area of unemployment assistance.
These decisions have major implications for Irish social policy, which has been
focussed on implementing restricted measures for new member state nationals. In
particular, these measures are also associated with the Irish government’s policy
that in the event of a down turn in labour market growth that they can apply EU
rules allowing for transitional measures that resulted in restrictions in access to
the labour market.
Indications from the review of the operation of the HRC, that was initiated on the
request of the Minister by the Department of Social and Family Affairs in 2005,
suggest that there will be some policy and administrative changes introduced to
lessen the impact of the HRC on non-nationals, particularly from the new EU-10
member states. Indications are that the “test” would require habitual residence to
be for a period of around six months, with access to emergency support through
supplementary welfare for all migrant workers. At the time of writing the scope of
this review had not been decided and whether it would apply to non-EU member
state nationals and spouses of work permit holders. The terms of reference for the
review include assessing the impact on different categories of persons,
organization and administrative arrangements and opportunities, and addressing
policy issues.
In a recent submission to the government on the impact of the HRC, the NCCRI134
noted that confusion over the application of this rule has led to many migrants
being wrongly refused welfare payments, not least because some deciding officers
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134. An independent expert body, which brings together government and non-governmental organizations, core funded by DJELR.
believed that work permit status was irreconcilable with habitual residence
(NCCRI, 2005). In addition, evidence from the Homeless Agency suggests that
application of the rule has rendered some migrant workers, unprepared for the
cost of living in Ireland, homeless and destitute. If a new class of migrant is created,
such as long-term residence of five years or more, this decision will directly impact
on social provisions between migrants with different statuses. Migrants of long-
standing residence will eventually obtain preferential treatment regarding the
provision of public services, compared with short-term or temporary migrants.
The confusion caused by the HRC emphasizes the importance of adequate and
appropriate information and orientation for new arrivals in Ireland as to their
rights and entitlements. The Immigrant Council of Ireland has produced a 250-
page handbook offering such information for migrants; yet, there is a lack of
similar material on the website of the Department of Family and Social Affairs.
Effectively determining entitlements is an essential element of the pre-departure
migration decision, and migrants need to have a full understanding of what they
can expect in terms of cost of living, social support, and access to health services.
In February 2006 press reports highlighted the eligibility of migrant workers from
all EU member states to claim the child benefit (of approximately EUR 150 per
month) and the new childcare subsidy (of EUR 1,000 to be commenced in 2006).135
Evidence of a child’s birth certificate and an Irish employer’s statement is needed
to enable a migrant worker to claim the benefits, even if their children are living in
other countries.
8.5  Housing and Accommodation
A decision to recognize migration as a permanent feature of the Irish labour
market will have a substantial impact on the housing market. If future policy
opens the prospect of increased family reunification, preferences for more skilled
or qualified migrants and the option of a long-term residence status, each of these
either together or separately will impact on the demand for housing.
Analysis of the nationality of households in the 2005 Housing Needs Assessment
shows that 6.7 per cent of households were from within the European Union
(other than Ireland), 8.4 per cent from outside of the European Union, with 85 per
cent of households being Irish. Although there has been an increase of non-EU
households on the waiting list for social housing (from 2,700 in 2002 to 3,664 in
2005), these numbers have largely been offset by a decrease of Irish households on
the waiting list for social housing. Relieving further pressures on social housing
has resulted from a greater dispersal of non-EU households on housing lists, with
a fall from 73 per cent to 54 per cent of those non-EU nationals on waiting lists, in
the three Dublin councils and Kildare county council, between 2002 and 2005.
Since 2004 local authorities have been responsible for accommodating recipients
of social welfare rent supplements of eighteen months. Figures from November
2005 show that 25 per cent (13,815) recipients were non-Irish nationals, many of
whom are married compared to a higher proportion of single females amongst
Irish recipients of supplementary rent allowance.
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There has been a significant increase in housing demand since the mid-1990s
(Bacon, 1998) and there are some suggestions that migration could increase
demand for housing in inelastic housing markets, and drive housing prices up
(Barrett et al., 2005, 19). Home ownership has begun to slip beyond the grasp of
many households as house prices rise and the share of home ownership fell from 80
per cent in 1991 to 77 per cent in 2002, (CSO, 2004). This is accompanied by
lengthening waiting lists for public social housing, for affordable housing, and
pressures on the supply of private rented accommodation (ICSH, 2005; NESF, 2000).
The significance of migration for the private housing market is recognized as
driving the demand for housing, housing construction and related household
consumption (Sherry FitzGerald, 2000). In the context of Ireland’s rapid economic
development, housing has been the subject of several policy reviews, including the
comprehensive study on housing commissioned by NESC (2004).
The Irish National Spatial Strategy (NSS), a planning framework for housing, urban
and rural development, conducted research into the likely population and housing
demands in 2020 (http://www.irishspatialstrategy.ie/docs/pdf/Population%20
Labourforce%20Housing.pdf). Based on the population and labour force estimates
made by the CSO, the NSS projected that the number of households would rise by
between 615,000 and 788,000 between 2000 and 2020, with migration accounting
for 25 to 45 per cent of that growth. The study also predicted particular pressures in
Dublin, with the share of the total population living in the region rising from 40 to
44 per cent by 2020. Available work permit data suggest that nearly half of migrant
workers are employed in the capital. Research commissioned by the Department of
Environment in 2000 suggested that “allowing for other migratory flows and the
likely age patterns of people making up these numbers, the impact on housing
demand from this source alone is likely to be around 8,000 to 10,000 units per
annum” (Bacon, 2000).
8.5.1  Migrant Workers and Housing Choices
A large number of immigrants in Ireland on work permits are in low-skilled
occupations, paid the minimum wage, and sometimes even less. The high cost of
living in Ireland means that some migrants are renting shared accommodation of
poor quality and which is often overcrowded to reduce costs: migrants have
reported renting properties that are dirty, damp, infested with rodents and without
proper heating (ICI, 2004). These can all be factors leading to poor health. Reports of
homelessness among migrants underlines the links between migrants’ social and
working environment and their health status.
Currently, non-EEA migrant workers working in Ireland on work permits have to be
renewed annually, or every two years in the case of people working on work
authorization visas and working visas. The uncertainty of their temporary status
makes it difficult to plan, particularly in purchasing property in Ireland, and they
will choose to rent instead. Migrants in lower-wage employment also choose to
share housing to reduce costs, which in turn reduces the number of individual
households in Dublin (MRCI, 2004; Kelleher, 2004). If the proposal to create a new
permanent residence status for some migrants (DJELR, 2005) were adopted, a new
long-term resident status would confer social entitlements on some migrants
similar to those enjoyed by Irish citizens, and could expand the number of persons
seeking more permanent housing in Ireland. This could increase home ownership
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among migrants, thereby accelerating integration and strengthen their stake in
Irish society. It could also increase demand on the social housing sector as migrant
families apply to join the waiting lists for public social housing. At present the
assessment of the need of individuals for public housing does not require any
specific migrant or immigrant status, but depends on the housing policy of
individual local authorities (NESF, 2000: 18).
A significant proportion of immigrants arrive without family members as workers,
as students, or student-workers, and their housing needs are similar to those of
single persons rather than family units. Any decision to apply for family reunifica-
tion may be related to the short-term nature of the current work permit regime,
meeting the income requirements for reunification, and the difficulties faced by
spouses in obtaining work permits in Ireland. This is a question for future research.
As a result, the demography of immigration of non-nationals is skewed towards
younger and economically active age groups. Changes in policy on family reunifica-
tion are likely to be accompanied by migrants seeking to switch to other segments
of the housing market, such as social housing.
As mentioned in earlier chapters, an important proportion of immigrants are Irish
emigrants returning home. About 17 per cent of both male and female immigrants
in 2003 and 2004 were Irish nationals (CSO, 2004: 8). This is lower relative to the
patterns seen in 1999 to 2002, when one in four or more immigrants were of Irish
origin. Returning Irish nationals impact on the housing market, although not
necessarily in the same geographic locations as migrants holding work permits
and work authorizations recruited into specific industries and services. They are
more likely to settle outside Dublin. In contrast to working-age non-Irish
immigrants, returning Irish migrants are also older. Those over the age of 60 are
the subject of a special initiative called the Safe-Home Programme, which acts as
a liaison between older Irish emigrants and Irish housing associations to
accommodate older people without family or relatives.
Anecdotal evidence from migrants, and NGOs working with migrants,136 indicates
that an unknown proportion of work permit holders are living in their employers’
households, or residing in caravans, portacabins, mobile homes, or on their
employers’ commercial premises, construction sites or farms. In some instances,
migrant accommodation is a farm outhouse or barn. Some of these are to be found
in detailed census categories on types of housing, where caravans and mobile
homes are included. Migrants looking for work have been reported to be sleeping
rough on the streets.137 It may be that a perverse consequence of the Irish economic
development is that standards of accommodation, which have generally improved
for the population as a whole, are at risk of declining where migrant workers are
concerned. Improved enforcement of employment conditions, and basic rates of
pay, would ensure that migrants are not forced into poor housing conditions either
by employers or their economic situation.
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8.5.2  Asylum Seekers and Direct Provision
Restrictions placed on Programme Refugees include the requirement that
programme refugees have to remain in the accommodation allocated to them for
up to one year, otherwise they lose their rent allowance. On leaving the
accommodation, for example, to move to be near family or social networks,
problems arise under the social assistance regulations that rent allowance can
only be claimed if a person has been living in rented accommodation for a period
of six months or more. This provision is seen to discriminate against refugees and
asylum seekers who may wish to join family or social networks in Dublin and forces
people to stay in one place even though it may not be a place of choice.
Asylum seekers are housed in groups or collective housing, such as converted
hotels, hostels, reception centres, self-catering accommodation and mobile homes.
At the end of 2004, there were 6,785 residents in Direct Provision of accommoda-
tion under the Reception and Integration Agency (2005). However, many received
housing services and left Direct Provision, only to return at a later date. Only a
small number are granted refugee status or leave to remain and thus settle or
become eligible for local authority/public housing. Legal restrictions on rent
allowances to pay for private rented accommodation were introduced to reduce
the incentive to move out of accommodation provided by the Reception and Inte-
gration Agency. This reduces the capacity of asylum seekers to have subsidized
private accommodation.
Local authorities in Ireland have had to take on new responsibilities for accommo-
dating asylum seekers and refugees living within their areas, and this has thrown
up new challenges for many local authorities. The Housing Unit of the Department
of the Environment and Local Government (2003) has issued good practice guide-
lines in housing management for local authorities in housing refugees, covering
the provision of information, interpretation and translation, staff training, tenancy
support, anti racism and ethnic monitoring, and planning and strategic manage-
ment issues.
Some organizations have expressed concerns about the vulnerability of asylum
seekers and refugees to many of the crises that are recognized factors in contribu-
ting to social exclusion, poor housing and homelessness. The Irish Refugee Council
has argued that the accommodation centres currently housing asylum seekers
contribute to the institutionalization and deskilling of asylum seekers that arise
from extended stays in direct provision. Adult asylum seekers are also restricted in
the educational training they can access and are prohibited from engaging in paid
employment while waiting decision on their application. Difficulties arise for those
who get refugee status since it can be difficult leaving such sheltered accommoda-
tion and many have little experience of and information about finding accom-
modation, training and employment.
In response to this the Reception and Integration Agency has established 11 step
down facilities to provide housing for those who experience difficulties in
accessing private rented accommodation. Specific concerns are also raised about
the provision of leave to remain on the basis of an Irish-born child (which will
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affect some 30,000 estimated people in total) and the need to consider the future
needs of this vulnerable section of the population. In particular, there are specific
needs of separated child asylum seekers who are particularly vulnerable and at
future risk of homelessness.
8.5.3  Homelessness and Access to Housing 
The operation of the HRC has further disadvantaged migrant workers access to
local authority and homeless services. In many cases a person’s legal status affects
their right to access a range of services, including housing and homeless services,
whilst issues of racism can impact on access to rented housing, credit and other
services. Homeless service providers have reported a significant increase in
immigrant and foreign-born residents among their clients and particular issues of
hidden homelessness have been raised by advocacy groups.
The Immigrant Council of Ireland (2005) have highlighted issues of access to
housing for the new migrant communities in Ireland, the need for immigrant
housing strategies and the need to address racism and access to housing. In
particular, women immigrants are vulnerable to homelessness arising from
domestic abuse and there is evidence of an increase in immigrants in women's
refuge accommodation. Particular issues are raised about exclusion from homeless
services due to lack of information, lack of actual services, legal barriers, or lack of
cooperation between the public sector and NGOs. They argue that there is a need
to consider homelessness beyond alleviation and emergency provision, in
facilitating the integration of immigrants into appropriate transitional or
permanent housing.
Research by the Homeless Agency (2000) and Pillinger (2006b) has revealed
growing numbers of people from the new EU-10 member states who are
principally homeless because of income and work related problems, including
exploitative work situations, poor information concerning work opportunities and
the high cost of living in Dublin in particular. It is estimated that at any one time
between 35 and 85 new EU-10 member state nationals were accessing homeless
services in Dublin in September 2005, although this was considered to be an
under-estimation of the problem (Homeless Agency, 2006).
In particular, homeless new member states nationals are not included in the
definition of who is homeless in Ireland. In addition, the HRC, although principally
focussed on entitlements to social welfare benefits, has been applied broadly to
include other services such as homeless related services, including temporary
accommodation and local authority housing. In particular, homeless and housing
providers are often unable to provide support services or have to restrict services
because of ineligibility to rent allowance (which falls under the Supplementary
Welfare Allowance regime) and which is generally provided to homeless people to
pay for temporary accommodation.
Despite this, and in keeping with the traditions of Irish social policy, many of the
church based charities that provide homeless services have continued to provide
food, shelter and accommodation services to homeless non-nationals who are
destitute and homeless. Despite this there continue to be confusions in relation to
the application of the HRC as to whether the HRC is specific and exclusive in its
application to benefit claims.
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Specific policy initiatives emerging from the NPAR, include the building of an
intercultural dimension into key housing and related policy instruments, with
reference to equality and diversity policy; measures to address housing inequali-
ties that impact on cultural and ethnic minorities and an equitable approach to
the housing of asylum seekers; improved data and participation in consultations
related to accommodation policy and provision.
8.6  Health and Social Care Services
Access to health for migrant workers, students and dependants in Ireland is on the
same basis as for Irish nationals. Migrants who are “ordinarily resident,”138 with a
weekly income of less than EUR 138, qualify for medical cards entitling them to free
healthcare and prescription medication. In reality, it is only the international
student population who qualify for medical cards, as minimum wage work permit
holders exceed the income threshold, at least in theory. Thus, migrant workers,
along with the general population, pay a nominal charge for medical visits,
emergency visits, and hospitalization (up to an annual maximum charge). While
this is not excessive, some migrant workers on incomes above the medical card
threshold have nonetheless been unable to afford medical treatment (MRCI, 2004:
29). Other migrants do not use health services because they are not aware of them,
do not understand them, or feel they are “foreign” to their own cultural beliefs.
Special health provision has been made for asylum seekers and refugees, but not
for migrants. Up to now, the health status of asylum seekers and refugees entering
and residing in Ireland have been the object of specific health initiatives, such as
specialized clinics, free health screening and treatment and the provision of
hospital and community care. Migrant workers, students and their children and
partners have specific health needs that are not included in the asylum and
refugee health services. Migrants recruited into Ireland on short-term contracts
from countries and regions with undeveloped or less developed health services
may require additional health screening and treatment, and have different risks
regarding ill health compared with the Irish-based population. These can range
from differences in disease immunity, different susceptibilities to specific cancers
and blood disorders, to mental health difficulties related to factors such as trauma,
social isolation and cultural barriers.
More research is necessary to determine the real access to health available to
migrants, and how far cultural, religious and language barriers are preventing non-
nationals from exercising their right to health. Particular attention needs to be
paid to migrants in low-income occupations who are less likely to access health
services, though are more likely to require them.
8.6.1  Migrants and Utilization of Health and Social Care Services
There is currently a limited evidence base of both the experiences of migrants in
utilizing services and of the provision of health services to an increasingly diverse
population. This lack of evidence impacts on both the planning and provision of
appropriate health and social care services and the extent to which full account is
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taken of minority ethnic people’s diverse health needs. The result is that health
needs may go unmet and significant health problems may result at a later stage.
From the perspective of service users key issues include access to information,
interpretation and translation, and an understanding of the complexity of the
healthcare system. From the perspective of service providers key issues concern the
development of culturally competent and appropriate services within a context of
limited additional resources. There are additional significant challenges concern-
ing the development of new perspective on social inclusion and equality in health
service provision. Barriers in accessing and utilizing health services by migrants
and their families can be affected by a person’s culture, religion, language and legal
status. Evidence from a number of European countries shows that services need to
increasingly reflect ethnic diversity and take on board issues such as ethnicity,
language, culture, religious beliefs and customs. A failure to do this and ignorance
of the impact of these can result in discrimination, low levels of trust in public
services and reduced quality and effectiveness of services.
In addition, a lack of knowledge, awareness and understanding, by planners and
service providers, of the specific physical and mental health difficulties faced by
migrants may result in further unnecessary barriers and unmet needs. Some
migrants may not be accessing health services because of a fear of loss of rights or
because their status is undocumented. Others may have limited knowledge of how
the healthcare system works and of the rights and entitlements they may hold.
While emergency services would seem to be open to all, and free for many, it appears
that resident non-nationals without a medical card will be subject to the nominal
charge.139 It is not clear whether irregular migrants in Ireland, unable to prove legal
residence, are eligible for treatment and/or subject to charges. The unstable and
marginal circumstances experienced by undocumented migrants increases the risks
to their health. Many countries in Europe offer free emergency healthcare to patients,
regardless of status and origin, though many are reluctant to access these services
for fear of deportation.
8.6.2  Developing Culturally Competent Health Services
At the same time there is a growth of good practice and knowledge both within
Ireland and internationally about cultural competence in the provision of
healthcare services, for example, through community engagement and cultural
mediation; advocacy and community based projects; awareness of providing
services that can accommodate diversity; and the provision of health services
within a framework of anti-discrimination and equality.
These issues are relevant to government policies that promote people-centred
approaches in the planning and delivery of services and for enhancing and
strengthening the capacity of the healthcare system to deliver these objectives.
The policy context is currently being delivered through Sustaining Progress, The
Health Strategy Quality and Fairness – A Health System for You (2001), Primary Care
– A New Direction (2001), National Health Promotion Strategy, 2000-2005 (2000)
Health Targets in the National Anti-Poverty Strategy, to name a few.
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In recent years the Health Service Executive (HSE), which provides both health and
social services, has begun to respond to the challenges of providing services to an
ethnically and culturally diverse population. A specific focus on equality and social
inclusion has emerged from the 2001 Health Strategy Quality and Fairness: A
Health System for You. In addition, the strategic focus given to equality in health
by the Equality Authority has also resulted in a number of initiatives to promote
equality in health through Equal Status Reviews of health services, the publication
The Equal Status Act and the Provision of Health Services, and the development of
a National Framework of Equality in Health. These initiatives have included
measures to ensure that health services become “culturally competent” within a
framework of equality and diversity, by taking account of the needs of migrants in
the planning, delivery and monitoring of services.
Other specific initiatives have included the development of migrant friendly
hospitals; incentives to GPs to include refugees and asylum seekers on their lists;
and specific Performance Indicators requiring the development of services for
refugees and asylum seekers. The HSE’s 2006 Service Plan makes provision for a
national Intercultural Strategy and for the development of an ethnic identifier in
order to monitor the uptake and provision of services to minority ethnic groups.
Some effort has been made by the Department of Health to reach out to ethnic
communities. In March 2003, a Health Awareness Week was organized by the
Islamic Cultural Centre of Ireland, in collaboration with three health boards, to
raise awareness of health issues among Muslims, and strengthen networks.140
However, there is no broader government strategy for raising health awareness
among migrant communities in Ireland.
A recent ICGP members survey has identified specific issues raised by GPs which
include communication and interpretation problems, poor health status and
mental health difficulty experienced by some groups, particularly refugees,
attitudinal barriers, language barriers and culturally inappropriate services (ICGP,
2005). In particular, specific health issues are raised by asylum seekers and refugees
concerning social isolation of people living in direct provision hostels, trauma and
post migration stress, racism, fear of deportation, lack of understanding of services
and culture shock and language barriers. The ICGP recommends that better
knowledge and understanding of culture and health beliefs and sensitivity around
specific diseases is needed.
The development of the Intercultural Health Strategy, as provided for in the NPAR
and the 2006 HSE Service Plan, builds on the former Eastern Region’s Ethnic
Minority Strategy which highlighted specific needs in relation to interpretation
and translation, community development and peer-led approaches to health
information and awareness, anti-racist approaches, and better awareness and
understanding of culture and minority ethnic groups by health service staff. Other
provisions contained in the NPAR include building an intercultural dimension into
health impact assessments, social services, family and childcare policies; improving
data; and enhancing the participation of cultural and ethnic minorities in the
health, social services and childcare sectors.
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Department of Health and Children.
Particular issues are raised concerning the provision of community based and
culturally sensitive mental health services (Inspector of Mental Health Services,
2005). Although there are some developments in specifically targeted services,
such as a dedicated refugee psychology service in St Brendans Hospital and the
Spirasi counselling service, these are isolated examples which tend to be located in
the Dublin area. These issues were raised at a national conference on the
Challenges of Addressing the Mental Health Needs of Asylum Seekers and
Minority Ethnic Groups in Ireland, held in Sligo in January 2006. The conference
addressed how the recent increase in immigrant minorities, requires service
providers to expand their knowledge-based cultural skills in order to provide
appropriate support to people with different health beliefs and expectations.
Specific interventions or support may be needed to ensure that these groups
obtain equality in health outcome. In particular, the stresses experienced by new
arrived migrants can result from cultural dislocation, language and cultural
barriers, and previous experiences of strife and trauma. Key issues that will need to
be addressed in the future will be the identification of mental health needs in an
increasingly diverse population and plan for service provision and training needs.
In some areas specific supports have been put in place for refugees and asylum
seekers. In the North West a coordinator for asylum seeker health has been
appointed and across the country special clinics have been established in the
Community Welfare Service for refugees and asylum seekers. A significant barrier
in the health service is a lack of interpretation which remains a big problem,
particularly for recently arrived programme refugees.
8.6.3  Childcare
Many organizations have raised the specific problems that migrant women face
regarding access to childcare, particularly because they may also lack family and
social support structures. In particular, childcare services can help women to
integrate into social and economic life in Ireland, including accessing health
services and taking up employment and training. Childcare has been highlighted
as a strategic priority for Ireland and is currently being progressed through the
national childcare strategy.
Specific social policy issues that have been raised by policy makers, service
providers and migrant led community groups concern unaccompanied minors
who require targeted support and interventions. The HSE has also expressed
concerns that around 250 unaccompanied minors have gone missing and that
some of them could be at risk of labour and sexual abuse, and exploitation and
these concerns have been mirrored by the IOM who have assisted unaccompanied
minors in the state. A particular problem has been the differential treatment given
to unaccompanied minors who are largely housed in private hostels that are not
subject to inspection by the Irish Social Services Inspectorate, in contrast to
services for cared for Irish children. This has resulted in calls for additional
resources and improved levels of services for unaccompanied minors by refugee
support groups.
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8.6.4  Peer-led and Community Development Programmes
The growth of peer-led and community development approaches to migrant
health is a response to policies to tackle health inequalities and social exclusion in
health. Within the HSE the development of a national social inclusion framework
has highlighted the importance of these local and community based approaches
to health gain. Examples of this is the support organization for asylum seekers
Spirasi's Health Information Programme (HIP), through a peer-led project which
trains groups of asylum seekers and refugees in health issues and resources, using
visual, multi-lingual and audio communication aids. Another example is Cáirde a
voluntary organization providing support to minority ethnic women in Ireland
who experience inequality because of difficulties accessing suitable services,
poverty, unemployment, and negative experiences of health services. They have a
women’s health action development programme that is designed to address the
health inequalities experienced by women and a key role is given to empowering
women and to building their own capacity to address their own health needs.
8.6.5  Mobility and Disease
Globalization and the international mobility of people, have generated new health
challenges worldwide. The increasingly diverse health status of people entering
and exiting Ireland makes population health, and the surveillance and
management of infectious diseases, an extremely complex and specialized area. In
2004, people from Ireland made 5.4 million trips abroad, three million for holidays,
670,000 for business and 1.3 million to visit friends and relatives (CSO, 2004: 1). The
internationalization of migration has also to be seen in the context of the
international mobility of workers and the close relationship between Irish
residents and Irish emigrants living abroad, accounting for one in four of the visits
to Ireland in 2004. Visits to remote regions of the world, the growing financial
capacity of individuals, including teenagers, to take overseas holidays, the falling
cost of air travel, changing habits in relation to sexual relationships when
travelling overseas, on holidays, marriages between Irish residents and citizens of
other countries—these are just some of the lifestyle factors which have a bearing
on exposure to infectious diseases in the resident Irish population.
8.6.6  Public Health and Infectious Diseases
Effective management of infectious diseases is an integral part of securing public
health in Ireland for both migrants and the host society. The National Disease
Surveillance Centre has begun collecting data on the country of origin of Irish
residents with certain infectious diseases, largely in response to moves to improve
epidemiological surveillance at the European level. These data show that foreign-
born residents in Ireland are over-represented as regards HIV and tuberculosis. Of
the 304 HIV diagnoses made in 2004 where geographic origin is known, 130
patients were born in sub-Saharan Africa. Given the rates of this infection on the
African continent, this is unsurprising. Of the 122 Africans who contracted the
infection through heterosexual contacts, 85 were female (NDSC, 2004).
It is hard to determine whether the high proportion of foreign-born in this dataset
demonstrates that surveillance of the health status of the migrant population is
working, or whether this number is evidence of the urgency to focus on the needs
of some migrant populations.
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Despite high rates of infection in some parts of Asia and Eastern Europe, few or no
cases have been reported among the migrant population from these regions.
Rather, the high African caseload could reflect the screening programme available for
asylum seekers and refugees, a significant proportion of who come from this region.
Further research is necessary to determine whether there is sufficient awareness of
the disease among migrants in Ireland, and access to screening.When health services
fail to reach out effectively to people of a different language and culture, these
people miss out on early detection and treatment (Haour-Knipe, 2000).
With respect to other infectious diseases, the most recent reports show that 30 per
cent of reported cases of tuberculosis (TB) in 2002 were among persons born
outside Ireland. The top three countries of origin were Pakistan, Nigeria and India.
Though the total number of cases remains low – under 400 in 2002 – the number
of foreign-born with TB in Ireland is increasing, while the number of Irish-born is
decreasing. This trend is not limited to Ireland, but can be seen in developed
countries across Western Europe and North America. The Chief Medical Officer has
noted that incidence of tuberculosis in the United Kingdom, where foreign-born
persons represent over 50 per cent of the caseload, is concentrated in urban, high-
immigration areas, and levels in some London boroughs are comparable to those
in developing countries (Department of Health, 2004).
Some countries with long histories of immigration, Australia, Canada and the
United States, have medical screening programmes for refugees and selected
migrants to detect a range of infectious diseases. Few European countries have
screening policies and most are limited to refugees and asylum seekers. Despite
these programmes, it would seem that there has been little effect on the foreign-
born TB caseloads in developed countries. Entry screening policies are unable to
address the public health concerns arising from those who make frequent trips
home to countries with a high incidence of the disease. In addition, health
screenings do not cover the irregular migrant population, who are least likely to
access public health services for fear of detection.
Health screenings for migrants are more effective when they are part of a
comprehensive migrant health policy, including accessible health services,
culturally appropriate communication with different migrant communities, and
partnerships with local non-governmental organizations to foster trust between
health services and migrant communities. For example, a study on the effects of an
agreement between a public teaching hospital and a non-government organiza-
tion dedicated to aiding undocumented migrants in Madrid, Spain, led to the
assistance and treatment of a large number of migrants who would otherwise not
have sought medical help. Of the 988 immigrants included in the study, most of
them undocumented, 44.2 per cent were found to have latent tuberculosis, 15.1 per
cent had malaria, 8.8 per cent had hepatitis C, 7.5 per cent had sexually transmitted
diseases, and 5.2 per cent were infected with HIV (Lopez-Velez et al., 2003).
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8.6.7  Occupational Health 
Migrant workers are being recruited into sectors and industries where they are
exposed to specific and increased risks of accident or disease; in Europe,
occupational accident rates are thought to be about twice as high for migrant
workers as for native workers (Taran, 2003). The ILO recognizes construction, mining
and agriculture as the three most dangerous occupations in the world.141 In Ireland,
construction and agriculture report the highest number of work-related fatalities. A
significant number of work permit holders from Turkey, Ukraine, Brazil and the
Philippines work in these occupations in Ireland, as well as a large number of workers
from the new EU accession states, particularly Poland. The construction industry
(Ukraine and Turkey) has the highest risk of industrial accidents and fatalities,
while the meat processing industry (Brazil) risks potential exposure to the occupa-
tional disease of Brucellosis, and the care sector workers (Philippines) exposure to
musculoskeletal injuries and other health risks.
The 2005 Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act has requirements for information
in a range of languages. The dangers of work-related injury are compounded by
language barriers, where safety signs and instructions are not properly under-
stood. The high number of fatal accidents registered in the construction industry
in recent years,142 has led the Health and Safety Executive in Ireland to produce
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142. The Health and Safety Executive has registered a 40 per cent rise in work-related fatalities during the first four months of 2005.
s Capacity-building within public health systems of source and host countries 
to minimize cross-border transmission of disease.
s Partnerships between countries and regions to strengthen surveillance and
information exchange.
s Training and education of healthcare providers, policy makers, health management
planner and health educators on how to address migration health issues.
s Development of integration and prevention strategies to combat stigmatization,
discrimination and the vulnerability of migrant populations.
s Facilitation of ethnic community participation in health services delivery.
s Improved access to healthcare for all migrants and mobile populations regardless
of their immigration status.
s Culturally appropriate communication with migrant communities.
s Research on best practices, standards and risks relating to migrants.
s Ethical and human rights-based approaches to ensure acceptable standards 
of care for migrants.
Methods of Improving Public Health Control (IOM, 2004)
largely pictorial translations of the Safe System of Work Plan for Polish and Turkish
workers to ensure communication of safety controls regardless of literacy or
language.143 These initiatives should be extended to other high-risk sectors of
industry employing large numbers of migrant workers. A national media campaign
began in 2005, including radio, television and newspaper advertising, providing
information about health and safety in Polish and Turkish.
Exploitation in the workplace, where migrant workers are required to work long
hours in poor conditions, is also a factor in increasing the risks to migrants’ health.
Improved enforcement of health and safety regulations and employment rights
could reduce the risk of injury and ill health.
8.7  Education
Education is an important element in effective integration (See Chapter 10 for
more on integration policies), be it primary or secondary schooling for migrant
children, tertiary-level learning for international students or vocational and
language training for adult migrants. Irish education policy has incorporated the
principles and provisions of equality and anti-discrimination legislation, and a
number of government papers and policy statements have been published over
the past decade, concerning the growing need to address the particular needs of a
multicultural classroom. In addition, specific equality initiatives have been devel-
oped with the Equality Authority. In response, the Department of Education and
Science has set up a working group to coordinate development of interculturalism
and racism across the education system (Joint Committee, 2004), and the National
Council for Curriculum and Assessment has reviewed national curricula to ensure
the promotion of intercultural education.
Specific education outcomes were also highlighted in the NPAR. Measures that are
identified include the development of a national intercultural education strategy,
with reference to equality and diversity policy; a more inclusive and intercultural
school environment and curriculum; measures covering youth work and enhanc-
ing participation in education for unaccompanied minors and refugee and asylum
seekers up to 18 years old, and for those with leave to remain to have improved
access to further and higher education. Other measures concern improved data
systems, enhancing the provision of English as a second language and to enhance
participation of key stakeholders in policy developments.
8.7.1  Educating Migrant Children
The numbers of migrant children in primary and secondary education are not
known, and mechanisms for collecting information on the ethnicity and nationality
of pupils in the Irish education system still need to be developed. Media reports
suggest that some schools have become very diverse, particularly in the Dublin
area, where primary schools are teaching children from more than 100 different
nationalities, and in some schools non-nationals account for over 40 per cent of
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pupils.144 Data from the NCCRI suggest that there are up to 10,000 non-nationals in
secondary education in Ireland, over one-third of them students from the United
Kingdom (Joint Committee, 2004). Other large cohorts include Nigerian (775),
American (580), Spanish (547) and German (541) students.
In order to fully participate in the Irish education system, many migrant children
need to acquire English language competence. Currently, the Irish schools system
provides 1.5 hours a week for each student, up to a maximum of 44 hours per
school. This limit means that should more than 28 students enrol in a particular
school, they cannot obtain full language support (Joint Committee, 2004). In
addition, training and support for primary and secondary school teachers respon-
sible for teaching English as a second language are limited. The Integrate Ireland
Language and Training (IILT) initiative, supported by the Department of Education,
offers a training programme for teachers based in Dublin, but there is no national
programme. In 2003, the IILT programme organized seminars for 531 primary
school teachers, and 89 secondary school teachers (Joint Committee, 2004).
In addition to practical language skills, migrant children require support while
settling into a new cultural and social environment, while schools need to adapt to
the cultural and religious diversity of their students. It has been noted by non-
governmental organizations that the vast majority of schools are managed and
owned by the Catholic Church: multi-denominational schools account for less than
one per cent of primary school enrolment.145 This has led some ethnic communities
to set up their own educational facilities to suit their religious and cultural needs.146
Finally, some requirements are specific to the nature of migration itself. The
temporary work permit system in Ireland means that migrants are frequently
entering and leaving the country; as a result, their children are also entering and
leaving the school system more frequently and at irregular periods during the
academic year. Aside from the disruption in the classroom itself, research in the
United Kingdom has noted that this can lead to educational under-achievements
for the students (Dobson et al., 2000). “Pupil mobility” is an issue which requires
extra resources: identifying gaps in education, language difficulties, social isolation
and possible trauma related to the journey to Ireland can be a time-consuming
process, drawing teachers away from the rest of the class, albeit an essential
support for migrant children.
8.7.2  International Students
As has been noted elsewhere in this report, the number of international students
has grown considerably over the past few years, and they are an important source
of income for higher-level education in Ireland (See Chapters 2 and 6). The diversity
of experience and knowledge introduced by international students is welcome in
the university environment and can add value to the learning experience.
However, it has been noted that there is very little provision at the university level
for the special needs of non-national students. The Union of Students in Ireland
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146. Discussion during a Workshop on the Social Implications of Migration to Ireland, 26-27 April 2005.
has recommended the implementation of a mentoring system for international
students to help them adjust to their new environment, and greater sensitivity to
particular cultural differences.147
Overall, it is too early to establish whether policies to address the needs of
migrants in education have had an impact, and if so, to what extent. Only once
migrant children have progressed through the schools system and into employment
is it possible to compare their educational attainment with that of Irish nationals. In
addition, given the level of temporary migration in Ireland, it may be impossible to
ascertain the long-term impact of migration, as educated non-nationals return home
or move on to other countries. However, it is clear that migration to Ireland will create
new demands on the education system and introduce new skills and the diversity of
culture and faith encountered by all children in Ireland.
8.8  Employment and Training Services
The need for vocational training has been addressed elsewhere in this report.
However, the lack of free language training for migrants to Ireland is worth noting.
Integrate Ireland Language and Training has provided free education for adult
asylum seekers and refugees since 2001, yet does not have the resources or
mandate to offer the same to the wider immigrant community: in 2003, 549 adults
were tutored under the scheme (Joint Committee, 2004).Though language schools
have proliferated in recent years, most of these are fee-based and not affordable
for migrants. In order for the migrant population to participate in Irish life and
society, basic language proficiency is a prerequisite.
FÁS provides a range of information about jobs, including web-based information
about coming to live and work in Ireland, and through the EURES website in
providing information about living and working conditions in Ireland. FÁS has also
launched Europe’s first information campaign to help workers from EU member
states to find work and integrate into life in Ireland. This includes a series of DVD
programmes in the languages of the new EU-10 member states. A pilot language
line is provided through Employment Service offices. This provides an interpreter
on the telephone to give information about job vacancies and training
opportunities. Specific training courses for particular sectors are also planned in
sectors such as construction and information technology, and English language
training for non-Irish nationals.
The Labour Inspectorate and the Rights Commissioner (based in the DETE) deals
with breaches of labour legislation and workers rights, such as wages and working
conditions. However, there are no systematic records of breaches of labour legis-
lation by national origin and there have been problems associated with the limited
resources available to proactively track breaches of legislation and exploitation of
workers (Ruhs, 2005). These issues came to a head in 2005 and legislation was
introduced to increase the resources available to the Labour Inspectorate.
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8.9  Information, Advice and Language Services
Beside the confusion caused over entitlements, migrants face other, more general
barriers to access. Foremost among these is language. A number of government
bodies have undertaken to translate essential documents for migrants into some
of the principal languages of origin. For example, the Labour Inspectorate has
translated their guide to Employment Rights Information into a number of
languages, including Polish, Lithuanian, Latvian, Russian, Romanian, Czech,
Hungarian and Portuguese.148 However, more care and attention is needed, as
separate government information for Chinese nationals has sometimes been
printed in Cantonese, when the targeted population were predominantly readers
of simplified Mandarin.
Other barriers are cultural. Migrants may mistrust government agencies, or be
unfamiliar with the procedures involved in making a complaint or seeking social
welfare compensation. Currently, a number of organizations, such as the Migrant
Rights Centre, are acting as go-betweens in Ireland, and communicate with govern-
ment agencies on behalf of migrants. The trade union SIPTU has noted that, while
some migrants have been able to change employer, following abuse of their
employment rights, none has been able to do so without the representation and
support of a non-governmental organization.
Accessing information has been shown to be a major problem for migrants in
Ireland. Ireland’s network of Citizen’s Information Services report on the poor use
made of information and advice provision. This has resulted in guidelines to
improve the accessibility of information for those groups that experience the
greatest barriers, including refugees and asylum seekers and migrant workers
(Comhairle, 2005). This has highlighted the need for the provision of information
in languages other than English, particularly to improve information provided to
Ireland’s new minority communities. The Oasis website, proving information about
government services, already provides information in English, Irish, French and
Romanian, and there are plans to provide this in a wider range of languages in the
future. Comhairle written leaflets are provided only in English and there are some
suggestions emerging from the research about the need to provide summaries of
information and more targeted information in a range of languages other than
English, including French, Spanish, Romania, Russian and Chinese, as well as the
languages of the EU’s member states.
In practice information about social policy rights and entitlements has tended to
take place through dedicated information providers and projects developed to
improve information accessibility to groups that experience barriers in accessing
information. This approach in Irish social policy has sought to use the resources of
minority ethnic communities through information and advocacy projects,
community development approaches and peer-led programmes. As a result, grants
for information and advocacy projects have been funded through Comhairle and a
number of organizations have produced specialist information about specific
groups. For example, the Immigration Council of Ireland have produced (2003)
Immigrants’ Rights and Entitlements.
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In recent years there has been a significant increase in support organizations for
migrants. Many of these organizations are migrant-led and provide accessible
information, advice, advocacy and community development programmes. Examples
include the Polish Information and Advice Centre, the Migrant Rights Centre and
Akida (for African women).
8.10  Migrant Workers: An Important Source of Labour for
Social Services
Ireland’s social services are becoming increasingly dependent on both professionally-
qualified migrant workers and those prepared to take up unskilled or minimum
wage jobs. This is the case for home care workers for people with disabilities,
hospitals in relation to medical staff (doctors and nurses), and in the field of
nursing home care (see Table 8.2 below and Chapter 10 for more on the migration
of healthcare workers). In the field of personal social services, by 2001 10 per cent
of social work occupations in the country were held by non-nationally qualified
social workers (NSWQB, 2002: 19).
The need for care work, care services and care employment, such as caring for
young children, the elderly and people with disabilities, has grown substantially
since the mid-1990s. This resulted in the increased demand for women workers,
one of the factors contributing to the growing feminization of migration towards
industrialized countries (Ehrenreich and Russell Hochschild, 2003). Childcare, care
of the elderly and disability care are each provided by a mixed public/private
marketing of social provision.
The care work of young children is related to the growth in the labour force
participation of women. Ireland now has an above average labour force
participation rate for women compared with other EU member states. The labour
force participation of young women aged 25 to 34 stood at between 75 and 77 per
cent between 2002 and 2004.
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Table 8.2 Work Permits/Authorization Issued for 
Healthcare and other Care-related Professions
2003 2004
Health Professionals1 206 627
Associate Health Professionals 284 161
Health/childcare workers & related occupations 2,026 1,880
Total 2,916 2,668
Source DETE
Notes Occupations set out by job classification, as used in the QNHS
The demand for childcare associated with young dual-working households has
soared: 23,000 families are currently using unpaid relatives to meet pre-school
childcare needs; and about 6,400 families with pre-school children would like to
have a childminder/paid carer (CSO, 2003). At present, work permits are not
supposed to be issued to nursery workers, crèche workers, childminders or
nannies.149 Nevertheless, the category “domestic workers” continues to report
successful applications for new and renewed work permits. The conditions of work
for some domestic workers fall well below minimum standards of decent work
(MRCI, 2005).
Regarding the care of the elderly, the expansion of nursing homes has led to an
expansion in the demand for care attendants, nursing aid and related workers.
Nursing home workers are recruited typically by recruitment agencies from both
inside and outside the European Union. The pay negotiated by trade unions for
care attendant grades in public facilities is around EUR 11 to EUR 12 per hour. Care
attendants in public facilities will soon have a training or promotion opportunity
to become healthcare assistants. The pay for care attendants in private nursing
homes is EUR 8 per hour, or 0.25 cents above the minimum wage.150
8.11  Concluding Remarks
Although policy makers are beginning to respond to the social policy challenges of
increasing population diversity brought about by migration, they nevertheless
have limited knowledge, data and understanding about the social situations of
migrants, which in turn has implications for economic and social policy planning.
These are critical issues if policies on settlement, social inclusion and integration
are to fully take account of the diversity of migrant’s lives in Ireland today.
To date, most migrants have been young and single and in the case of accession
state nationals and some categories of work permit holders their access to welfare
entitlements were restricted until changes were announced in early 2006.
Generally speaking, it is likely therefore that migrants have contributed more in
taxes and social insurance contributions than they have received in welfare
payments in recent years. Unlike other countries in Europe few immigrants in
Ireland are unemployed or claim social assistance benefits. Migrants have also
helped to reduce skill and labour shortages in the health and social care sectors of
employment. And Ireland’s health sector has even actively sought to recruit health
workers from countries like the Philippines, India and China, in recent years to
meet shortages in skilled labour.
However, the pattern of immigration to Ireland may change and this may pose
new challenges for social policy in the future. For one thing, it is likely that an
increasing proportion of immigrants to Ireland are EU nationals and following the
reform of the HRC will provide full access to Ireland’s social services and benefits.
Furthermore, although the non-Irish migrant workforce is still predominantly
composed of young people without dependants, the experience of other countries
suggests that this pattern may change as more migrants choose to settle in Ireland
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and are joined by their family members. It is also likely that a growing number of
migrants will wish to settle in Ireland and that temporary migration will become
permanent migration for some. Long-term migrants will need to be given wider
access to social services and government departments dealing with social policy
issues will need to be more sensitive to the impact of this change on Irish society.
Migration policies can substantially affect the costs and benefits felt by migrant
and host communities in society. Public policy up to now has concentrated on the
short-term benefits. The longer-term impacts of migration, in such areas as
housing, have not yet been explored. The decision to exclude migrants from some
welfare categories because they were not habitually resident in Ireland was a
short-term policy, which will eventually have to be replaced by one which allows
some migrants to establish long-term residence in Ireland. A decision to actively
attract more professionally-qualified migrants to Ireland and/or to reduce the
number of minimum wage jobs filled by migrants will have corresponding
implications for Ireland’s welfare system in terms of filling jobs and the consumption
of welfare “goods.” Measuring these impacts should be part of the future migration
research agenda.
It is clear that for government departments not directly involved in the adminis-
tration of immigration policy, the needs of migrants have not been mainstreamed
into policy development. All social services, whether involving health, housing,
education, or social welfare, will have to recognize that Ireland has become a much
more diverse country because of immigration. Most importantly, for migrants to be
able to contribute fully to Irish society, they need to be informed about their rights,
entitlements and the functioning of the public welfare system. Comprehensive
orientation services should be offered to all migrants arriving in Ireland for work,
to join their family or to study, in order to ensure their ability to participate in Irish
society and prevent their exclusion. Preparation for migration could begin in the
migrant’s home country, by providing them with more information about their
rights and entitlements in Ireland.
Many migrants living and working in Ireland experience poverty, poor living
conditions, social exclusion, racism and poor access to employment, particularly
well paid and secure employment. The vulnerability of certain groups, for example,
unaccompanied minors, spouses of work permit holders, and migrant workers who
do not fulfil the HRC, raise important challenges for Irish social policy.
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Fostering Integration9
9.1  Overview
This chapter focuses on the integration of newcomers in Ireland. Integration is a
relatively new concern and its prominence at the policy level marks a transition in
official thinking. Until recently, the migration debate was taken up almost entirely
by discussions of growth and asylum. Now, there is a growing realization that
economic modernization will need to be accompanied by social adaptations if
Ireland’s transformation is to be sustained.
Policies imply choice, either between alternatives or among multiple options. In an
ideal world, these would be evaluated using precise calculations, and decisions would
be based on scientifically determined cost-benefit ratios. This, however, does not
reflect the realities of the world of migration. Policy makers do indeed face choices
that are fundamentally important to Ireland’s future, but they are not well defined
and remain controversial. Unfortunately, however, they cannot be avoided, since
inaction as much as action generates consequences that then have to be dealt with.
Earlier chapters of this report traced the parallel trends of economic growth and
rising migration to Ireland. This comparison is illuminating, but it also tends to
present migration as an exclusive choice between development, on the one hand,
and stagnation on the other; or, more benignly, as a choice between faster
economic growth with higher levels of migration, and slower growth with fewer
migrants. The present chapter does not dispute this link, but addresses a different
and arguably more fundamental issue, which is the choice between integration,
coupled with cultural accommodation, and segregation, coupled with a manning
of cultural defences. Either case assumes, albeit implicitly, that migration will
continue and that the migration bottle once opened, cannot be stopped, though
migration can, and will, need to be managed. What exactly this implies for policy is
the subject of this chapter.
9.2  Lessons for Policy Development
For the past two decades, Europe has looked to Canada, the United States and
Australia for inspiration on how to manage both immigration and integration.
With their long tradition of welcoming newcomers, the so-called “countries of
immigration” have provided the European Union with a handy “test-bed” with
which to assess the likely efficacy of measures aimed at coping with the fall-out of
guest worker programmes and a sharp increase in refugee numbers. More recently,
European interest in North American migration programmes has been driven by
demographic concerns: by population ageing and predicted labour force contrac-
tion and population decline.
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The gradual convergence between Europe and North America/Australia in terms of
migrant intake and population diversity offers policy makers valuable opportu-
nities to exchange knowledge and to learn from each other.151 For Ireland, this will
be especially helpful. Given the rapidity with which immigration has positioned
itself as a central policy issue, the country has had scant opportunity to develop
experience and to build capacity in the area of immigration management and
integration. Tapping into the experience of states with a long history of managed
migration will afford Ireland a running start and allow it to steer clear of the more
egregious mistakes that other countries have made – provided that care is taken in
transferring the lessons. Comparative learning is possible, but it is rare that policies
can be imported in their entirety from one regime to another.
The policy topics addressed below do not concentrate extensively on theory.
Instead, they focus on extracting practical policy lessons and directions, employing
academic insights and analytic work, as needed. The choice of items is based on
the anticipated interests and needs of the policy community and the projected
utility of the measures proposed, nor does the material draw extensively on Irish
studies and makes only limited reference to Irish policy developments, except to
comment on major, recent policy announcements and to draw on insights
obtained in the course of two workshops, held in April of 2005, dealing with
integration and multiculturalism.152 As discussed in the previous chapter, the
reasons for the paucity of specifically Irish material are straightforward. There are
virtually no empirical data concerning the social, or even economic, integration of
minorities in Ireland, and scant academic analysis of the social impacts of
migration. Most academic work, while recognizing the importance of social issues,
has focused on economic impacts or on asylum. Even the recently-announced
immigration and residence policy measures do not contain specific directions that
could be analysed. Instead, they establish an overall framework and create a
legislative capacity to develop and to flesh out a variety of admission and
integration policies at some future date.
In the absence of Irish material, most of the policy lessons have been drawn from
North America, particularly Canada, from Australia and, in several instances, from
pan-European studies conducted on behalf of the European Union. A noteworthy
feature of these lessons is their focus on areas where policy thinking has been
evolving because of a change in understanding, or because policies have not
achieved the intended results.
9.2.1  General Remarks Concerning Policy Coordination and Context
Since 2002, Ireland has witnessed considerable activity on the immigration front.
Concept papers, legislative proposals and amendments have been introduced by
the government and by important non-governmental organizations. Among the
more noteworthy are “Labour Migration into Ireland” and “Voices of Immigrants”,
by the Immigrant Council of Ireland; the NPAR and the “Immigration and Residence
in Ireland: A Discussion Document”, by the DJELR; “the Internationalisation of Irish
Education Services” Report by the Department of Education, and the Irish
Nationality and Citizenship Act 2004.
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151. Europe is no longer far behind North America in terms of the total numbers of migrants living in each of these territories. Even on a
per capita basis, the proportions are rapidly aligning (especially vis-à-vis the United States). Indeed, in European microstates such as
Lichtenstein and Luxembourg, the proportion of foreign-born exceeds the proportions found in North America.
152. The workshops were organized by the IOM as part of a larger policy study commissioned by NESC. See the summaries in Annex A to
this report.
What these measures reveal is the pressure that Ireland has been under to develop
an effective response to migration (solicited and unsolicited), and to the domestic
interests concerned with migration. More difficult to gauge is the extent of
coordination and the degree to which unified strategic thinking has informed this
response. The impression created by a series of workshops organized under the
mantle of the NESC is that a good deal of policy development has occurred in silos,
as might be expected in the early stages of a transformation, but that coordination
is rapidly improving. Coordination is essential for effective migration governance.
No migrant-receiving state can ignore the fact that migration does not respect
jurisdictional boundaries. The issues being raised by migration and integration cut
across divisions of power between different levels of government (national, state
and local) and, within governments, they cut across the mandates of individual
departments.This fact is recognized in the NPAR, which calls for action on migration
by half a dozen state ministries.
For Ireland to produce a viable integration strategy, these ministries (and others
not explicitly mentioned) will need to realize how their actions on migration
contribute to integration, and how they support one another. Based on this
understanding, they will have to create effective joint planning mechanisms. For
reasons elaborated below, this can prove to be challenging.
Immigration, and specifically integration, is a process that unfolds over generations.
Unfortunately, governments are not particularly adept at managing horizontal
issues that play out over such extended periods. That is why, in both the United
Kingdom and Canada, immigration has been the subject of special inquiries 
by central agencies concerned that cross-cutting, strategic issues are not getting
their due.153
Beyond this, the ability of governments to execute integration strategies success-
fully is constrained by their own limited role in the process of integration. For the
most part, it is not governments that integrate migrants, but the general public,
especially the residents of large cities, such as Dublin, where the majority of
migrants settle. The role of government concentrates on providing essential core
services, ensuring that these services are accessible, and creating the necessary
frameworks to help shape a welcoming environment. In this regard, it is important
for governments to appreciate the profound interactions among different policy
spheres; for example, between citizenship legislation and long-term integration, or
between admissions policy and public acceptance of immigrants. These points are
revisited below.
While migration and integration policies will always pose complex challenges,
Ireland is fortunate (and wise) to be tackling these issues under the present
economic circumstances. There is considerable analytic and historical evidence
correlating public acceptance of migration and tolerance of diversity with a strong
economy. Two decades of public opinion polls in Canada have shown that public
support of immigration is inversely related to unemployment. The higher unemploy-
ment rises, the more immigration is seen as a zero-sum game – the idea of a fixed
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153. Governments are increasingly aware of the difficulties in dealing with strategic, cross-cutting issues. The formation of the Strategy
Unit in the United Kingdom and the Policy Research Initiative in Canada represent explicit attempts to address horizontal concerns
and to force government policy and research units to abandon their silos. Both the United Kingdom and the Canadian entities have
undertaken immigration projects because of a perceived incapacity on the part of the mainstream agencies to address critically
important issues.
pool of jobs and that immigrant gains occur at the expense of employment of the
locally-born population (Palmer, various years).
The Canadian context is, obviously, different from the conditions prevailing in
Ireland, but the seminal point (i.e., that migration must not be perceived as a
threat) would seem to hold. There appears to be a fairly substantial constituency
at the moment that supports immigration to Ireland and believes it to be a good
thing, with a nearly identical proportion believing that immigration contributes to
Irish prosperity. It is worth noting, however, that support wanes further down the
socio-economic spectrum where the perceived competition for jobs is stronger.154 
9.2.2  Policy Horizons and Focus
Immigration policy can never remain still because there are no durable solutions in
immigration, only trajectories. These are shaped by history and context, but also by
strategic choices, responses to situations that arise spontaneously, and by the
economic, social and institutional capacities that exist, or that society is prepared
to create.
Across Europe, the public debate on migration has been changing. Policy horizons
have been lengthening as demographic and social concerns have supplanted
economic ones. In particular, horizons have been expanding in line with the
realization that social, cultural and, especially, religious differences will somehow
need to be accommodated or contained as a matter of socio-economic necessity,
or to prevent socio-economic disruption. It is understood that this will require
sustained, long-term social investments; however, there is as yet no agreement
across EU members on the form that these investments should take. Some
countries, such as the Netherlands and Finland, are devising separate, special
programmes for migrants while others, such as Italy and Spain, are emphasizing
adjustments to mainstream measures (MPI, 2004).
The means will have to be found to develop effective integration strategies. This
will require profound changes in several policy aspects: the level of expenditure for
migrant integration will need to rise; more profoundly, the organization of
mainstream and targeted services will need to be rethought, and governments will
need to invest more heavily in the creation of symbolic and legal frameworks, such
as citizenship laws, in order to establish the terms of social integration and foster
inclusion.
Above all, policy must seek to avoid creating an excluded social underclass. Once
this develops, public support for remedial interventions declines, while the cost of
intervening rises. This requires a long view. As noted above, immigrant integration
can span two, and even three, generations. This means that the success, or failure,
of integration policies cannot be fully gauged by their impact on the first
generation of migrants alone. At a minimum, it will also be necessary to assess the
integration of the second generation, the children of immigrants. School
outcomes, labour market performance, interactions with the justice sphere and
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154. These observations are derived from a number of recent polls. The Lansdowne Market Research poll conducted in 2004 shows that
around two-thirds of the population feel that Ireland is better for having immigration (Lansdowne, 2004). Roughly similar results
appear in a May 2005 poll conducted on behalf of the Sunday Tribune. The Tribune poll shows 80 per cent agreement with a
statement that it is good for children to grow up in a multicultural society, and over 50 per cent agreement that non-nationals are
good to have in the community. In addition, a Special Eurobarometer poll carried out for the EU situates Ireland well above the EU
mean in viewing immigration as positive and not a threat (Eurobarometer, 2004,
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb62/eb62_en.htm).
attitudes are all vital indicators of integration success. In fact, some analysts
maintain that the success of immigrant children (both those who entered at a
young age and those who were born to immigrant parents) is of greater importance
than the success of their parents.
Typically, migration policy occupies itself with individuals. However, a strong case
can be made for policy to focus on family units and communities. Migration
decisions tend to be made by families who send their “strongest” applicants ahead
in order to establish a foothold. Other members then follow within a period of
some five years. Research also confirms that the family is the principal medium
that newcomers rely on for information about jobs, location and services (Ruddick,
2003).155 This suggests that, in some instances, the family rather than individual
migrants is the more appropriate unit of analysis for gauging the success of
integration policy. Beyond this, there have been recent suggestions that policy
should target communities as a whole rather than individuals or even families.
This point will be dealt with below under the discussion of social capital.
9.2.3  Integration - Theory and Practice
Throughout this report, the term “integration” is used to refer to the adjustments
that result from interactions (or their lack) between immigrants and mainstream
Irish society. But what exactly is integration and does it, for policy development
purposes, need to be distinguished from other closely related terms, such as
adaptation, acculturation, absorption, assimilation and incorporation? These terms
differ in subtle ways from integration, emphasizing different features of the
adjustment process, such as its character or its origins (individual or structural;
endogenous, originating in the group, or exogenous, the result of changes in the
opportunity structure of society) (Alba and Nee, 1995). Rather than getting
embroiled in the theoretical debate, this section merely samples the academic
literature, noting some of the ideas and distinctions that have a bearing on policy
development.
The research literature converges on the notion that immigrant integration is a
process that is multi-dimensional, extends over several generations and is 
bi-directional – that is, it affects not only immigrants, but also their hosts. The
process is shaped by many factors, notably the characteristics of the migrants – their
skills, language abilities, education, religion and so forth – and the characteristics –
economic, social, cultural and political – of the milieu they are attempting to enter.
Policy matters. Immigration and integration policies, as well as the prevailing
ideology of the state – pluralist, multicultural or rigidly cohesive and conformist –
affect integration and the perceptions of who is or is not integrated. The prevailing
ideology also plays a large role in determining the institutional arrangements that
immigrants encounter, whether the services they receive are organized on a
universal basis or are targeted and particularistic (McAndrew and Weinfield, 1996).
While the integration process tends to be seen, especially in North America, as
inevitable, cohesive and universal, with each successive, post-immigrant
generation moving a little closer to the mainstream in terms of their social,
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155. Comments by Professor Sue Richardson, of Flinders University, on this research suggest that similar results had been obtained for
Australia.
economic and cultural values and behaviours, the academic literature tells a more
ambiguous story. There are questions as to the certainty of assimilation in the light
of the sustained nature of modern immigration and the fact that attitudes and ties
are being constantly refreshed by newcomers. Also, the growth of ethnic commu-
nities and their access to new communication technologies that allow unbroken
contact with friends and family in the country of origin are, in some instances,
slowing the velocity of integration (Levitt, 1999).
Research is also revealing that integration is not a smooth process. It operates
fitfully, in stops and starts, across different domains and often proceeds in a
segmented manner (Zhou, 1997). Immigrants do not immediately assimilate into
the mainstream but into ethnic communities, either their own or other
“subordinate” communities. The most obvious expression of this can be seen in the
spatially concentrated ethnic neighbourhoods and ethnic economies that operate
in every major city in Europe and North America.
Nor is the uncertainty regarding immigrant integration confined to the first
generation of arrivals. Questions have arisen about the unidirectional nature of
integration; witness the tensions that appear among the second and subsequent
generations (Zhou, 1997). Other questions with important policy implications
concern the relationship among various forms of integration that are associated
with different policy spheres: are these different “forms” of integration causally
related? Does economic integration, for example, precede social and cultural
integration? Is it an essential first step? 
Conceptually, integration can be broken into three spheres of measurement, each
one emphasizing a different aspect of the integration process. These can be
classified as:
s measures relating to socio-economic performance and civic behaviour that
focus on egalitarianism and equal opportunity, essentially measures of
conformity, comparing immigrant and minority outcomes with those of
“mainstream” residents;
s measures of structural integration that focus on the extent to which people
live together in a common civic space, and whether they rely on common or
parallel institutions; and 
s measures of values, attitudes and behaviours that compare migrants with
members of the host society in order to determine the degree of social
cohesion and solidarity that exists in society.
Countries emphasize different measures depending on their ideological and
political orientations. They also configure their institutions and services according
to these preferences, offering varying degrees of accommodation and targeting.156
Recently, in response to concerns that social cohesion is being undermined, there
has been a shift away from particularistic models of assistance towards greater
universalism and a common civic culture (Entzinger, 2004; Joppke, 2003).157 This
agrees with the current orientation under the NPAR in favour of “mainstreaming”.
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156. In assessing these differences, McAndrew and Weinfeld (1996) propose examining the professionals who deliver the service (the
ethnic match between clients and producers), the organizations they work for (universal or particularistic), and the services or
programmes that are delivered (general or targeted)
157. In particular, note the discussion of the Dutch “minorities policy” and the shift towards integration.
The close interrelationship among the three spheres of measurement means that
policy interventions cannot be uniquely assigned to one or another of the spheres.
Nevertheless, different interventions produce different footprints and the focus of
this particular section will be on the first sphere of socio-economic and civic
behaviour and on policies that promote equality of opportunity and institutional
access. The remaining two measurement spheres will receive more attention in
subsequent sections dealing with admissions policy, social capital, multicultural-
ism and citizenship.
The smattering of policy concerns and lessons enumerated below are both generic
(touching on general aspects of delivery) and specific (directed to particular areas
of policy).158 These agree well with the programme areas identified by the NPAR.
9.2.4  General Policy Lessons
At a minimum, social and economic integration require that immigrants:
s be able to communicate well in the language of the host community;
s be economically independent and able to find work commensurate with their
abilities and qualifications;
s have access to adequate housing and transportation;
s have access to critical services, especially health and education;
s obey the law, respect democratic institutions, pay taxes and participate in the
political process.
At present, Ireland’s few integration programmes are largely confined to refugees.
In order to serve the broader immigrant and minority population, the programmes
and services will need to be expanded in three ways:
s extend beyond refugees to include all classes of immigrants;
s reach beyond the head of household to include other members of the family,
and 
s extend beyond immigrants to address issues confronting second-generation
migrants.
Reconfiguring policy in this way, especially coupled with the changing distribution
of immigrants and the consequent need to pay more attention to integration, will
cause programme expenditures to rise. This notwithstanding, the increase in costs
should not alter the fundamentals which point to positive benefits from immigra-
tion. Macroeconomic studies generally agree that, over the long run, immigration
is fiscally neutral, though there are distributional consequences with areas of
higher concentration absorbing a disproportionate share of the costs.
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Paper for 23-24 June 2004 NCP Seminar by the Migration Policy Group.
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Since 1999, the European Union’s
competence with respect to integration
issues has been enlarged. At the request of
the European Council, the European
Commission reviewed policy options for an
EU integration strategy in its Communica-
tion on Immigration, Integration and
Employment (European Commission, 2003),
and produced its first Annual Report on
Migration and Integration (European
Commission, 2004). This report mapped the
integration policies of member states and
found that, despite diverse policies to
tackle integration, member states faced
common challenges and needs, including:
s lack of access to employment;
s language skills and the improvement
of educational attainment;
s civic education or orientation for 
new immigrants;
s participation in the political 
decision-making process;
s risk of poverty and social exclusion;
s affordable housing;
s discrimination and racism, and
s gender considerations.
Some of these issues are already being
addressed at the EU level. For example, the
European Employment Strategy recognizes
the importance of immigration in filling
labour shortages, and has called for action
to better integrate immigrants in the
labour market. Immigrants and ethnic
minorities were highlighted as one of six
critical priorities in the drive to reduce
poverty and social exclusion in the European
Commission’s 2003 Joint Inclusion Report.
Most recently, the European Council
announced a new five-year programme
(2005-2010) of work towards Strengthening
Freedom, Security and Justice Within the
European Union, known as the Hague
Programme (European Council, 2004).
Integration is one of five migration-related
areas of work, and calls for the “creation of
equal opportunities [for migrants] to fully
participate in society”. In addition, the
Hague Programme set out six common
basic principles for a European framework
on integration (European Council, 2004:
19). According to these, integration
s is a continuous, two-way process
involving both legally resident third-
country nationals and the host society;
s includes, but goes beyond,
anti-discrimination policy;
s implies respect for the basic values of
the European Union and fundamental
human rights;
s requires basic skills for participation 
in society;
s relies on frequent interaction and
intercultural dialogue between all
members of society within common
forums and activities in order to
improve mutual understanding;
s Extends to a variety of policy areas,
including employment and education.
Whether this new five-year programme 
to develop a comprehensive and coherent
approach to integration at the EU level
involving stakeholders at the local, regional
and national levels will be successful,
remains to be seen. Spencer has noted that
fear of public resistance to migrants (and
EU control over their conditions of stay),
the difficulties involved in coordinating a
large number of directorates-general,
committees and national ministries, and
the diverse strategies being employed by
member states at the moment, are all
potential barriers to agreement on a
common strategy (Spencer, 2003). However,
the Hague Programme does provide
impetus and direction for national govern-
ments to focus on integration as part of 
an overall migration policy.
Integration Policy in the European Union
9.3  Integration Policy in the European Union
Integration was recognized at the European Council in Tampere in 1999 as a
necessary part of comprehensive immigration and refugee strategies. The Tampere
Programme set out by the Council requested a “more vigorous integration policy”
under the heading of “fair treatment of third-country nationals”. In the same year,
the Treaty of Amsterdam gave the European Union a mandate to address racial and
religious discrimination. (See box, opposite.)
9.4  Policy Fields
9.4.1  Language Training
There is a broad, international consensus that the value of language training has
been seriously underestimated (MPI, 2004). In Europe, many countries now see
language as a key instrument to address structural integration and social
cohesion, while in North America and Australia, additional language training is
seen as essential for improved labour market integration. Among the critical
lessons pertaining to delivery, are the following: language training should not be
limited to the head of household; the number of hours of training should be
maximized; language training should be vocationally specific; and more flexible
delivery is required in terms of when and where language training is offered.
Current thinking favours training in work settings and delivery by employers and
NGOs. Training capacity issues arise outside of major cities.
9.4.2  Skills Utilization
The failure of western labour markets to recognize the educational and profes-
sional credentials of immigrants is a significant barrier to the utilization of their
skills and constitutes a huge economic loss.159 In order to remedy this situation,
countries such as Canada and Australia have been working with domestic
professional associations and with universities and colleges to help educate
employers and to certify immigrant credentials. Australia requires the process of
credential assessment to be initiated and concluded prior to entry. (The charges for
this service are borne by the applicant.) Other methods that have shown promise
include additional language training, which helps overcome the critical job barriers
that keep immigrants from being employed in the jobs for which they trained.
Relatively small investments in language acquisition have been shown to yield
large gains. In addition, a variety of elaborate mentoring programmes, some of
them paid by employers, others requiring government subsidies, have met with
some degree of success.
9.4.3  Education
Education is considered a key area for promoting socio-economic advancement
and combating social exclusion.160 It is especially important that the second gen-
eration be given access to high quality schooling and advanced education. Beyond
this, education policy should be broadly conceived and not limited to children or to
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159. Loss estimates for Canada as a result of non-recognition of immigrant credential have ranged from CAD 6 billion (Conference Board
of Canada) to a recent estimate of CAD 2 billion (World Education Services). The wide range indicates the reliance of such estimates
on assumptions, but the seminal point remains: the losses are substantial.
160. The workshop on social integration that preceded this report emphasized the importance of secularizing Ireland’s education
system and making it more accessible to newcomers.
formal, school-based curricula. Education policy for migrants should embrace adult
education, continuing education, and citizenship education. Particular attention
should also be paid to gender and to the performance of visible and religious
minorities. Also, in addition to the areas noted in the NPAR, intercultural training
should be provided to teachers in certain areas.
9.4.4  Health
In the health domain, a variety of issues arise for both migrants and hosts. The
major issues include access to the health system; how well the health system is
equipped to deal with mental health concerns (especially important for refugees);
how well it is equipped to deal with gender issues (this refers to cultural
sensitivities regarding treatment); and how well it is equipped to deal with public
health and safety issues (immigrants travel to and from exotic locations). This last
item raises the question of preparedness by the health authorities to diagnose and
deal with various transmitted diseases. A final point concerns population health
and the manner in which immigrant health is affected by environmental and
socio-economic conditions and stresses. The issue is health, but the remedies lie
beyond the health field.
9.4.5  Justice and Discrimination
Issues in the justice domain involve immigrants as victims of discrimination, and
crime or as perpetrators. As in the case of health, many of the causes and remedies
lie outside the justice domain.
In terms of victimization, anti-racism and anti-discrimination legislation provide a
valuable means for attacking overt racism in the workplace and classroom. Their
value in addressing more concealed forms of discrimination is, however, limited.
The persistence of significant income differentials between immigrants (especially
visible minority immigrants) and native-born residents - lasting into the second
generation – notwithstanding legislation requiring equal pay for equal work,
clearly demonstrates the limits of legislated solutions to social and economic
problems.. Ultimately, inequalities will need to be addressed through public
education and, if this fails, through the use of affirmative targets (not quotas).
Such instruments have proven broadly successful across issues ranging from the
equitable provision of bank loans to the recruitment of minorities for executive
positions.
In terms of the justice system per se, and how it deals with migrants and
minorities, the situation is troubling. There is robust empirical evidence from
various jurisdictions, including Canada, showing that at every step of the way,
initial interception, laying of charges, conviction and sentencing, visible minorities
tend to fare worse (Wortley, 1994). Despite this, immigrants in Canada, unlike
Ireland (or Europe), are under-represented in prisons.161 This suggests that crime in
Europe may be related to the exclusionary conditions under which migrants live.
(Organized crime is excluded from this point.) 
The final point concerns relations between the justice system and migrant
communities. Often, these are a major source of friction, especially in the area of
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161. It is interesting to speculate on possible explanations for the discrepancy in immigrant criminality between Canada and Europe. In
the absence of compelling evidence showing that European immigrants are more criminally inclined, the explanation is likely to be
found in the treatment of migrants and the access they are given to mainstream institutions (Thomas, 1993).
policing. Remedying this will require particular attention and investments in
training, in recruitment (of co-ethnics) and in community relations. Numerous
“best practice models” exist, though the area is likely to remain troublesome.
9.4.6  Housing
Housing is an issue in its own right as well as being a cross-cutting area with
important ties to health, justice, welfare, labour markets and integration. One of
the major problems that migrants face upon arrival is the lack of affordable
housing and the mismatch between immigrant needs (often for larger units) and
current offers in the housing market. Homelessness is another issue that resonates
on both sides of the Atlantic (FEANTSA, 2002).162
Of widespread concern is the issue of immigrant concentration, especially where
concentration intersects with low income and visible minority status in
metropolitan areas, such as Dublin. Public housing strategies, such as Sweden’s,
which deliberately created concentrations of immigrants, are now judged to be
failures.163
The final point on housing refers to the widespread resentment that arises when
immigrants “jump the queue” for housing lines and are rewarded ahead of
citizens. As a general policy rule, it is better to channel support to migrants in the
form of investments in human capital, or even subsidies allowing them to compete
on the market, rather than allocating them public goods, such as housing
(especially housing), that are perceived as being in short supply.
9.4.7  Connecting Admission Programmes and Integration 
The relationship between integration and admission programmes is complex,
reciprocal and complementary. Integration begins with a country’s admission
strategies that, typically, shape both the volume and composition of incoming
migration. This, in turn, affects integration outcomes, related public costs and
receptivity by the host society.
In the case of Canada and Australia, admission (referred to as selection) is based on
criteria that variously include age, education, occupation, experience, language
ability, association with the country of destination, and demand, including job
offers by employers. There is extensive research linking these criteria to improved
integration outcomes, including stronger labour market performance (i.e., higher
starting wages and steeper income trajectories), lower unemployment and
reduced social assistance.164 By comparison, non-selected migrants, such as
refugees and sponsored family members, do not perform as well.165
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162. See also the special session of the Metropolis Interdepartmental Committee (October 2005) dealing with housing and homelessness.
163. Sweden’s Million Homes Programme renewed Sweden’s housing stock, but also produced concentrations of disadvantaged ethnic
populations. See case studies of Stockholm and Malmö conducted under the Neighbourhood Housing Models programme. See also
Jederlund (1998).
164. Recent research comparing Australian and Canadian immigration policies and labour market integration shows that recent
migrants to Australia are doing significantly better than recent migrants to Canada (Richardson and Lester, 2004). For example, six
months after arrival, the unemployment rate for migrants to Canada was 26 per cent, while the unemployment rate for
comparable Australian migrants stood at only 10 per cent. The study attributed the superior Australian outcomes to key features of
Australia’s selection system. These included Australia’s greater emphasis on youth, skills, work experience and especially on pre-
arrival, formally assessed qualifications and elevated English language requirements. The report discounted the influence of
prevailing economic conditions in the two countries.
165. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the families of highly qualified labour applicants outperform the families of non-selected migrants.
Of course, a critical element of the Canadian and Australian systems is their focus
on high-end migration and integration. This differs from Ireland, where admissions
have focused on temporary entry, and most recently at the lower end of the
occupational spectrum. As a result, many of the positive features evident in
Canada and Australia would not normally manifest themselves in Ireland, except
perhaps in regard to high-skilled migrants, recruited by employers. Recently, a
number of restrictions governing the mobility of such migrants have been relaxed
in relation to designated, high-demand occupations. This change can be expected
to have a salutary effect on Ireland’s ability to meet critical skill shortages and on
long-term integration prospects. It will also help Ireland’s migration programmes
to more closely emulate the programmes of traditional immigrant-receiving
countries, making them more competitive internationally. (The changes will also
help skilled migrants to protect themselves against exploitation.) 
The main point above is that integration outcomes are closely linked to the
character of the incoming population, which is a function of policy design.
Integration costs in Canada and Australia are reduced and labour market outcomes
are better than those obtained elsewhere, because the admission systems of both
countries are tuned to domestic integration requirements. In contrast, Ireland’s
entry “filters” are unlikely to produce such “payoffs” because they are designed to
admit migrants into low-wage employment.
A point worth noting about the Canadian and Australian selection systems is their
relationship to literacy. Language and education (in other words, literacy) are both
privileged in the selection process, resulting in significantly improved integration
outcomes. Importantly, immigrants can also “invest” in these factors prior to
applying for entry. This tends to shift the burden for settlement (i.e., the cost of
public and private integration programmes) from the host country back to the
would-be immigrants, and shifts the locus of the adjustment from the country of
destination back to the country of origin.
Of course, integration policy cannot concern itself exclusively with economic
entrants. Family migrants must be served as well. (Refugees are not dealt with in
this chapter.) This occurs because immigration is fundamentally a chain activity
and the decision to admit migrant workers (permanently or, in Ireland’s case, for an
extended period) is tantamount to admitting family migrants, albeit with time
lags. The volume and composition of these flows are determined by the
configuration of admission programmes which shape the timing, the number and
the relationships of migrants granted entry.
Because family migration is generally less skilled and less educated than (high-
end) labour migration, more generous family sponsorship provisions tend to raise
the overall costs of integration and dilute the economic benefits produced by the
original labour entrants. (Note that the bulk of family migrants are sponsored by
other migrants.) Empirical work in both Canada and Australia shows significant
differentials in economic performance and social assistance between labour
market and family-based migration. Similar results appear to underlie the
arguments propounded by George Borjas in his comparisons of Canada and the
United States. Immigration advocates have suggested that the presence of family
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has a positive, stabilising influence on migrants, facilitating their integration and
supporting investments in human capital, but there are no solid empirical studies
to support these claims.166
In addition to accelerating and easing migrant integration, selective admission
policies also produce important, indirect effects. The first of these concerns the
contribution that immigrant communities are able to make to the integration of
new arrivals. Established members of immigrant communities, having been in the
country for some time, are aware of local conditions, have amassed physical and
social capital and have established ties with the native population.167 These assets
are important for integrating new arrivals. Canadian longitudinal research shows
that migrants rely on friends and family above all other sources, in choosing their
destinations, locating housing, securing jobs, obtaining information about
educational opportunities and accessing healthcare (Ruddick, 2003). Similar results
have been obtained in Australia.168
The reliance on family and friends is reinforced by the tendency of immigrants to
settle in areas of high migrant concentration. This increases interactions among
migrants and creates a situation wherein integration is carried out by other
migrants and not by members of the native-born population. This is especially
pronounced in cities like Toronto, where more than 50 per cent of residents are
foreign born. Similar patterns can be expected to develop in Dublin, which is
already home to roughly one-third of the country’s foreign-born residents.
The point this analysis makes, is that policies favouring immigrants with higher
education and better skills also produce communities and urban settings that are
better endowed with human and social capital. This, in turn, improves the
integration capacity of society and the prospects of migrants. Not because the
state invests more, but because immigrant communities are better able to assist
their members to settle. The upshot is that investment in skilled labour selection
produces not only immediate benefits in the form of lower integration costs, but
also an elevated capacity to settle future entrants.
A related argument draws on the fact that the settlement and integration
“infrastructure” of virtually all countries relies heavily on migrant organizations for
service delivery, advocacy and representation. Consequently, there is an interest by
the state in the capacity of these organizations to serve their constituencies.
Communities that are rich in human capital tend to produce more effective
settlement organizations than do poorly endowed communities. This has impli-
cations for Ireland. At present, migrant organizations are still underdeveloped, a
function of community size (migrant groups are still small) and the short length of
time that most groups have been in existence. Nevertheless, interviews with
various NGOs in Dublin indicate that the NGO sector is rapidly becoming more
sophisticated and more effective in its dealings with government.169
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166. Immigration data generally focus on individuals rather than households. Over the next few years, it will be possible to test a variety
of family and household propositions using new data sets and reconstructed family files. For a recent assessment of family
investment strategies see Cobb-Clark and Crossley (2002).
167. The development of links between the immigrant and host population is referred to as linking or bridging social capital and is
viewed by social capital theorists as particularly important to integration. This subject is treated in greater depth below in a
separate point.
168. Comments by Professor Sue Richardson at the conference “The Opportunity and Challenge of Diversity: A Role for Social Capital?”
sponsored by the OECD and the Privy Council Office in Canada, November 2003.
169. Conducted in April 2005.
The final point regarding the connection between admissions policy and
integration arises from the relationship between migrant composition and public
attitudes. It is not by accident that Canada is a remarkably tolerant society at a
point in history where tolerance and cross-cultural understanding constitute a
strategic resource. Nor is it because of legislation or programmes promoting
human rights or multiculturalism.These programmes have a contributory but, by no
means, a definitive role in determining attitudes. Canada is, in large part, tolerant
because of its immigration programme and the attitudes it engenders.170  
The connection between immigration and tolerance is not simply the result of
having immigration. It is the result of having a particular kind of immigration.
Canada’s skilled worker programme is unanimously viewed as being in the public
interest, because skilled immigrant workers are widely believed to contribute to
domestic prosperity. And because immigration, particularly skilled migration, is
seen as benefiting Canadians, integration policy tends to be viewed as a public
investment rather than a public drain.
The critical determinant of integration is what goes on in the private sphere where
most interactions occur, in settings over which governments have little influence.
These are the daily exchanges taking place in schools, in jobs, in nightclubs and on
the streets. What is critical is not so much the quantity of these interactions as
their quality. Face-to-face contact, under favourable circumstances, is the engine
that generates tolerance and promotes integration in Canada. The fact that
Canada’s immigration programme selects individuals who are visibly successful,
economically self-sufficient, who value education for their children and who aspire
to owning their own homes and cars reassures Canadians that their values will be
respected and their communities enhanced. It is this that produces support for the
essential integration services that benefit not only those arrivals who are selected
for their skills, but also those who are sponsored by their families or who arrive
spontaneously and find some way to remain in the country.
The arguments in this section have focused on the links between integration and
the admission of skilled workers. A less positive trajectory results from the
admission and settlement of low-skilled labour. At a minimum, integration needs
would be higher and the likelihood of public support lower. What is not known is
whether low-skilled migration also creates active resistance to migrants and, as a
result of stigmatization, intolerance. If so, this would establish a link between
admissions policy and social exclusion. Combating social exclusion is a difficult and
drawn-out process that is best dealt with through prevention.
9.4.8  Managing Economic Integration in a Changing Landscape
Economic and social research in Canada and the United States, but not Australia,
has identified substantial declines in the economic performance of immigrants
who arrived in the 1980s and 1990s, compared with immigrants who arrived
during the 1960s and 1970s. These declines revealed themselves in lower starting
wages, higher unemployment, lower participation rates and slower income growth
rates (Parent and Worswick, 2004).
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170. The arguments in this section were originally prepared for a workshop sponsored by the Washington-based Migration Policy
Institute and the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2003 during the Greek presidency of the European Union.
Many of the differences were quite pronounced. Over a 15-year period between
1981 and 1996, immigrant entry earnings (relative to the Canadian born) dropped
by more than 20 per cent, while the proportion of recent immigrants (who had
been in Canada for less than three years) living in families whose incomes fell
below the poverty line, nearly doubled. Without social assistance, more than one
in three recent immigrants would have been poor in 1999.
What is especially problematic about this decline in immigrant economic
performance is the fact that it coincided with a change in migrant composition,
away from Europe and North America to sources in Asia, the Middle East, Africa,
the Caribbean and South and Central America.171 This has produced an unhappy
association between visible minority status, on the one hand, and poverty and low
income, on the other. Given that this intake pattern is likely to persist, the coupling
of migration with poverty constitutes a significant threat to the long-term viability
of Canada’s immigration programme and, potentially, to migration programmes in
other countries. Trend figures for Ireland (see the section on migration trends)
reveal that non-EU migration has been rising sharply, suggesting that similar
challenges may be in store.
Explanations for the decline in economic outcomes have focused on three sets of
factors: economic restructuring; the business cycle, and changes in migrant
composition.These explanations have implications for the management of Ireland’s
migration programmes.
The difficulties experienced by recent immigrants are similar to those experienced
by other new labour entrants in the eighties and nineties. This lends credence to
arguments that the declining fortunes of new entrants resulted from massive,
global economic restructuring. But, whereas the economic fortunes of native-born
entrants have improved in recent years, the recovery by immigrants has been
uneven.172 In particular, immigrants from English-speaking countries (e.g., the
United States, Australia and New Zealand) and from Western Europe have not
experienced the same difficulties as have immigrants from non-western back-
grounds.173 The former possess several advantages, including English fluency, and
the fact that their education and experience credentials are more familiar to
employers than those of immigrants from non-English speaking backgrounds and
from countries with different educational and labour market systems. Canadian
labour markets tend to assess the value of foreign education and experience at
close to zero when those credentials originate in non-English speaking countries
(Green and Worswick, 2002). Racism and discrimination are likely to play some role
in determining market outcomes, though evidence regarding their importance 
is mixed.174 
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171. In 2003, only 20 per cent of migrants to Canada came from Europe and the United States, with more than 50 per cent of arrivals
coming from Asia. Before 1961, the proportion of immigrants not from the United States or Europe was less than five per cent, and
in the 1961 to 1971 period still accounted for some 75 per cent of total entrants..
172. The recent improvement in the catch-up rates of many migrants supports the structural hypothesis.
173. The fact that, unlike Canada, Australia did not experience a decline in the proportion of English-speaking immigrants and,
consequently, did not experience a decline in immigrant economic performance, adds weight to arguments that point to language
as the principal culprit. See Richardson (2004).
174. The influence of source country confounds discrimination with local business practices and social norms. There is widespread
agreement that discrimination exists against black and Muslim immigrants in Canada.
Current research suggests that approximately one-third of the decline in
immigrant economic performance can be attributed to declining labour market
conditions. Immigrants who were unable to find work in their field at the time of
entry because jobs were scarce, found that their skills were no longer recognized
when economic conditions picked up.This “scarring” was especially pronounced for
those with high levels of education. Similar results hold for social assistance. The
incidence of social assistance has remained high for those who arrived during
recessionary periods (CIC, 2004).
Two conclusions from this analysis have strong implications for Ireland: the first
concerns composition; and the second overall flow management.
9.4.9  Composition
Ireland currently relies on the EU accession states for low-skilled labour and is
planning to limit intake from outside the European Union to highly skilled
migrants. This chapter is silent on the feasibility of this policy and whether the
desired volume of low-skilled EU migrants can be sustained; however, insofar as
recruitment from outside the European Union is concerned (whether high or low-
skilled), there is a compelling case for introducing language requirements or seek-
ing commitments from employers to provide language training. There will also be
a need to invest in systems to evaluate foreign educational and professional
credentials.
9.4.10  Macro-management
There is a definite requirement to manage immigration flows in a counter-cyclical
manner, so as to prevent “scarring” and facilitate integration. This, in turn, requires
management machinery that is able to regulate entry volumes over the business
cycle. This means that the immigration management system cannot be exclusively
rights driven or entirely family based. There are a number of “models” to choose
from that offer various degrees of control over volumes, including the systems
employed by Canada, Australia and the United States. A second reason for
managing migration in a counter-cyclical fashion has to do with the relationship
between immigrant economic performance and public support for immigrants
and integration. Favourable public attitudes and public support go hand in hand
with favourable economic performance which requires contra-cyclical flow
management.
9.4.11  Social Capital Policies
According to Michael Woolcock, a key proponent of social capital policy, “Social
capital refers to the norms and networks that facilitate collective action”. More
expansively, the OECD defines social capital as “… the networks, norms, values and
understandings that facilitate co-operation within or among groups” (OECD, 2001).
Based on this, immigrant integration can be thought of as a process whereby new
networks and new attachments to the host community are formed, while old
attachments to the country of origin and to domestic immigrant and minority
groups are weakened.
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Social capital advocates argue that government policies are needed to promote
this process of coupling and decoupling, paying special attention to the formation
of ties that bridge immigrants to mainstream groups and mainstream institutions.
Among the claims made for such bridging policies are that they greatly facilitate
social and economic integration by producing:
s better health and education outcomes;
s improved labour market outcomes and a reduction in poverty;
s more effective policing and justice-related service provisions;
s better communications, and
s a reduction in welfare expenditures.
It is also argued that investments in social capital stimulate individual investment
in key mobility determinants, such as education.
While there is a fair degree of interest in social capital policy, governments have
been reluctant to intervene extensively in private associational life. As a result,
they have shied away from major new initiatives directed expressly at the
formation of social networks. This being said, many existing programmes already
contribute to the development of social capital, including educational investments,
community services, sports programmes, arts subsidies and cross-cultural
communication initiatives (APC, 2003). Also germane for integration are tax incen-
tives that stimulate the voluntary sector, investments in community leadership and
in bridging structures (e.g., interfaith religious councils), school bridging programmes
that teach immigrant and minority youth how to operate in different cultural con-
texts,175 and mentoring programmes (e.g., Canada’s Host Program, which connects
refugees with established Canadians, or Ireland’s MORE refugee resettlement project).
Social capital depends heavily on local behaviour and practices. It is not just
policies, but the means used that are important.176 The creation of task-oriented
groups that draw together individuals from different networks is among the best
ways to build bridging social capital. People are most inclined to help those they
feel are in the same boat (Breton, 1997). This should be of particular salience for
Ireland, given the country’s emigration history and the large numbers of returning
expatriates who retain a family memory of the difficulties encountered.
Social capital advocates extend their promotion of networks to include not only
the connections formed among individuals, but also the links that develop
between immigrants (and immigrant groups) and institutions, both public and
private. The creation of such institutional links can be problematic and time-
consuming when faced with long-standing disadvantage and social exclusion (Ray,
2003). Two reasons for this are, first, that social capital cannot replace investments
in physical and human capital, and, second, that not all groups are equally capable
of sharing resources, as this will depend on sufficient levels of trust and bonding
(intra-group) social capital.177
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175. US school desegregation policies are an excellent example of programmes that create bridging social capital.
176. Michael Woolcock and Xavier de Souza Briggs, both prominent social capital researchers, have emphasized the importance of local
action and face-to-face relationships in their writings.
177. Bonding social capital refers to connections and relationships between members of the same group.
The final point on social capital concerns the role of government. Among the instru-
ments available to the government is a capacity to create framework policies, such
as multiculturalism, anti-discrimination measures and citizenship provisions. These
measures have symbolic force and define standards of fairness according to which
public and private actions are judged. This point is taken up below.
9.4.12  The Role of Non-governmental Organizations
As this chapter has already indicated, state support is often secondary to the
actions of local migrant organizations and other non-governmental agencies in
welcoming immigrants and helping them to integrate, i.e., to find work, to learn to
speak the language of the host community, to register children for school and so
forth. This is because technocratic solutions by government are not always approp-
riate or effective in dealing with the particularistic nature of integration. Devolution
of settlement services to the local level tends to achieve better results. For this
reason, one of the main tasks for the government in the area of integration is to
facilitate community action.
Generally, NGOs tend to have superior knowledge of local conditions, are better
equipped to communicate with migrants and, because they have a vested interest
in the results of their actions, are more highly motivated than government agencies
to successfully integrate migrants. Unfortunately, they also face significant con-
straints, particularly financial.
Though immigration to Ireland is of recent origin, Ireland’s tradition of voluntarism
and community action has strong and well-established roots. There also exists a
considerable amount of latent sympathy for migrants as a result of the country’s
recent, and harsh, experience with emigration. It remains to connect this latent
empathy with local action in the service of immigrant integration. As it stands,
Ireland’s integrative capacity is still fairly rudimentary: NGOs have shown them-
selves to be adept at advocacy, but their capacity to deliver assistance and services
to migrants is still weak, especially outside Dublin and other major urban centres.
This weakness has revealed itself in respect of Ireland’s policy of dispersing
migrants to avoid aggravating the housing shortage in Dublin. The policy has
stumbled due to a lack of language training capability and other integrative
capacities outside major cities.This has resulted in delayed integration and extensive
secondary migration (Kelly, 2002). This will raise downstream state expenditures as
well as “scarring” the migrants who will, in future, find it much harder to obtain good
employment commensurate with their original, but by now depleted, skills.
If community organisms are to play a larger role in migrant integration, their
capacity to consult, to plan, to implement ideas and to deliver services will need to
be expanded. This will require sustained support by government and the
development of a more mature working relationship across the sector, character-
ized by better coordination among NGOs and more effective ties with government
ministries (RTI, 2002).
NGOs should not be treated by governments as mere third-party service deliverers.
Instead, they will need to be treated as independent actors and allowed to exercise
their own “voice”. This will require a degree of tolerance on the part of the
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government (eschewing coercive financial measures in order to control NGO
behaviour) and restraint on the part NGOs so as to allow the partnership to operate
effectively.178 It will also require transparency and the creation of accountability
mechanisms, since public moneys would be involved.
One further question worth asking is whether governments can, or indeed should,
concern themselves with creating strong community leaders.
9.4.13  Multiculturalism and Inter-culturalism
Multiculturalism and integration are frequently invoked together as if the one
implied the other or, indeed, required it. The confusion originates in the use of both
terms as descriptors – multiculturalism as synonymous with a diverse society, and
integration as the process of accommodation that inevitably accompanies this
diversity. When both terms are used normatively to refer to policy, it becomes
evident that the terms are not necessarily coherent and, indeed, come into conflict
when integration policy shifts in the direction of assimilation.
Multiculturalism is a term that has come to be associated most closely with
Canada and, perhaps, Australia. However, for quite some time multiculturalism had
considerable influence over the policies adopted by a number of states including
the United Kingdom, Sweden and, especially, the Netherlands. This advance would
appear to have come to a halt. The European debate around integration and social
cohesion, provoked in large measure by the perceived challenge of integrating
religious diversity,179 has shifted public opinion (along with political rhetoric and
action) in the direction of assimilationist models of incorporation. This, together
with the reintroduction of identity into the discussion, has led to a considerable
distancing by countries, such as the Netherlands, from their former embrace of
multicultural ideals.180 Replacing those ideals is a new emphasis on civic pluralism, or
interculturalism, which has, in turn, affected the strategic aims, priorities and choice
of instruments used by states to deal with cultural communities and migration.
Even in Canada, where multiculturalism enjoys uniquely high levels of support,181
some cracks have begun to appear. These have been accompanied by a series of
unresolved policy debates around social cohesion, shared citizenship and, most
recently, rights and obligations. One of the main problems with these debates is
the difficulty of specifying the obligations and responsibilities of membership in
society and, then, translating those obligations into actionable policies. This is
especially so when the responsibilities centre on liberal democratic principles but
the instruments used to promote them are, in fact, illiberal and involve sanctions.
Sanctions is not a path for which Canada has shown much appetite but it is one
that is increasingly being experimented with in Europe, the main focus being on
language and citizenship education (see the earlier discussion on integration).
Whether this will succeed is, ultimately, an empirical question and one that carries
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178. The shared interest in migration policy was addressed by Sarah Spencer of COMPAS in a presentation entitled “Impact of NGOs on
Migration Policy in Ireland.”
179. The concern is, specifically, with groups that reject liberal, democratic ideals.
180. Under a multicultural model, it is difficult to specify into what identity immigrants are being asked – or told – to integrate.
181. The explanation for this according to Will Kymlicka (one of the main thinkers on this issue) is part geographic, part historical, and
part serendipitous. He argues that what is unique about Canada’s multicultural policy is not the instrument per se, but the support
it enjoys. And this he attributes to Canada’s remoteness from large, potential migrant pools and the fact that multiculturalism
evolved at time when immigration to Canada was largely white and Christian, consisting of people with values and behaviours
similar to those of their hosts. See Kymlicka (2004).
a degree of risk as a result of its reliance on sanctions. It may also be premature, as
alternative options have not been exhausted. Rather than tying citizenship to
migrant incorporation and homogenous values, which narrows national identity
and the scope for belonging, governments should focus on inclusion and
enhancing the capacity for collective action. This develops through people living,
working and playing together, particularly on projects in the public domain –
which is where the state operates.
The main policy focus suggested by this line of argument does not deviate much
from the NPAR. It emphasizes the creation of a common civic culture based on
democracy and the rule of law, and it seeks to implement this through policies that
promote language and citizenship education, tolerance, anti-discrimination and
mainstreaming of services. The emphasis is on universality of treatment. Less
emphasis is placed on multicultural policies that promote particularistic, ethnic
activities and ethnic languages.182
As a final point, there has not been much empirical study of the effects of
multiculturalism on such concepts as integration, social cohesion and identity.
Some work has been done showing that, apparently, diversity depresses trust. But
when multiculturalism is examined, it does not appear to erode support for the
welfare state or for welfare expenditures. This is good news because it suggests
that multiculturalism, and its close cousins, can be used to promote belonging
without damaging key policies used to maintain social cohesion (Banting and
Kymlicka, 2004).
9.4.14  Citizenship and Naturalization
Citizenship is fundamentally an instrument defining membership in a society. It
does this by allocating the benefits, burdens and rights that are accorded to
citizens, to other residents and to non-citizens (Feldblum, 2000; Klusmeyer, 2000).
Included in this allocation is the access that different classes of members are given
to a variety of policy domains. These include employment, health, education,
mobility, politics, sponsored entry of family, and the ability to include family in the
package of benefits and rights.
Citizenship is also about the rules of incorporation. Citizenship is a powerful device
for facilitating inclusion and for signalling national preferences regarding the
future “shape” of the population and the preferred terms of allegiance.
If citizenship were regarded as an asset in a stock portfolio, its value as a state
instrument would have declined steadily over the last two decades. Among the
changes eroding the value of citizenship have been:
s the acceptance of dual and even multiple citizenships;
s the expansion of the European Union and the elaboration of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights;
s the ratification of various conventions limiting state sovereignty as regards
entry and protection;
s the activation of new governance structures with authority to create and to
manage new forms of citizenship, and 
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182. Interestingly, in a survey of public attitudes in Canada (Ekos, 1996) the most important perceived dimensions of multiculturalism
were tolerance and integration while the least were promoting and preserving diversity. Similarly, the preference for future
directions centred on the promotion of tolerance and the elimination of racism while the promotion of minority rights was seen as
the lowest priority. This said, diversity was judged by 75 per cent of the population as enriching Canada and making it stronger.
s the development of treaties and related instruments that define entry rights
and (limited) benefits accorded to non-nationals.
In particular, the extension of privileges and protections to long-term residents has
created alternative modes and vehicles for working and living in the European space.
In the last few years, spurred partly by events and by populist sentiment, states
have begun to rethink the potential value and uses of citizenship as an instrument
of policy. In Ireland’s case, consideration of the links between citizenship and
immigration has taken place chiefly in connection with asylum. The use of
naturalization as a strategic policy instrument and its relationship to the proposed
long-term residence provisions put forward in Immigration and Residence in
Ireland, a Discussion Document, have not been extensively explored and debated.183
There are at least three good reasons why this should be remedied and the
instrumental uses of citizenship rethought.
The first reason has to do with social inclusion and the anticipated structure of
Ireland’s labour migration policies. Ireland’s long-term residence provisions are not
directed at low-skilled workers from within the European Union, but to highly
skilled workers outside the EU’s boundaries. Many of these workers will be
members of “visible” minorities and a significant proportion (workers and students)
will remain in Ireland. The lack of clarity and certainty regarding the acquisition of
citizenship will delay their integration and incorporation into Irish society. This is
not only so because the workers are themselves unsure about their position, but
also because Irish citizens and institutions are unable to form clear expectations
regarding their role and the value of “investing” in their future.
The second reason for revisiting citizenship concerns the international competition
that is developing for the most talented, “creative” workers. Ireland is competing
not only with other EU countries, but also with North America and Australia for the
best and the brightest. Citizenship, and the certainty it affords, is a valuable asset
in this international competition.
The final reason for rethinking citizenship and residence concerns integration and
the welfare burden that immigration imposes on the state. A recent study of the
immigrant and foreign resident population of the European Union shows that
while naturalization has no effect on EU citizens or on American, Canadian and
Australian citizens living in Europe, for immigrants from other parts of the world,
naturalization is associated with lower unemployment rates, higher skill levels, and
a higher proportion of persons working in skilled jobs. In other words, the natural-
ized population tends to be more economically and socially integrated (Munz and
Fassman, 2004).
9.5  Strategic Goals and Considerations
Immigration is both a matter of choice and of fact. But irrespective of whether it is
planned or imposed, immigration has consequences and those consequences can
be shaped by policy interventions and by the actions, purposive or otherwise, of
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183. Irish citizenship law provides for citizenship to be acquired through birth, descent, marriage, and naturalization. Naturalization may
be applied for, providing the applicant has legally resided in Ireland for a period of at least five years. The newly proposed
Immigration and Residence Bill also provides for long-term resident status to be granted to persons who have resided in the
country for over five years.
stakeholders. It is this possibility of shaping the consequences of migration that
makes it so important to adopt a strategic approach.
Until recently, Ireland’s immigration strategies were quite rudimentary. They were
shaped by a desire to maintain orderly labour markets, to offer protection to
refugees and to prevent discrimination, but they were essentially reactive and
accommodative. This is beginning to change. Both the NPAR and the DJELR’s
discussion document on immigration and residence hint at the fact that broader
strategies are being contemplated, though neither document sets out a bold vision
for integrating immigration management with integration and with a larger set of
high-level strategic objectives.
The absence of approved, high-level strategic goals means that the policy and
analytic lessons set out earlier in this chapter must be viewed with caution. This
said, the lessons were chosen for their relevance to the extensive policy and
advocacy material that has emerged in Ireland over the past few years.184 A close
reading of this material suggests three overarching (implicit) strategic goals that
are closely tied to integration.185 These are briefly described below.
Goal One: To develop a robust capacity to manage conflict and to create a sense
of common purpose and cohesion 
Social change invariably creates discomfort. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that
the profound changes introduced by immigration and growing ethnic, racial,
cultural and religious diversity generate conflict and reduce overall levels of trust
within society, trust being a key ingredient of social cohesion. Coping with these
changes and with their effects constitutes a major policy challenge for all
multicultural societies, a club that Ireland is in the process of joining.
A recent article pertaining to conflict resolution and appearing in Optimum, a
Canadian policy magazine, argues that “Plural societies are characterized (not
only) by diversity, but also by an explicit recognition that individuals and groups
are motivated by different values and…can legitimately have different value
systems…Plural societies…deny that there is any constantly overriding value. This
entails the inevitability of conflicts and the need to develop reasonable and
effective conflict resolution mechanisms based on some credo that the disputants
might share.” (Paquet and Reid, 2003) 
According to the authors, pluralistic societies must evolve machinery that enables
different groups to learn from each other. Social learning is essential for creating
shared goals and for developing (or retaining) a capacity to mobilize both public
and private resources, to achieve national interests and to fend off threats.
Research indicates that governance can play a vital role in developing this capacity
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184. Among the more important reports are: “Labour Migration into Ireland”; “Voices of Immigrants”; the “NPAR; Immigration and
Residence in Ireland”, a discussion document; the Internationalisation of Irish Education Services Report and the Irish Nationality
and Citizenship Act 2004.
185. A related version of these goals was originally proposed in a paper prepared for the Intergovernmental Consultations Committee on
behalf of the Government of Canada. The aim of that paper was to explore whether member states – essentially, EU countries,
Canada, Australia and New Zealand – were prepared to broaden the Committee’s agenda to include issues related to integration.
The listed goals are fully consistent with the principles of integration of third-country nationals enunciated by the European
Council under the Hague Program, see section on Integration in the European Union. .
for social learning—attenuating conflict, increasing social interaction, increasing
tolerance and trust, and boosting productivity.186
The ultimate policy goal of social learning is to foster a sense of belonging and of
common purpose. However, social learning can only take place in an atmosphere
of mutual respect. Governments can foster this atmosphere by creating the
possibility of full societal membership and citizenship under the umbrella of an
inclusive national identity.187 The resulting sense of belonging is essential for
creating solidarity between newcomers and established residents, together with a
capacity to marshal public and private investments for the common good.
In the absence of a capacity to manage differences and to achieve common
purpose, it is difficult to understand how support for integration could be sustained.
In particular, it is difficult to see how immigration could be linked to nation building
and why immigration would be seen as operating in the public interest.
Goal Two: To create prosperity and to improve international competitiveness
A predominant concern for Ireland is to maintain the conditions that have contri-
buted to international competitiveness and domestic prosperity. This will require
that more attention be paid to migrant integration as demographic change begins
to impact significantly on labour force and population growth.188
The role that integration plays in Ireland’s economic development will depend on
the mix of competitiveness strategies that is adopted. Until recently, the focus has
been on low-skilled labour but, increasingly, there is interest in promoting the
entry and retention of highly-skilled workers. This has taken the form of programs
to attract skilled migrants (and students) to particular industries and locales in
order to fill critical vacancies and to attract investment in knowledge-intensive,
internationally competitive sectors.
The role of integration in these strategies is both accommodative and instrumen-
tal. In respect of low-skilled migration, there is sufficient international experience
to know that temporary, low-wage, guest worker programmes “leak” and result in
a gradual build-up of permanent populations. In this context, integration is
essential to prevent the formation of a social underclass with all that this entails.
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186. These conclusions are based on empirical work presented by Robert Putnam and John Helliwell at a joint OECD-Canada conference,
”The Opportunity and Challenge of Diversity: A Role for Social Capital?” held in Ottawa in November 2003. This is also supported by
APC (2003).
187. The creation of an inclusive national identity does not mean that everything is negotiable. All parties must, however, feel that the
exchange is fair and reasonable. At a minimum, most observers would argue that a bottom line, non-negotiable condition is the
respect for liberal democracy and the rule of law.
188. The demand this creates for migration will depend on how the Irish economy and education sector respond to demographic
change. Economies adjust to labour shortages by abandoning labour-intensive industries in favour of capital-intensive production
processes and adopting technology in favour of capital-intensive production methods; by relying on international trade to import
labour-intensive goods; by moving production offshore to countries where labour is cheap; and by increasing labour supply,
drawing inactive workers into the labour force and importing workers from abroad. In practice, all these adjustments occur
simultaneously and continually, though technological constraints, political preferences and the desire to prevent short-term labour
disruptions create an important role for public policy.
Integration policy also plays a critical and complementary role in respect of admis-
sions policy and recruitment. For countries or individual employers to realize a
return on their investments in recruitment, skilled migrants must be given the
opportunity to capitalize on their education and experience.189 Countries must also
be cognisant of the fact that many skilled migrants, even if their entry was
designated as temporary, will remain in the country and acquire citizenship. Apart
from the obligation this places on the state for the welfare and prosperity of its
newest citizens, there is a public policy interest in successfully integrating these
newcomers. Successful integration creates support for remedial immigration pro-
grammes; it serves to leverage private resources for settlement and it creates a
favourable climate for interpersonal exchanges.
The final strategy cited above links not only integration but also multicultural
diversity to economic growth and competitiveness. This is part of a wider analysis
linking social policy to investment and productivity. The main argument is that
competitiveness will increasingly depend on human and social capital, in
particular human capital associated with creativity and innovation, as opposed to
physical capital and raw materials. The key proponent of this view, Richard
Florida,190 has coined the term “creative class” workers to describe these highly
educated individuals whose jobs involve the transformation of ideas and concepts
(Florida, 2002).
In addition to these arguments, there is a substantial body of opinion, that links
multicultural diversity and integration to economic growth and competitiveness.
This has produced a flow of creative talent to cities that are characterized by
“quality of place”, of which diversity – including multicultural diversity – is a major
component. Businesses seeking to capitalize on these concentrations of talent
channel investment into such diverse, multicultural cities, thereby creating more
jobs, further inflows of talent and further rounds of investment. The result is a
virtuous circle of mobility, investment, more mobility and so on.
A critical question for policy makers is how to initiate this virtuous circle. Florida
has a number of answers but his main idea is that creativity and innovation need
to be seen as part of an “ecosystem” that requires nourishing and investment. A key
element of this ecosystem is investment in diversity, including cultural diversity,
which equips cities and regions to compete internationally.191
Goal Three: To promote personal and state security and to build public confidence
in governance structures
Modern migration can pose threats to personal security as well as to the security
of public and private institutions. If members of the receiving society feel
threatened by migrants, the capacity of the state to address economic challenges
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189. In the case of niche recruitment, one of the main goals is retention. Niche recruitment is associated with maintaining industries
that require highly specialized skills that are not available domestically, or with contributing to the sustainability of rural
communities and smaller towns that depend on specialized services, such as medical services, to remain viable.
190. His ideas have found favour with a number of Canadian academics. In a recent report prepared for the Government of Ontario’s
Ministry of Enterprise, Opportunity and Innovation, and for the Institute for Competitiveness and Prosperity, Meric Gertler, an
economist at the University of Toronto, has found that the relationships claimed by Florida for the United States hold even more
strongly for Canada. According to the report, “there appears to be a strong set of linkages between creativity, diversity, talent and
technology-intensive activity that are driving the economies of Ontario’s – and Canada’s – city regions … this work underscores the
importance of immigration and settlement, as well as the nurturing of arts and creativity”.
191. An interesting idea that has been advanced is to link Irish return migration to Florida’s virtuous circle. In other words, what prompts
skilled expatriates to return is not just the booming Irish economy but the prospects of a richer, multicultural life.
through migration or to foster an inclusive identity and support for diversity, is
compromised. Integration and multicultural policies can play an important role in
mitigating these risks and dampening the reactions they elicit.
While sound border control and screening policies are necessary, along with
effective internal policing, they cannot, on their own, produce safe societies
without severely impinging normal commerce and day-to-day transactions across
community ‘boundaries’. The resulting climate of mistrust may produce a ‘cure’
that is worse than the original threat.
Ultimately, authorities must rely on intelligence to fight criminal and terrorist
threats, which means that the state will need to depend on migrants for
information, for denying criminals and terrorists a safe haven and for resisting the
urge to recreate and express homeland conflicts. For this to happen, migrant
communities will need to identify with their hosts as opposed to identifying with
the perpetrators (potential or actual), a process that depends on the welcome they
are accorded - the willingness of society to invest in integration and the creation of
an inclusive, multicultural environment. The main focus of these policies will need
to be on children and young people. Investments in community leadership and
intercultural dialogue may also limit the opportunity for threats to take root in
society (see goal one).
9.6  Concluding Remarks: Five Critical Recommendations
The topic of integration spans an enormous body of theory and practice, one that
crosses scientific, jurisdictional and bureaucratic boundaries. Both the size and
complexity of this landscape are profoundly disorienting to policy makers having
to navigate difficult decisions. The five recommendations below are intended to
help with this process by serving as strategic guideposts. They draw on the earlier
discussion of ideas and practices derived from research and from policy experience.
s Create a strategic vision to mobilize society
The need to establish a clear strategic vision for immigration and integration
derives from their complexity and from the fact that governments hold only some
of the strategic cards to be played. Private interests (i.e., business, unions, non-
governmental organizations, churches and the public at large) hold the rest. These
interests, individual and institutional, need to be mobilized for integration to
succeed since integration takes place in settings that are not under government
control. Put somewhat differently, integration cannot remain a “government
project”. To be successful, it must become a fully national undertaking.
The requirement to mobilize interests across the board dictates the need for a
compelling rationale that is able to cut through complexity and resonate with
numerous, diverse groups. Such a rationale has yet to be constructed in Ireland,
though a number of important new initiatives indicate that the process has
begun: The NPAR expands the integration debate to the critical areas of housing,
health, education and justice, while the new Immigration and Residence Bill will
offer a machinery for the reconfiguring of the admission system to address a broader
set of strategic interests. The manner in which these instruments are wielded will
determine Ireland’s integration policy.
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Ultimately, for integration to succeed migrants will have to be seen as potential
assets and not as charitable works or temporary aids to facilitate labour adjust-
ment. This will require going beyond the NPAR’s asylum-inspired approach. Anti-
racism measures can, at best, produce tolerance, which is undeniably important.
But such measures are unlikely to produce integration, which cannot be compelled
or achieved through sanctions. For integration to occur, support will need to be
built on a widely-shared vision of how integration might contribute to a dynamic,
secure and socially cohesive Irish future. The creation of such a vision would
provide a basis for stakeholder alliances and would permit the development of
coherent plans. In the absence of such a vision policy will inevitably remain
fragmented and integration will be impaired.
s Integrate policies as well as people
There is a pressing need to integrate not just migrants but a portfolio of comple-
mentary policies that are directly and indirectly implicated in migrant integration.
The range of such measures reflects the conceptual span of integration and the
correspondingly broad horizontal and strategic nature of integration policy.
Integration policy is best conceptualized as an ecosystem for nurturing the
relationship and inspiring the transactions that occur between migrants and their
hosts. Migrants will need to receive assistance and access, institutions will need to
be reformed and made more accessible, tolerance will need to be promoted,
private resources will need to be mobilized, and frameworks will need to be
constructed in order to modulate the exchanges between newcomers and long-
term residents. Not to put too fine a point on it, the NPAR will need to be
integrated with the Immigration and Residence Bill, with the envisioned secondary
legislation that breathes life into the Bill’s statutory possibilities, with citizenship
legislation and a host of integration-related measures in the fields of health,
education, housing and justice. The complementarities inherent in these policies
must be exploited for Ireland to get the most out of its integration investments.
Horizontal policy development requires horizontal coordinating machinery. This is
gradually being developed. A new, combined service delivery agency is nearing
completion (the Integration Unit) and several high-level committees have started to
operate. A sense of urgency will need to be injected into the work of these structures
and their mandates will need to be framed more clearly and more publicly.
Consideration should also be given to a single migration agency that could exercise
leadership and drive the combined enterprise.
s Act locally through horizontal partnerships
Integration takes place at the level of neighbourhoods, worksites and schools. It
results from day-to-day contact between newcomers and residents and it depends
on the capacity and willingness of public and private institutions to respond to
migrant needs. It is these characteristics, the inherently local nature of integration
and the particularistic nature of integration services, that create a compelling logic
for integration programmes and services to be planned, coordinated and delivered
locally through broad, horizontal partnerships among local service providers and
community agencies.
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The most critical issue associated with local delivery and engagement is capacity.
The capacity of local government agencies and non-governmental stakeholders to
plan, organize and deliver integration services will need to be expanded for a
strategy of horizontal partnership and local action to succeed.
The main role of national or state governments in respect of integration should be
to exercise policy leadership. This involves creating the vision that informs local
partnerships, supplying resources and expertise, monitoring outcomes, and
transferring knowledge.
s Privilege social interaction over common values
Integration ultimately requires the formation of common values and norms. But to
focus on this misses the point that integration is a process and not static. The
manner in which this process is conducted is as important as its results. Implicit in
this is the idea that values are by-products and not ends; the result, and not the
precursor, of living, working and playing together, particularly on projects in the
public domain.
Rather than focusing exclusively on such questions as “how do we become the
same?” or “how similar do we need to be?” – questions that lead in the direction of
social engineering – the government needs to pay attention to the question of
“how might we best live together?”.
National governments have a critical role to play in addressing this question
through the creation of overarching and symbolic frameworks that set out the
rights and responsibilities of societal membership. It is these frameworks that
create the boundaries and rules that allow complex, diverse societies to manage
conflict and to negotiate differences. The critical policy instruments for shaping
these exchanges are citizenship policy, multiculturalism and inter-culturalism
policy, broad social inclusion strategies, as well as anti-discrimination and human
rights policies. Measures that directly target interactions between newcomers and
hosts, for example, policies seeking to create “bridging” social capital, can also play
a role in fostering integration.
s Focus on the long term 
The process of social, cultural and economic integration is characterized by com-
plexity, fluidity and exceptionally long-time horizons. To address these challenges
on an ongoing basis requires the development of not one, but many capacities.
The essential capacities that must be developed within the private and public
spheres in order to be able to respond to the needs (and demands) of both
migrants and hosts include the following: a capacity to mobilize public support; a
capacity for political action; a capacity to coordinate policies and programs at both
the national and local levels; a capacity to leverage non-governmental support;
and a capacity to evaluate policies and to transfer lessons from one locale and
sector to another.
Rather than starting with the present and analysing the effect of incremental
improvements in the status quo, the better strategy would be to imagine a future
state and to investigate the capacities that would be needed to sustain it. Many of
these essential capacities are already latent in Irish society and could be developed
progressively as opportunities arise, as resources are located and as stakeholders
are mobilized.
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Migration to Ireland: the Implications
for Developing Countries
10
10.1  Introduction
Unlike earlier chapters, this section looks at the impact of migration to Ireland on
countries of origin, especially the developing countries. It looks briefly at the size
and scope of emigration from poorer countries and whether these outflows are
having an adverse effect on local human resources. The paper explores the role of
migrant associations and expatriate groups in the development process, the
significance and cost of migrant remittances to their home countries, and draws
some preliminary conclusions on the management of Ireland’s migration and
development aid policies.
The relationship between development aid and migration cuts across a range of
government departments in Ireland, such as Foreign Affairs (aid), Enterprise, Trade,
and Employment (employment strategies and migration policies), Health and
Children (employer of professional and non-professional staff in health services),
and Education and Science (policies to recruit international students).
As noted in Chapter 2, a significant and rising proportion of immigrants in Ireland
originate from developing countries. Despite this, the relationship between develop-
ment and migration has not to date been articulated in public debate in Ireland. A
rare exception is the recent DJELR discussion document which notes the relevance
of ensuring that migration does not contribute to “brain drain” from developing
countries (DJELR, 2005: 71). Conversely policy documents dealing with Ireland’s
development policy have paid little attention to questions relating to migration.
10.2  Extent and Nature of Migration 
from Developing Countries
Many migrants from developing countries have come to Ireland through
specialized employment agencies working on behalf of both private and public
sector employers or employer groups. Recruitment strategies have been pursued in
the following countries:
s The Philippines for nursing, care work, seafarers and domestic workers;
s Brazil for jobs in the meat industry, especially butchering and boning;
s India and the Arab world for temporary medical professionals such as doctors
and nurses;
s China for low-wage jobs in restaurants, shops, garages and retail outlets; and 
s Turkey – including Kurdish workers – for the construction industry.
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Migrants from developing countries include a variety of migrant statuses, ranging
from worker students, temporary work permit holders and the longer-duration
professional visa or work authorization holders to refugees and asylum seekers.
Though these represent only a minority of the overall inflow into Ireland, they form
a significant portion of work permit holders, refugees and asylum seekers, and a
growing proportion of the international student population.
Table 10.1 shows the proportion of work permit holders from low and lower-middle
income countries. Though a small proportion came from the poorest countries, a
majority of work permit holders originate from lower-middle income countries,
which are still considered as falling within the developing country bracket. As
employment growth continues to expand in Ireland, demand for migrant workers,
including from the developing world, is likely to continue despite policy adjust-
ments targeting workers from the new EU member states. A number of industrial
or service sub-sectors show evidence of their reliance on developing country
migrant workers, such as the meat processing industry and the private nursing
home and acute hospital sectors.
Indian and Pakistani nationals accounted for close to 6 per cent of the international
student body in the 2003/4 academic year, while the number of students from
China is also rapidly increasing. As noted in Chapter 3, in 2004 there were 21,270
registered non-EEA students in Ireland, about half of whom came from China.
Regarding asylum, as noted in Chapter 2, the vast majority of asylum seekers and
confirmed refugees are from developing countries.
10.3  Relationship Between Overseas Development
Assistance and Migration to Ireland
In order to determine the existence of a relationship between Irish overseas
development assistance (ODA) and migration to Ireland, the principal beneficiaries
of ODA and source countries of migration were compared in respect of poverty
indicators. The UN Human Development Index (HDI) and the World Bank’s Income
Country Classification are indicators of development “need”.
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Table 10.1 Work Permit Holders Ireland 2004 by 
Country Income Classification (US$)
Proportion of work permit holders Country income classification per capita
13.7 % (4,602 persons) Low income: less than US$ 765 per capita
54.3 % (18,509 persons) Lower-middle income: US$ 766-3,035
19.3 % (6,578 persons) Upper-middle income: US$ 3,036-9,385
12.7 % (4,378 persons) High income: more than US$ 9,386
Source Extracted from World Bank Income Country Classification and Irish work permits data for 2004 by nationality
The results of this exercise are reproduced in Table 10.2 below. It shows that there
is no relationship between less-developed countries and the home countries of
work permit holders (column 2). None of the most important migrant sending
countries is among the poorest UN countries, though many display low per capita
income levels. The top ten migrant source countries accounted for almost 19,000
of the 34,000 work permits issued in 2004. Only 34 migrants from the ten
countries ranking at the bottom end of the UN HDI received work permits in 2004.
This suggests that relatively few migrants from the world’s poorest countries
migrate to Ireland.
However, the picture looks a little different for asylum seekers. The five most
important countries of origin of asylum seekers in Ireland during 2004 were
Nigeria, Romania, Somalia, China and Sudan (UNHCR, 2005).
At first sight, Table 10.2 does not suggest a relationship between migration to
Ireland and the top receiving countries for Ireland’s ODA—only South Africa
features in both columns. However, a number of significant sending countries are
in the lower-income brackets (column 4). Migration to Ireland could thus
complement official development assistance in countries where poverty, though of
concern, is less acute, through the economic contribution made by migrants
themselves, mainly in the form of remittances. This is explored further in the next
section.
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Table 10.2 Developing Countries of Origin of Migrants in Ireland ranked by Deprivation
Indices, Recipient Countries of Irish ODA and Migrant Workers Source Countries
Top ten receiving countries Top ten countries of UN HDI World Bank Country 
of ODA from Ireland permit holders in ranking Income Classification
Ireland (2004)1
1 2 3 4
Uganda Philippines Medium Lower-middle
Mozambique Ukraine Medium Lower-middle
Ethiopia Romania Medium Lower-middle
Tanzania Poland (EU) High Upper-middle
Zambia South Africa Medium Lower-middle
South Africa Brazil Medium Lower-middle
Lesotho China Medium Lower-middle
Afghanistan India Medium Low
Palestinian Admin Area Lithuania (EU) High Upper-middle
Kenya Latvia High Upper-middle
Source Extracted by Helen O’Leary, Ralaheen, from Department of Foreign Affairs, UN Human Development Reports, OECD data gross bilateral ODA 2002-2003, and DETE statistics.
Note World Bank Income Classification: Low: < $765 GNI per capita; Lower-Middle: $766-3035; Upper-Middle: $3036-9385.
UN HDI ranking is based on a number of factors including life expectancy, adult literacy, GDP per capita and educational enrolment.
The true impact on sending countries of these migration flows to Ireland is
unknown. The departure of educated and skilled migrants raises concerns over
“brain drain” in developing countries (Pieke et al., 2002: 8). While some countries
have seen little brain drain in the form of emigration among professionals, others
have felt the impact more strongly. Up to 40 per cent of African countries
experience brain drain, as over one-third of their college educated nationals leave
to work and reside abroad (World Bank, 2004a, 4) representing a direct loss of
investments made in their education and in their forgone professional
contribution to the local economy.
As noted above, few migrants come from the poorest countries and the only major
sending country receiving development aid from the Irish government is South
Africa, thus redressing the contradiction that would arise from simultaneously
investing in and draining the resources from developing countries. Moreover, many
sending countries have large populations – notably China, but also Brazil and India
– so the overall loss of skills may be small relative to the total local skills base. Some
migrants are also from countries that are intentionally geared towards the export
of labour as a mechanism for economic growth. India and the Philippines are
examples of this, particularly in the information technology and health sectors,
respectively. Both countries train a surplus of workers with the explicit intention
that many will then emigrate.
However, some sectors, such as healthcare, are vulnerable to and weakened by the
loss of their skilled professionals and attention is needed to ensure that Ireland
does not further exacerbate existing human resource shortages in some
developing countries.
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Over the last ten years, an important part
of the growth in employment in Ireland
concerned professional or specialist jobs for
which there was an insufficient supply or
retention of Irish graduates or skilled
workers. The greatest shortfalls were in
three employment segments: construction,
medical and healthcare and the IT sector. In
response to these labour shortages, Ireland
adjusted its migration policy by fast-
tracking the applications of professionals
seeking to enter and work in Ireland,
granting additional rights, such as family
reunification, which are not ordinarily
given to migrants holding work permits for
manual or minimum wage jobs (see
Chapter 3 for a more detailed description of
this policy). One of the more controversial
issues between developed and less
developed countries is the recruitment of
the skilled human resources of the
developing world to fill shortages in the
labour markets of the northern
hemisphere.
The recruitment of nurses from outside the
European Union began in earnest in 1999.
Recruitment for public sector hospitals
initially started in the Philippines with the
support of recruitment agencies.
Recruitment focused on skilled nurses with
experience of large-scale hospitals. It has
since expanded slightly to include migrant
Indian nurses in the Arab Gulf States, and
South African, and Zimbabwean and
Nigerian nurses. These countries were
chosen because their training is conducted
in English and the medical model conforms
The Recruitment of Overseas Health Professionals
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192. Data supplied by DETE (2005).
193. Fidel Taguinod, Head of the Overseas Nurses Section of the INO, speaking at a recent meeting of the Overseas Nurses Section 
in Limerick. http://www.ino.ie/DesktopModules/Articles/ArticlesView.aspx?TabID=519&ItemID=5029&mid=8264.
to that of Ireland. This allows for a
relatively easy recognition of professional
qualifications and registration with the
Irish Nursing Board.
Nurses from developing countries rarely
come to Ireland outside the framework of
groups specifically recruited by an Irish
health employer or group of health
employers (Conroy and Taguinod, 2003). Of
the 1,098 working visas issued in 2004 for
professional or technical workers, 285 were
issued to Filipino nurses, 487 to Indian
nurses, 45 to Indian doctors and 92 to
Indian ICT professionals: thus 909 visas
went to professionals from just two
countries.192
Overseas nurses from the developing
world fill part of the deficit in nursing staff
created by young Irish nurses who have left
their nursing jobs, often after less than five
years as a practising nurse. In 1999-2000,
for every 1,600 overseas nurses registered
in Ireland, 800 Irish nurses left or intended
to leave Ireland (OECD, 2005). Thus, a part
of the deficit in nursing staff in Ireland can
be viewed as staff retention failures in the
Irish health services. Alternatively, the
movement of nurses in and out of Ireland
can be viewed as part of the international
mobility of health professionals.
Some overseas nurses are in specialized,
well-paid posts with prospects of
advancement in academic teaching
hospitals. Others are in less popular posts
with less chances of promotion in
residential centres for the intellectually
impaired, psychiatric hospitals and private
nursing homes. Research conducted by IOM
in the United Kingdom found that migrant
health workers from Zimbabwe are
experiencing occupational downgrading
after migration and are frequently unable
to use the full range of their skills (Bloch,
2004). It is likely that similar lack of
professional development and “brain
wastage” is occurring in Ireland. Unlike
other countries, it has not been the practice
in Irish nursing schools to offer nursing
scholarships for basic training to nurse
trainees from the developing world. Yet,
such scholarship programmes can offset
some of the costs to the developing
countries of training and subsequently
losing their nurses.
Overseas nurses from the developing world
are now set to become a permanent
feature of the Irish health services – both in
the public and private sectors. The number
of registrations from overseas nurses of all
origins is now equal to those of Irish
nurses. A large proportion of overseas
nurses are members of the Irish Nurses
Organisation (INO) or are part of national
associations of, for example, Filipino or
Nigerian nurses. The Overseas Nurses
Section of the INO itself has noted that
“health professionals in Ireland, and the
INO itself, should not shy away from issues
and developments arising from Ireland’s
and other more developed nations’
continuous reliance on overseas-trained
staff”.193 However, there have been few
developments at government level.
In the United Kingdom, the aggressive
recruitment practices of health
employment agencies in the developing
world have prompted accusations of asset-
stripping countries in need of health
professionals. In response, the UK
Department of Health has developed a
code of conduct for healthcare employers.
The Code of Practice for the International
Recruitment of Healthcare Professionals
sets out guiding principles and best
practice, and encourages the use of
government-to-government agreements as
a strategy to manage the migration of
healthcare workers. Most importantly, the
code states that employers should not
target developing countries for
recruitment, and has published a list of
10.4  The Contribution of Migrants to Development
in Their Home Countries
Research and the activities of international development agencies in the
developing world have rendered migrant remittances more visible, and the huge
contribution made by international migrants to their home countries through
their remittances is widely recognized.
The role of migrant remittances is as important today as it was to the Irish
economy after the establishment of Ireland. In 1938 remittances to Ireland from
Irish emigrants amounted to 1.9 per cent of national income and this increased to
2.5 per cent in 1952. That same year, Irish exports were valued at GBP 99.1 million,
while emigrant remittances amounted to GBP 9.9 million, or 10 per cent of the
value of exports from Ireland (Commission on Emigration, 1955: 54-57). Today, many
households in the developing world are as dependent for their survival on the
remittances sent home by their family members abroad as Irish households were
in the last century.
The literature and knowledge base on migrant remittances is growing worldwide.
The research and analysis of the World Bank has captured widespread attention in
this regard (see World Bank, 2005).
Using very detailed analysis of balance of payments data for over 100 countries,
Ratha (2004) reveals that migrant remittances to the developing world are
growing annually, often outstripping official development assistance as a source
of external finance. In other countries, they are second only to foreign direct
investment. In 36 out of 153 countries examined by Ratha, remittances were larger
than all inward public and private capital flows. He notes that, while lower-middle
income countries receive the largest share of remittances, the significance of
remittances is actually higher for low-income countries. There, remittances as a
percentage of GDP account for a much larger share than in the lower-middle
income countries. This is extremely important for governments intending to
concentrate on or prioritize their official development aid to the poorest countries
in the world. For example, in Lesotho remittances made up 26.5 per cent of GDP,
180
194. With the exception of four Indian states (Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and West Bengal).
over 150 countries where employment
agencies should not “actively” recruit.
The two main source countries for Ireland’s
healthcare workers, the Philippines and
India, were originally on this list. Though
the Philippines deliberately trains a surplus
of nurses to supply the global demand for
health workers, the health system in India
suffers from a lack of qualified staff,
particularly nurses and support technicians
(Chanda, 2003). However, in the United
Kingdom, both the Philippines and India194
have been removed from the list following
informal agreements to facilitate and
monitor the recruitment process. The use of
informal agreements and bilateral
cooperation as a method of managing the
global shortage of healthcare workers was
encouraged at the World Health Assembly
in 2004 (WHO, 2004).
and 8.5 per cent of GDP in Uganda in 2001, both of which are priority countries for
Ireland Aid.
In addition, it has been observed that both the Philippines and India have pro-
active policies as regards remittances. In India, 74 per cent of the trade deficit is
financed by remittances, while the Philippines has encouraged the US$ 7 billion
coming into the country as remittances through offering purchase privileges, tax
breaks, and investment options for migrants (DFID and World Bank, 2003). Both
countries have been significant sources of labour for Ireland over the past decade.
The largest portion of remittances is sent from the United States. Migrants based
in the USA sent home US$ 28.5 billion in 2001 (Ratha, 2004: 160). In addition, ten of
the top 20 source countries are EU countries, in particular Germany and France.195
Besides their continuing growth, migrant remittances are a more stable source of
foreign exchange than foreign direct investment. When corporations in the
developed world cut back their investments in the developing world, worker
remittances tend to continue to flow into the country. Naturally, expatriate
workers remain loyal to their families back home, and as such their remittance
flows are less volatile and subject to political and economic considerations than
are investments by multinationals. Thus, migrant workers can be a dynamic factor
in improving the well-being of their families, and the development of their regions
of origin.
10.4.1  The Impact of Remittances
Remittances that are used to improve the livelihood and well-being of the family
back home and to invest in their future, create positive forward and backward
socio-economic linkages that, if properly harnessed, can offset the loss of human
resources caused at the individual and community level by emigration and brain
drain. Besides reducing poverty and diversifying income flows for families,
remittances contribute to economic growth through a multiplier effect generated
by rising local demand for goods and services, and investments in the home
country. It is also found to be a more stable form of income for developing
countries and more evenly distributed than other capital flows. However, it has
also been argued that since it is the wealthier workers who emigrate, it is the
wealthier families who benefit from remittances, which might actually increase
socio-economic inequality in a developing country. Undoubtedly, the outcome will
depend on the particular case and local conditions, and the degree to which
remittances can act locally to lift communities as such out of poverty. Finally, there
is evidence that migrants respond altruistically to events in their home countries,
sending more in times of individual need and national crisis.
The UK House of Commons International Development Committee Report entitled
Migration and Development: How to Make Migration Work for Poverty Reduction,
offers some useful insights into the role of migrant remittances in poverty
reduction. The report states that remittances do not always make their way to the
poorest countries, nor the poorest families. Therefore, efforts and money spent
maximizing the beneficial effects of remittances generally will be ineffective to lift
the poorest out of poverty and policies aimed at remittance-driven socio-economic
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which inevitably favours those banks/currencies which have large-scale monopoly positions in the global market.
development must not become a substitute for aid. This is not to deny the
considerable potential of remittances in their own right. The report recommends
that development agencies ensure “that lessons are learnt, and best practices
disseminated widely…” as regards policies and programmes aimed at remittances
(UK, House of Commons, 2004: 58).
10.4.2  Measuring Remittances from Ireland
In an updated note of July 2004, the CSO points out that international balance of
payments data now include the remittances sent abroad out of earnings of
immigrant workers in Ireland (CSO, 2004: 14). Remittances have also been included
in “compensation to employees”, although strictly speaking, this category should
only apply to short-term temporary workers.
As countries use slightly different methods to determine their balance of
payments and, considering the considerable margin of error, its usefulness for
comparing relatively small amounts of data is limited. In the Philippines, for
instance, at least 42 per cent of total remittance flows elude balance of payment
statistics, as remittances are either carried by hand or arrive as in-kind transfers. An
alternative approach, therefore, would be to assess remittance flows through
surveys in the receiving countries, with particular attention to developing and low-
income countries (as detailed in Table 10.2 above). This is done, for example, by
regular annual special detailed household surveys carried out by the Philippines
National Statistics Office (PNSO, 2003).
Alternatively, remittances can be assessed through an operating “model” from the
destination country, Ireland, based on a number of assumptions about
remittances, inserting proxy data for a one-year period and obtaining an estimate
of remittances for indicative purposes. This was the approach adopted here for
Ireland. Assumptions were made using a conservative perspective to avoid over-
estimation. The model was based on 11 assumptions:
s All regular migrant workers send remittances home;
s Remittances from European, Australian and US nationals are excluded;
s Migrants send home 5 to 10 per cent of their income;
s All migrants earn minimum wages or less;
s Different income groups and migrant profiles send different volumes 
of remittances;
s All migrants pay tax and social contributions;
s All migrants pay income tax as single persons;
s Migrants’ working hours are those determined by law or collective agreements;
s Overseas student workers send smaller remittances than other migrants;
s Overseas student workers work only 20 hours per week;
s Migrants pay a fee to send the remittance whether using banking or non-
bank channels; and
s Asylum seekers working regularly or irregularly do not send remittances home
and are not included in the model.
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Based on these assumptions, three “profiles” of migrant remittance senders were
developed for the “model” that correspond to three broad occupational categories.
These were then combined to produce an estimated total of remittances from
Ireland in 2004. The results are presented in Table 10.3.
The “model” generated migrant remittances from Ireland of nearly EUR 44 million
annually for 2004.
Remittances from overseas professionals in Ireland were estimated at EUR 1,785
per migrant per year in 2005 after currency transactions. This is higher than the
average remittance payments recorded in the Philippines from Filipino profes-
sionals working in all overseas locations in 2002, which amounted to an average of
EUR 1,000 (PNSO, 2003). However, this lower average includes Filipino professionals
working in both low and high-wage countries, such as those of Western Europe.
Estimated remittances sent from Ireland in 2005 are the equivalent of 12 per cent
of ODA, however, only a portion of remittances are sent to developing countries as
many migrants in Ireland originate from EEA countries, although the total amount
of remittances sent home by migrant workers from Ireland is likely to be much
higher than these calculations suggest. Nonetheless, even our conservative
estimates suggest that approximately EUR 100 million over a two-year period was
sent from Ireland to developing countries.
10.4.3  The Costs of Sending Remittances from Ireland
The transfer costs of remittances are of interest to both the individual migrant
worker and the receiving country. Transfer costs are controlled either by private
financial services providers, by informal operators or by migrants carrying cash-in-
hand when returning home. A question on the use of banking facilities for
remittances in Ireland was included in a 2002 study (Conroy and Brennan, 2003, 38-
39) and the results showed that some migrants had difficulties opening accounts,
and some operated without bank accounts. During the course of the study, the
authors observed the operation of a banking facility which was not registered with
the Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority, and an informal remittance-
sending arrangement.
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Table 10.3 Estimate of Total Remittances sent from Ireland 2004 (in EUR)
Category of migrant workers Estimated Yearly Total 2004
Remittances from full-time manual workers paid by the 
hour (excluding migrants from industrialized countries) 22,266,709
Remittances from part-time student workers 9,828,000
Remittances from salaried professionals 11,784,102
Estimated total remittances from Ireland 43,878,811
Source specially prepared data/calculations by Ralaheen.
To test remittance costs in 2005, some services were contacted and asked to
indicate their fee for the transfer of EUR 200 outside of the European Union to two
named countries – the Philippines and Nigeria. The amount of EUR 200 presumed
that a low-paid migrant might save EUR 50 a week and remit the total on a
monthly basis. The following table shows the results from four providers. Other
providers who indicated fees used either Western Union or MoneyGram.
Price variations between money sending institutions depend on the country of
destination. Excluding the TSB Bank, transfer fees for the Philippines ranged from
5 to 10 per cent of the amount being sent, while for Nigeria prices varied between
8 and 10 per cent of the sum to be remitted. The costs are substantial for some
migrant workers who send money home on a regular basis. The loss of even EUR
100 a year is equivalent to the school fees for a child, or food for a large family for
a few weeks. It is not surprising, therefore, to learn that migrant workers explore
and use a number of methods for transmitting money home to avoid transaction
charges.
In relation to the transfer cost for remittances, the UK House of Commons
International Development Committee argued that reducing transaction costs
offered great potential for increasing the flow of remittances and, in turn,
increasing resources in countries of origin. The report states that:
Put simply, the transaction costs of remittances are high because the market
for remittance services is not working efficiently. There is too little competition
and a lack of information; remittance agencies can charge high fees without
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196. An account with Permanent TSB is necessary to send a money transfer. The bank does not deal in the currencies of the Philippines
and Nigeria, and would, for instance, have to use a German bank to undertake the transaction. The EUR 31.50 is a flat rate
regardless of the amount being sent.
Table 10.4 Cost of Sending Eur 200 from Ireland to 
Africa and Asia, March 2005
Service Total Fee (Eur)
Western Union Money transfer to Philippines 10.00
Bank of Ireland (MoneyGram) to the Philippines 16.00
AIB to the Philippines 20.00
Permanent TSB to the Philippines196 31.50
Western Union to Nigeria 20.00
Bank of Ireland (MoneyGram) to Nigeria 16.00
AIB to Nigeria 20.00
Permanent TSB to Nigeria 31.50
Source specially prepared data/calculations by Ralaheen..
losing all of their customers. In sectors of the market where there is
competition, such as between the United Kingdom and Somalia, fees are much
lower. If transaction costs are to be reduced, then the market for remittance
services needs to work better so that service providers compete harder to offer
better and cheaper services, to more informed customers. (UK House of
Commons, 2004: 58).
There is clearly scope for research into quantifying and examining the transfer
systems and costs of migrant remittances from Ireland. Such research would be a
prelude to determining whether there is a role for specific policies regarding
remittances as an instrument of development for migrant sending countries.
10.5  Diasporas in Ireland
The extent to which remittances might have an aggregate collective development
function in sending countries involves discussion and debate with diaspora
communities. Such a dialogue depends in turn on the strength of diaspora
communities in Ireland. If they are strong and maintain durable ties with the
countries of origin, the development of development-oriented remittance strategies
is feasible or likely. Though some diaspora communities have been present in
Ireland for half a century or since the nineteenth century, mass immigration to
Ireland is of quite recent origin. The strength of newer diaspora communities
appears to be related to the presence of specific features, such as the size of the
migrant community, the support provided to migrant community populations, the
level of education or entrepreneurship and the historical continuity of the diaspora
population.197
10.5.1  Diaspora Communities
Among the largest diaspora communities in Ireland are those of Chinese origin,
which, in fact, comprise several communities. These include the smaller long-
settled Hong Kong Cantonese-speaking community and the more recent mainland
communities from distinctive sending regions, such as Fujian province, and
speaking versions of Mandarin. The Cantonese community has been instrumental
in establishing information centres, welfare services and developing links with
mainstream Irish business, social and local government institutions. Besides the
thriving restaurants, shops and wholesale sector, there are also weekend play-
groups operating in Dublin where Irish-born and Chinese-born Chinese children
can learn their mother tongue.
The Islamic community embraces Muslims from the Middle East, North Africa,
India, Pakistan, Singapore, Malaya and converts from many countries. The religious
community of Muslims has benefited from support from Middle Eastern States
such as Kuwait, from Sheikh Al-Maktoum and from the considerable efforts of
their own communities. The Islamic Foundation of Ireland established in 1959 is
now a major provider of educational, social, cultural and spiritual activities. At the
Mosque in Clonskeagh, Dublin, there is a national school for 250 pupils, meeting
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and Ethnic Studies of Trinity College Dublin have undertaken a number of diaspora studies, as have postgraduates at the Dublin
Institute of Technology Transcultural Media Centre.
hall, shop, restaurant, Mosque and administration. There are extensive weekend
activities, Koranic classes and family events in both Clonskeagh and the mosques
in Dublin city, Galway, Cork, Limerick, Cavan, Waterford, Ballyhaunis and elsewhere.
Africans have been in Ireland since the eighteenth century (Ugba, 2004), though
their number has increased substantially over the past two decades, with at least
20,000 resident Africans in 2002. Research into the strength of this diaspora in
2000 found that, while there is little sense of community in African terms, there is
an effective network offering support and solidarity for new arrivals (Smith and
Mutwarasibo, 2000). Despite the lack of facilities and funding for community
programmes, the Dublin-based African Solidarity Centre was established in order
to reach out to the diaspora, facilitate integration and links to Ireland, and promote
community development projects. There is also a monthly Africans Magazine,
focused on Africans in Ireland.
Finally, there is the Filipino community in Ireland. Predominantly female, they are
highly concentrated in nursing, social care and domestic work. While most are
actively engaged with the Catholic Church, linguistically they are divided into
many communities and often use English as their common language. The Filipino
community quickly established a presence by integrating into Irish trade unions,
forming a league of Filipino Irish workers, organizing their own national festivals,
and other events. Pressure from the Filipino nurses through their trade unions has
been one of the factors leading to a reconsideration of the ban on labour market
participation by the accompanying spouses of nurses. This was reversed to allow
nurses to bring their husbands to Ireland and that the latter could take up jobs
without requiring a work permit, as has been the case in the United Kingdom.
10.5.2  Working with the Diaspora
The UK House of Commons International Development Committee report of July
2004 outlined a number of ways in which governments and the UK Department
for International Development (DFID)198 might work more closely with the
diaspora, including policy consultation, schemes for the channelling of remittances
for poverty reduction, and the promotion of temporary return of skilled nationals.
Most importantly, the committee recommended that the government encourage
and support initiatives to create migrant associations, and promote their activities.
The creation of diaspora development projects for their home regions has been
successful in the United States, primarily with Mexican workers. Significant
amounts of remittances, running to millions of dollars, have been collected inside
the United States through hometown organizations or associations and directed
to specific village and urban or rural projects in the home country. In this organized
support chain, migrants themselves contribute to the selection and direction of
projects in their home areas. These developments in the United States have been
facilitated by the Mexican authorities by providing undocumented migrants with
temporary and simplified identity cards that suffice to open a bank account.
Mexican representations in the United States, the US Inland Revenue and the
banks have organized joint “fairs” where undocumented migrants can be
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198. DFID is the agency of the UK government managing UK aid to poor countries and working to eliminate extreme poverty. This is
similar to Development Cooperation Ireland of the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs.
documented with a simplified identity card, bank account and register to pay taxes
in an afternoon.
In 1977, The United Nations Development Programme introduced the Transfer of
Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) Project, in which IOM is
involved. The project aims at transferring some of the skills and knowledge of
expatriate professionals back to their country of origin. The project maintains that
proficiency in the language, a strong motivation to serve the home country and a
demonstrated success in the participant's profession have been factors in the
project’s success.
A similar programme is IOM’s Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA). As
noted earlier, Africa suffers huge losses of skilled labour each year, including medical
doctors, nurses, accountants, engineers, managers and teachers. Therefore, IOM set
up MIDA as a capacity-building project to mobilize expertise acquired by African
nationals living abroad, making it possible for African nationals to contribute
directly to the development of their countries of origin.
A third IOM programme, the EU Return of Qualified Nationals Programme, was set
up in order to support the rebuilding of Afghanistan after more than 20 years of
conflict and instability. Qualified and highly qualified Afghans living in EU
countries and wishing to return to their home country to work in the public or
private sector were sought to help rebuild the country and offered comprehensive
assistance packages. The programme focused on the development of critical
sectors, including private businesses that offer goods and services in the domestic
market, civil and social services, public infrastructure and rural development.199 
10.6  Concluding Remarks
A significant proportion of migrants, including professionals, who arrived in Ireland
since the 1990s are from countries at medium to low levels of development.
Though we do not know the impact that migration to Ireland specifically has had
on sending countries, the potential for brain drain in the light of increasing
globalization and international mobility cannot be ignored. Thus, the deliberate
recruitment of qualified graduates from developing countries should be
monitored to ensure that scarce human resources are managed for the benefit of
both sending and receiving countries. Possible policy responses include the
promotion of the return of qualified nationals, and informal agreements in
cooperation with sending countries to operate training and exchange programmes
for professionals and other skilled workers.
Migrants from developing countries in Ireland could be sending as much as EUR 44
million back to their countries every year, remittances that can foster
development. However, the cost to migrants of transferring remittances can be
substantial and it is likely that informal transfer systems are being resorted to. This
issue requires further exploration to further reduce formal remittance sending
costs. The Financial Services Regulatory Authority should also ensure that migrants
do not face insurmountable or disproportionately burdensome obstacles to
opening bank accounts that effectively exclude them financially.
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However, it is clear that the potential for migrants to become a resource for
development remains largely untapped by aid agencies in Ireland. The relationship
between overseas development aid from Ireland, and migration into Ireland from
the developing world, should be further explored in research and policy. In addition
to strengthening the capacity of NGOs to integrate migrants in Ireland (see
Chapter 9), the government should also try to support migrant associations that
could become partners in development. The positive experiences of those involved
in hometown associations and other projects with migrants to channel
remittances for development purposes suggest that the diaspora is a significant
source of development support, and this chapter has highlighted a number of
burgeoning community networks in Ireland.
Despite policy changes in Ireland to promote the recruitment of workers from
central and eastern Europe, migration from outside the European Union, including
from developing countries, is likely to continue. Ireland should aim to attract the
brightest and best from around the world, while guarding against negative
impacts on countries of origin, and ensure that migration becomes a net
contributor to development.
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Conclusions11
This report has discussed some of the social and economic effects of recent
migration, especially non-Irish immigration to Ireland, and reviewed current policy
responses. In this last chapter, we discuss what might be Ireland’s overall approach
to migration and its policy objectives in relation to migration, given the rapid
increase in non-Irish immigration flows in recent years. How can Ireland develop
and promote policies that maximize the benefits of migration and minimize the
costs? We begin by summarising some of the key points from the earlier chapters.
11.1  Key Trends 
The impact of migration in Ireland, and the policy challenges posed by migration,
will vary according to many factors, the most important being the scale and
composition of the migrant population. In earlier chapters, we noted several key
trends:
s Net immigration has risen quite recently and very rapidly
In the year up to April 2005, over 70,000 people moved to Ireland, resulting in a net
immigration of just over 53,000, more than double the level in 2000. After EU
enlargement, there was a 4 per cent increase in the Irish labour force due to
immigration. In 2005, the Irish workforce grew by an additional 58,000 people, of
whom 40,000 were migrants.
s The profile of migrants has changed
While historically the bulk of migration into Ireland consisted of returning Irish
nationals, a distinctive feature of immigration in recent years is the growing
proportion of non-nationals among migrants. Already by 2000, the share of non-
nationals in inward migration had increased to 50 per cent. In 2004, this
proportion jumped to nearly 75 per cent. In addition, there has been a substantial
increase in the share of non-national migrants coming from outside the European
Union and the English-speaking world.
The bulk of immigration into Ireland, over the 1990s was skilled labour. More
recently there has been a substantial influx of less-skilled migrants with work
permits granted for semi-skilled or unskilled work predominantly in agriculture
and the services sector. Approximately 75 per cent of work permit holders in 2003
were in unskilled jobs.
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s Migration is expected to continue to increase although the profile of
migrants may change
Net immigration is projected to continue at current levels for the next five to ten
years, and then to decline, with migrants contributing 40 to 50 per cent of
expected labour force growth in the decade to 2016. The non-Irish migrant
workforce is still predominantly made up of young people without dependants,
but the experience of other countries suggests that this pattern may change as
more migrants choose to settle in Ireland and are joined by their family members.
11.2  Policy Context
The growth in immigration to Ireland was very much influenced by Ireland’s
economic boom and subsequent policy responses that facilitated immigration and
the return of Irish nationals living abroad.
Economically motivated migration to Ireland and other countries is generally
explained by demand-pull factors in the destination area, supply-push factors in
the origin area, and network factors that link them. The first migrants are often
recruited with government encouragement or toleration, setting labour migration
flows in motion. However, labour migration can then take on a life of its own, as
e.g. the demand for migrants becomes “structural” as employers adapt their
supervisory systems to migrants, leading them to prefer migrants to available local
workers. This means that a policy shift to stop recruitment may not actually stop
the influx of migrants if supply push and network factors have become relatively
important and sending countries are not creating sufficient jobs that prompt
potential migrants to stay at home.
There are three basic immigration questions: how many; from where; and in what
status should newcomers arrive? Ireland has answered these questions primarily
by letting employer requests set the number of migrants, by expressing a
preference for EEA nationals when employers seek additional unskilled workers,
and by allowing most foreigners to be probationary immigrants – after five years
of legal residence, foreigners can apply for naturalization.
The government itself has acknowledged that in recent years Ireland has had the
most open economic migration system in Europe (DJELR, 2005). Until April 2003,
Ireland’s labour migration policies were almost entirely “employer-led”. Few
restrictions were imposed on the recruitment by employers of non-EEA workers,
apart from a “labour market test”, aimed at encouraging employers to fill existing
vacancies with local workers before looking for migrant workers. In addition, until
recent changes in policy introduced in 2005, large numbers of foreign students
were able to come to Ireland to take advantage of opportunities to work part-time
in low paid jobs with very little regulation of the education sector.
Separate administrative measures in 2003-04 made it more difficult for Irish
employers to obtain work permits for unskilled non-EEA workers, and jobs in some
sectors were barred to non-EEA workers. Ireland was one of only a few countries in
the European Union that decided in 2004 not to impose restrictions in relation to
the free movement of labour from the ten new EU accession countries. As a result
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of this change, Ireland will have a declining influence over the scale and
composition of a significant portion of immigration flows in the future. Therefore,
it is important to keep in mind the distinction between immigration from within
the EEA (EU-25 plus the three EEA countries (Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein)
which takes place almost without restriction and immigration from outside the
EEA. Ireland today has large numbers of EEA nationals who have the freedom to
live and work in Ireland, and the Irish government has declining influence over
their movements as barriers to travel and work have fallen in the enlarged EU. This
means that it is likely to become increasingly important that migration is
managed effectively within Ireland, in order to reduce the risk of potentially
negative effects on migrants or Irish workers.
The government has accepted that there is now a need for a change in policy
towards a more comprehensive, transparent and managed approach. As explained
in Chapter 3, recent policy proposals/developments provide evidence of this new
approach (see p. 48). Furthermore, on 29 June 2005, the government announced
that it would publish new legislation to help prevent the exploitation of migrant
workers. A new Employment Permits Bill is expected to give overseas workers the
right to change employers in case of abuse or exploitation. It will also increase
penalties for employers in breach of the law.
In discussions about the case for a more managed approach to migration in
Ireland, there has been relatively little explicit dialogue about the costs and
benefits of migration and what might be the impact of certain policy measures on
different groups such as migrants, employers, the local workforce, the social
welfare system and countries of origin, etc.
Indeed, there has been little recognition in recent policy documents that migration
brings both benefits and costs and these impacts are sometimes interrelated and
potentially conflicting. For example, a policy to hire unskilled immigrants may
bring benefits to employers but may not benefit native workers; a policy to recruit
highly skilled workers may benefit the Irish economy but may potentially harm the
economy of a developing country by encouraging a “brain drain”.
As one of the authors of this report has commented “left on its own, migration is
unlikely to automatically create a win-win outcome from which all sides benefit”
(Ruhs, 2005b). The problem is that these effects are not always easily discernable,
making it difficult to define, select and then adopt an appropriate policy
response(s).
11.3  Understanding the Effects of Migration
s The international evidence
Migration has a complex set of economic, social, political and cultural conse-
quences for the receiving country, for migrant workers and their countries 
of origin. Just as the causes of international migration are complex, so too are 
its effects. Such impacts cannot nor should not be characterized as purely “good”
or “bad”.
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The actual impact of immigration is much disputed, and in most industrialized
economies there is considerable public anxiety about the potential negative
effects of migration. These include concerns that migrants take jobs away from
local workers, depress wages, and become a burden on the educational and
welfare systems. Much research, however, does not bear this out. While the
consensus is that migrants who move voluntarily from lower to higher-wage areas
are the major beneficiaries of migration, receiving or destination countries also
benefit from immigration as it expands employment, lowering (the growth in)
wages and creating additional income.
Many well-cited studies of the general economic effects of migration have been
conducted in the United States, which has a long history as a major net
immigration country. The major conclusion from this varied work is that
immigration expands the size of the economy but has little or no impact on
average living standards of the population. Therefore, the most important effect of
immigration in the United States has been found to be distributional. This work
has also generally found relatively little significant wage depression or
unemployment increases among local workers. However, as the bulk of recent US
immigration has been shown to be increasingly unskilled, this has resulted in some
increase in earnings inequality particularly affecting the least skilled and educated
US workers.
Research carried out in 15 European countries between 1991 and 1995 found that
every 1 per cent increase in a country’s population through immigration increased
its GDP by 1.25-1.5 per cent. In the United Kingdom, increased immigration has been
show to be associated with higher wage growth in the currently resident
population. Other simulation models indicate that the impact of immigration on a
country’s output can be substantial if the skills of the migrants complement those
of the native population. Indeed, in the case of Israel, research concluded that the
arrival of highly skilled migrants did not reduce wages or the employment of local
workers because the immigration wave was accompanied by more capital
investment, which maintained the capital-labour ratio. The benefits can also be
sector specific, as migrants have become an increasingly important source of
labour, for example, in the social and healthcare sectors in many countries.
Another finding from a number of studies is that on average migrants tend to pay
more in taxes than they receive in benefits over their lifetime. For example, recent
research in the United Kingdom suggests that the contribution of immigrants to
public finances is both positive and growing. By 2003-2004, immigrants accounted
for 10 per cent of government tax receipts and only 9.1 per cent of government
spending. Total revenue from immigrants grew by 22 per cent in real terms from
1999-2000 to 2003-2004. This compared quite favourably with the 6 per cent
increase seen over the same period for the UK-born.
Most of the international research on the effects of migration has focused on the
economic impact of migration, while the social and cultural benefits of migration
tend to be overlooked. Migrants undoubtedly make significant positive
contributions to social and cultural life in the arts, literature, sports and science.
Though these impacts are likely more pronounced than any economic effect, they
are more difficult to quantify. At the same time, migrants can introduce new
religious, cultural and other perspectives that affect schools, residential areas, and
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other social spheres. Failure to integrate migrants into society and to offer them
access to public services can lead to their social exclusion. Immigrants in OECD
countries tend to remain concentrated in particular regions and cities, and may
remain socially excluded even after they and the second generation have become
citizens of the host country. There is international evidence of disadvantage on all
the key indicators of integration: legal rights, education, employment, criminal
justice, health, living conditions and civic participation.
s The Irish evidence: benefits
International labour migration to Ireland is relatively new, and consequently there
are fewer data sources and studies that evaluate migrant characteristics,
performance and effects. Nonetheless, new research has emerged which suggests
a variety of outcomes resulting from recent immigration to Ireland.
Research from a variety of sources generally shows that Ireland has benefited from
immigration particularly owing to the fact that the labour market profile of
immigrants has shown them to be a young and highly educated group. For
example, as the bulk of immigration to Ireland over the 1990s was skilled labour,
about half being returning Irish emigrants, migration played a key role in
expanding the productive economy, allowing the economy to grow more rapidly
and helping to reduce long-term unemployment and easing significant skills
shortages. Furthermore, Ireland’s booming economy has attracted many former
emigrants to return home. This return flow of migrants also had a number of
positive effects on the economy. For instance, some research shows that returnees
were relatively more highly skilled than the domestic population, and that the
inflow, because of its skilled nature, contributed to a reduction in earnings
inequality.
Overall, it is agreed that immigration in recent years has increased economic
growth, eased labour market shortages, improved output and reduced earnings
inequalities. While economic studies show that immigration tends to contribute
positively to Irish GNP, these analyses are less definitive on its impact on GNP per
capita, which is broadly used as a measure of the standard of living. It is clear that
the skills composition of the migrant population has been an important
determinant of the overall economic impact of immigration on national income:
the more highly skilled the migrants, the greater the positive impact on GNP.
Immigration has also brought other benefits, as it has fuelled population
growth—the population currently stands at its highest level since 1871 (4.04
million). It is also reasonable to generalize that employment in Ireland leads to a
financial gain for the individual migrant which may not have materialized if that
worker had stayed home. Even when employment in Ireland is at or near the
minimum wage, the wages earned by migrants are still likely to be significantly
higher than the wages they would be earning in their countries of origin, regard-
less of their skill level.
It is possible that Ireland’s openness to admitting migrant workers for employ-
ment, including for low-skilled jobs, has helped to avoid the large-scale irregular
immigration and/or irregular working of migrants as seen in, for example, the
United States. There may be significant irregular employment of foreigners in
Ireland, but there has been little systematic research to confirm this.
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Another distinctive feature of the rapid growth in immigration to Ireland has been
the huge increase in the number of foreign students. A total of 18,608 inter-
national students were pursuing higher education in Ireland in 2004, of which
15,000 were from non-EU countries. It has been estimated that international
students generated revenue of EUR 275 million during the year 2003/2004.
In addition to the benefits to receiving countries and the individual migrant,
migration also results in benefits for the migrant’s country of origin. This is
especially important for the economies of developing countries as migrants living
in Ireland regularly send money back home. This study estimates, for the first time,
the value of remittances sent from Ireland and suggests that, during the last two
years, migrants sent home more than EUR 100 million through formal channels.
However, the cost of transferring money from Ireland is high and the development
impact of these transfers in countries of origin could be enhanced if transaction
costs were lower.
Migrants in Ireland come from more than 100 different countries. The resulting
greater cultural diversity could boost Ireland’s trade with other countries.
Migrants’ language skills and their knowledge of business practices in Ireland and
their own countries may stimulate the development of new trading relations.
Immigration and increasing diversity are likely to spur investment into Ireland,
particularly in Dublin, where the majority of migrants are concentrated.
s The Irish evidence: costs
Overall, there is less evidence that the sharp increase in migration has resulted in
extensive or significant negative economic or social effects, but there are some
negative aspects. As in many other countries, most of the concern over the labour
market status of immigrants is mainly in respect of migrants in low-paid jobs. Irish
employers argue that non-EEA migrants are filling jobs shunned by local workers,
sustaining local industries and earning far more than they could at home.
However, unions and NGOs stress that some migrants are subject to low wages,
poor treatment and poor housing, and there are recurring media reports of such
conditions. Although, as this study has shown, there is little research to suggest
that migration is systematically lowering wages or raising unemployment among
local workers, there have been some recent high-profile cases where native
workers’ wages and employment opportunities may have been negatively
affected.
When an economy is growing, the capacity to absorb and benefit from new
workers can be considerable. Unrestricted international migration means that
employers may choose among a larger number of prospective employees and offer
lower wages than they might offer to attract workers in a tighter labour market.
The result could be lower wages, longer working hours and fewer benefits. The
actual effects of migration will vary depending on broader economic trends in the
country and policies chosen by the Irish government to facilitate or restrict the
hiring of non-EEA nationals.
Recent Irish research conducted after the bulk of this report was written, suggests
that there is little solid evidence to assess the extent to which displacement of
Irish workers may be happening. A study of non-nationals in the labour market
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based on an analysis of the third quarter 2005 Quarterly National Household
Survey concluded that “the case regarding displacement remains unproven”. The
authors went on to comment:
“By the very nature of the intensity of international competition, it is very likely
that some non-national workers have displaced Irish workers as companies seek to
remain competitive. However, actual statistics on this issue are not available so it
is difficult to ascertain the scale on which this may be happening” (AIB, 2006: 1).
As discussed in Chapter 6, there is some research using economic models which
suggests that low-skilled immigration might create negative effects in the future,
if economic conditions change in Ireland. Theoretical simulations conducted by the
Economic and Social Research Institute suggest that a substantial influx of less-
skilled migrants into Ireland, while relieving unskilled wage pressures, if continued
indefinitely could push unskilled wage rates down further and lead to an increase
in unemployment among the unskilled. Although an immigrant inflow that is
largely unskilled would still increase GNP, the impact on unskilled labour could be
very negative. As GNP per head would fall, this also suggests a possible decline in
living standards.
However, to date there is little evidence to suggest that the recent sharp rise in
immigration to Ireland has increased unemployment among Irish workers. The
most recent analysis concludes that: “[d]espite the increase in non-national
employment in Ireland, employment among indigenous Irish workers has
continued to grow and the unemployment rate for this group has remained close to
full employment” (AIB, 2006: 2). The same report states that the scale of non-
national employment in Ireland is not particularly large by international standards.
Not all migrants find economic success and migrant workers may sometimes
become victims of discrimination and/or exploitation, including trafficking. It is
important to emphasize that the currently available information is too limited to
draw conclusions about the extent to which the extensive rights and protections
offered to migrant workers under Ireland’s equality legislation are implemented
and enforced in practice. In the absence of systematic evidence, the suggestion
that the exploitation of migrant workers may be fairly widespread can be neither
supported nor refuted. What can be said, based on the anecdotal evidence, is that
at least some migrant workers employed in Ireland do experience limitations of
their rights that exceed those provided for by Ireland’s labour immigration policies.
There were only 21 inspectors to monitor compliance with labour and immigration
laws, and there were 300 cases of possible employer violations pending in March
2005. Since the introduction of employer sanctions, only three employers have
been convicted of hiring unauthorized foreign workers. This is cited by unions as
illustrative of a growing “culture of lawbreaking” among certain employers. The
Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment has recently increased the number
of labour inspectors from 17 to 31, partly in response to allegations of such abuse of
migrant workers in particular industries.
There are also some signs that Ireland is not making the best use of migrants’ skills
and that this is resulting in “brain waste”. One study estimates that if immigrants
were in jobs that fully utilized their educational abilities, immigration would have
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increased Irish GNP by 3.3 per cent in the five years to 2003, rather than the actual
2.6 per cent. Though the causes of this “underemployment of skills” have not been
fully investigated, it is suggested that the lack of English language skills, the non-
recognition by employers of non-Irish qualifications, or the inability to search for
jobs efficiently may be among them.
Between 1995 and 2004, Ireland granted refugee status to 6,800 of the over
55,000 asylum seekers. Only those recognized as refugees are given work permits.
Although there are only few data and studies on the labour market status of
refugees in Ireland, it has been reported that some refugees have qualifications
and experience that are not recognized by Irish employers.
11.4  Managing the Costs and Benefits of Migration 
in Ireland: Some Key Policy Issues
As pointed out in Chapter 6, immigration is often characterized as “good” or “bad”.
Such an approach is often misleading because immigration, like many other public
policy choices, is more often a contest between competing goods. Immigration has
benefits and costs, and thus the proper approach is to analyse and debate these
benefits and costs and then discuss which benefits get higher priority and how
best to minimize costs. As the number of immigrants in Ireland increases,
discussions about the competing goods involved in immigration are likely to
become more common.
Some of the key questions and issues that policy makers are likely to have to
address in the future are outlined below. These questions and issues are drawn
from the IOM team’s discussions with stakeholders in Ireland during four days of
intensive discussion at two workshops held in Dublin in 2005, and our analysis of
the evidence relating to the likely short-term and long-term effects of migration in
Ireland as presented in this report.
11.4.1  A statement of strategic goals?
Similar to many other countries, the question facing Ireland is no longer whether
to accept migration, but rather how to manage migration more effectively to
enhance the positive while minimizing the negative. Left on its own, migration is
unlikely to produce equitable benefits for all.
To that end, policy makers need to identify the essential components of a viable
migration policy that are consistent with national objectives and other elements
of public policy, and to balance these elements against each other and integrate
them into a cohesive strategy. Indeed, no simple task.
Immigration has consequences and those consequences can be shaped by policy
interventions and by actions, purposive or otherwise, of stakeholders. It is this
possibility of shaping the consequences of migration that makes it so important to
adopt a strategic approach. Until recently, Ireland’s immigration strategies were
quite rudimentary. This is beginning to change, but Ireland’s strategic goals in
regards to migration have not been fully articulated. During the course of our
discussions with government officials and other stakeholders in Ireland, the IOM
team posed the question—what are Ireland’s main goals in regards to migration
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policy? Many different objectives were mentioned, but there was no clear answer
or common consensus.
Given that immigration is likely to remain a structural feature of a growing Irish
economy, the Irish government should consider, therefore, developing an explicit
policy statement that provides guidance for employers, unions and civil society
regarding Ireland’s overall approach to immigration. The government should lead
a balanced and informed public debate about the reasons for migration, and
explain how it will manage the costs and benefits of migration.
As discussed in Chapter 7, any policy recommendation on labour immigration has
to be preceded by separate discussions about the impact of migration and the
objectives of labour immigration policy. There has been little discussion about
which of the multifaceted and interrelated impacts of migration should be
assigned most importance in the design of Ireland’s labour immigration policies,
and why. As a result, a number of important questions about the overall objectives
of Ireland’s labour immigration policies remain unanswered. For example:
s To what extent, if at all, should Ireland’s labour immigration policies prioritize
the interests of Irish citizens over those of migrants and their countries of
origin?
s To what extent, if at all, should concerns over the potentially adverse effects
of immigration on local workers limit the level of labour immigration
demanded by individual employers?
s What role should non-economic considerations, such as potential impacts of
migration on national identity and social cohesion, play in shaping Ireland’s
labour immigration policy?
As we have shown, migration brings both benefits and costs and these effects are
often interrelated and potentially conflicting. Explicit discussion of these types of
effects needs to be central to thinking about future directions for migration policy.
11.4.2  Who will manage migration?
Ireland today has large numbers of EEA nationals who have the freedom to live and
work in Ireland, and the Irish government will have declining influence over their
movements as barriers to travel and work fall in the European Union. At present,
the majority of immigrants originate from other EU countries and this situation
seems unlikely to change in the near future given Ireland’s policy in favour of
restricting the recruitment of less-skilled migrants from non-EEA countries. This
suggests as mentioned earlier that there will need to be an increased emphasis on
the effective management of migration within Ireland.
Given that migration impacts on the work of many government departments and
stakeholders, it will be necessary to develop a comprehensive and coordinated
approach. Ireland’s overall policy framework for regulating immigration since the
late 1990s has given employers relatively easy access to a large pool of non-Irish
workers of all skill levels. However, if migration is to be managed successfully,
strategies will have to be developed to manage the costs and benefits of migration
in the interests of a broad range of interest groups.
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Informal discussions with stakeholders during the course of this study suggest
that there is currently no clearly defined lead agency to develop migration policy
and coordinate efforts to manage migration within government. For example,
migration and integration policies are still conceived and delivered in silos. Few
policy coordination mechanisms exist, and those that do are rudimentary.
Broader and more active coordinating structures are needed. Coordination
between different government departments and between government and
relevant stakeholders, unions, employers, NGOs and migrant associations is
essential for effective migration governance. Although a number of different
departments are involved in managing migration, or are affected by migration,
there is currently no permanent inter-departmental committee or working group
on migration. Nor are there mechanisms in place to enable regular coordination
with relevant stakeholders outside the government.
It was also suggested to us that given the recent fall in the number of asylum
seekers, the government has an opportunity to shift resources to the migration
sector without necessarily increasing government expenditures. Government
resources are currently skewed in favour of asylum rather than immigration. It has
been reported by the Department of Finance that EUR 370 million were spent in
2004 on operating the asylum system. The DJELR reported that of its 800 staff
dealing with asylum and immigration issues, 70 per cent are currently working on
asylum-related tasks. Given the fall in the number of asylum seekers and the
continuing growth in migration, this imbalance needs to be redressed. Spending
on migration management could then increase without necessarily requiring an
overall increase in government expenditures.
In order to promote greater policy coherence, it is likely that mechanisms should
be established to promote greater inter-departmental coordination. Consideration
should be given to the establishment of an inter-departmental working group
within the government. A mechanism aimed at fostering policy dialogue on
migration between the government and other stakeholders, such as NGOs,
employers and unions, is also needed.
In order to inform these policy discussions and contribute to evidence-based policy
making, the government, in consultation with key stakeholders, could consider
sponsoring a programme of policy-oriented research and analysis to promote a
better understanding of the effects of migration and the likely impacts of different
policy measures.
11.4.3  Temporary or permanent migration?
Unlike European countries which declared their preference for guest workers
during the economic boom of the 1960s, and traditional immigration countries
which have a long-standing preference for settler immigrants, Ireland is still
considering to what extent today’s migrants are to be considered as temporary
workers or immigrants who are expected to settle. Does Ireland want to become a
“country of immigrants” with permanent residence status, a country of “guest
workers” with temporary work and residence permits, or a mixture of both? 
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To date, migration has been viewed as a temporary phenomenon and not part of a
long-term strategy to promote economic and social goals. It would be useful and
desirable to develop an explicit policy statement to guide employers, unions and
civil society on whether migrants are expected to return to their countries of origin
or expected to remain and become integrated in Irish society.
The shape of Ireland’s future integration strategy is contingent on whether Ireland
embraces permanent or temporary migration, and in particular how it wishes to
treat migrants arriving from non-EEA countries. If the former, a more
comprehensive approach to integration will be needed. It would seem almost
inevitable, given the decision to open up of the Irish labour market to the new
accession states in 2004, that more migrants arriving in Ireland will be able to
settle in the country in the coming years.
Ireland does not currently have a permanent immigration programme that issues
permanent residence and employment permits to migrants immediately upon
their arrival. International experience suggests that if migrants do not have a long-
term secure status, the benefits of migration can be undermined. Ireland’s ability
to attract skilled workers in competition with other countries may be hampered if
migrants have limited prospects of settlement.
If Ireland wishes to attract more skilled migrants and non-EEA migrants, to settle
in Ireland, it may have to consider creating a permanent immigration channel.
Ireland could develop an immigrant status that entitles selected migrants to long-
term working and residence rights in Ireland. Such a measure could help Ireland to
become a more attractive destination for highly skilled workers. There is some
research cited in this report which suggests that Ireland will benefit the most
economically from policies which encourage inflows of highly skilled workers.
11.4.4  How to foster integration?
The current economic climate offers Ireland an excellent opportunity to reform its
immigration programmes and to implement a robust integration strategy. As a
result of Ireland’s experience with emigration and its strong sense of community,
there already exists a latent capacity to mobilize support for integration in the
country. This capacity will need to be nurtured as the capacity of the NGO sector to
provide services is still relatively weak. If Ireland’s integration programmes are
expanded, they should include a wider range of categories of immigrants. For
integration to succeed, governments, union, employers, and NGOs will need to
work together to develop an effective partnership. The capacity of local govern-
ment agencies, unions and NGOs to plan, organize and deliver integration services
will need to be enlarged.
Some migrants have restricted access to social welfare benefits due to their
temporary status. It is likely that a growing number of migrants may choose to
reside in Ireland for a long period of time, and they and their children may settle in
the country. This is to some extent to be expected as a result of EU enlargement. To
date, most migrants have been young and single, but this pattern may change.
Long-term migrants will need to be given wider access to social services, and
government departments dealing with social policy will need to be increasingly
sensitive to the requirements of this group and the growing diversity of Irish society.
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For integration to occur, support will need to be built on a widely shared vision of
how integration might contribute to a dynamic, secure and socially cohesive Irish
future. The creation of such a vision would provide a basis for stakeholder alliances
and would permit the development of coherent plans. Ultimately for integration to
succeed, migrants will have to be seen as potential assets and not as charitable
works or temporary aids to facilitate labour adjustment. Integration of migrants
into the host society is likely to be a key determinant of whether migration will be
a success or failure in Ireland in the future. An active integration policy is a key
requirement of a successful migration management strategy.
11.4.5  How to manage the benefits of migration for all?
Although there is little evidence that immigration is significantly lowering wages
or raising unemployment for local workers, the potential for immigration to
generate adverse labour market impacts is likely to increase significantly during an
economic downturn. Although currently no such economic downturn is expected
in Ireland, rapid economic growth may not continue indefinitely. There are several
different ways in which Ireland’s labour immigration system could implement
measures to ensure that migrants are recruited in sectors which have genuine
labour shortages—for example by developing better assessments of which sectors
are likely to suffer from labour shortages and more effective enforcement of
labour market tests. Better enforcement of employment laws for all workers is
likely to ensure that migrants do not undercut natives by accepting lower wages
and worse working conditions. Such measures will benefit both migrants and local
workers. Sanctions must be enforced more effectively against employers who
illegally employ migrant workers or exploit workers with work permits or students
in employment, to protect all migrant workers and prevent the growth of irregular
migration.
To minimize conflicts and promote cooperation with non-EEA countries of origin,
Ireland may wish to explore bilateral agreements that set out arrangements 
for the recruitment and employment of migrants. Closer cooperation with sending
countries could also help to reduce the potential costs of migration to these
countries.
11.5  Concluding Remarks
Ireland has largely benefited from immigration in recent years. This is partly due to
the fact that the Irish economy has been growing rapidly and unemployment has
remained low. It is also due to the fact that a high percentage of immigrants have
been skilled workers and young people without dependants, who arrived in Ireland
to take up temporary employment, many with work permits. The extent to which
Ireland will continue to benefit from immigration will depend on a broad range of
factors, including general economic conditions and the socio-economic profile of
migrants. Much will also depend on government policy and how migration is
managed. It is likely, given recent public concerns about some of the perceived
negative aspects of migration, that Ireland will need to take a much more
proactive approach to migration management in the future in order to reduce the
potential costs of migration for migrants, local workers and Irish society.
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Immigration did not create the Irish economic miracle, but, properly managed,
migration can sustain Ireland’s economic growth and generate many other
benefits. Immigration coupled with successful integration strategies is likely to
make Irish society more tolerant and, ultimately, more resilient and adaptive.
If migration is to be successfully managed, migrants’ rights will need to be
protected and their integration fostered. At the same time, if there is to be support
for immigration from the Irish population it is essential that policies are designed
in such a way as to protect the employment prospects of Irish workers. These
measures can be mutually supportive. For example, better enforcement of employ-
ment laws to ensure that migrants don’t undercut natives by accepting lower
wages and worse working conditions than legally required, can benefit both
migrants and local workers.
As Ireland grapples with these issues, it should be remembered that it is good to
have the challenge of managing immigration, since immigration reflects the fact
that foreigners want to come and work or settle in Ireland.
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Annex A:
Summaries of the Workshops
Workshop on Economic Implications 7-8 April 2005
A1.1  Policy Formulation
As a general outcome, the workshop discussions concluded that it was necessary
to define the overarching goals of national and international migration policy, as
no statement of immigration objectives existed in any government departments.
Moreover, as pointed out by some participants, government policy was often
reacting to past events rather than looking forward.
The competence to determine and formulate immigration policy among the various
departments, such as DJELR, DETE or the Taoiseach, has not been determined. Even
though DJELR enjoys an overall mandate and has formulated policy in the past,
they do not feel well placed to determine overall immigration policy goals. Policy
guidelines, decided at the highest levels, are needed to direct relevant agencies. In
addition, there are no formal mechanisms such as an interdepartmental
committee, to coordinate policy formulation, though there is some informal
communication between departments.
To date, the Irish immigration system has been largely ad hoc, informal and
flexible, focusing on asylum rather than immigration. However, it was repeatedly
noted that this informality had resulted in a lack of clarity. Participants stated a
desire to move to a more transparent and comprehensive system (for the benefit
of government, migrants and the public alike), while retaining sufficient flexibility
to respond to any future changes in migration needs.
Regarding new legislation, opinion was divided as to the need for a fundamental
overhaul of immigration policy, or whether reinforcing the statutory basis for the
existing system was sufficient. Several participants noted that policy should be
based on current migration realities in Ireland rather than established policy, and
emphasized the need for more data on which to base policy formulation.
A1.2  Migration and the Economy
Though, as stressed by the consultants, it is very difficult to determine the precise
effect of migration on the Irish economy, partly because of a lack of necessary data,
it was acknowledged by both governmental and non-governmental representa-
tives that migrants have played a vital part in sustaining Ireland's economic
growth. The diversity that migration has brought to Ireland has also improved
Ireland’s ability to do business on a global level, fostering trade networks and cultural
interaction. Overall, participants felt that the economic impacts had been positive.
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Though estimates as to the amount of immigration Ireland would need in the
future varied among participants, it was generally accepted that immigration was
here to stay. Any determination of magnitudes is strongly linked to future
population trends in Ireland, Irish workforce participation (Irish youth are staying
longer in education) and whether economic growth continues at current rates.
Many participants are working on the assumption that Irish economic growth is
sustainable and fuelling the labour market. However, it was also pointed out that
such a scenario was not guaranteed.
Several participants highlighted the need to look beyond narrow economic
benefits: though there are links with trade and the economy, migration deals with
people and not just factors of production, and policies need to reflect this. Besides,
migration needs to be embedded in Ireland's broader social and economic develop-
ment agenda.
A1.3  Public Perceptions of Migration
A general perception that immigration could be halted at will, a lack of broad-
based acceptance of permanent immigration to Ireland and a certain ambivalence
regarding the role played by migrants in Irish society were noted, and that such
ambivalence is precluding a frank public debate on migration to Ireland. Several
reasons for this were suggested:
s Lack of information and awareness regarding different manifestations of
migration and their various channels, and especially a certain confluence of
the terms “asylum seeker” and “migrant”.
s Lack of a clear policy, and policy objectives concerning migration have given
rise to a mixed message emanating from the government, expressed as “we
are in control” vs. “we have a problem with migration”.
s Lack of communication among government agencies as well as the public,
with a clear need to improve public outreach.
Though there is no anti-immigration party as such in Ireland, several politicians
have profited from the anti-immigration platform.
A1.4  Labour Migration
A1.4.1  Highly Skilled vs. Low-skilled 
The extent to which skilled and unskilled labour migration needed to be
differentiated in Irish policy attracted considerable discussion. It was generally
accepted that Ireland was likely to need both types of labour migration in the
future, though it was questioned whether the current policy of obtaining all low-
skilled migrants from within the European Union (while discouraging low-skilled
labour from non-EEA regions) is sustainable. Currently, FÀS is engaged in assessing
the future needs for skills on the Irish labour market, to inform future policy debate.
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The following factors were cited as supporting the continued need for low-skilled
labour migrants:
s Service and construction industries were expected to continue to grow.
s The expansion of high-skill labour segments has created knock-on
requirements for low-skill jobs.
s The need to replace young Irish nationals remaining longer in higher education.
s Labour accepting to do the 3-D (dirty, dangerous, difficult) jobs that nationals
no longer want.
The consultants suggested that Ireland’s policy should follow the example of the
rest of the developed world: attract the highly skilled and rotate the low-skilled.
However, this could be accomplished in various ways, and none of the participants
had any strong views as to how this might be implemented: points systems, green
card systems, or temporary permit systems were all discussed. It was noted that, in
practical terms, creating two systems (one for highly skilled, one for low-skilled
workers) would be difficult to administer, and concern was expressed that such an
approach would result in two different rights systems, entrenching inequalities
between migrant workers themselves.
Finally, several participants referred to the considerable underutilization of
migrant skills. Highly skilled workers were working in low-skilled jobs, as they were
unable to switch jobs under the current system, amounting to a waste of human
resources.
A1.4.2  Permanent vs. Temporary Migration
The consultants wanted to know whether Ireland wanted a guest-worker system
or an immigration system aimed at people coming to the country to settle. The
current system is somewhere in between, with little clarity for the worker.
The issue of permanent residence was discussed. No right of permanent residence
exists short of citizenship; migrants who had been in the country for eight years
could obtain unlimited residence right, conferring de facto, though not de jure
permanent residence. But there was some confusion over whether, and how,
migrants could obtain an unlimited residence stamp. In practice, to obtain
permanent residence status, migrants applied for naturalization, and such
applications had risen over the past few years, which had created a considerable
backlog in the system.
Considering Ireland's future need for migrants, it was pointed out that length of
stay may be variable, and immigration policies would need to take into account
migrants returning after a short stay, as well as those renewing their permits.
Though it was widely assumed that all migrants wanted to stay, many will be keen
to return home after having accumulated some savings. According to the
experiences of some participants, most migrants stayed for just a few years.
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A1.4.3  Work Permits 
Two main issues emerged concerning the work permit system: uncertainty related
to the temporary nature of the permit, and risks of exploitation associated with
permits tied to specific employers.
It was noted that the need to renew permits meant that migrants often found it
difficult to plan and manage their personal economic and social lives, and that it
affected their ability to obtain a mortgage, bank loans, or secure a lease and send
children to school. Some participants also commented that the fear of non-
renewal prevented some migrant workers from fully asserting their labour rights
and accessing public services to which they are entitled. There is some evidence
that labour migrants from the new EU countries who no longer needed permits
had become more vocal in enforcing their rights and entitlements.
The difficulty of untying workers from employers was discussed. On the one hand,
the employer's control over work permits leaves migrants vulnerable to
exploitation and abuse (see below). However, complete freedom suggests that
newly arrived migrants could change jobs with ease, implying an economic loss for
the employer (having covered administrative expenses) and the loss of a needed
worker. A middle ground needs to be found. Though migrants can currently change
employers, this is done on a case-by-case basis, and most migrants need
representation (from migrant rights groups, trade unions and the like) to be able
to negotiate the system.
Finally, it was pointed out that to focus only on work permits distorted the true
picture of migration to Ireland, as other migrants - students, stamp-4 holders and
foreign parents of Irish-born children – have a significant economic impact: in the
first three months of 2005, 90,000 non-EEA nationals were registered in Ireland,
but only 27,000 of those are work permit holders. No economic tests exist for those
arriving outside the work permit system, especially the increasing number of
students.
A1.4.4  Abuse of Migrant Workers
That some workers suffer abuse was not questioned during the workshop, though
the presence of both good and bad employers was also emphasized. The discussion
focused instead on the structural problems of regulation and possible solutions.
As regards regulation, employment laws are complex, complicated and difficult to
enforce. It was also agreed that the labour inspectorate is overstretched, lacks
sufficient resources and is unable to focus on migrants as a separate section of the
workforce with specific needs. It was suggested that the government create a
register of employers with overseas workers to ensure some degree of
accountability, and minimum standards for the employment of migrant workers.
In particular, the recruitment industry was highlighted as a sector requiring
further regulation.
Finally, many of the NGOs working with and on behalf of migrants stressed that
the level of information also played a large role in the exploitation of workers, as
many are unsure of their rights. It was suggested that more needed to be done to
instruct workers either pre- or post-arrival regarding their rights.
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A1.4.5  Role of Employers and of Recruitment Agencies
It was acknowledged by government and non-government representatives alike
that employers had taken the lead in determining labour migration in Ireland thus
far. The government wishes to regain some control in that regard, while also
maintaining a system responsive to labour market needs. The consultants pointed
out that the Irish government had to decide whether to privilege a selection
system driven by either demand or supply.
Recruitment agencies are playing an increasingly important role in labour
migration to Ireland, yet they remain largely unregulated. That issue needs to be
addressed before the recruitment industry becomes too well established. As a
participant noted, recruitment agencies play an important role also in countries of
origin, and the Irish government had no means of regulating their activities.
A1.5  Family Reunification
Though family reunification was identified as a key issue, it was not discussed at
great length. However, several participants pointed out that restricting the right to
work for spouses created an undue economic burden for migrant families and
neglected a potential skilled and unskilled labour pool.
A1.6  Study Migration
It was noted that migration for study to Ireland is subject to widespread abuse and
that many “students” are in fact working illegally (beyond the 20-hour limit for
students). Though they entered Ireland outside the economic migration system,
their effect on the informal economy is significant. Though the Irish government
has made efforts to regulate educational establishments, such efforts are still in
the early stages. It was pointed out that students working outside the formal
labour market are also vulnerable to exploitation and abuse.
It was noted that of the nationalities taking advantage of the system, Chinese
nationals were the most numerous.
A1.7  Irregular Migration
The migration issue of most concern in Ireland is not irregular entry, but irregular
employment and residence. Many migrants may be falling out of the work permit
system and finding it difficult to get back in, often through no fault of their own.
Though resolving employment situations is not difficult in general, many migrants
find it difficult to do so alone. Representative support for migrants was crucial, and
it was recommended that the government consider creating mechanisms to
facilitate re-entry into the permit system.
Several participants cited the need to consider regularizing the irregular workforce
to include them in the economy. In that respect, the question also arose as to
whether the Irish government should also regularize irregular entrants.
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A1.8  Migrant Rights and Services
Much of the discussion concerned the need for the better protection of migrant
rights, both in relation to immigration procedures and access to public services, as
well as protection from employers and others in a position to exploit migrants. It
was noted that the informality of the current system has an adverse effect on
migrants and that they needed support to understand it. The system needs to be
more easily understandable for the migrant, the public, and those responsible to
administer it. Help with language is also important to ensure workers can secure
their rights and negotiate better terms of employment.
It was also noted that investing in the training of migrant workers could result in
maximizing economic benefits of migration, and some services, particularly
vocational language training, should be considered. Thus, appropriate information
for migrants before departure and after arrival on working, living and immigration
conditions, as well as their rights and obligations and means of redress in case of
difficulties was considered of great importance for the success of the migration
experience.
A1.9  Data Collection
It was agreed that the system of data collection in Ireland is inadequate, and that
the country has no tradition of collecting data. The government also pointed out
that including nationality in data collection could lead to charges of racism (e.g.,
the maternity data published during the citizenship referendum debate), making
the effective recording of such data difficult.
Census figures do not accurately reflect the foreign-born population in Ireland, as
clandestine populations are generally unwilling to be recorded. However, it was
pointed out that the census would have to remain the main source for data in the
absence of a population registration system. Though the QNHS is useful, it covers
only a small sample of households. It was suggested that new data parameters in
the 2006 census and the QNHS be introduced.
Several areas were marked out as important during the workshop:
s The analysis of migrant flows in addition to stocks, in order to assess the
retention rates of foreign workers.
s Skill profiles of migrants coming to Ireland to ascertain whether they are
utilizing their full potential while working in the country.
s PPS data to link employment, earnings and welfare. With regard to PPS
numbers at the DSFA, the potential to obtain employment data and
eventually longitudinal data has yet to be realized.
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Workshop on Social Implications
26–27 April 2005
A2.1  Policy and Legislation
It was accepted by government participants that, so far, there had been little
thinking on integration policy. However, as migration has increased, integration
has also assumed greater importance, and though the government is still in the
early stages of reflecting on integration policy, the next two years will be critical.
Most importantly, little policy consideration has been given to the social needs of
migrants outside of the Reception and Integration Agency, though many
departments are involved in the provision of services to migrants. In addition,
there has been very little cross-departmental communication on the issue.
The need for an inclusive policy development process for an integration strategy
was stressed by all, accepting that this is a cross-departmental issue that needs
grass roots participation. A number of strategies to promote policy engagement
with the various departments were briefly discussed, and it was questioned
whether departments should be held responsible for the multicultural and
integration aspects of their policies. In this regard, several government repre-
sentatives highlighted the need for departments to set aside resources for migrant-
oriented policies. The new EU integration fund was suggested as a possible future
source of funding.
The new immigration and residence discussion paper was presented to
participants and though it incorporates indirectly integration issues through the
provision on permanent residence, integration as such has largely been left out.
Yet, as noted by the consultants, a successful integration policy depends on a
comprehensive and coherent immigration policy capable of being understood by
both migrants and the host society. Moving from an ad hoc to a managed system
of immigration would assist the promulgation of integration and social policies. It
was also noted that a future Immigration and Residence Bill will send an implicit
message to migrants on how they were viewed in Ireland, and that this will have a
secondary impact on integration and social acceptance. The need for interaction
between the immigration and integration policy spheres was acknowledged, but
that integration policy would be better left out of formal legislative reform for the
sake of flexibility.
A2.2  Public Perception
It was noted that public support for migration is critical for integration policies to
be effective. However, dialogue regarding migrants has to be better developed and
engaged, as it largely takes its cue from government statements, and is particularly
fragmented between newcomers and the host society. One participant suggested
that such dialogue about migrants take place on two levels: on the ground,
diversity is not welcomed, but this is not openly debated for the sake of “political
correctness”; at the higher “establishment” level, while debate does occur, this is on
a purely theoretical level, since at that level society currently does not feel affected
by migration.
Finally, it was suggested that the perception that migrants present a risk to the
security of the state still remains and that this needs to change.
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A2.3  Integration
A2.3.1  Definitions and Goals
It was accepted that Ireland is still in a relatively early phase in its consideration
regarding integration, though the government is embarking on a reflective exercise
on how to create future INIS strategy. The consultants led a discussion on whether
Ireland should define an end goal and create a set of shared goals and core values
in society, or take a minimalist approach instead to ensure basic social cohesion
without requiring shared values?
If the latter approach were to be adopted, then the basic operational elements of
a successful integration policy would have to be the following:
s understanding of common language;
s access to labour market;
s access to essential services;
s ability to find housing and ensure personal security;
s participation in public institutions.
Participants favoured the minimalist approach as the only realistic one. Though
there was some discussion over whether Ireland actually wanted diversity, it was
pointed out that diversity already existed and was not a matter of choice. The
question was thus one of managing diversity for the benefit of society. Cohesion is
not in conflict with diversity, but rather a method to shape that diversity.
There was some discussion of identity, and what it would mean to be part of Irish
society. One participant offered the following view of integration that could be
split into four stages, and stressed the need for common goals, while accepting
different values:
1. Acculturation – does the migrant have the skills, knowledge and competence
to interact in society?
2. Inclusion – can the migrant enter society?
3. Interaction – does the migrant have the capacity to form networks within 
the society?
4. Identification – can the migrant feel affinity with the national identity?
There was a brief discussion of the potential conflict between integration policies,
which look toward assimilation, and multicultural policies, that emphasized the
retention of one's own culture.The Netherlands and the United Kingdom were both
cited as examples where governments were moving away from multicultural ideals.
A2.3.2  Barriers to Integration
Participants discussed current barriers to integration in Irish society. First, the
perception that migrants are a burden on services is a source of tension within the
community, and the need to move away from that mindset. In addition, it was
noted that, while approaches to integration have been set out in Irish policy
statements – most notably the NCCRI National Action Plan Against Racism,
implementation of these strategies has been minimal.
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More specific issues included:
s Political disenfranchisement caused by the lack of voting rights.
s Lack of information flow to migrants and host society alike.
s The slow response of certain public services to new challenges of a
multicultural community (e.g. in education and health).
s Deskilling, where migrants are unable to use their skills fully.
s Language barriers and lack of accessible vocational language training.
It was also noted that creating a community capable of successfully integrating
migrants depends on the ability to ensure the status and security of all the members
of the community, and those who are uncertain of their length of stay are less
likely to invest in their future in Ireland.
A2.3.3  Measuring Integration
Citizenship was put forward as a method of assessing social integration, offering a
measure of “added value” and sense of belonging to the community. However, this
was disputed by several participants who felt that promoting the concept would
reinforce divisions between those who had acquired citizenship and those who
had not nor wanted to do so. Though it may have symbolic relevance, some
participants felt that ensuring migrants’ access to housing and the labour market
was a more important measure of integration.
In terms of data, standards that could be used for measuring integration were
discussed, such as wage levels, unemployment, and the performance of first and
second-generation immigrants. Participants noted the need for better data
indicators.
A2.3.4  Implementing Policies
The potential of the approach pursued by the NCCRI National Action Plan Against
Racism to integration was repeatedly cited, though it was questioned whether
anti-racism campaigns and investment in normal civil society were either
complementary or to some extent antagonistic. For example, sanctions to reduce
racist incidents can sometimes interfere with efforts to create common feeling
within a community.
One participant suggested that the Migrant Rights Convention should be ratified,
as it contains many principles on which to base a successful integration policy.
However, government agencies stated that those principles were already
embedded in Irish and EU legislation, and the inclusion of irregular migrants
within the terms of the convention meant that Ireland could not comply without
this offering a huge incentive for irregular migration.
It was noted that service provision for migrants is often made without their
participation, and that this reduces its effectiveness in reaching target migrant
groups. In the same vein, the concept of “giving“ integration to migrants has to
give way to a two-way participatory process, in combination with the need to build
bridges between communities and break down walls.
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A2.3.5  Role of NGOs and Community Groups
Though government can provide the integration framework and financing, the
real work occurs at the local level. Partnerships and networks involving the NGO
community and migrant groups are essential, and the government needs to invest
in relevant capacity building. It was noted that there are a number of structures
already in existence in Irish society, such as trade unions, student organizations
and the like, that are capable of supporting migrant groups, but which require
some adjustment and adaptation.
The lack of homogeneous resources for migrants was noted, and the fact that
many NGOs currently service only very specific types of migrants, particularly
asylum seekers. Horizontal coordination among non-governmental groups, as well
as vertical partnerships with government departments was felt to be essential. A
balance would also have to be struck between government support and the
maintenance of NGO independence.
Finally, the consultants expressed surprise that few of the NGOs had taken the
opportunity to request resources from the government, and suggested that civil
society in Ireland was still at an early advocacy stage, and not yet ready to take on
service provision.
A2.4  Skilled vs. Unskilled
It was noted that the implicit government view was to welcome skilled workers as
potential future citizens, but that there was some confusion as to how unskilled
workers were to be seen. This is exacerbated by the fact that unskilled workers are
more likely to become a burden on the state, though it was also noted that the
assumption that unskilled workers were a risk to the state and the economy may
be unfounded. It was suggested that proper treatment of unskilled migrants,
along with development of skills, would maximize benefits and minimize the
burden to the state.
There was some debate as to how far unskilled workers are to be integrated into
the community, presuming that their stay would be temporary, and whether
linking residence to rights and access to public services is an appropriate approach.
A2.5  Migrant Rights and Services
There was some discussion on the desirability of targeted services for migrants, or
whether to ensure that mainstream services are capable of responding to the
needs of migrants. Several participants noted the need for both types of services
which are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and that a mixed approach of
“tailored universalism” should be adopted. For example, tailoring the Christian
education system to accommodate other faiths, or secularizing the system, needs
to be considered. It was also pointed out that service provision should not be a goal
in itself, but rather a method for empowering the migrant community, allowing
them to articulate their own needs. However, it was also recognized by most
participants that the departments most concerned with service provision have not
paid sufficient attention to the needs of migrants, whether specialized or
mainstream, outside the general focus on social exclusion and poverty.
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Most government departments did not consider information for migrants an
element of service provision. It was accepted that informing migrants, both pre-
and post-departure, is an essential element of successful integration and manage-
ment of expectations.
Finally, the level of access migrants had to services differed according to their
status. Participants noted that this was not necessarily negative, but that it was
necessary to consider whether to provide universal access to some basic services in
order to avoid poverty and social exclusion.
A2.6  Impact on Public Services
During the discussions of the habitual residence conditions for migrants and the
effect on social integration, it was noted that this rule was a source of a great deal
of confusion, and sent out a very defensive message to migrants regarding access
to public services. The government emphasized that it was a rule to determine
entitlements rather than exclusion, but accepted that there was a need to
constantly review the application of such rules to minimize hardships.
A2.7  Family Reunification
Some participants were concerned that stringent rules for family reunification
might be fuelling smuggling and trafficking, particularly as regards unaccompanied
children, and that there could be a negative effect on family life in the source
countries from single sex migration (with one member being absent for long
periods of time).
The government argued that there had to be a minimum level of income for
workers to be allowed to bring dependants, as the subsequent burden on income
support could be quite heavy. Currently, it is set at quite a low level, which may not
be sufficient, though it was pointed out that expanding the right for spouses to
work would immediately raise the family income upon family reunification, and
better utilize available human resources. Some non-governmental agencies noted
that to distinguish between skilled and unskilled workers concerning their right to
bring their families to Ireland could create a two-tier system of rights with the
resulting negative impact on the perception of integration in Ireland.
A2.8  Migration and Development
Participants discussed how far migration to Ireland could affect source countries,
as well as the potential development contribution to be made by remittances in
regions of origin. The correct treatment of migrants together with the possibility
to develop and use their skills while in Ireland would ensure that migrants
returned to their home countries having acquired useful experience and developed
skills that would enable them to succeed at home, while Ireland could also learn
and draw useful lessons from its own emigration experience.
The discussion of ethical recruitment policies among the participants also showed
certain differences regarding the extent to which these would be effective and
desirable in Ireland. It was noted that the role of agents in the migration process can
often leave the migrant in a situation of dependence, even before arrival in Ireland.
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A2.9  Participant Priorities
At the end of the workshop, a number of participants were asked for their views on
the priorities for Ireland regarding the social implications of migration.
At the top of the list figured the need for dialogue, both between departments
(and, indeed, in engaging also departments not present at the workshop), and with
non-governmental groups, as well as the public at large to foster communication,
integration and ultimately improve the provision of services.
Other priorities included:
s creating government resources for integration and service provision;
s improving research and data on the social impact of migration to Ireland,
and establishing benchmarks against which to gauge success;
s improving information for and fostering language skills among migrants;
s establishing how migration fitted into the larger social development plan 
of Ireland.
Finally, a number of participants stressed the need for a roadmap for integration
policies, to include strategies for the practical implementation of policy, and
coordination of “who does what” within the government. The importance of the
current project in the creation of such a roadmap and strategy was recognized by
all participants.
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Annex B:
Case Study: Implications of Recent
Migration to Ireland for Poland
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Marek Kupiszewski.
Central European Forum for Migration Research, Warsaw
International Organization for Migration
B.1  Introduction
A high proportion of the immigrants arriving in Ireland in recent years from Central
and Eastern Europe come from Poland. A reasonably good source of information on
the number of immigrants arriving in Ireland is the number of Personal Public
Service (PPS) numbers allocated. There were 25,222 such numbers issued to Polish
nationals in 2004 and 64,766 in 2005.
This note briefly discusses some of the possible effects of this growing trend for
Poland. In order to do this, it is necessary to consider briefly the reasons for
migration from Poland to Ireland, and the socio-economic profile of Polish
migrants.
Leaving aside the question of why Poles emigrate in general, (for more see e.g.,
Korys´, 2003), the key issue concerns the choice of Ireland as a destination country.
Taking into account the relatively weak migration links between the two countries,
the emergence of Ireland as an important destination country for Polish emigra-
tion remains an interesting phenomenon undoubtedly worthy of further study.
The earlier pre-accession research conducted by Grabowska (2002, 37-43)
demonstrated that the main push factors for migration to Ireland were
employment-related, such as Poland’s low wages and lack of well-paid jobs
matching people’s education. The desire to improve living conditions was also
found to play a significant role in migratory decisions, along with the lack of, or
limited opportunities for, professional development, and difficult workplace
relations resulting from the worsening state of the Polish economy and rising
unemployment. The earlier links with the country (e.g., working holidays,
scholarships) also played a role, as did the fact that Ireland is an English-speaking
country and relatively easier to migrate to than the United Kingdom. What is also
worth pointing out is that Irish employers seemed to be very pleased with Polish
workers, to the extent that Irish society had developed a positive attitude to Poles
(Grabowska, 2002, 42) – an aspect that might reasonably be encapsulated in the
words of a respondent: “The Irish have a very good opinion of us and they like us.”
(Grabowska, 2002, 43).
The first factor to be mentioned as a determinant behind the choice of Ireland as
a destination country for a considerable proportion of post-EU-accession Polish
emigrants is the decision of the Irish government to forego any transitional period
for the free flow of workers from the enlarged European Union. The transitional
period was one of the hottest issues covered by the Polish media leading up to
enlargement. This was expressed clearly by one Internet forum user:
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Luck 04.01.2006, 0:17 am
It goes without saying that Poles flood the labour market of the UK and Ireland
because they cannot go anywhere else among others (…).200 
Additionally, as migration expert Izabela Grabowska-Lusin´ska has acknowledged
(Interview 3), Ireland was perceived to welcome nationals of the new member
states, and appeared to harbour no negative stereotypes of Poles.
Economic factors were obviously of utmost importance, especially the demand for
labour on the Irish labour market. As Grabowska pointed out (2003: 27), the growth
of the Irish economy (1997-2001) resulted in niche sectors for migrant workers. At
the same time, the economic situation in Poland ensured the presence of strong
push factors. These co-occurring, and in a sense, complementary factors (push
from Poland and pull to Ireland) resulted in considerable migration from the
former to the latter. This view is supported by an AIB report (2006: 10) which notes
that “the ready availability of jobs has attracted a growing number of non-
nationals to Ireland”. The economic growth producing increasing demand for
workers was balanced by a growing labour supply, due to both increasing labour-
force participation rates of the local population and the inflow of non-national
workers into Ireland. The least-attractive, low-paid jobs were very largely left to the
immigrants. These jobs, still with wages relatively higher than achievable in
Poland, are being filled by low-skilled and/or non-English-speaking Polish
immigrants. On the other hand, the high demand for professionals and specialists
in banking, IT and engineering, attracts young and educated Poles as well. Not only
are these jobs better paid, but they offer conditions for work and professional
development that are far better than those available in Poland. In addition, a
motivated if inexperienced university graduate with a good command of English
would still tend to consider it easier to find a job (e.g., in a bank) in Ireland than in
Poland, the latter’s labour market being saturated to the point where selection
criteria have become inflated.201 
For some Polish migrants, Ireland is perceived to offer more job opportunities than
in the United Kingdom where there are already large numbers of Poles. Polish
media depictions of the post-enlargement influx of thousands of Poles combined
with the belief that the UK labour market was already saturated, encouraged some
Polish migrants to choose Ireland.There is the perception that Ireland offers similar
advantages to the United Kingdom (in terms of language, wages and legal
employment), but more jobs are available, with smaller numbers of Poles already
claiming them.
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200. http://www.tpi.poznan.pl/ipb/index.php?showtopic=1327, accessed: 21.02.2006.
201. makati, Rozwijaj swoja˛ kariere˛ w Irlandii! [Develop your career in Ireland!],
http://www.polskidublin.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=182&Itemid=92, accessed: 06.02.2006.
Ireland is also perceived as  business-friendly, thereby proving attractive to those
wanting to establish a first small company of their own. Furthermore, although
the taxes in Ireland are high, the large amount of tax-free income lessens the
burden both to the employed and to entrepreneurs. Praca i z˙ycie za granica˛ (“Work
and Life Abroad”), the Polish biweekly magazine devoted solely to emigration
issues, presented a story of a young Polish IT specialist who decided to open a
company in Ireland: “The most important thing is the tax system PAYE, whose
name can be translated into Pay As You Earn. It is not Poland – where, as soon as
you set up your own business, dozens of institutions ask for the money you have
not yet earned” – he remarks bitterly. “The VAT in Ireland is 21 per cent but for all
types of activities you register as a payer only when your company’s turnover
exceeds 26 thousand Euros.(…) I felt on my own skin that the legal and fiscal
system is for the citizen – and not the other way round.”202 Last but not least, a
factor that might contribute to the economic attractiveness of migration to
Ireland, is a favourable double taxation agreement between Ireland and Poland
signed in 1995. According to the agreement, the earnings of Poles in Ireland are not
subject to taxation in Poland.
The Polish media cite Ireland as the best example of how success can be achieved
within the European Union. Moreover, the common emigration history, and the
dominance of the Catholic faith have contributed to a vision of Irish society as
being very similar to Polish society (I.1).
Analysis of Internet fora reveals the positive image of Ireland among potential and
actual migrants but also a limited real knowledge of the country largely founded
upon intangible positive stereotypes and myths. Although the historical or
religious issues are not mentioned explicitly, there is a deep sense of cultural
similarity between the two nations that contributes to the very warm feelings of
potential emigrants about Ireland as a potential destination.
The simple, yet important, factor of the English language has also to be
mentioned. Over half of young Poles aged 18-24, claim to speak English in a country
where the majority of people speak no foreign language (CBOS, 2004). Knowledge
of English is commonly perceived as a basic requirement for the successful perform-
ance of migrants on the Irish labour market.
Last but not least, the radical decrease in travel costs between Poland and Ireland,
resulting from the expansion of cheap airlines and the launching of direct flights
after 1 May 2004 must have played a role in raising the attractiveness of Ireland to
potential migrants from Poland (I.3).
case study: implications of recent 
migration from poland to ireland 233
202  Wybranowski T.,“Teraz Irlandia” (“Ireland now”) September 26th, 2005, in: Praca i z˙ycie za granica˛ (Work and Life Abroad),15/2005.
In sum, there are at least four major groups of factors contributing in different
ways to the choice of Ireland as a migration destination for Polish emigrants. These
range from purely-economic pull factors of the Irish economy, through a lack of
restrictions on access to the labour market and the attractiveness of the English
language, to the more intangible one which is the very positive vision of Ireland
prevailing in Polish society. It is impossible to weight the importance of a given
factor in the decision to migrate, rather the different factors should be treated as
parts of a complicated composition that ultimately leads to the choice of Ireland
as the destination country.
B.2 Migrant Profiles and Channels of Migration of Polish Immigrants 
to Ireland 
Who migrates?
According to Grabowska (2002, 28), the highly skilled employees of multinational
companies were the group of migrants that had “trodden the paths of spatial
mobility from Poland to Ireland”. They started to arrive at the beginning of the
economic boom, the majority of them being posted to Irish “mother” companies
through their Polish branches. Subsequently, the patterns of migration gradually
shifted to short-term seasonal jobs that needed lower qualifications. Yet, it was
still Poles that were young and educated (mostly with tertiary education) that
constituted the group with the highest propensity to migrate to Ireland
(Grabowska, 2002, 29).
Due to the limited amount of time that has elapsed, there is no empirical research
on the profiles of post-accession Polish migrants in Ireland. According to Maciej
Duszczyk (I.1), however, the significant proportion of young people in the
emigration stream from Poland to Ireland is also evident from Internet and press
analysis, with the obvious limitations that only some migrants and potential
migrants from Poland to Ireland make active use of the Internet as a means of
communication or an information source, and that a propensity to use the Internet
is much higher among young people than those who are older.
While short-term or even seasonal migration remain the dominant trends for
emigration from Poland, an unknown, yet probably significant, part of the migration
to Ireland might turn out to be permanent. Analysis of the motivations of potential
and actual migrants suggests that the economic rationale behind the migratory
move is supplemented by hopes for a new start in Ireland. All in all, the frustration
and lack of prospects seems to be the dominant feeling expressed on the Internet
fora by potential emigrants. Interestingly enough, many of the emigrants have
jobs or job prospects in Poland, but undertake migration as a means of enhancing
their life chances and the opportunities available to their children. The frustration
expressed widely by all age groups in relation to the continuing lack of prospects in
Poland very probably increases people’s determination to prolong their stay abroad.
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How do they migrate? Mechanisms of migration and methods of recruitment
The different groups of emigrants make their way onto the Irish labour market via
different mechanisms of recruitment and migration. The most profound differenti-
ation - between the highly skilled workers (mostly intra-company transferees) that
migrate with the support of the HR departments of their companies, and the low-
skilled workers, using the mechanisms of chain migration - was already revealed by
research on the pre-accession flows (Grabowska, 2002).
The separation between highly skilled, skilled and low-skilled migration channels
persists in the post-accession migration to Ireland, yet the forms are more diverse.
According to Internet and press analysis, the workers looking for unskilled
employment in hotels, pubs or construction find jobs once in situ, by distributing
their CVs and looking for advertisements in the local Irish newspapers.They usually
do not look for a job before leaving Poland – or are even discouraged from doing so
– because they can be easily replaced by somebody already available at the
destination. However, it remains worthy of note that a decision to migrate on just
a small sum of money is strongly discouraged by Internet-users as being certain to
end in failure.
Polish immigrants with language problems often turn to Polish organizations in
Ireland, the Polish-Irish Society and the Polish Social and Cultural Association.
While these do not act as job agencies in any official way, they naturally create
“informal labour exchanges” among the Polish immigrants attracted to them (I.3).
The next group is comprised of workers, such as drivers, construction, security or
warehouse workers. These individuals find employment through the EURES
network or even directly in Polish labour offices, in which recruitment at the
request of Irish employers is ongoing (I.2). Although this method has been
advocated by the Polish press specializing in migration,203 it is hardly ever
mentioned as effective by Internet users. This category of workers would also go to
Irish recruitment agencies, especially those who cooperate with large companies.212
The two aforementioned groups are also potential clients of FÁS offices. According
to the expert interviews carried out by Grabowska (I.3), the number of Poles
searching for a job in Ireland using the FÁS offices has risen considerably since EU
enlargement, though there are no data on the profile of these users.
Another method by which potential Polish emigrants can search for a job is
through the press. The rapid development of a specialist press concentrating on
migration issues in Poland after EU enlargement (such as “Working and Studying
Abroad” since September 2003 and “Work and Life Abroad” since March 2005), is a
phenomenon that warrants further research beyond the scope of this study. Yet,
the role of the press, offering thousands of job offers abroad, cannot be under-
estimated in any study on the modes of recruitment of Polish emigrants.
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203. EURES and the Polish labour offices were quoted as the first sites to visit in the article Jak szukac´ pracy? [ How to look for a job?], 6
May 2005, Praca i nauka za granica˛ [Working and Studying Abroad], 37/2005. Since October 2004, every issue of this magazine has
contained the Eures offers sent to Poland and targeted at qualified workers.
204  Some recruiting agencies are known for sending masses of workers for the production lines in the leading IT companies, see for
example http://www.gazeta.ie/forum/index.php?showtopic=1298 accessed: 16.02.2006.
The third group of migrants to Ireland are highly skilled (i.e., specialists in finance
or IT, architects and engineers) that quite often search for employment while still
in Poland. They use the Internet, and register with recruiting agencies specializing
in the given sector. The most successful ones go through a phone interview and
already have a signed contract by the time they enter Ireland.
This group is the potential target of many companies that started active
recruitment in Poland immediately after accession, by way of the organization of
special recruitment fares (I.1). They also enjoy the greatest organizational support
from employers.
In summary, the mechanisms used by Polish immigrants in Ireland searching for
employment range from the press or Internet advertisements, job fairs, job
agencies, FÁS offices, and “head-hunting” agencies to informal connections and
migration networks. While different groups of migrants use different strategies to
find employment, the higher the level of qualification, the greater the propensity
to use institutionalized channels.
B.3  Polish nationals on the Irish labour market
There is a high (85%) employment rate for the nationals of new EU member states
in comparison with the native population (67%), and nationals of other EU
member states (69%) and third countries (57%) (CEC, 2006: 11) There are no data on
the distribution of foreign workers by country of origin and sector of the economy
in which they work. However such data for Q2 2005 are available for geographical
aggregates (AIB, 2006), with Poland included among the accession countries.
According to the AIB (2006), 25.8 per cent of all immigrants from the accession
countries work in construction (in comparison with 12.4 per cent of Irish employees
working in this sector) and another 21.8 per cent (15.2% of the Irish) in other
production industries. About 16.5 per cent (5% of the Irish) work in hotels and
restaurants and 11.8 per cent in wholesale and retail trade (14% of the Irish).
This means 75.9 per cent of nationals of the new member states work in low-
skilled and/or seasonal industries, something that may suggest rather wide-
spread “brain waste”.
The idea that Polish migrants are not able to make full use of their skills on the
Irish labour market was suggested in an earlier Polish study by Grabowska (2002:
29). She found in her empirical qualitative research that 80 per cent of respondents
had tertiary education, while only 68.7 per cent of them were working in their
profession in Ireland (2002: 37). According to the AIB (2006), at the high end of the
employment market, 7.4 per cent of accession country workers are employed in
financial and other business services compared with 13.3 per cent of the native
population. One of the likely reasons for this is that migrants do not have sufficient
command of English and language training targeted at migrants is not widely
available in Ireland. The following example may be typical of many cases.
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Atopol 30.09.2005, 1:42am
I’ve been in Ireland for eight months now and I still like it.(…) I’m a chemist with
one-year experience (acquired in Poland). Now I work in a bar (for 7,65 euro per
hour – the minimal pay) but I have the ambition to find a job in my profession. I
don’t feel as if I was depriving myself of dignity, because I know one thing: my
English is not good enough to work in my profession. Not yet, but it will certainly
be in a few months.205 
The labour-market performance of Polish immigrants in Ireland depends heavily
on their qualifications and language knowledge, which emerges as the crucial
factor in accessing the better-paid skilled and highly skilled jobs. Employment
below qualifications seems to be a widespread phenomenon among Polish
immigrants, a conclusion based upon both data regarding the structure of employ-
ment and the Internet and press analysis.
B.4  Likely Effects of Migration to Ireland on Poland
There are no studies which assess the impact of recent Polish migration to Ireland
on Poland’s economy. It is clear that given the level of unemployment in Poland
(18% of the labour force in January 2006 (CSO 2006),206 Polish migration reduces
pressure on the local labour market and, in turn, the level of unemployment.
According to Kaczmarczyk and Okólski (2006), a massive exodus of highly skilled
workers from Poland is unlikely (2006: 122). According to the authors, the general
increase in migration of Polish nationals after 1 May 2004 did not include high
numbers of highly skilled workers to any significant extent. There is a concern,
however, that rather than acquiring new skills while abroad, migrants will return
to Poland after spending a period of time in Ireland where they have not been able
to apply their skills. In this sense migration could contribute to “deskilling”.
It has also been reported that certain branches of the Polish economy are
experiencing shortages of skilled labour. This concerns in particular the construc-
tion sector, where employers find it difficult to fill all vacancies and are lobbying
the government to sign an agreement with Ukraine to change current legislation
in order to facilitate the employment of skilled workers from Ukraine.207 In
addition, it has been reported that the shipbuilding sector is facing shortages of
labour due to emigration. The management of a shipyard in Szczecin publicly stated
that they will have to decline new orders due to the massive emigration of skilled
employees.208
Another problem concerning the future of labour markets in Poland is the slow
depopulation and rapid ageing of Polish society. A study by Bijak et al. (2005) has
shown that ageing is a serious problem in Poland and the accelerated loss of
population today will result in increasing problems with sustainability of social
security systems in the future. This is a general problem relating to the
consequences of migration, rather than a problem specific to the flows to Ireland.
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205. http://newsweek.redakcja.pl/forum/forum.asp?Artykul=13493&Watek=95403&WatekStr=1&DA=300920050142 accessed:
17.02.2006.
206  http://www.stat.gov.pl/dane_spol-gosp/praca_ludnosc/bezrob_pow/2006/01_06.xls.
207. Polscy budowlan´cy chca˛ Ukrain´ców [Polish employers in construction want the Ukrainians], Gazeta Wyborcza, 24.10.2005;
Organizacje budowlane chca˛ robotników ze wschodu [Construction unions want the workers from the East], Gazeta Wyborcza
19.09.2005.
208  Europe: Skill exodus worries Polish employers, Financial Times, 09.02.2006.
We may tentatively conclude that it seems likely that the overall impact of
migration from Poland to Ireland is positive for Polish society. Migration helps to
reduce unemployment, and remittances sent home by Polish migrants help to
improve living standards at home. In addition, many migrants during their stay in
Ireland are saving money to be spent it in Poland (e.g., for buying property on their
return) so in the long run this increases the demand for goods and services on the
Polish market. Some migrants have declared an intention to establish their small
companies in Ireland and then transfer them back to Poland. The Irish experience
may improve their entrepreneurial skills and in the long run help to develop small-
and medium-sized enterprises in Poland. However there are some worrying
aspects of emigration in general namely its impact on demographic dynamics and
the depletion of skilled labour in certain sectors of the economy. These
phenomena, however, cannot be attributed solely to migration to Ireland.
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